Theories of Economic Regulation and the Development of the Doctrine of  Conspiracies in Restraint of Trade  in the Labor Market. by Noell, Edd Sidney
Louisiana State University
LSU Digital Commons
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses Graduate School
1989
Theories of Economic Regulation and the
Development of the Doctrine of "Conspiracies in
Restraint of Trade" in the Labor Market.
Edd Sidney Noell
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
gradetd@lsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Noell, Edd Sidney, "Theories of Economic Regulation and the Development of the Doctrine of "Conspiracies in Restraint of Trade" in
the Labor Market." (1989). LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses. 4798.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/4798
INFORMATION TO USERS
The most ad v an ced  techno logy  has  been used  to ph o to ­
graph  and  reproduce th is  m an u sc r ip t  from th e  microfilm 
master.  UM I f i lm s t h e  tex t  d irec t ly  from  th e  o r ig in a l  or 
copy subm itted .  Thus,  some thesis  an d  d isser ta t ion  copies 
are in typew rite r  face, while others  may be from any type 
of com puter  printer.
The q u a l i ty  of th i s  rep ro du c t io n  is d e p e n d e n t  upon th e  
quality  of the  copy subm itted .  Broken or indis tinct  prin t ,  
colored or poor q u a l i ty  i l lu s t r a t io n s  an d  ph o to g raph s ,  
prin t  b leedthrough, su b s tan d a rd  margins ,  an d  improper 
a l ignm en t  can adversely  affect reproduction.
In the unlikely  event th a t  the  au tho r  did not send UMI a 
complete m an u sc r ip t  and  there  a re  m issing  pages, these  
will be noted. Also, if u n a u th o r iz e d  cop y r igh t  m a te r ia l  
had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.
Oversize m a te r ia ls  (e.g., maps, drawings,  charts )  a re  re ­
produced by sec t io n in g  th e  o r ig in a l ,  b e g in n in g  a t  th e  
upper left-hand corner and con t inu ing  from left to r igh t  in 
equal sections with small  overlaps. Each original is also 
photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced 
form at the  back of th e  book. These are  also available as 
one exposure on a s tan d a rd  ,‘J5mm slide or as a 17" x 23" 
black a n d  w h i t e  p h o to g r a p h ic  p r i n t  for an  a d d i t i o n a l  
charge.
P h o to g rap h s  inc luded  in the  o r ig in a l  m a n u s c r ip t  have 
been rep roduced  x e ro g ra p h ic a l ly  in th is  copy. H ig h e r  
q u a l i ty  6" x 9" black an d  w h i te  p h o to g rap h ic  p r in t s  a r e  
available for any  pho tographs  or i l lus tra t ions  app ear in g  
in th is  copy for an additional charge. Contact  UMI directly  
to order.
Order Number 9017282
T h e o r ie s  o f  e c o n o m ic  r e g u la t io n  a n d  th e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  th e  
d o c tr in e  o f  “c o n s p ir a c ie s  in  r e s tr a in t  o f  t r a d e ” in  th e  la b o r  
m a r k e t
Noell, Edd Sidney, Ph.D.
T h e  L o u is ia n a  S t a t e  U n iv e r s i ty  a n d  A g r i c u l t u r a l  a n d  M e c h a n ic a l  C o l . ,  1989
Copyright © 1 9 9 0  by Noell, Ed d  Sidney. All rights reserved.
UMI
300 N. Zccb Rd.
Ann Arbor, MI 48106
THEORIES OF ECONOMIC REGULATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE DOCTRINE OF 'CONSPIRACIES IN RESTRAINT OF 
TRADE" IN THE LABOR MARKET
A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the 
Louisiana State University and 
Agricultural and Mechanical College 
in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy
in
The Department of Economics
by
Edd Sidney Noell
B.A., Texas Tech University, 1976 
M.B.A., University of Texas at Austin, i960
August 1989
CREDITS
I am indebted to the following authors and publishers 
for permission to quote from works published by them:
Henry Phelps Brown, Origins ot Trade Union Power, (c)l98 3. 
Reproduced by permission of Oxford University Press.
Oxford, England.
Benjamin Taylor and Fred Witney, Labor Relations Law.
(c )19 71; pp. 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 26 , 30, 38 , 39, 46, 47, 48, 
49, 50, 51, 52, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 71, 72, 74, 79, 80, 
81, 95, 97, 103, 104, 117, 137, 138, 144, 146, 152, 153,
157, 158, 163, 165, 167, 187, 1 8 8 . Reproduced by permission
of Prentice-Hall, Inc. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.
DEDICATION
This study could not have been completed without the
faithful support of my wife Nancy. She has been a constant
source of encouragement and strength. Her love has sustained
my effort over several years, including the wonderful time
of the birth and nurturing of Mary Beth and David. I will
always praise our Lord for His marvelous grace in our
relationship.
An excellent wife, who can find?
For her worth is far above jewels.
The heart of her husband trusts in her,
And he will have no lack of gain . . .
Her children rise up and bless her;
Her husband also, and he praises her, saying,
"Many daughters have done nobly,
But you excel them all."
Charm is deceitful and beauty is vain,
But a woman who fears the Lord, 
she shall be praised.
(Proverbs 31: 10-11, 28-30)
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This study owes a great deal to the direction of 
Dr. William Campbell. He has stimulated my interests in the 
English common law, and guided me in seeking connections 
between the history of economic thought and American 
jurisprudence. He has been a source of wise counsel in 
applying the insights of ancient political economy to a 
variety of topics. I truly appreciate his diligent efforts 
in sharpening my reasoning in regard to many arguments in 
this inquiry.
My thanks also go to Dr. William J. Moore for his 
advice on applying regulatory models to labor economics, to 
Dr. Lamar Jones for his recommendations in the area of 
English economic history, and to Dr. John Lunn for his 




A B S T R A C T ..................................................... vii
INTRODUCTION ...............................................  ix
I. RESEARCH ON BRITISH AND AMERICAN
LABOR L E G I S L A T I O N .................................. xiii
II. AN OUTLINE OF THE S T U D Y ...........................xvxi
1. THEORIES OF ECONOMIC REGULATION ...................... 1
I. THE MARKET FAILURE MODEL ............................  3
A. REGULATION IN THE LABOR M A R K E T .................  5
B. THE LIBERTY AND VIRTUE C O M P O N E N T ................ 14
II. THE INTEREST GROUP M O D E L .............................. 29
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTEREST GROUP THEORY 3 2
B. THE RENT-SEEKING COMPONENT ....................  4 7
C. REGULATION AND THE DIFFERENT BRANCHES
OF GOVERNMENT.................................... 5 3
D. REGULATION IN THE LABOR M A R K E T ................6 0
III. THE INTERACTION OF THE M O D E L S ....................... 68
2. RESTRAINT OF TRADE IN THE ENGLISH COMMON
LAW, 1500-1628   77
I . THE ECONOMIC AND LEGAL BACKGROUND TO
RESTRAINT OF T R A D E ..................................8 5
A. THE G U I L D S ...................................... 8 6
B. REGULATION OF GUILD ACTIONS PRIOR TO THE 1560S 9 5
C. THE STATUTE OF ARTIFICERS AND THE
DECLINE OF THE G U I L D S ............................106
iv
CHAPTER PAGE
II. COKE AND THE COMMON LAW COURTS ON
RESTRAINT OF T R A D E ............................... 118
A. THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF THE
COMMON LAW R U L I N G S ........................... 121
B. COKE AND THE COMMON LAW ON FREE
TRADE AND M O N O P O L Y ........................... 125
III. AN ANALYSIS OF COKE AS LABOR MARKET REGULATOR . . 130
A. GUILD ORDINANCES AND APPRENTICESHIP REGULATION 133
B. ROYAL PATENTS AND EXCLUSIVE TRADING PRIVILEGES 141
C. AN EVALUATION OF COKE'S A P P R O A C H ........... 156
3. CONSPIRACY IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE IN
ENGLAND, 1800-1906   169
I. SMITH AND THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL
VIEW OF LABOR M A R K E T S ...........................171
A. APPRENTICESHIP REGULATION ......................  173
B. COMBINATIONS IN THE LABOR M A R K E T ........... 18 3
C. THE NORMATIVE FEATURES OF LABOR
MARKET REGULATION............................. 188
D. AN EVALUATION OF SMITH'S A P P R O A C H ...........19 2
II. COMBINATION LAW IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY . . . . 198
A. SMITH'S APPROACH AND THE COMMON L A W .........199
B. STATUTORY LAW AND THE RISE OF COMBINATIONS . . 2  07
C. COMBINATIONS AS CONSPIRACIES IN
RESTRAINT OF T R A D E ........................... 212
III. ENGLISH LABOR LAW FROM 1799 UNTIL THE 1850S . . .  216
A. THE COMBINATION ACTS OF 1799 AND 1800 ........  216
B. THE COMBINATION ACTS OF 182 4 AND 182 5 ........  224
v
CHAPTER PAGE
IV. ENGLISH LABOR LAW FROM THE 18SOS THROUGH 1906 . . 2 30
A. THE COURTS AND LABOR LAW FRCM
1850 THROUGH THE 1 8 7 0 S ......................... 230
B. THE "TRILOGY CASES" AND THE TRADE DISPUTES ACT 2 37
C. AN EVALUATION OF ENGLISH LABOR L A W ............ 249
4. CONSPIRACY IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE IN
AMERICA, 1800-1941 ....................................  261
I. AMERICAN LABOR LAW FROM 1800 THROUGH THE 1920S . . 265
A. THE CONSPIRACY DOCTRINE IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY .............................  265
B. LABOR UNIONS AND ANTITRUST POLICY ..............  280
II. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND POLICE POWERS . . . . 291
A. ECONOMIC DUE PROCESS IN THE LATE
NINETEENTH-CENTURY SUPREME COURT ............  294
B. LABOR UNIONS AND LIBERTY OF CONTRACT .........  310
III. LABOR CASES AND LEGISLATION IN THE 193O S ........... 326
A. THE NORRIS-LAGUARDIA ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT 328
B. NEW DEAL LABOR LEGISLATION AND
THE SUPREME C O U R T ................................. 334
C. AN EVALUATION OF AMERICAN LABOR L A W .............346
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...............................................  355
V I T A ........................................................ 372
vi
ABSTRACT
THEORIES OF ECONOMIC REGULATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE DOCTRINE OF "CONSPIRACIES IN RESTRAINT 
OF TRADE" IN THE LABOR MARKET
by
EDD SIDNEY NOELL, B.A., M.B.A.
Supervising Professor: Dr. William F. Campbell
The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the
development of the doctrine of "conspiracies in restraint of 
trade" in the labor market by means of an application of two 
models of economic regulation. As heuristic devices, these 
models are utilized to explain the formation of English and 
American labor law in three different eras.
The market failure model posits that labor market
regulators seek to remedy unequal bargaining power and 
asymmetric information so as to achieve economic efficiency. 
This model's 'liberty and virtue' component emphasizes the 
normative end of character formation.
According to the interest group model, organized labor 
and other interest groups demand various forms of regula­
tion. This theory's rent-seeking component highlights 
the role of the legislature and judiciary as self-interested 
suppliers of regulation.
The approach to labor market regulation taken by the
common-law jurist and legislator Sir Edward Coke in
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England is best under­
stood in terms of the liberty and virtue component. Coke
vii
validated regulation consistent with the avowed ends of 
guilds to promote quality workmanship and moral virtue, yet 
also broadened the right to pursue a trade by invalidating 
guild ordinances which were arbitrary restraints of trade. 
This distinction shapes the origins of the economic 
conspiracy doctrine.
In nineteenth-century England, labor legislation first 
included and then subsequently exempted unions from the
criminal and civil aspects of common law conspiracy. This
change, which reflects in part the influence of Adam Smith's 
arguments that both apprenticeship and combination laws were 
ineffectual, is best attributed to elements in the liberty 
and virtue component and the interest group model. The 
latter theory best explains the acquisition by organized 
labor of legal immunities in early twentieth-century British 
legislation.
The liberty and virtue component best describes the 
approach taken by nineteenth-century and twentieth-century 
American law towards the right of labor to organize and the 
'substantive due process' Supreme Court rulings that formed 
the boundaries of the legitimate use of police powers in 
regulating labor markets. The interest group model best 
explains the New Deal legislation which conferred upon
unions special privileges and immunities in the law.
viii
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study is to analyze the development 
of the doctrine of "conspiracies in restraint of trade" in 
the labor market by means of an application of two models of 
economic regulation. This inquiry focuses on the barriers to 
entry in labor markets as they have been treated in law and 
public policy in England and America. It seeks to determine 
how the models of regulation explain the changing way in 
which the notions of freedom of trade, restraint of trade, 
and freedom of association have been perceived and applied 
in economic policy over time. The focus will be on the 
economic conspiracy doctrine as applied to the practices of 
guilds, trade associations, and labor unions.
Two main models of regulation will be utilized to 
explain economic policy as meted out in the courts and in 
legislation. One is the market failure model, which argues 
that regulators seek to remedy economic inefficiency. As 
will be shown, though there are a wide variety of arguments 
for market failure, what unifies this approach is the 
assumption that regulators act with "public interest" goals 
in mind. This model relies on the concepts of unequal 
bargaining power and asymmetric information as its rationale 
for the enactment of labor law and occupational regulation.
The other model is the interest group theory, which 
posits that labor market regulators respond to the demands 
of unions and professional groups for a legally enforceable
ix
cartel arrangement in an industry or market that would 
otherwise be competitive. Legislation is geared to serve the 
interests of particular labor organizations.
As heuristic devices, these models are utilized to 
explain the formation of regulatory policy in two different 
countries and three different time periods: England from 
1500 through 1628, and during the period of 1800 through 
1906; and the United States from 1800 through 1941. The 
focus of the study shifts from regulation of guilds to labor 
law affecting unions as we move from sixteenth-century 
England to Britain and America in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries.
In each of these cases, the main question to be 
answered is, how do these models contribute to the econo­
mists ' understanding of the development of the doctrine of 
"conspiracies in restraint of trade"? In a different period 
under a different set of circumstances than we observe 
today, were regulatory barriers to entry in labor markets 
designed and enforced to deal with market failure, or were 
they in fact implemented so as to benefit particular groups 
in the labor market by restricting competition?
This issue is addressed by looking at specific labor 
legislation. For example, one can consider the American 
labor statutes passed during the decade of the 1930s. Were 
the Norris-LaGuardia and Wagner ActB examples of enlightened 
labor law based on public sympathy towards unions at this 
time (and the alleged inability of the market to cure the
x
Great Depression) ? Or was it true that the events of the 
1930s dramatically weakened the opposition faced by benefi­
ciaries of the legislation who were thus able to engineer 
changes in the legislative environment? In a similar fashion 
the economic policy towards labor found in English legisla­
tion and judicial decisions dealing with restraint of trade 
in labor markets is considered.
These questions are treated as part of the overall 
explanation of the evolution of the economic conspiracy 
doctrine. The policies toward restraint of trade in labor 
markets were not the same in the three time periods. Thus, 
while any one model may have stronger explanatory power for 
a particular era, changes in economic conditions and social 
objectives may reduce its applicability over tine.
Moreover, the doctrine of conspiracy in restraint of 
trade underwent changes within each of these time periods. 
At specific points within each time period, either model may 
have greater explanatory power than the other in regards to 
developments in labor law. To cite one example, the interest 
group theory more fully explains the New Deal labor legisla­
tion as the product of concerted efforts by organized labor 
to restrict competition by requiring closed shops; but in 
the late nineteenth century, a key component of the market 
failure model fares better as an explanatory vehicle, 
particularly as it applies to the American judicial under­
standing of labor market regulation.
These different historical periods and national
xi
settings call for a comparative analysis of the development 
of labor market regulation. Thus different kinds of ques­
tions must be considered. Some of them deal with changes in 
economic conditions as they influence the approaches to 
regulation. For example, how do changes in economic condi­
tions (such as technology, transportation facilities, and 
the availability of resources) lead to changes in the way 
people argue about the need for regulation? The 
seventeenth-century English common law focused on craft 
guilds, which largely made physical products. In the case of 
professional services, which are largely the object of 
modern occupational regulation, there is not as much 
tangible information as with a product. The complexities 
involved with labor market regulation increase over time.
There are also changes in the norms for labor law. What 
are the links, if any, between the goals of liberty and 
character formation pursued by the English common law and 
the goals of American labor law? How do these values relate 
to the 'substantive due process' judicial rulings?
My investigation considers the commonalities in the 
three eras and the outstanding differences. The significance 
of an attempt to address these questions can be seen by a 
brief overview of previous attempts to explain labor 
legislation in England and America. Two of the studies rely 
heavily on the private interest theory of regulation; the 
other major work does not explicitly recognize this theory.
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I. RESEARCH ON BRITISH AND AMERICAN LABOR LEGISLATION
There have been only a few efforts in the literature to 
utilize the interest group theory as an explanatory device 
for regulation in labor markets. These studies have been 
limited to economic legislation in particular periods of 
English history. The most significant examples are the two 
investigations of the English Factory Act of 1833 by Marvel 
(1977) and Anderson and Tollison (1984). This legislation 
was designed to regulate the employment of children, 
adolescents, and adult women in the textile factories of 
England. Marvel rejects a standard interpretation of this 
law, namely that it came as a response to the popular outcry 
against the abuse of these particular workers. Instead he 
finds that this statute was designed to further the 
interests of the leading textile manufacturers who intended 
it to increase the returns on their investment and harm 
other textile manufacturers: "the group standing to gain was 
the large urban manufacturers who relied on steam engines to 
drive their machinery"; such steam-powered mills "employed 
relatively fewer very young children" than the water-powered 
mills of their competitors (p. 388).
Anderson and Tollison present a somewhat different 
finding; they argue that the legislation regulating factory 
employment "represented the mechanism by which skilled male 
operatives attempted to limit competition from alternative 
labor suppliers (children, adolescents, and adult women), 
who were becoming increasingly close substitutes as the
xiii
nineteenth century progressed." The Act was part of the 
Factory Movement, which was motivated "by the rents availa­
ble to skilled adult male laborers (the core of the Factory 
Movement) resulting from parliamentary intervention [which 
restricted competition] in the labor market" (p. 188).
Another work dealing with labor law explores a broader 
range of labor legislation and its philosophical and 
economic rationale than do the aforementioned studies. 
Dickman (1987) has set forth a significant examination of 
the "ideological origins of national labor relations policy" 
as part of his efforts to explain the concept of "industrial 
democracy in America." His work seeks to
explain and re-examine the reasons that have been 
put forward in favor of unions, in order to 
understand why American society came to favor 
collective over individual bargaining, and to 
account for the peculiar legal structure our 
system of collective bargaining - our system of 
industrial democracy - assumed as a result of the 
Wagner Act (p. 4).
Dickman's study focuses then on explaining the changes in
approach to labor law which are the background to the
American National Labor Relations Act of 1935,
Dickman discusses "three far-reaching theories which
historically constituted the rationale for industrial
democracy," both in the United States and in Europe:
"a theory of laborers' bargaining disadvantages under
competition; a theory of income redistribution through
collective bargaining; and a theory of unions' proper legal
relations with employers, other workers, and the state in a
xiv
modified capitalism" (p. 11) . The first of these theories
overlaps with the reasoning of the market failure model.
Dickman argues that belief in competition in a general sense
diminished during the nineteenth century. In regards to the
labor market, there arose as a consequence the idea that
unions were "indispensable" if workers were to obtain fair
wages and working conditions. He claims that
Union proponents insisted that the 'right to 
organize' under the common law was not enough. The 
state, they urged, must also positively restrict 
employers' freeaom not to associate with unions or 
their members . . .  It is this positive right 
which the Wagner Act secures (p. 8).
My study has a different purpose from Dickman*s. My 
goal is not to explain the ideological origins of the Wagner 
Act, though in dealing with the development of English and 
American labor law our two studies do at several points 
inquire into similar concerns. My work deals much more 
extensively with the English common law on labor relations, 
especially as it was formulated in the late sixteenth- and 
early seventeenth-centuries. It also looks more fully at the 
development of nineteenth-century British labor law.
My purpose is to explain the development of the 
doctrine of conspiracy in restraint of trade in labor 
markets. This leads my research to rely much mere explicitly 
and heavily on the two economic theories of regulation than 
does Dickman's study. Dickman does not discuss or appear to 
recognize the interest group theory. Our understanding of 
the development of labor law in England and America can be
xv
enhanced significantly by treating these periods with the 
analytical tools derived from this model. Indeed, my work 
discusses the two theories as applied to labor markets 
outside of a historical context before utilizing them in 
explaining labor law in three particular eras. It also 
delves more broadly into the philosophy underlying restraint 
of trade in the English common law. In short, while Hick­
man* s emphasis on the change in the conception of the 'right 
to organize' from a negative to a positive right is recog­
nized and discussed in my study, my concerns go beyond the 
ideological background to compulsory unionism in America to 
a broader application of the theories of regulation to labor 
market law in England and America in three particular 
historical periods.
In a broader sense, my work pushes beyond these earlier 
efforts in the literature by more fully considering the 
issues raised in the regulation of labor markets. One clear 
way in which this is seen is in a discussion of the 
difference between labor markets and other markets. Thus one 
may ask, why have legislation and court rulings in the past 
set up barriers to entry in labor markets and not other 
markets? Was it because there are problems with market 
failure (perhaps unequal bargaining power on the part of 
labor suppliers) which are especially prevalent and/or 
powerful in labor marketB rather than in product markets? Or 
does the special ability of labor groups to obtain economic 
policy measures favorable to their interests undergird
xv i
legislation which sets up entry barriers, and court rulings 
which validate the legislation?
These questions are a significant part of the overall 
contribution of this study to the economic analysis of 
regulation in the history of economic thought. By applying 
the two models to the economic legislation and judicial 
rulings of England and America in three selected periods of 
time, this inquiry seeks to enhance the economists' under­
standing and appreciation of historical and ideological 
factors which played in a role in the evolution of labor 
law. An outline of the four chapters in the study will help 
to demonstrate the thrust of this contribution.
II. AN OUTLINE OF THE STUDY
Chapter one surveys the literature and draw outs the key 
elements of the major models of economic regulation. The 
focus is largely on labor market regulation. The positive 
and normative elements of the different models are distin­
guished. Particular applications of each of the models are 
made to labor unions and occupational associations.
The market failure theory emphasizes instances of a 
sub-optimal allocation of resources. This may occur due to 
monopoly power, imperfect information, or externalities in 
production. The first reason is most important in labor 
markets; it is exhibited where the division of bargaining 
power between employers and employees is 'unequal,' often 
due to coalitions of either buyers or sellers of labor.
xv i i
A single firm which hires a large part of the labor in 
a market has monopsony power. The usual regulatory response 
is to give unions offseting power, by means of legal 
sanction for their right to organize and collectively 
bargain with management.
The presence of each of the market failure problems 
indicates that there is economic inefficiency. The normative 
elements of the market failure model feature efficiency as a 
key goal of regulation, as well as equity and fairness.
This chapter also develops the liberty and virtue 
component of this model, which acknowledges market failure, 
but differs with the broader model over the extent to which 
it is proper to rely on the market to accomplish allocative 
efficiency, and to what extent it is better to rely on 
governmental regulation. Beyond economic efficiency, this 
component also focuses on character formation and moral 
virtue. This component emphasizes the role of police powers 
regulation in the labor market.
The interest group theory views regulation as a good 
(service) that is demanded by the regulated occupations or 
labor groups. Under the guise of promoting the public 
interest, organized coalitions pursue regulations such as 
barriers to entry in order to protect themselves from 
outside competition and enhance their incomes. Regulation is 
supplied by politicians/regulators who garner votes and 
monetary contributions which are key both for survival and 
acquisition of greater power in a representative democracy.
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The interest group theory argues that the goals of 
regulation ought to be both efficiency and economic freedom. 
Constraints must be placed on rent-seeking regulatory 
activity to improve the regulatory process.
The remainder of chapter one reviews the literature on 
this theory of regulation, as it is developed by both the 
"Chicago" and public choice schools. It examines carefully 
the rent-seeking component of the theory, with special 
attention paid to the role of the legislature, executive 
branch, and judiciary in supplying regulation so as to 
optimize their own interests.
The features of this component are applied to the labor 
market. Guilds, licensed occupations, and unions supply a 
vehicle through which skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled 
workers obtain higher earnings. Unions in particular are 
seen as "rent-seeking agencies" which seek to limit entry 
from non-union workers. Such rent seeking is often done 
under a public interest cover. Trade unions and licensed 
occupations attempt to convince the regulators and the 
public at large of the benefits to society associated with 
their protection or licensure.
The latest developments in modern regulatory theory 
emphasize that regulation is often shaped by a type of 
compromise among the demands by competing business, labor 
and consumer interests, who each have an incentive to 
organize and lobby for protection or privileges. Both 
allocative and distributive concerns may matter in regula­
xix
tion. This acknowledgement is especially significant for 
this study of the approaches to labor market regulation over 
past periods of history. It is likely that neither the 
market failure nor the interest group theory will completely 
explain any one approach to the question of restraint of 
trade by a particular policymaker(s) in a particular era in 
a particular country.
Chapters two through four utilize the models of 
regulation in a chronological examination of each of the 
three historical periods. In each of these chapters changes 
in economic conditions, institutions, and norms are high­
lighted for their effect on regulation in labor markets, 
especially with regards to the economic conspiracy doctrine.
Chapter two deals with the treatment of labor in the 
seventeenth-century English common law. The rulings, reports 
and speeches of Sir Edward Coke are examined for his 
positive and normative analysis of regulation of trade by 
the guild system and the Statute of Artificers. Coke's 
approach is set in the context of the legal and economic 
history of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England.
Coke's decisions in regards to regulation set the mold 
for legal interpretation for the next two centuries. Coke 
did not try to explain labor market regulation in terms of 
economic theory. But as a practicing jurist and legislator 
he drew upon the late medieval common law conceptions of 
private and public trade restraints.
There was a significant tradition of common law
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opposition to arbitrary trade restraints by guilds and other 
combinations. Guild ordinances which raised prices and 
arbitrarily excluded competent craft practitioners were 
contrary to the public interest.
The avowed ends of guilds were to promote quality 
workmanship and moral virtue. Often under the guise of 
promoting these ends, guilds became very exclusive in 
response to various economic changes in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries.
In response to these developments the common law 
broadened the rule against restraint of trade into "the 
liberty of the subject to pursue lawful and established 
trades." In this context Coke articulated the common law 
distinction between legitimate regulations and artificial 
restrictions of trade. Coke makes use of this distinction in 
several court rulings and other cases he reports. Coke 
opposed guild by-laws by which someone who was completely 
qualified by apprenticeship could be denied entry into a 
trade on the basis of an artificial pretext.
Coke interpreted and applied the Statute of Artificers 
consistent with its goals of enforcing full employment and 
banishing idleness in the commonwealth in the face of 
increasing social instability. Certain guild stipulations 
appeared to him to be merely trade restraints, not promoting 
quality production, but hindering qualified craftsmen from 
pursuing their trade. On the other hand, Coke endorsed guild 
regulations which were consistent with quality in workman­
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ship and character formation.
Coke acknowledged that some occupational groups made 
claims to the possession of a true 'mystery1 when the level 
of skill involved in the craft was not significant or there 
was not a true need to limit competition in order to protect 
the public welfare. Coke recognized the existence of a 
demand for regulation on the part of well-organized groups. 
He was dubious of the claims of many regulatory measures, 
and sceptical about private claims that certain regulations 
served the public interest.
There are elements of each of the models of regulation 
in Coke's thought. Nonetheless, the liberty and virtue 
component best explains his approach to labor market 
regulation. Coke built on the common law treatment of guilds 
as institutions which promoted character formation; guilds 
were seen as the effective transmitters of civic and moral 
virtue, as well as being more efficient vehicles for 
technology transfer. Coke followed the traditional hostili­
ty in the common law towards guild ordinances which reduced 
product quality or shut out qualified craft practitioners. 
The doctrine of conspiracy in restraint of trade originates 
in the common law distinction between arbitrary restraints 
of trade and regulations of trade designed to foster certain 
virtues for the public good.
Chapter three explores the development of labor law in 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century England. It begins with a 
consideration of the writings of Adam Smith on guilds and
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combinations. Smith argues that both apprenticeship and 
combination laws are ineffectual in achieving their ends. 
While Smith thought that employers often had superior 
bargaining power compared to their employees, he did not 
believe that labor combinations should be granted special 
privileges in the law.
A combination of key elements of the liberty and virtue 
component and the interest group model best explains Smith's 
approach. In regards to the latter, Smith observed that the 
force of self-interest led some groups to demand regulation. 
Smith was highly cognizant of the efforts of organized 
coalitions to obtain monopoly advantages.
Both Coke's common law approach and Smith's classical 
liberal approach shared an emphasis on character formation. 
Coke employed a paternalistic approach to virtue. Smith 
argued that virtue would be achieved by allowing individuals 
wide economic freedom. Unlike the common law, Smith and 
classical economic liberals upheld liberty as the highest 
good.
Chapter three proceeds to discuss the treatment of 
combinations in restraint of trade in nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century England, particularly as it is related to 
the rise of exclusive unionism. The key pieces of labor 
legislation and judicial rulings in the common law tradition 
are examined for their contribution to developments in the 
economic conspiracy doctrine.
The eighteenth century saw the implementation of
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several statutes against combinations among particular trade 
groups. These statutes were generalized in the Combination 
Acts of 1799 and 1800. Labor unions were constituted as 
criminal conspiracies against the public when their members 
sought higher wages by means of inducing others to quit 
their employment, or by hindering employers from hiring 
whatever workers they pleased.
These laws were repealed by the Combination Act of 
1824, which rendered unions immune from prosecution for 
peaceful acts under the common or statute law of criminal 
conspiracy. The Combination Act of 1825 in turn repealed the 
previous statute and restricted the right of combination. 
This right was subject to the criminal aspect of the common 
law 'conspiracy in restraint of trade' doctrine.
Legislation in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century changed the legal status of unions. The Trade Union 
Act of 1871 sought to eliminate the application of the 
criminal conspiracy doctrine to unions who purposed to 
restrain trade in a labor dispute. The Conspiracy and 
Protection of Property Act of 1875 limited the number of 
specific actions taken by unions which were punishable as a 
crime under the rubric of intimidation. It declared that 
actions by two or more individuals in combination, in the 
context of a trade dispute, did not constitute them as a 
conspiracy if such actions done by an individual alone were 
not punishable as a crime.
In the remainder of the nineteenth century the courts
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applied the laws of tort and civil conspiracy to union 
activities for such common law offenses as restraint of 
trade and intimidation. The liberty and virtue component 
best explains the late nineteenth-century court rulings.
Under the Trade Disputes Act of 1906, Parliament 
abolished the civil law aspect of conspiracy in restraint of 
trade from labor disputes. It also made unions immune from 
any liability for torts based on any action committed by or 
on behalf of the union.
This change in the treatment of unions under the 
conspiracy in restraint of trade doctrine is a product of 
the political power and persuasiveness of organized labor 
groups compared to other groups. That is, the early 
twentieth-century English legislation is best understood 
using the interest group theory rather than the market 
failure theory. While organized labor appealed to the 
unequal bargaining rationale as the basis for the change in 
their treatment in the statutory law, this statute went 
beyond "equaling out the bargaining power" in its grant of 
legal privileges. In giving unions a wide range of immuni­
ties not previously available, Parliament enacted provisions 
far outside the scope of legitimate regulation of trade as 
understood in the English common law.
Chapter four explains the nineteenth and twentieth 
century American approach to labor law. A central issue to 
be explained is the changed status of labor unions in the 
law and in economic policy. The social and economic policy
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toward labor combinations in America went from allowing 
labor unions the right to organize in 1842, to a limited 
application of the conspiracy concept until the 1930s, to 
elimination of the concept of the labor union as conspiracy 
as expressed in the New Deal labor legislation. Initially 
the jurists deciding labor cases utilized the traditional 
common law concepts of breach of contract and tort. Under 
the labor law passed in the 1930s labor unions were given 
special privileges and immunities in the law. The liberty 
and virtue component best explains the approach of American 
statutory and common law prior to the 1930s. The interest 
group theory most clearly explains the enactment of the 
labor legislation of the 1930s. Neither model completely 
explains the development of labor law over the entire 
period.
In the first half of the nineteenth century, American 
common law jurists recognized the right of unions to 
organize workers based on the concept of freedom of 
association, but still scrutinized the purposes of union 
activities with regards to restraint of trade. After 1890 
the Supreme Court applied the Sherman antitrust law to 
organized labor. Union activity was treated in much the same 
manner as actions by any other type of combination. In 
several key cases the Court held that the use of secondary 
boycotts and strikes, due to their effect on interstate 
commerce, could constitute a labor union as a conspiracy in 
restraint of trade.
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During the early part of the twentieth century, 
employers utilized injunctions to enforce yellow-dog 
contracts. In overthrowing state legislation banning such 
agreements, the Supreme Court relied on the 'substantive (or 
economic) due process' principle. The use of this principle 
was also characteristic of many key Court rulings from 1885 
until 1937 which overturned state police powers' regulation. 
These judicial rulings are best explained utilizing the 
liberty and virtue component.
During the Great Depression the legal status of unions 
underwent significant change. The Norris-LaGuardia Act of 
1932 granted unions immunity from the application of the 
common law conspiracy doctrine in regards to labor disputes. 
In the Wagner Act of 1935, unions elected by a majority of 
workers were granted the privilege of being the exclusive 
representative of these workers in order to engage in 
collective bargaining. In 1937, the Supreme Court refused to 
overthrow this law on the basis of substantive due process. 
The interest group model best explains the abandonment by 
the Court of the principle of economic due process.
The three chapters which deal with particular historical 
periods are interspersed with comparisons and contrasts to 
the approach to labor law taken in both prior and subse­
quent eras in England and the United States. Each of these 
chapters also ends with some concluding remarks which serve 
as an evaluation of the relevant labor law on the basis of 
the norms of the liberty and virtue component.
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THEORIES OF ECONOMIC REGULATION
The purpose of this chapter is to survey the literature 
and draw out the key elements of the major models of 
economic regulation. Several features of this discussion 
should be noted at the outset. First, the focus will be 
largely on labor market regulation, not regulation of all
the sectors of the economy; particular applications of each 
of the models will thus focus on labor unions and 
occupational associations. This will be in keeping witn the 
broader focus of the study, which is to examine the efficacy 
of the models in explaining the development of policies 
dealing with "conspiracies in restraint of trade" in regards 
to labor markets in three different historical periods. 
Second, the economic theories will be utilized as ideal
types, or models which can be used to evaluate patterns of 
thought and policy that typify each of these time periods;
this study is not concerned with setting forth formal
hypotheses which will be statistically tested. Third, the 
positive and normative elements of the different approaches 
to regulation will be distinguished. This will be crucial, 
for in the study of regulation normative and positive issues 
tend to meld together indiscriminately without any common 
theoretical bond (Peltzman, 1981, p. 371).
Taken at the broadest level, economic regulation is an 
attempt by the state to use its legal powers to direct the 
economic conduct of nongovernmental bodies (Stigler, 1981,
1
2p. 73). In its institutional context, as Hogan (1983) 
explains, government control may be implemented by either 
the judicial, legislative, or executive branches, and 
administered by a regulatory agency under the aegis of the 
executive or legislative branches. Regulatory activity is 
"governed by constitutional law, statutory law, common law, 
and agency-made law" (p. 117).
Studies of regulation normally fall into three cate­
gories: price and entry regulation in competitive indus­
tries, price and entry regulation in monopolistic indus­
tries, and 'qualitative' regulation, "which attempts to cope 
with various kinds of market-failure problems that are only 
indirectly linked to prices, profits, and market structure." 
The third category includes environmental and product- 
quality regulation (Joskow and Noll, p. 3).1 Studies of
1 Occupational regulation involves elements of all 
three areas. Economists distinguish between three types of 
occupational regulation: registration, certification and 
licensure, where the latter two are often forms of self- 
regulation. Registration represents control at a minimal 
level; it simply means "an arrangement under which indivi­
duals are required to list their names in some official 
register if they engage in certain kinds of activities" 
(Friedman, p. 144). Certification involves a governmental 
agency's acknowledgement of certain skills possessed by an 
individual, but not necessarily its restriction of the 
activity to only those with such a certificate. The agency 
"is empowered by Btatute to certify individuals to the 
public as having satisfied particular educational and 
training requirements judged (by the certifying body) to 
indicate competence in a particular range of professional 
services" (Wolfson et al., p. 203). Licensure is the stric­
test form of occupational control. It is an arrangement 
under which one must obtain a license from either a public 
employee or from private persons who operate under the 
authority of the government in order to practice the 
occupation. Licensure requires "some demonstration of
government regulation are usually concerned with what 
specific controls on prices, firm entry, taxation and 
subsidies a regulator should have in order to achieve 
maximum economic efficiency.
There are two major theories of economic regulation. 
The first is the market failure theory; it posits that 
regulators seek to serve the 'public interest,' implicitly 
maximizing some measure of economic welfare. ’Market 
failure' is the rubric which is my choice for designating a 
variety of economists who emphasize the need for government 
intervention to achieve economic efficiency. The second 
major model is self-identified as the interest group theory; 
it posits that regulators try to serve the interests of 
particular client groups, often by creating a legally 
enforceable cartel arrangement in an industry or market that 
would otherwise be competitive.
I. THE MARKET FAILURE MODEL
Market failure arises when the market does not bring 
about an optimal allocation of resources. There are several 
reasons why this might occur. Markets may fail in the 
presence of natural monopoly. A natural monopoly may exist 
due to the presence of scale economies or indivisibilities. 
That is, "natural monopoly occurs when economies of scale
competence or the meeting of some tests ostensibly designed 
to insure competence . . . " (Friedman, p. 145), as does
certification, but only individuals licensed are legally 
permitted to offer the relevant services.
are so extensive relative to the size of the market that 
only one firm can operate efficiently within the bounds of 
market demand" (Phillips, pp. 2-3).2 The well-known conse­
quences of monopoly power for consumers may thus result; 
prices for the monopolist's product are too high, and output 
is insufficient.
Another type of market failure occurs when there is 
imperfect information. As Akerlof (1970) has explained, 
markets may exhibit information flow characteristics such as 
uncertainty and asymmetry in the information possessed by 
different individuals. Market imperfections of this type are 
due to costly and inexact information about the consequences 
of economic decisions, because there is a wide information 
disparity between buyers and sellers of increasingly complex 
goods and services. As a result consumers may not purchase 
products with the particular level of quality they desire.
A third type of market failure stems from externali­
ties. This problem occurs when some of the costs and 
benefits of producing and consuming a product or service 
fall on people who neither make nor purchase it. In the 
absence of constraints, producers will impose costs on third 
parties which the producer does not have to bear. These 
negative externalities or spillover costs will lead to 
overproduction of the product. Likewise, producers acting
2 The first large federal regulatory agency, the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, was established with this 
justification. Railroad regulation sought to remedy the 
deleterious consequences associated with natural monopoly.
according to rational self-interest have no incentive to 
bestow benefits to third parties if these benefits do not 
bring a corresponding compensation to the producer; positive 
externalities or spillover benefits lead to underproduction.
On the basis of these market deficiencies, regulation 
is supplied in order to ameliorate the deleterious effects 
of unregulated market activity. In the case of natural 
monopoly, the regulator will force the firm to sell at lower 
prices and to produce and sell larger quantities. To deal 
with imperfect information, the regulator licenses the 
production of the good or service to insure that only 
sufficiently qualified producers serve consumers. In the 
face of externalities, the regulator's optimal policy may be 
one of either taxation to decrease production or subsidies 
to increase production. Essentially the failure in each 
case lies in not providing for maximum economic efficiency. 
Thus regulation is intended to increase the efficiency of 
the market.
So far the discussion has been of markets in general. 
Do these types of market failure occur in labor markets? If 
so, what type of regulation is applied in the market failure 
model? And are there other types of rationale for regulation 
in labor markets?
A. REGULATION IN THE LABOR MARKET
Though there are no economies of scale or indivisi­
bilities in production, monopoly power may still exist in
labor markets, leading to a misallocation of resources. 
Proponents of the market failure model claim that an sub- 
optimal allocation of resources exists where there is an 
improper allocation of bargaining power (Breyer, p. 32). 
This type of market failure can result from coalitions of 
either buyers or sellers of labor with unequal bargaining 
power relative to their counterparts on the other side of 
the market. In regards to the demand for labor, monopsony 
may exist in a labor market where a single firm is the sole 
employer of labor. In a less extreme situation, a single 
firm may hire such a large part of the labor in a market 
that it has monopsony power. In regards to the supply of 
labor, union groups will have monopoly power when they 
organize all (or most) of the workers in an industry or 
occupation and collectively bargain with management. In 
principle legislators might regulate the monopoly buyers of 
labor in order to offset unequal bargaining power; but the 
more usual regulatory response is to give unions legal 
sanction for their right to organize and collectively 
bargain in labor markets.
A second rationale for labor market failure and the 
legal sanction of unions has been set forth by a pair of 
labor economists, Freeman and Medoff (1984). They claim that 
certain aspects of the modern workplace involve "public 
goods" which individual bargaining will not fully take into 
account (pp. 8-9). A second problem revolves around imper­
fect information. They argue that "workers who are tied to a
firm are unlikely to reveal their true preferences to an 
employer, for fear the employer may fire them." A collective 
organization is required to provide "the incentive for 
individuals to take into account the effects of his or her 
actions on others" and "to collect information about the 
preferences of all workers" (pp. 9, 13). By means of
collective bargaining, labor unions remedy these market 
failure problems.
There are also arguments for market failure in regards 
to professional services. They differ from unions in that 
professionals may act as business firms in selling their 
product to consumers, in addition to offering their services 
in the labor market.
Consider first the problem of the asymmetrical charac­
ter of information in regards to the quality of professional 
services. The buyer of a professional service is at a great 
informational disadvantage compared to the seller. Consumers 
may not have enough information to assess the benefits of 
services professionals offer them on the market due to the 
costs of obtaining information outweighing the benefits of 
such information. This can result in nonoptimal decisions 
such as purchases that buyers would not make if they had 
perfect information.
The issue here is whether consumers have enough 
information to assess the benefits of professional services 
with accuracy; that is, are they "able to judge the value to 
them of the services offered on the market? If this ability
8is not present, then competitive market outcomes are not
optimal." This leads to a type of relationship peculiar to
professional markets, as Wolfson et al. explain:
To compensate for their inability to assess the 
value of the services offered, consumers of 
professional services establish agency relation­
ships with practitioners so that the latter can 
act on their behalf in making informed decisions 
about the purchase of services. If these agency 
relationships function perfectly, the consumer 
acts as if he were perfectly informed, and the 
interaction between independent supply and demand 
produces an optimum market equilibrium. 
Unfortunately, the professional agency relation­
ship involves inherently competing interests, 
because the "demand agent" is often the supplier 
of services as well (p. 190).
This leads to the potential for demand-generation:
To the extent that practitioners exploit their 
agency to generate a demand for their own services 
greater than that which fully informed consumers 
would demand in their own right, the resulting 
level and mix of professional services provided 
deviates from competitive market solutions, and 
social welfare is reduced (p. 191).
Medicine and law are archetypes of this problem in
professional markets.
A more extreme version of this form of market failure
argues that "society knows better than the individual what
is best for the individual." As Moore observes, this
rationale itself has two forms: "According to one, the
individual, if he had perfect knowledge of past, present,
and future, would know what is best for himself . . . [but]
the individual does not know the future, and society may
have a better idea of the future than the individual." The
second form of this rationale claims that "the individual,
even if he did have perfect knowledge of past, present, and
future, would still not be the best judge of his own
welfare." In this view, "society knows the future better
than the individual," as Moore explains:
. . . individuals have, subjectively, a higher
probability expectation of a desired result than 
is statistically warranted for society as a
whole. Hence, while an individual may agree that, 
if n people go to unlicensed practitioners, there 
is a probability that any one of these persons 
will be disappointed or harmed, the individual 
himself will base his course of action on the 
assumption that there is a smaller probability 
than oc that he personally will be harmed. 
Therefore, the proponents of this thesis argue, 
welfare of individuals will be greater in the long 
run under licensing (p. 106).
This view is pushed to its extreme when it is is said that 
the ability of the purchaser to choose must be distrusted. 
Either the consumer of professional services is unable to 
evaluate available information, or if he can accurately 
evaluate it, "irrational human tendencies" prevent him from 
doing so (Breyer, p. 33) .
Serious informational problems do not appear to exist 
in some markets in which consumers are relatively sophisti­
cated and do not, in general, need to establish agency 
relationships with practitioners. While accounting, archi­
tecture, and engineering do not suffer as much from this 
problem, pervasive externalities are nonetheless present. 
For example, "the purpose of auditing is to lend credibility 
to the client corporation’s financial statements (which are 
used by third parties in making investment decisions)." 
Likewise, there are evident 'neighborhood' effects in
building design. In virtually every branch of engineering, 
"the potential effects of bad design on public health and 
safety are dramatic." In these cases, if "some of the costs 
of producing services are not borne by the producers" or 
"some of the benefits of what is consumed do not accrue to 
the consumers," production and consumption decisions will 
not be socially optimal. For example, if producers ignore 
the interests of third parties, then the level of services 
produced "would be lower than what would be socially optimal 
if all interests were taken into account," because "the 
clients who purchase professional services would demand only 
enough to satisfy their own needs . . . "  (Wolfson et al., 
pp. 193-194).
In sum, market imperfections in the provision of 
professional services may yield either too high or too low a 
level of both quantity and quality. As Wolfson et.al. 
observe,
Unscrupulous or negligent practitioners may 
deliver services of poor quality without being 
detected. Moreover, the needs of third parties may 
dictate modifications in the nature of services 
provided, as well as in their number. If the 
legitimate interests of clients and third parties 
are not taken into account, the resulting quality 
of services provided could be too low. On the 
other hand, it is possible to find quality 
standards too high to be justified from a cost 
perspective . . . Practitioners may make more
money by providing only high-priced, high-quality 
services (p. 196) .
Occupational regulation must ensure that enough of the right
kind of services are purchased.
In regards to the imperfect information problem, this
model argues that occupational regulation should reduce the 
transactions costs involved with consumer search for 
professional services. To deal with the asymmetrical 
character of information in regards to the quality of 
professional services, occupational certification, and more 
often, occupational licensing will be required. Public 
provision of information (as in the case of certification) 
will likely be more costly and less effective than licensure 
"where difficult probabilistic judgments are required" of 
consumers of professional services "to avoid mistakes" 
(Thompson and Jones, p. 82).3
Where informational problems are significant, regula­
tory policy must address the potential for demand-generation 
yielding excessive use of services. As Wolfson et al. argue, 
what is needed is regulation of "the suppliers of these 
services to ensure that practitioners do not take advantage 
of unsophisticated clients by exploiting the professional 
agency relationship" (p. 195) . They contend that occupa­
tional associations should be encouraged to foster "strong 
allegiances to the profession and its norms," which would be 
"developed by members as part of their education and 
training," and which would "serve to enhance compliance with 
quality standards" (p. 212).
3 Leland (1979) offers a formal proof that the certifi­
cation process entails elements of economies of scale and/or 
natural monopoly characteristics (i.e., externalities thwart 
the marketplace). These factors militate for compulsory 
licensing by a government agency.
In dealing with the presence of significant externali­
ties, regulatory policy seeks to ensure that sufficient 
services are purchased to protect third-party interests. 
Regulation of the demand-side of professional services 
attempts to ensure that the appropriate quantity of services 
are purchased. Examples of demand-side regulation include 
statutory audits in accounting; the requirements of an 
architect or an engineer for the construction of certain 
kinds of buildings; and statutes concerning public safety 
and health in engineering (Wolfson et al., p. 195).
The discussion so far has highlighted features of labor 
markets in which they fail to achieve the optimal allocation 
of resouces; this is implicitly uplifting a standard of 
economic efficiency (which would include both technical 
efficiency and allocative efficiency). This leads to a 
consideration of the normative elements of the market 
failure model. Economic efficiency refers to ’'the maximiza­
tion of the value of total output." In the occupational 
labor market, this value can be maximized only if profes­
sionals are supplying services "in accord with consumer 
preferences and minimizing production costs in so doing" 
(Elzinga, 1977, p. 1192). Taking production technology, 
consumer preferences, and the distribution of income as 
given, efficiency as a goal of regulatory policy in regards 
to the professions means "the allocation of factors of 
production and professional service outputs that achieves 
a social Pareto optimum in which no individual can be made
better off except at someone else's expense" (Wolfson et 
al., p. 186).
Economic welfare is sometimes said to also involve the 
concept of equity. Under the rubric of equity are policies 
which seek to use regulation as a device for balancing 
social power or moving the income distribution in a less 
unequal direction. If there is an unequal allocation of 
bargaining power among parties in the market, "regulation 
may be justified in order to achieve a better balance" 
(Breyer, p. 32).
This model also posits fairness as a normative element. 
Fairness is a part of the issue of due process, both legal 
procedural fairness and substantive due process. There 
are at least two dimensions to this concept. Wolfson et al. 
emphasize that fairness in the context of occupational 
services means that "people in similar circumstances must 
be treated according to the same standard. Applicants for 
licensure, for example, ought to be judged on the basis 
only of qualities relevant to the practice of the profession 
for which they are seeking to be licensed." In addition, 
"policy enforcement cannot be arbitrary: decisions in 
individual cases must be taken in accordance with due 
process of law" (Wolfson et al., p. 187).
Two assumptions lie underneath the version of the 
theory of market failure that has been set forth so far: one 
is that "markets are extremely fragile and apt to operate 
very inefficiently (or inequitably) if left alone"; the
other is that "government regulation is virtually costless" 
(Posner, 1974, p. 336). There are some economists who 
acknowledge the possibility of market failure but nonethe­
less do not find it as palpable or remediable as has been 
suggested. They also hold out some different normative ends 
for regulation in labor markets. We turn now to an examina­
tion of this perspective as a separate component of the 
market failure model.
B. THE LIBERTY AND VIRTUE COMPONENT
Within the framework of the market failure model, 
there are those who would argue that nonetheless much 
economic regulation is undesirable. Adam Smith set forth the 
classic apologetic for the value of reliance upon a largely 
uninhibited marketplace to achieve social norms such as 
'natural liberty.* While Smith recognized instances of 
market failure in the case of public goods and externali­
ties, he laid much more stress on the role of consumer 
sovereignty and the discipline inherent in the market 
mechanism to deal with problems which certain groups in the 
economy claimed government intervention was required to 
solve. The 'liberty and virtue' component of the market 
failure model has several key features consistent with these 
themes,
Many economists recognize that the avowed objective of 
regulators in dealing with market failure is to promote 
economic efficiency. Noll (1985) observes that economists
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have taken note of the fact that the actions of regulatory 
agencies themselves must be evaluated by this standard as 
well:
Despite their variety, all regulatory agencies 
make many decisions that, in principle at least, 
affect economic efficiency. The economics litera­
ture as well as regulatory law emphasizes the 
effects of regulation on static efficiency - that 
is, the effect of regulatory decisions on costs, 
prices, and product quality, given unchanging 
technology and consumer tastes. By controlling 
prices, profits, entry, and the attributes of 
products or processes, regulators directly alter 
the net economic benefits derived from the 
regulated industry. To the extent that regulatory 
rules counteract market imperfections, they 
contribute to economic efficiency; to the extent 
that they reduce production efficiency or confer 
monopoly market positions on regulated firms, they 
reduce efficiency (pp. 10-11).
Some economists contend that while there may be instances of
market failure, the frequency of their occurrence and their
impact are questionable. Moreover, the costs of governmental
regulation have to be taken into account as well. Curing a
market failure by regulatory intervention generates costs as
well as benefits.
Much research on the effects of governmental regulation
pictures regulatory agencies as "ineffective in dealing with
market-failure problems such as environmental externalities
and monopolistic control of markets." In addition the
agencies are said to thwart technological and economic
changes,4 "impose significant costs on consumers without
4 Kirzner contends that regulation tends to interfere 
harmfully in the entrepreneurial process, and thus govern­
ment failure is more significant than market failure:
Even if current market outcomes in some sense are
producing many benefits," and protect businesses from 
competition (Noll, p. 11).
Before considering these arguments more closely, it 
should be recognized that some might argue that these 
criticisms of regulation do not take account of the pecu­
liarities of the market for professional services or the 
labor market. Thus the question might be asked, are there 
not features of these markets that give rise to acute forms 
of market failure?
Considering the market for professional services first, 
it can be argued that, while externalities and imperfect 
information or other market failure problems may exist, 
these characteristics alone do not differentiate "profes­
sional" markets from other types of markets. Even though 
there are recognized instances of market failure, the 
conditions for market failure apply equally to product 
markets as well as to professional services markets. In
judged to be unsatisfactory, intervention, and 
even intervention that can successfully achieve 
its immediate objectives, cannot be considered to 
be the obviously correct solution. After all, the 
very problems apparent in the market might 
generate processes of discovery and correction 
superior to those undertaken deliberately by 
government regulation; deliberate intervention by 
the state not only might serve as an imperfect 
substitute for the spontaneous market process of 
discovery, but also might impede desirable 
processes of discovery the need for which has 
not been perceived by the government. Again, 
government regulation itself may generate new 
(unintended and undesired) processes of market 
adjustments that produce a final outcome even less 
preferred than what might have emerged in the free 
market (p. 13).
regards to the natural monopoly rationale, there is no 
reason to believe that the production function for occupa­
tional services should result in firms subject to increasing 
internal economies of scale, with the outcome being ever- 
declining cost curves. Likewise there is no reason to 
suppose that "firms supplying professional services are 
especially prone to market failure because of externalities 
in either the production or the consumption of the ser­
vices." The potential for externality is not exclusive to 
the services market. In addition, the problem of consumer 
ignorance "is not endemic to professional services"; 
products may be subject to high search costs in order for 
consumers to satisfy their preferences just as well as 
personal services might be (Elzinga, 1980, pp. 108-109). 
Thus it has been concluded that
The bottom line is that there is no conceptual 
difference in markets for goods and markets for 
personal services. Either sector of the economy 
may have components subject to market power, 
externalities, or substantial information costs, 
there being no presumption that professional 
services are more disposed to market failure, and 
therefore less congenial to the discipline of the 
market mechanism, than markets for goods (Elzinga,
1980, p. 109).
The regulation of professional services can claim no special 
justification not applicable to product markets as well.
A similar argument may be made about the existence of 
unequal bargaining power in labor markets. It is ques­
tionable whether one can posit the presence of widespread 
monopsony power in labor markets. There is no reason
to suppose that workers are especially ignorant of alterna­
tive employment opportunities in any given bargaining 
relationship with management. Nor are there compelling 
reasons to suppose that workers are prohibited from seeking 
out these other job possibilities. Thus there is no special 
justification for regulation in this context.
Thus it is argued that the real question is one of 
fact; are labor markets characterized by market failures? If 
so, can government regulation improve on the results of the 
marketplace? If regulation is to serve the "public interest" 
in the sense that there is a maximization of the value of 
society's output, the rise in market efficiency (i.e., 
benefits) must exceed the costs of regulation.
What are the costs of regulation? It often leads to the 
restriction of output and the constraint of consumer 
choice. Consider each of these results in regards to 
professional services. Occupational licensing "imposes 
higher costs of entry into the occupation than would exist 
if the occupation were not licensed." These higher entry 
costs lead to a reduction in "the quantity of services 
produced in that occupation" and a higher price for these 
services (Rottenberg, p. 3).
How are entry costs raised in the labor market for 
professional services? Requirements for licensure such as 
experience and apprenticeship "extend the period necessary 
for entry; they make it more costly to enter, and more 
difficult to enter" (Rose, p. 194). Moreover, the regulatory
laws occupational groups obtain are often quite exclu­
sionary. Shimberg and Roederer note that they include 
requirements such as "age, years of formal education, 
citizenship, high license fees, and residency - which bear 
little or no relationship to effective performance on the 
job." A state-approved licensing board, by erecting barriers 
to keep out practitioners from other states, in effect esta­
blishes for the licensed group "monopoly conditions which 
enable it to control the availability and cost of services 
and restrict competition by prohibiting advertising and com­
petitive bidding" (p. 6) . The rules that limit competitive
behavior characterize such practices as "unprofessional 
conduct."
Such results run counter to the stated intentions of
the advocates of occupational licensure. Kahn observes that
The avowed purpose of licensing doctors, barbers, 
prize fighters and drugs is not usually to have 
the government substitute its judgment for that of 
the market in determining, on economic grounds, 
how many or who should be permitted to enter the 
market, but only to assure that those who do enter 
are qualified - on professional, scientific, or 
technical grounds. But in point of fact, . . . the
licensure is often economic, in motivation or 
effect, and does effectively limit the force of 
the competitive market (1, pp. 8-9).
By limiting competition, higher incomes are generated for
the producers of professional services.5
5 It should also be observed that those who are 
excluded by licensing "make their way into other occupa­
tions; they are less productive in those second-best occupa­
tions than they would be in the licensed occupation from 
which they are excluded" (Rottenberg, p. 9).
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Occupational licensure often fails to achieve its 
avowed purpose of improving the quality of services. Joskow 
and Noll argue that this can be seen by asking "whether 
service quality is higher in states with stricter regulation 
and, if it is, whether consumers are being denied access to 
lower-quality services, which, with the relevant informa­
tion, they would prefer to purchase"; they claim that
on a priori grounds one would suspect that quality 
is not improved by entry restrictions, because so 
little of the regulatory effect is in fact 
directed at issues of quality. Occupational 
licensing is usually for a lifetime, whereas a 
system designed primarily to ensure that practi­
tioners were competent would subject professionals 
to periodic examinations (p. 33).6
Furthermore, it is not clear that either quality or safety
are enhanced by licensure. Rottenberg (1980) argues that
another deleterious impact of entry restrictions which raise
the price of occupational services and reduce the number of
practitioners is that "some consumers resort to do-it-
yourself methods, and this sometimes results in lower-
quality work and less safety than would occur if there were
no licensing" (p. 6) .
It is significant to note that occupational regulation
differs from other types of regulation in that it tends to
be self-regulation by means of licensure. One of the key
6 It is also argued that examinations may not accurate­
ly test competence to practice the particular occupation. In 
addition, those who are targeted for disciplinary action are 
often industry "mavericks" or persons who have engaged in 
competitive conduct (such as advertising) rather than decep­
tive behavior (Rose, p. 192).
market failure rationales for occupational licensing is the 
protection of poorly informed consumers from incompetent 
practioners. However, due to the principal-agent problem 
described here, occupational self-regulation may in fact be 
inadequate to deal with the demand generation problem 
associated with licensure.
Regulation can impose greater costs on the community 
than non-regulation. There are no market checks on alloca­
tive or productive inefficiency if a regulatory committee 
administers the pricing and resource allocation decisions.7 
In addition, there is a continual problem of the licenser 
"being and remaining informed about consumer desires." The 
'information-generating quality' of the market system is one 
feature that is most difficult for public regulation to 
duplicate (Elzinga, 1980, pp. 116, 122, n.39).
There are also costs associated with the regulation of 
labor markets so as to ameliorate unequal bargaining 
power. Regulation may take the form of legal support and 
protection for the process of collective bargaining between 
labor unions and management. The inefficiencies associated 
with this process are highlighted if we follow a definition 
of the labor union such as that provided by Reynolds: it is
7 In addition, it is argued that the monopolistic 
position enjoyed by most regulatory agencies can lead to 
organizational slack (internal or X-inefficiency). Noll 
observes that "The insulation of agencies from markets for 
their outputs or equities should leave them with less 
incentive than a private monopolistic firm has to operate 
efficiently" (1985, p. 23).
"a group of labor suppliers who individually have little 
or no market control over wages and working conditions but 
who want to control (raise) compensation as a group." He
notes that this particular definition makes unions no
different from other forms of cartels (producers who attempt 
to act as monopolies): . . there is nothing different in
principle between combinations of workers and combinations 
of sellers in other markets (businessmen, farmers, oil 
producers, physicians) who attempt to restrict supply and 
push up the prices of their services" (1984, p. 44). By
granting labor unions special privileges in the law, such as
exclusive representation via majority-rule voting by the 
employees of a unionized firm, wages are raised above the 
competitive level and production costs for the firm rise. 
Labor relations law which grants unions immunities from 
damages caused to non-union workers and to business firms 
also leads to reductions in economic welfare. In sum, 
restriction of entry has certain implications and tendencies 
wherever it is practiced, whether it deals with trade 
unions, or whether it deals with gas pipelines, radio 
stations, doctors, or barbers (Kahn, 1, p. 13).
The thrust of each of these arguments is that regula­
tion in labor markets creates barriers to entry and, 
consequently, there is a reduction in consumer welfare. In 
the liberty and virtue component of the model, such barriers 
are seen as harmful restraints on trade which are quite 
often not justified.
If regulation is to serve the 'public interest' in the 
sense that the efficiency of the entire social system is 
increased, the rise in market efficiency (i.e., benefits) 
must exceed the costs of regulation. Making a comparison of 
the costs and benefits of regulation and non-regulation, the 
liberty and virtue component claims that economic welfare 
will be enhanced if employers and workers are given freedom 
to negotiate individually as well as bargain collectively 
where they voluntarily chose to do so. Likewise, greater 
output of professional services will be provided at lower 
prices if consumers are allowed a full range of choice among 
all occupational practitioners. Along these lines, Elzinga 
contends that both technical and allocative efficiency are 
achieved if the 'economic rules of the game' bar output 
restriction. That is, for the liberty and virtue component, 
economic freedom accompanied by output expansion is a key 
goal; competition is the means to this end, but not a goal 
in and of itself. The question revolves around what form the 
competition for the provision of professional services will 
take. This model prescribes a policy of preventing "restric­
tions of output without barring efforts to expand the 
market" for professional services (1980, pp. 110, 119).
The proponents of this view claim that certification, 
instead of licensing, can deal with the problems of market 
failure by allowing the forces of competition to operate. 
Elzinga argues that certification can be consistent with 
free competition and carry the potential for ameliorating
the asymmetric information problem. For example, "a group of 
professionals may elect voluntarily to establish a code of 
conduct which sets the quality standards they will main­
tain"; they might agree to "hire inspectors who can impose 
penalties on anyone in the association violating the terms 
of the agreement." By implementing such performance stan­
dards, "these firms are internalizing the externality of 
shoddy performance." Moreover, the professionals can "adver­
tise that their behavior offers customers a superior buy 
relative to noncertified professionals." Thus certification 
has some quite attractive features: it "can be a means of
economizing on information for consumers and internalizing 
on externalities for producers. As a result, it can effi­
ciently expand the market . . ." (1980, p. 113).
Certification is an appealing alternative to licensure 
because it maintains the existence of substitutes for the 
consumer (both certified and non-certified practitioners). 
In contrast to licensing, under certification the number of 
persons who may practice a trade or occupation is not 
limited by state intervention. Accordingly, one clear 
benefit of certification is that supply of a service will 
most likely be greater than under licensing. And if we 
assume constant demand in both licensing and certification, 
prices should be lower in the certification case.
Certification is clearly more consistent with the 
principle of economic liberty. As Elzinga observes, "Unlike 
registration and certification, the licensing of pro-
fessionals, by its nature, is inconsistent with a free - 
market allocative system." Can a case then be made for 
licensing under the liberty and virtue component of the
market failure model? Only under the restrictive conditions 
that "market failure cannot be remedied by private exchange 
(such as by certification and advertising) as costlessly as 
it can be remedied by government identification and the 
outlawing of incompetent and unscrupulous practitioners." 
Such a case would have to be verified on cost-benefit 
grounds (1980, p. 114).
The liberty and virtue component claims that the
discipline of the market mechanism often insures that 
product quality will be maintained. Along these lines, Davis 
and Helfand (1985) assert that "Accountability and responsi­
bility is fostered by the demands of consumers, by competi­
tion in the marketplace, and by the competition of pro­
fessionals for high-quality labor and management." The 
ultimate sanction against a wayward practitioner is the
nonsponsorship of the market and the resulting failure of 
his or her practice (p. 12). The market system itself can be 
largely relied upon to deal with the various forms of market 
failure. It has a self-correcting mechanism to deal with 
these problems in professional services markets; it is a 
mechanism that works well enough to not require in most 
instances the measure of instituting occupational licensing.
In general, the market failure model features the
normative end of regulatory policy of economic efficiency
(allocative efficiency). So far, we have seen market failure 
narrowly construed in terms of failing to meet some cri­
terion of efficiency; for example, what consumers would buy 
of professional services if they were optimally informed. 
The liberty and virtue component acknowledges market 
failure, but differs over to what extent it is proper to 
rely on the market to accomplish these ends, and to what 
extent it is better to rely on governmental regulation. 
These are differences dealing with the positive aspect of 
the model: how do labor markets and markets for professional 
services work? In sum, proponents of the market failure 
model do not all agree that certain industries or occupa­
tions require regulation, but they agree that externalities 
and imperfect information are reasons for intervention 
within certain constraints.
The broad market failure model posits efficiency as a 
common goal that regulators are striving for, and should be 
striving for. Joskow and Noll call this emphasis on effi­
ciency in the market failure model a "normative analysis as 
a positive theory." Its essence is that "one begins an 
analysis of a regulatory process with the assumption that 
its purpose is to maximize some universal measure of 
economic welfare, such as consumers' surplus or total 
surplus" (p. 36).
The liberty and virtue component takes market failure 
to involve more than just a failure in relation to economic 
efficiency alone. What distinguishes this key constituent
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part from the broader market failure model is its focus on 
character formation. Thus my designation for this component 
highlights its focus on intrinsic normative values, the kind 
of substantive ends that characterized political economy as 
conceived in antiquity; it is a discipline dealing with 
regimes or ways of life. Thus the issue in labor market 
regulation is not merely fairness as substantive due 
process, but the "substance" underlying regulation; is a 
prudential way of life for man promoted by the institutional 
arrangements?
In this component of the market failure model, the 
politics of regulation are evaluated according to the 
criterion of "public spirit." Kelman (1987) describes 
public spirit as "behavior motivated by the desire to 
choose good public policy." He argues that "if the political 
process functions as it should, the process will serve as a 
school that helps mold character" (p. 81) . The liberty and 
virtue component evaluates different forms of regulation in 
the labor market as to the kind of character formed; it 
asks, what are the laws which regulate occupations promoting 
in terms of industriousness and propriety? The reason why 
the exclusionary aspects of licensure are so harmful are not 
simply because they generate allocative inefficiency; they 
are deleterious because they take away an occasion for the 
promotion of moral virtue. This is the opportunity cost of 
not having full employment.
In this study 'substantive good' and 'public good' are
used interchangeably in reference to the liberty and 
virtue component. It should be noted that advocates of the 
broader market failure theory would claim that they are
arguing that the 'public good* is promoted by regulation; 
efficiency and equity are in the 'public good* or 'public 
interest.' Likewise, those who hold to the interest group 
theory would contend that the 'public good* lies in deregu­
lation which fosters greater economic freedom. Yet neither 
group would subscribe to character formation as the ultimate 
end of regulation. Thus when some advocates of market 
failure argue that occupational regulation should foster 
allegiance to the profession and its norms, they are
utilizing an appeal to ethical standards, but for utili­
tarian ends. My usage of the term 'public good' in connec­
tion with this component refers to the substantive notion of
the inculcation of virtue as an end in itself.
Certainly this component involves a measure of paterna­
lism in labor market regulation. As was seen earlier, the 
informational problem is sometimes cast in quite an extreme 
light when it is posited that the individual is in a 
position such that he or she does not know their own best 
interests. This leads to a call for paternalistic measures 
that rely on the use of police powers by the state. Pater­
nalism can be described as
the view that it is justified to restrict a 
person's liberty of choice,without his consent, 
even when the person's action would affect himself 
only, when the person is not considered to be 
in a position to know his own best interests and
the behavior imposed is believed to be in those 
best interests (Kelman, 1981, p. 220) .
Paternalism can also be necessary even if full and adequate 
information about a professional service is available in the 
marketplace. It is argued that individuals make irrational 
decisions. The regulator knows better than individuals what 
they want or what is good for them.
The use of police powers in regulating labor markets 
does not mean that all regulations are thereby lauded. For 
example, a judicious distinction can be made between the 
need for regulation of physicians and of beauty culturists; 
registration, certification, or licensure can each be scru­
tinized as to their efficacy in promoting substantive ends. 
The liberty and virtue component invokes a prudential consi­
deration of the appropriate form of labor market regulation.
II. THE INTEREST GROUP MODEL
Another theory of economic regulation has arisen out of 
a perceived dissatisfaction with the market failure model. 
Posner (197 4) has noted that the model contains no mechanism 
providing a link between the public interest and statutory 
enactments; there is no “articulation of how a public 
perception as to what legislative policies or arrangements 
would maximize public welfare is translated into legislative 
action" (p. 340). The existence of market failure is suffi­
cient to generate a demand for regulation, but there is no 
mention of the mechanism that makes that demand effective.
This led to a re-examination of the purposes of 
regulation; is it truly designed to remedy market failure? 
What came to be questioned was not whether regulation serves 
the public interest (as those who hold to the liberty and 
virtue component of the market failure model might ask) but 
whether regulation in many instances is actually intended to 
serve the public interest. Many economists claim that 
regulation is often beneficial to regulated industries..
They argue that the weight of the evidence suggests that 
regulatory agencies in many instances have not been pursuing 
in any systematic way the "public interest."
Consequently, economists began to view regulation as 
being procured by the regulated firms rather than being 
thrust upon them (McKenzie and Tullock, p. 220). Beyond just 
questioning the overall capability of government to compen­
sate for market failure, it was thought that perhaps politi­
cians and regulators were in fact endogenous actors in 
economic processes. That is, political agents, as economic 
actors, "respond to incentives created by political institu­
tions and administrative processes" (Joskow and Noll, 
p. 36).
In sum, for many economists, "the traditional role of 
regulation in economic analysis as a deus ex machina which 
eliminated one or another unfortunate allocative conse­
quences of market failure" was found to be wanting. Because 
regulation seldom seemed to work this way, the discipline 
came to focus on the influence of the regulatory powers of
the state "on the distribution of wealth as well as on 
allocative efficiency" (Peltzman, 1976, p. 211).
The interest group theory claims that regulation is a 
'good' that is supplied and demanded much like other 
political goods. Politicians will supply government monopoly 
privileges and regulations to their constituents, individual 
firms or labor groups whose self-interest leads them to 
demand regulation. Regulation can take various forms, among 
which are the control of entry into the market by outside 
competitors, thus securing a greater income for the regula­
ted party. Regulation is a device for transfering income to 
groups who actively demand it; well-organized groups will 
obtain it if they provide votes and contributions to politi­
cians (Joskow and Noll, p. 36), Regulation is designed and 
operated primarily for the group's benefit.0
Thus, instead of claiming that regulatory mechanisms 
appear in response to market failures, this theory argues 
that regulation comes about as a means of wealth transfer.
0 As Owen and Braeutigam observe, there are at least 
two different versions in which this purpose for regulation 
predominates. One version claims that "regulatory agencies 
are established for 'public interest' purposes, but subse­
quently they become the tools of the industry they regu­
late" (p. 11). Along these lines, Bernstein (1955) has 
argued that regulatory agencies have a life cycle of their 
own. As Joskow and Noll explain this version, the agencies 
"age," moving from "active advocates of generalized consumer 
interests to passive conduits of the interest of organized 
groups" (p. 37) . The other version claims that "regulatory 
agencies are in fact created to serve the interests of the 
industry they regulate, as a direct response by congressmen 
to the demands of industry for cartel management" (Owen and 
Braeutigam, p. 11).
Where the market failure model is concerned with the allo­
cative consequences of regulation, the interest group theory 
is occupied with the distributive effects of regulation.
Having stated in summary form the interest group 
theory, the outline of the rest of this section is as 
follows. First, the literature on this theory will be 
reviewed for a fuller understanding of the development of 
this model. We will consider how it applies both to unions 
and to occupational groups. We will also look more closely 
at the rent-seeking component of the theory, and also look 
at the role of the legislature, executive branch, and 
judiciary in supplying regulation. After considering the 
normative goals of the model, we will briefly discuss some 
of the most recent developments and extensions of the model, 
and conclude by describing how these models will be applied 
to the study of the economic conspiracy doctrine.
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTEREST GROUP THEORY
It should be noted that Adam Smith also ‘'deserves 
paternity" for this theory in its earliest form (Peltzman, 
1981, p. 375). Smith observed the significance of interest 
group pressure for regulation in the eighteenth century. He 
recognized the role of guilds and corporations in demanding 
regulation, so as to effectively reduce competition and gain 
a higher price and higher incomes. The interest group theory 
utilizes the principles of self-interest and competition 
first articulated clearly by Smith. This is consistent with
Smith's conception of the discipline of political economy, 
where economics is seen as part of a broader social and 
political inquiry.
As noted, the interest group theory arose out of a 
sense of the perceived shortcomings of the market failure 
model. Its most primitive form is as the 'capture theory' of 
regulation. In this view regulation is a process by which 
interest groups seek to promote their private interests.
As Tollison (1982) describes the capture theory, "there are 
a small number of producers who are able to overcome free 
riding costs and organize to wield complete (wealth- 
maximizing) influence over regulators." Though they suffer 
losses from monopoly-enhancing legislation, consumer 
interests "have no rational incentive to organize to resist 
regulations in favor of producers"; simply put, "it costs 
more than it is worth" (p. 591).
This version of the interest group theory is essen­
tially the same as that of the Marxists, with some modifica­
tions. They argue that big business controls regulatory 
agencies; they are set up to serve the businesses they 
regulate. American government is an instrument for protec­
ting capitalist interests; regulatory agencies are agents 
for increasing the wealth of producers, usually by establi­
shing a legally enforceable cartel which aids the capitalist 
in his exploitation of his labor force. Kolko (1965) uses 
the Marxist argument to explain the birth of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission and the regulation of railroads.
The Marxist regulatory theory has several fatal flaws. 
The flaws in the Marxist theory "arise from its simple 
dichotomization of society into two interest groups, 
capitalists and workers. Only by adopting a model of society 
as a complex combination of numerous interests can one 
explain the diversity of regulatory institutions." Moreover, 
oftentimes "regulatory agencies deal with policy issues 
having far more complexity than a straightforward conflict 
between capitalists and workers" (Noll, p. 26).
Stigler (1971), Posner (1974), and Peltzman (1976) have 
set forth a much more sophisticated version of the interest 
group theory. Stigler's article is the seminal work for the 
theory. As Romer and Rosenthal observe, what Stigler sought 
to do was "to develop a theory of government intervention in 
economic affairs that would approximate the same level of 
generality as neoclassical microeconomic theory" (p. 75). As 
we have previously noted, Stigler defines regulation quite 
broadly: it is an attempt by the state to use its legal
powers to direct the economic conduct of nongovernment 
bodies; it includes virtually all economic acts of govern­
ment (1981, p. 73). Stigler's definition includes all public 
interventions in resource markets, including labor markets.
In essence, Stigler explains regulation as a good 
(service) which is allocated by means of demand and supply. 
The demanders of regulation face costs and receive benefits 
from acquiring regulation. Ekelund and Hebert highlight a
key feature of this model; they point out that Stigler
recognizes that "regulation is almost never an unmixed
blessing." Regulated occupations
must submit to certain rules, regulations, 
'standards of conduct,' or other interferences.
These are costly and reduce the net return to the 
regulated firm, but as long as the net benefit is 
positive and lobbying costs are not prohibitive, 
those who stand to gain from the regulatory 
process will demand it (p. 532).
In regards to the demand for regulation, Stigler notes 
that an industry or occupation may seek a direct cash 
subsidy, control over entry by new rivals, the suppression 
of substitute and encouragement of complementary goods and 
services, and price controls which buttress their ability to 
practice price discrimination (1971, pp. 4-6). Since we are 
concerned with restraint of trade in this study, it is 
particularly important to note that Stigler sets forth the 
general hypothesis that "every industry or occupation that 
has enough political power to utilize the state will seek to 
control entry" (p. 5).
Stigler observes that as the demand for regulation 
works out, it becomes a question of which group has the 
highest effective demand. As Peltzman has summarized 
Stigler's model, the producer interest tends to dominate 
because producers as a small group "have a large per capita 
stake," while consumers as a large group have "more diffused 
interests." Regulations are enacted that harm these numerous 
consumers by only a small amount but benefit the few produ­
cers by a large amount. How does Stigler explain this regu­
larity of small group dominance in the regulatory process? 
The answer lies essentially in "the relationship of group 
size to the costs of using the political process" (Peltzman, 
1976, p. 212) .
Stigler observes that the political process in a 
representative democracy leads to dominance by a small 
group. Stigler notes first that political decisions "must be 
made simultaneously by a large number of persons (or their 
representatives) . . . "  This condition of simultaneity 
"makes voting on specific issues prohibitively expensive." 
As a result, the voters rely on a representative democracy 
(p. 10), Hence, "only those groups that can provide enough 
political returns to be represented get their agendas 
enacted" (Romer and Rosenthal, p. 77).
Stigler also argues that "the democratic decision 
process must involve 'all' the community, not simply those 
who are directly concerned with decisions . . . the politi­
cal decision process cannot exclude the uninterested voter 
. . ." This presents a problem because "the political system
does not offer good incentives like those in private markets 
to the acquisition of knowledge" (p. 11). As Peltzman 
further explains, voters then may be willingly ignorant 
about the significance of an issue: "the voter must spend 
resources to inform himself about its implications for his 
wealth" and the likely stance of a particular politician on 
the issue itself (p. 213). Ekelund and Hebert draw out the 
implications of this feature of the model:
Information acquisition is a good with costs and 
benefits. An individual has no incentive to 
acquire costly information on issues of no concern 
to him or her, but the individual votes on these 
issues anyway, ordinarily through a full-time 
representative affiliated with a political party 
(p. 533) .
Politicans may then vote for economic policies that injure 
the large group of voters (consumers) without a great deal 
of fear of not being reelected.
The effective size of groups which compete for regula­
tion is limited by the costs of organization. As Peltzman 
describes Stigler's theory, "It is not enough for the
successful group to recognize its interests; it must
organize to translate this interest into support for the 
politician who will implement it" (1976, p. 213). This is 
very difficult for large, diffuse consumer groups to
accomplish, but much easier for small, concentrated producer 
groups to achieve.
Stigler argues that the political power of producers 
(industries) greatly exceeds that of individual citizens. 
He explains that the industry seeking regulation provides 
"two things a [political] party needs: votes and resources." 
These resources include "campaign contributions" and
"contributed services" (p. 12).
In return for these provisions, Stigler argues that
politicians as regulators supply regulation in the various
forms mentioned earlier. This regulation often entails
deadweight losses (higher prices and lower output than in
competition). The implication from Stigler's theory, as
Romer and Rosenthal note, is that the regulator must
recognize that regulation will not "generally pass by a
direct majority vote, even if the industry that receives the
benefits is in a majority." They further observe that
Indeed, the number of losers from most regulation 
of the type Stigler deals with (rate and entry 
regulation, e.g., of transportation, or occupa­
tional licensing) significantly exceeds the number 
of gainers. So even without deadweight losses, we 
would not expect majority rule to support regula­
tion (p. 77) .
Taking account of this feature of the political environment, 
political parties act as the entrepreneur in Stigler’s 
model. In effect, they "aggregate political producers by 
forming winning coalitions" (Romer and Rosenthal, p. 78).10
Some have interpreted Stigler*s model as a theory of 
"producer interests," thinking that Stigler portrays this 
group as most often tending to prevail over the consumer 
interest. But it is more than a refined version of the 
capture theory; Stigler's model admits the possibility of 
capture by interest groups other than the regulated firms.
Moreover, Stigler's theory is only superficially similar 
to the Marxian model depicting capitalists directing 
political institutions for their own gains. As Ekelund and
10 Romer and Rosenthal also observe that Stigler makes 
"no distinction between the political arena (legislature) 
and the administrative arena (regulatory agency). In this 
view regulatory agencies are merely neutral reflections of 
the political process." The regulatory agency and the 
political entrepreneur are conflated into one agent (p. 78). 
Peltzman (1976) and Becker (1983) also fail to make a 
distinction between the different institutions which supply 
regulation.
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Hebert observe, in Stigler*s model the capitalists do not
always win out: "Groups of any kind, e.g., labor, farmers or
consumers, may institute or take over the regulatory system
at different times. In Stigler's view regulation benefits
politically effective groups" (p. 532). Tollison adds that
under certain configurations of costs and benefits 
some larger producer groups (e.g., farmers and 
union members) will find it feasible to seek 
wealth transfers from the state, while some small 
producer groups (e.g., automobile firms) will 
organize mainly to resist negative regulation.
Moreover, any group of sellers or buyers poten­
tially qualifies as an interest group in this 
theory. Labor and capital can form potent interest 
groups in Stigler's theory and will sometimes 
(often?) find themselves allied in the pursuit of 
a wealth transfer for a particular industry (1982, 
p. 591) .
Thus the model insists that economic regulation serves the 
private interests of various politically effective groups.
Recognizing the supply and demand elements in Stigler's 
model, Posner (1974) utilizes the economic theory of cartels 
to highlight features of both sides of the market for 
regulation. Posner argues that in the political market the 
essential commodity being transacted is a transfer of 
wealth. Constituents are on the demand side and their 
political representatives are on the supply side. The effect 
of a regulatory device as an entry control "is the same as 
that of cartelization," i.e., raising "prices above competi­
tive levels" - hence the demand for regulation (p. 344) . The 
market will distribute more of the good (regulation) to 
those whose effective demand is highest.
The members of the coalition demanding regulation must
The members of the coalition demanding regulation must
agree on the form of regulation. As Posner observes, any one
member "will have some incentive to avoid joining in the
efforts of his group to obtain the regulation" (pp. 344-
345). Posner adds that
If the regulation is forthcoming, he will benefit 
from it - he cannot be excluded from the protec­
tion of a general regulation, just as a seller 
cannot be excluded from the benefits of his 
competitors' charging a monopoly price - but, 
unlike the active participants in the coalition, 
he will benefit at no cost (p. 345).
This reluctance to cooperate in the cartel is more easily
overcome the fewer the prospective beneficiaries of a
regulation - it is easier to coordinate their efforts and it
is also more difficult for any one member to refuse to
participate in the collective efforts. Posner notes that the
homogeneity of interests of the members is also significant:
"The more homogenous their interest in the regulation in
question, the easier (cheaper) will it be for them to arrive
at a common position and the more likely will it be that the
common position does not so disadvantage one or more members
as to cause them to defect from the group" (p. 345).
In regards to the supply side of regulation, the
political system must be accounted for. Following Stigler,
Posner asserts that in a democratic system, "legislation is
awarded by the vote of elected representatives of the
people." Posner observes that
Willingness to pay is also important in the 
democratic as in the entrepreneurial political 
system, since legislators are elected in campaigns
in which the amount of money expended on behalf of 
a candidate exerts great influence on the out­
come. However, unlike the case of an entrepre­
neurial system, in a democratic system the 
free-rider problem remains a serious one: it may 
limit the ability of an industry or other interest 
group to make substantial campaign contributions 
(P. 347) .
This leads Posner to argue that one of the characteristics
which normally discourages cartelization ("a large number of
parties whose cooperation is necessary to create and
maintain the cartel*') in fact encourages regulation. He
contends that
Large numbers have voting (and, potentially, 
coercive) power and also increase the likelihood
of an asymmetry of interests that will encourage
broad participation in the coalition seeking 
regulation. In addition, large numbers, and other 
factors that discourage private cartelization, 
increase the demand for protective legislation 
(p. 347) .
Private cartelization is not so feasible in areas like labor
and the professions, and thus instances of protective
legislation are more often observed in these sectors of the 
economy.
Posner goes on to describe some of the other institu­
tional features of the supply of regulation. He notes that 
legislators "delegate much of the regulatory function either 
to the courts or to administrative agencies. In the area of 
economic regulation the legislative choice has generally 
been the administrative agency rather than the court"
(p. 346) . This falls in line with the interest group theory, 
because the court is more insulated from political control 
than the agency. Posner says that
The terminal character of many judicial appoint­
ments, the general jurisdiction of most courts, 
the procedural characteristics of the judicial 
process, and the freedom of judges from close 
annual supervision by appropriations committees, 
all operate to make the courts freer from the 
interest group pressures operating through the 
legislative process, and more disposed to decide 
issues of policy on grounds of efficiency, than 
any other institution of government - specifically 
the administrative agency, where these features 
are absent or attenuated (p. 3 51) .
Posner makes some key observations in regards to the 
interest-group explanation of regulation. He contends that 
the simple capture theory would be supported if one showed 
that the licensure of physicians benefited them rather than 
their patients, for this simply demonstrates "that interest 
groups influence public policy." For this type of case study 
to support the interest group theory it would have to show 
"that the characteristics and circumstances of interest 
groups" were of such a type that this theory "would have 
predicted that they, and not some other groups, would obtain 
the regulation" that they are observed benefiting from. 
Posner adds that "Otherwise anv legislation that benefited 
some group at the expense of the general public would count 
as support" for the interest group theory (p. 352).
Noll elaborates on the need for clarification of the 
interest group theory. He explains that to avoid tautology, 
a theory of regulation "must include an explanation of why 
certain groups receive benefits as successful purchasers of 
institutional protections while others receive no benefits 
at all but bear some costs through the economic ineffi-
ciencies of administrative management . . . " The theory must
also "describe the factors that determine the relative sizes 
of these amounts," This will inevitably involve a theory of 
"the relationship between interest-group characteristics and 
the effectiveness of groups in the political decisionmaking 
process" (Noll, 1985, p. 27).
Peltzman (1976) addresses some of these concerns and 
makes a quite important contribution to the interest group 
theory by generalizing stigler’s model to include the role 
of opposition groups in determining regulatory behavior. The 
simple goal of the contending interest groups is wealth 
redistribution through the regulatory process.
Instead of following the Marxian notion that "regula­
tory agencies were created with the purpose of serving a 
single economic interest," Peltzman takes account of the 
fact that regulatory controls have been "sought by consumer 
as well as producer groups" (Thompson and Jones, p. 98) .
In Peltzman's analysis politicians gain support from 
both producer and consumer groups.
Peltzman provides a more extensive explanation of the 
supply side of the market for regulation than Stigler. 
Peltzman portrays the regulator as essentially equivalent to 
an elected politician. He arbitrates among the interest 
groups in seeking to maximize his majority - that is, his 
probability of election or re-election. Peltzman assumes 
that politicians want to maximize vote margins (p. 214) . As 
Owen and Braeutigam explain, the politician utilizes "the
redistributive powers of regulatory agencies to benefit 
groups that can supply these vote margins.'* They add that 
Peltzman's model thus becomes "a special case of the general 
proposition that government will seek to redistribute income 
to benefit majorities of the electorate . . the model
"is a framework in which the purpose of regulation is to 
redistribute incomes in favor of groups that will supply 
electoral rewards to the politicians who engineer the 
redistribution" (p. 11).
Peltzman develops a model in which there is no market 
failure. As Keeler points out, Peltzman assumes "constant 
returns to scale with no externalities . . . the regulator
sets rates above costs for at least some of the users of 
whatever service is regulated and then uses the resulting 
profits to pay off other groups" (p. 107). Peltzman goes on 
to describe a political or regulatory equilibrium in which 
the regulator maximizes political support by distributing 
the benefits from regulation among different interest 
groups. As Hirshleifer observes, it is a outcome "where a 
balance is struck among the marginal costs and benefits of 
the different interest groups affected . . ." (p. 243).
Peltzman then analyzes how the regulator's maximizing 
behavior is affected by changes in different parameters. He 
looks at the impact of a change in the political support 
function, the function describing opposition to regulation, 
and the cost of organizing a group for political support 
(pp. 220-221). He also considers the significance of
exogenous changes in such factors as technology and demand 
for "price-entry regulation” for regulatory equilibrium 
(pp. 222-227) . As Hirshleifer notes, the impact of these 
changes is such that "It is then generally in the political 
interest of the regulators, given certain diminishing- 
returns conditions, to 'correct* the new market solution 
that would ensue." The regulatory solution will tend to 
allocate some benefits "to all interest groups involved, if 
there is a social gain to be distributed" (p. 243).
Though some benefits are likely to be distributed to 
all interest groups, regulation is more likely to be applied 
to certain industries. As Keeler notes, these industries 
tend to be the ones "where firms have the most to gain by 
forming political coalitions." In atomistic industries, such 
as the medical professions, "there may be an especially 
strong incentive to coalesce and seek regulation, because in 
competitive industries the potential for monopoly rents is 
greatest" (p. 107) .
Peltzman finds several key results from his model.
He notes that "the costs of using the political process 
limit not only the size of the dominant group but also their 
gains." This result has important implications "for entry 
into regulation and for the price-output structure that 
emerges from regulation" (p. 213). In addition, the intra­
group equilibrium aspects of Peltzman's model generate some 
implications of entry, both for regulators and for regulated 
f irms:
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there is a clear incentive for regulators to limit 
entry (or seek the power to do so) quite apart 
from considerations of the producer interest. This 
stems directly from the fact that the politically 
appropriate price structure is invariably discri­
minatory (in the economic sense) when costs differ 
among customers . . . (p. 239).
Peltzman finds that the vote-maximizing regulator trades 
off the benefits he gives to producers relative to the costs 
imposed on consumers in the process of setting regulated 
prices. Finally, Peltzman contends that regulation will 
tend to be weighted more heavily toward producer protection 
in periods of depressed economic activity and toward 
consumer protection in expansionary periods (p. 227).
Peltzman*s regulator is very similar to a representa­
tive in a legislature. Hirshleifer argues that "this identi­
fication of the regulator with the elected politician is too 
radical a simplification." He observes that
different types of constitutionally empowered 
agents on the political scene - bureaucrats, 
judges, legislators, and elected executives - each 
bring different motivations, authorities, and con­
straints into the process of political exchange 
that leads to the final regulatory outcome 
(p. 242).
The public choice school of analysis more fully recognizes 
these distinctions; it assumes that "agents in the political 
arena, as in the economic arena, are rational individuals, 
optimizing in the context of institutional environments that 
define constraints and opportunities" (Romer and Rosenthal, 
p. 77). The public choice school lends a rent-seeking 
component to the theory by recognizing that "politicians" of 
various forms (members of each of the three branches of
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government) obtain wealth redistribution through the 
regulatory process.
B. THE RENT-SEEKING COMPONENT
James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock are the leading 
figures in developing the public choice school in economics. 
This school of thought has an interesting relationship to 
the Stigler-Peltzman model. In developing a theory of 
regulation, Stigler's goal has been described by Romer and 
Rosenthal as "nothing less than the construction of a price 
theory of political economy"; they add that by calling for 
this type of analysis, Stigler joined "the already deve­
loping public choice school's approach to the study of 
political processes" (pp. 75, 77). Similarly, Peltzman's
contribution is consistent with the public choice emphasis 
on constitutional politics. Peltzman "goes beyond the 
conventional limits of economics to show how politics in the 
form of regulation changes the rules of the contest in the 
market arena"; it is a game "played to change the rules or 
conditions of market rivalry" (Hirshleifer, p. 244).
Further comparisons can be made between the "Chicago" 
and public choice schools. Both seek to explain regulation 
based on a supply and demand model in which interest groups 
compete for regulatory favor. In the Stigler-Feltzman 
version, the underlying preferences of the interest groups 
are weighted more heavily; the regulator is concerned to 
deal with deadweight loss among the interest groups. In the
rent-seeking version proferred by those utilizing the public 
choice approach, the regulator is not so concerned with all 
the various interest groupB; producer groups are relatively 
stronger in influence.
Two key areas in which the rent-seeking component makes 
a distinctive contribution to the interest group theory are 
(1) the significance of the social loss due to rent-seeking, 
and (2) the role of political agents in rent-seeking. The 
Stigler-Peltzman model only points to the deadweight 
consumer losses due to entry control and other monopoly 
privileges given by the state to labor and occupational 
groups. The rent-seeking model highlights even greater 
social waste due to the competition for rents by interest 
groups and the rent dissipation that occurs as a process of 
this competition. Furthermore, the Stigler-Peltzman version 
basically fails to specify the role of the politician in the 
voting process; the politician is basically treated as a 
passive broker among private rent seekers, redistributing 
wealth in response to competing private demands.11 The
11 Ben Zion and Eyton (1974) develop a similar model; 
they show that "via political contributions, there is at 
least a limited market in which political power can be 
•bought' by economic resources" (p. 2). They depict contri­
butions made by organizations like business firms, labor 
unions, trade and occupational associations, and other 
organized "pressure groups" as "investment expenditures" 
(p. 4) . In their view, "pressure groups serve as interme­
diaries between individuals and the government." These 
groups "try to influence the policy formation in a manner 
advantageous to the individuals belonging to the pressure 
group." They are successful in their endeavors by means of 
monetary contributions and encouragement to politicians "to 
vote in a certain way." In exchange, they get "a policy
contributors to the interest group theory from the public 
choice school make the politician's role much more explicit. 
In seeking to optimize their own interests, politicians 
impact upon the entire economic system, through the supply 
of economic regulation. Each of these distinctives of the 
rent-seeking component will be discussed in turn.
Public choice theory claims that democratic governments 
act through a particular set of Institutional arrangements. 
As in our previous discussion of the "Chicago school" verion 
of the interest group theory, the key elements in the 
regulatory process in a representative democracy include 
political parties, bureaucracies, and special-interest 
groups. Political actors within these institutions are 
assumed to act according to their own self-interest. Public 
choice theory contends that, unlike the market, "the 
political setting is a non-proprietary setting where 
individual agents do not always perceive the full benefit 
and cost of their decisions." The constraints on behavior in 
the market and political settings are different {Tollison, 
p. 589) .
The concept of principal and agent relationships 
described earlier are often utilized by public choice 
theorists. In a political setting the agent (politician) 
agrees to perform a service for the principal (voter).
It is likely that the agent will not always act in the
beneficial to their constituency" (p. 4, n.10).
interest of the principal, particularly if the behavior of 
the agent is costly to monitor. Politicians are competitors 
maximizing returns (power, position, votes, etc.) under 
certain constraints (reelection, for instance). Managers of 
political firms (bureaucracies) do not have as great an 
incentive to control costs as do managers of private firms; 
it is costly for voters to delimit shirking by political 
managers (for example, through recall). In sum, as Tollison 
notes, political agents face different constraints on their 
behavior than do private agents because the principals in 
the two cases "face different incentives to control the 
behavior of the agents" (p. 589).
These elements form the framework for the rent-seeking 
component of the interest group theory. Politicians distri­
bute wealth or "rents" to various producer (and consumer)
groups. The pursuit of these benefits is known as rent
seeking, which may be defined as "the expenditure of scarce 
resources to capture an artificially created transfer" 
(Tollison, p. 578).
The pursuit of monopoly rents by various interest 
groups has been shown to be part of the social cost of
monopoly in an important paper by Tullock (1967). Tullock
distinguishes between "the existence of widespread 
government-sponsored monopoly and detailed regulations of an 
inefficient character" (static inefficiencies) , on the one 
hand, and "the activity of getting a monopoly or some other 
government favor", on the other, which is known as rent
seeking (1984, p. 224). Rent-seeking activity is the means 
by which an individual or group seeks to change regulation 
in their favor or protect themselves against undesirable 
regulation. Tullock contends that the costs of monopoly to 
society are greater than the familiar welfare triangle which 
measures static inefficiency (deadweight consumer loss); 
they also include the resource investment devoted to 
acquiring a monopoly position involved in rent-seeking 
activity. The welfare loss from monopoly includes not only 
"the lump-sum transfer from consumers to the monopolist" 
(Tollison, p. 581); if resources are spent in the pursuit of 
a government monopoly which generates rents, these resources 
are wasted from a societal standpoint. Tollison adds that 
expenditures on lobbying and other methods of obtaining rent 
"add nothing to social product (they are zero-sum at best)," 
and "their opportunity cost constitutes lost production to 
society" (p. 576).
According to the rent-seeking component producers 
demand regulation "if the expected political rents net of 
the cost of organizing and procuring favorable legislation 
are positive , . (McChesney, p. 103). However, securing a
monopoly by influencing the government is essentially a 
competitive industry. This means that, as Tullock has 
observed, "resources will therefore flow into the activity 
of getting the monopoly and will continue their flow until 
the present discounted value of the resource investment 
equals the present discounted value of the monopoly, taking
account of risk" (1984, p. 228). The profits which were once 
seen as a transfer from consumers to the monopolist are 
better seen as "something which the monopolist has obtained 
by investment of resources and, hence, is a net social waste 
. . ." (p. 228) in addition to the deadweight loss.12
The rent-seeking component also highlights the fact that
politicians have a monopoly of their own. They are not
passive brokers in the process, but rather are out to gain
rents for themselves. This is in contrast with the "Chicago"
version of the interest group model, which assumes that
politicians "respond to private demands for rents with a
supply of regulation but do not actively enter the market
for rents with their own demands." McChesney has observed
this is consistent
with the consumer-sovereignty model of private 
markets, but the applicability of that model to 
the political market is questionable. Clearly a 
politician himself actively seeks votes, campaign 
contributions, and other forms of recompense, 
contracting to receive a supply of goods or 
services from private parties in response to his 
own demands (p. 104) .
McChesney considers the opportunities for political gains
from activities other than rent creation. He pictures
politicians as "independent actors making their own demands
to which private actors respond." He develops a model which
demonstrates "how politicians reap returns first by
12 Benham (1980) argues that the demand for occupa­
tional regulation involves more than merely rents. Security 
is also an important goal; professionals are trying to 
"hedge against a fall in their career earnings" by suppor­
ting different forms of regulation (p. 14).
threatening and then by forbearing from extracting private 
rents already in existence. These private rents . . . repre­
sent returns to their owners' entrepreneurial ability and 
firm-specific private investments" (p. 102) . The gains from 
restriction of competition (rents) are then dissipated in 
lobbying or legal fees.
So far we have seen that the interest group theory does 
not consider government to be a "monolith," but a "complica­
ted network of individuals, each with an incentive to 
maximize his own interest" (McChesney, pp. 101-102). We now 
turn to a survey of how these insights are applied to the 
role of the legislative, judicial, and executive branches in 
supplying and enforcing regulation.
C. REGULATION AND THE DIFFERENT BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT
The interest group theory makes some specific claims 
about economic legislation; it argues that statutes are 
often enacted in the interest of organized coalitions who 
expect to obtain specific benefits from these same laws. 
Following this theory, we would anticipate that legislation 
regulating the conduct of a professional group or union 
would benefit the laborers in these groups, "since they 
would have the most to gain from such legislation," as well 
as other interest groups (Kau and Rubin, 1979, p. 366).
There have been several empirical analyses of the 
interest group theory in relation to legislation. In 
particular, these studies focus on the question of the
behavior of politicians in relation to the "public interest" 
and constituent interest. Kau and Rubin (1979) seek to 
distinguish between three potential explanations for the 
vote of a legislator on a particular bill: the influences of 
self-interest, logrolling, or ideology. That is, "the bill 
may be in the economic interests of his constituents"; or 
the congressman may vote "for this bill in return for the 
vote of another congressman on a bill which is important to 
the first congressman"; or, "the representative (or his 
constituency) may be ideologically in favor of the bill." 
Kau and Rubin describe this last motivation as based on the 
belief that "the bill will make the country a better place 
to live, independently of any direct self-interest motiva­
tion" (p. 366).
They find empirical evidence that ideology plays a key 
role in explaining voting by congressmen on bills with 
primarily economic elements; "there appears to be some­
thing that is significantly and systematically associated 
with voting which correlates with the ratings given to 
congressmen by ideological groups" (p. 384). However, they 
acknowledge that the ideological variable may reflect some 
economic interest in some unmeasured way. It should be noted 
that they find that on many issues, unions have a signifi­
cant influence on the votes of congressmen.13
13 Kau and Rubin (1981) undertook another study which 
more specifically explored the impact of labor unions and 
campaign contributions on the voting behavior of congress­
men. They examined eight bills that bear on labor issues.
In another study, Kau, Keenan, and Rubin (1982) look 
more closely at the question of whether economic factors 
alone affect legislation. They examine the roll call 
voting behavior of congressmen, seeking to relate this 
variable to "economic and other characteristics of consti­
tuents and of donors to campaigns" in order to better under­
stand "the characteristics of economic agents who favor or 
oppose various laws" {p. 271).14 They are concerned with the 
patterns of laws favored and opposed by various interest 
groups.
Their study sought to discover "the impetus for laws 
that serve to increase the role of the government in regu­
lating the economy." One of their findings raises questions 
about the implications of the interest group model; they 
report that "most of the force behind such laws may come 
from ideology." On the other hand, they also find that 
"unions seem to be active in the political sector of the
They determined that unions "use political contributions in 
a systematic and coordinated manner" (p. 133) to influence 
congressional votes on minimum wages and wage-price con­
trols, and that "both union membership and contributions 
received from unions are significant in explaining the 
voting behavior of representatives . . (p. 144).
14 They hypothesize that "voting by Congressmen is a 
function of constituent characteristics and campaign 
contributions," while voting by constituents for Congress­
men is "a function of voting by the Congressman on bills 
affecting constituents, seniority of the Congressman and 
money spent in the election campaign," They further assume 
that "contributions by donors are assumed to be a function 
of the voting behavior of the Congressman and his 
seniority." An empirical test generates results that support 
this specification (p. 288).
economy and seem to favor regulation and increased govern­
ment intervention; business seems to oppose such laws" 
(p. 289). The first result was challenged by Peltzman in an 
article employing a different type of modeling strategy.
In this study, Peltzman (1984) analyzed congressional 
voting behavior with a simple principal-agent model. Voters 
are principals and legislators are their agents; "political 
competition constrains legislative agents to serve the 
interests of those who 'pay' for their services." Payments 
take the form of votes, campaign funds, and "other forms of 
political currency" (p. 181).
Peltzman seeks to show, contrary to previous studies, 
that party and ideology have much smaller roles in deter­
mining legislative voting behavior, while the interests of 
constituents plays "a far larger, even dominant, role" 
(p. 183). Based on an empirical study, he concludes that 
"generally, the larger and more well defined the wealth 
stakes in a vote, the more important are constituent 
characteristics in explaining their agents' behavior" 
(p. 184). Thus he writes, "The tendency for legislators to 
shirk serving their constituents' interests in favor of 
their own preferences (ideology) seems more apparent than 
real" (p. 210) .15
15 Denzau and Munger (1986) seek to modify the interest 
group theory to more fully account for the supply side of 
regulation. They argue that the attempts by Kau and Rubin, 
Peltzman, etc. to explain the effects that interest groups 
have in influencing legislators and legislation by using 
"district-level aggregate data to measure the effect of
We have seen that in the interest group theory, 
legislation (such as a law restricting entry into an 
occupation or the labor market) is supplied to organized 
coalitions that provide votes and campaign contributions. 
In order for interest-group politics to operate in the 
legislative arena, there must be stability. Landes and 
Posner (1975) argue that stability is provided by granting 
the judiciary independence, that is, giving judges tenure 
for life. The value of legislation obtained by interest 
groups is enhanced if these jurists rarely nullify past 
legislative enactments (pp. 878-879). Landes and Posner thus 
contend that "the existence of an independent judiciary and 
the constitutive rules of legislative bodies (such as the 
requirement of a majority vote to enact legislation) are 
methods of imparting durability to an initial legislative
demographic and other regularities of constituency on 
roll-call voting behavior" are limited by the fact that this 
kind of data is unable "to measure accurately lobbying 
activity, constituent interests, and the preferences of 
legislators." Thus, "rather than explicitly modeling these 
disparate but important influences, the economic studies 
have simply identified regularities in the characteristics 
of interest groups and legislative voting behavior or policy 
outcomes." They propose a theoretical model of the American 
supply of public policy, and show that "it yields testable 
implications about which interest groups and which sets of 
voters are likely to be served" (p. 90) . Assuming that 
legislators seek to maximize votes, they derive an explicit 
"supply price" (or cost) for policy. They find that "the 
amounts interest groups must offer a legislator for his 
services" depend on "that legislator's productivity and the 
preferences of the voters in his district" (p. 91).
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judgment protecting some group" (p. 892).16
In their analysis, legislation passed in a previous 
legislative session could be nullified by jurists who are 
subservient to the current membership of the legislature. 
As they explain, "Judges which are merely agents of the 
current legislature" could damage or weaken the 'contract' 
between the enacting legislature and the group that procured 
the legislation by using their "interpretive leeway to 
rewrite the legislation." On the other hand, an independent 
judiciary would "interpret and apply legislation in accor­
dance with the original legislative understanding . . ."
(p. 879).17
This reasoning is based on the fact that it is in the 
interest of independent jurists to interpret statutory law
16 Crain and Tollison (1979) explain executive vetos as 
another means of enhancing the durability of legislation, 
functionally equivalent to the independent judiciary. They 
see an analogy "between the veto power of the chief execu­
tive and the nullification power of the independent judi­
ciary" which Landes and Power have overlooked. They contend 
that "the veto power raises the costs of reneging on 
previous legislative contracts." Thus they expect "to 
observe more vetoes in cases where attempts are being made 
to renege or to alter substantively previous legislative 
contracts with special interests" (p. 557). Moreover, the 
veto power increases the returns from these contracts by 
making them harder to repeal (p. 560) , As they point out, 
"The fact that vetoes are sometimes overridden provides a 
rationale for the role of the independent judiciary in 
serving as a longer-term guarantor of legislative bargains" 
(p. 561).
Landes and Posner argue that administrative regula­
tory agencies are examples of the "dependent" judiciary; the 
ICC "has some indicia of independence but many fewer than 
the federal courts" (that is, "its members serve for limited 
terms" and there is rapid turnover) (pp. 887-888).
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according to its original import, for "the legislative and 
executive branches do have means of coercing the [indepen­
dent] judiciary." Landes and Posner assert that
The value (both social and private) of courts is a 
function in major part of the predictability of 
their decisions, and decision according to the 
original meaning of a statute rather than accor­
ding to the evershifting preferences of successive 
legislatures is probably an important source of 
that predictability . . . the ability of the
courts to maintain their independence from the 
political branches may depend at least in part on 
their willingness to enforce the 'contracts’ of 
earlier legislatures according to the original 
understanding of the 'contract' (p. 885),18
The interest group perspective on the judiciary presents a
stark contrast to the view of judicial interpretation held
by the other major theory of regulation.
The market failure model and its liberty and virtue
component would understand an independent judiciary to mean
jurists who are committed to certain principles and not
driven by interest-group pressures. In the interest group
model of the judiciary set forth by Landes and Posner,
jurists "do not enforce the moral law or ideals of neutrali­
18 Landes and Posner argue that the more a given 
legislature's jurisdiction is localized, "the less scope 
it will have for enacting protective legislation. Citizen 
mobility limits the effectiveness of schemes of redistribu­
ting wealth from one group to another at the state and local 
levels." In addition, "the regulation of a product or 
service is less effective the more limited the jurisdiction 
of the regulatory authority, because the providers are more 
mobile within a more limited area." Independent jurists are 
less important in regards to the durability of legislation 
for regulation that is more confined to a given area. As 
Landes and Posner point out, "The interest groups will seek 
durable compacts from state and local legislatures anyway, 
so why should the political branches pay the price of an 
independent judiciary?” (p. 891) .
ty, justice, or fairness; they enforce the 'deals' made by 
effective interest groups with earlier legislatures" 
(p. 894). That is, the judiciary is "indifferent to the 
ethical content of the legislative or constitutional 
provisions that the court is being asked to enforce" 
(p. 895, n.40). Landes and Posner do concede that "since the 
judges are independent, an appeal to principles may be 
effective courtroom or law-review advocacy" (p. 894).
The insights into regulation afforded by the interest 
group theory have some significant implications for under­
standing the behavior of unions and occupational groups in 
relation to public policy.
D. REGULATION IN THE LABOR HARKET
As applied to the actions of various labor groups in 
the political marketplace, the interest group theory regards 
unions as "rent-seeking agencies." Unions are pictured as 
attempting "to redistribute income in their favor at the 
expense of other groups in society." Applying Stigler's 
insights into the benefits of regulation, Hirsch and Addison 
further explain that union gains may accrue through "direct 
money subsidies, control of entry, control of production of 
complements and substitutes, and control of market price." 
Correspondingly, in the pecuniary marketplace, unions can 
gain at the expense of (respectively) taxpayers, consumers, 
and other workers. The latter are generally non-union 
workers, but the gains could conceivably be won at the
expense of other union workers too (p. 274).
Control of entry is especially significant. As
Hirsch and Addison explain, monopoly rents obtained by
unions can be eroded through two means: "the rising price of
unionism and the incentives provided firms and consumers to
make substitution in production and consumption." Therefore
unions turn to governmental powers for help in preventing
such an economic reaction: "The strength of this market
escape route to labor cartels may be attenuated or even
blocked if unions can gain the assistance of the state" in
barring competition (p. 274).
Union membership or collective bargaining coverage
can be treated as a public good; once it has been provided,
it is nonrival in consumption so that use by one person does
not prevent its use by another. Along these lines, McKenzie
and Tullock observe that
Any effort that a union makes to restrict the 
labor supply and raise wages in a particular labor
market is a public good to the workers in that
labor market. If the wage is increased through 
labor supply restrictions, some workers must bear 
the cost of bringing about those restrictions; 
some group of workers must refuse to work (strike) 
and must be willing to bargain. However, if the 
group of striking workers retains their jobs and 
receives higher wages, all workers in the market 
benefit from the group's actions (p. 276).
They note that collective action of this type is much more
likely to be achieved within a small group of employees than
in a large one. A worker in a large group "represents a very
small fraction of the total labor supply." His individual
actions (such as participation in a strike) are "insignifi­
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cant in the context of the labor market" (towards the goal
of raising the wage rate). Thus they observe that
The market wage will be the same with or without 
the person's participation in the large union 
movement. Therefore, although all workers in a 
labor market may sense the benefits of unioniza­
tion, they may fail to participate in any movement 
toward that end. They have insufficient private 
incentive to incur the implied costs (lost income, 
etc.) of participation in the large union move­
ment; their incentive is perverse - to take a 
'free ride' on the activities of other workers 
(p. 276).
Hirsch and Addison note that the implications of group size
mean that "rent seeking will be relatively more attractive
to small, homogeneous unions (e.g. craft unions) because
unions with a large and heterogeneous membership face
substantial costs in first constructing and then policing
the cartel" in the pecuniary marketplace (p. 274).
However, this difficulty is offset by a compensating
advantage of large membership in the political marketplace,
because, as Hirsch and Addison observe,
. . . the union may be able to offer a critical
mass of voting support to 'accommodating' govern­
ments and politicians. Not only is such a union 
likely to evince a higher demand for state 
assistance because of the costs of private 
cartelization, then, but the government is likely 
to supply greater amounts of regulation where the 
voting rewards are greatest (pp. 274-275).
As we saw previously, the characteristic which discourages
cartelization (a large number of union members "whose
cooperation is necessary to create and maintain the cartel")
in fact encourages regulation (Posner, 1974, p. 347).
Unions seek after regulation which overcomes the free
rider problem. McKenzie and Tullock note that "the (govern­
ment can impose a cost on workers who do not wish to 
participate in union activities.” This reduces the cost of 
organizing the employer's workforce. If a firm is organized 
as a union shop, there is a substantial disincentive to 
free-riding created, as McKenzie and Tullock point out:
In a union shop all workers, once employed, must 
belong to the union if a simple majority of the 
workers votes for unionization. If 51 percent of 
the workers have voted for a union and a worker 
refuses to join the union, he or she is simply 
denied employment in that firm; this is a rather 
substantial cost for nonparticipation (p. 277).
These same laws that facilitate the expansion of
labor unions by reducing organization costs also give these
coalitions greater market power. All unions, large and
small, have an incentive to obtain governmental protection
from non-union workers. As Hirsch and Addison observe, this
protection "often involves measures that buttress bargaining
power in the economic marketplace through decreasing the
cost of organizing or stimulating the demand for union
labor” (Hirsch and Addison, p. 275).
Likewise, we might consider an occupational group such
as a professional association. It too faces a free rider
problem. Professional groups will wish to limit the benefits
of their behavior to only participating members. Becker
argues that "Free riding can be partially controlled by
policing behavior, punishing deviant members with ostracism,
intimidation, and fines, and by implementing rules for
sharing benefits and costs that reduce the incentive to
shirk." Free riding increases the cost of producing pressure 
on government for legislative favors, but political suc­
cess is determined by relative, not absolute, degree of 
control over free riding (pp. 377, 380).
Once the group is organized, its representatives will 
go to the state legislature and seek a legally sanctioned 
cartel (such as self-regulation through licensure). The 
group will put their argument in public-interest terms, 
appealing to the need to protect quality or to ensure an 
orderly marketplace. The interest group theory argues that 
rent seeking is often done under a public interest cover; 
that is, the professional group must cover its intentions if 
it is to get legislation through Congress which will injure 
the average man but benefit their particular group.
Trade unions and licensed occupations must be able to 
convince the public at large of the benefits to society 
associated with their protection or licensure. Benham 
suggests that this task requires "the cultivation of the 
public perception of 'market failures'" in their own occupa­
tion, and the acknowledgement of the ability of regulation 
to successfully cope with these failures. Many resources are 
expended on research which focuses on the services provided 
by members of the trade or occupation and on discovering the 
deleterious consequences of relaxing controls on its 
membership (p. 17).
In regards to the need for occupational regulation to 
remedy market failures in the 'public interest,' it has been
observed that "Requests for licensure seldom come from an 
outraged public seeking to end some intolerable abuse"; 
rather they most frequently come from "occupational associa­
tions acting on behalf of practitioners," who contend that 
"regulation is needed to protect the public health, safety, 
and welfare" (Shimberg and Roederer, p. 3). One outstanding 
example is the American Medical Association, which has 
obtained limitations on the practice of medicine (and hence 
boosted the incomes of their members) under the guise of 
enhancing the quality of medical care.
The interest group theory exhibits a great degree of 
scepticism towards claims by labor groups of the need to 
remedy market failure. Accordingly, one might ask, just 
where do 'public interest' considerations come into play in 
the theory? Ekelund and Hebert observe that in this model, 
they are seen through the lens of all the individual 
interests competing for regulatory favors:
Politics and the voting process are thus a gross 
filter of individual preferences. Regulations of 
all kinds are simply the result of interactions of 
self-interested demanders, i.e., effective 
coalitions of individuals who stand to gain from 
regulation and political suppliers who must endure 
periodic reelection constraints (p. 533).
They add that in the interest group model, the idea of the
'public interest,' which is to correct perceived market
failure, is not "some abstract legalism," but it is "merely
a summation of individual's interests on some issue"
(p. 533) .
However, the interest group theory is not simply a
positive theory; it does have normative elements as well. 
Efficiency considerations are part of its normative goals. 
For example, Stigler (1978) argues that as long as a person 
is "free to choose methods of earning and spending, in­
creases in these sums imply widening domains of choice" 
(p. 214). A wider range of options leads to a greater 
earnings potential in general, as Stigler observes:
He may well find it most productive to specialize, 
say as a physician, but unless he is free to enter 
this (and other) occupations he cannot exploit his 
most favorable opportunities. If by luck or 
inheritance he is admitted to a sheltered, highly 
paid occupation, then most other people must be 
excluded from this occupation, and on average 
earnings in the society will be smaller than with 
free choice (because it is a condition for maximum 
output that men of equal ability earn equal 
amounts) (p. 213).
Stigler further explains that "A wider domain of choice is 
another way of saying that a person has more freedom or 
liberty" (p. 214). In this view, the distinction between 
wealth and liberty is not easily drawn.
It is further argued that, given this view of wealth, 
any increase in the wealth of individuals in a society will 
"increase the range of options available to the people in 
that society." Furthermore, if efficiency is equated with 
wealth maximization, then policy ought to be evaluated by 
its effect on the freedom of choice of individuals. Ineffi­
cient policies in this view constrain the range of options 
available to members of society, and thus reduce the 
aggregate wealth (p. 217) . As Buchanan has put it, "The 
market economy's socio-political function is that of
minimizing the necessity of resorting to internal ethical 
constraints on human behavior and/or external legal- 
governmental-political restrictions" (1974, p. 486).
The interest group theory argues that the goals of 
regulation ought to be both efficiency and liberty. However, 
the model finds that in practice allocative efficiency is 
not the goal of regulators. Father, they implement regula­
tions which redistribute income to various interest groups 
at the expense of the larger segments of society who find it 
either not rewarding enough or too difficult to organize and 
resist the enactment of the regulatory legislation. Given 
this outcome that is unsatisfactory from a normative 
standpoint, constraints must be placed on rent-seeking 
regulatory activity to improve the regulatory process. There 
could be changes in the political rules, for example by 
changing "the reward structure of the regulators" (Elzinga, 
1980, p. 119), making their compensation unrelated to their 
services to the regulated professionals or labor groups; or 
this might be achieved by constitutional changes that 
circumvent the capture problem by modifying the pattern of 
interest group representation. Or it could be argued that 
the special interests are too strong for democratic forms of 
government so that regulators should be replaced by a strong 
scientific commission to regulate the provision of profes­
sional services or the activity of labor groups.
III. THE INTERACTION OF THE MODELS
More recent studies in the literature have raised some
questions about the relationship between the market failure
and interest group theories of regulation. Is there any
allowance for public interest regulation in any form in the
modern approach?
Several recent studies suggest there is some movement
towards reconciliation of the two models. Peltzman (1981)
contends that there is a "creeping realism" in modern
approaches to regulation, arising out of a dissatisfaction
with the interest group model in explaining some aspects of
the behavior of regulatory agencies (particularly with
regards to the new 'social' regulation). This new attempt at
a synthesis seeks "to integrate some of the newer economics
of political decisionmaking with some of the elements of the
older normative economics of regulation" (p. 372).
In the more recent studies of regulation, the older
"welfare economics" or market failure approach is called
upon to justify regulatory intervention, but "the resulting
real-world institution then must bend to the realities of
politics." In this case Peltzman observes that "nothing so
simple as a 'public' interest or a 'producer* interest is
going to predominate" (p. 372) . There is a pattern then to
the new research on regulation, as Peltzman explains:
Select an area where producer protection has 
seemed important (for example, licensing, minimum 
price, or entry regulation) ; then show that there 
is a potential market failure that makes it 
credible for a coalition of producers and consu­
mers, not merely the producers alone, to seek 
regulation. Or, reverse the pattern: Select an 
area, such as pollution, where market failure had 
seemed the most compelling force for regulation; 
then show how regulation of the market failure can 
be structured to serve a producer interest at the 
same time, and thereby enhance the survival value 
of the regulatory institutions (p. 375).
The theoretical grounding of this new approach to explaining 
regulation lies in the implicit insertion of "specific 
allocative outcomes into the relevant objective function of 
regulators" (p. 381).
This new research into regulation is consistent with 
the developments in the modern interest group theory we have 
observed thus far, namely that labor, business and consumer 
groups each may have an incentive to organize, "both to 
obtain the gains and to avoid the losses from a whole menu 
of government enactments." As the underlying costs of (and 
demand for) regulation shift, there will be corresponding 
changes in the gains and losses going to these different 
groups. As one example, new technology "may render existing 
government regulations undesirable to their prior benefi­
ciaries or make current regulations useful to groups 
previously not benefited" (McChesney, p. 101).
Becker (1983) utilizes a model that is consistent with 
the desire of private interests for new regulation along the 
lines of the synthesis which Peltzman has described. While 
in Peltzman's generalization of the interest group theory 
the active agent is the regulator, Becker sees the active 
agents as interest groups. Interest groups (made up of
individuals defined by characteristics such as occupation, 
industry, income, geography, and age) "use political 
influence to enhance the well-being of their members" 
(p. 372). In Becker's analysis "groups compete within the 
context of rules that translate expenditures on political 
pressure into political influence and access to political 
resources" (p. 374). The political instruments that are used 
to raise the welfare of the more influential pressure groups 
include taxes, subsidies, and regulations; "competition 
among these groups for political influence determines the 
equilibrium structure" of these political favors (p. 372).
These groups recognize that gaining a favor from the 
state "almost always imposes a cost on some other group(s), 
both in direct transfers and in deadweight losses" (Romer 
and Rosenthal, p. 80). Becker contends that deadweight 
costs, "the distortions in the use of resources induced by 
different taxes and subsidies," play a major part in "the 
competition for political influence" because they "stimulate 
efforts by taxed groups to lower taxes, but discourage 
efforts by subsidized groups to raise subsidies" (p. 373). 
He adds that taxpayers have an "intrinsic" advantage in 
terms of impact on the structure of regulations as a con­
sequence of the fact that "deadweight costs encourage 
pressure by taxpayers and discourage pressure by recipients" 
(p. 381).
Becker finds that political equilibrium depends on 
several factors: "the efficiency of each group in producing
pressure, the effect of additional pressure on their 
influence, the number of persons in different groups, and 
the deadweight costs of taxes and subsidies." The cost of 
controlling free riding among group members partly deter­
mines the level of efficiency in producing pressure:19 
"Greater control over free riding raises the optimal 
pressure by a group and thus increases its subsidy or 
reduces its taxes" (p. 395).
As Romer and Rosenthal observe, the heart of Becker's 
argument is that "competition for political influence will 
lead to a policy bundle that accomplishes a given level of 
redistribution in such a way that deadweight losses are 
minimized." Becker assumes that political groups are fully 
informed about the true costs and benefits of all policies; 
as they explain, "Since deadweight losses increase opposi­
tion to any particular group's subsidy, without increasing 
that group's gains, it is in the interest of pressure groups 
to lobby for subsidies that have, ceteris paribus. low 
deadweight losses." Political competition in equilibrium 
eliminates the most wasteful policies, but not all dead­
weight losses (p. 80).
Consistent with the new synthesis, Becker argues that 
his model "does not emphasize political redistribution of 
income at the expense of political increases in efficiency."
19 Besides its impact on free riding, the size of a 
group also influences efficiency "because small groups may 
not be able to take advantage of scale economies in the 
production of pressure" (Becker, p. 395).
In regards to market failures, Becker argues that "political
policies that raise efficiency are more likely to be adopted
than policies that lower efficiency." Policies that increase 
efficiency are likely to be the winners in the competition 
for influence "because they produce gains rather than 
deadweight costs, so that groups benefited have the intrin­
sic advantage compared to groups harmed." He thinks his 
model "can unify the view that governments correct market 
failures and what has seemed to be a contrary view that
governments favor the politically powerful" (p. 384); his 
model shows that both outcomes "are produced by competition 
among pressure groups for political favors" (p. 396).
Keeler (1984) offers another example of a modern 
approach which claims that regulation is motivated by a 
combination of public interest and special interest con­
cerns. He utilizes the Peltzman version of the interest 
group theory and extends it to integrate several market
failure considerations. He argues that his version explains 
both regulation and deregulation in three industries 
(railroads, airlines, and telecommunications) better than 
the simple interest group theory alone (p. 105).
Keeler observes that the market failure theory points 
to the exhaustion of scale economies as a reason for 
deregulation, but takes no account of the special-interest 
considerations emphasized by the interest group theory. As 
we have noted, Peltzman's model "explicitly assumes constant 
returns to scale with no externalities or indivisibilities."
Thus, as Keeler observes, "an unregulated marketplace will 
generate the most efficient results and a regulator will 
likely reduce efficiency" (p. 122). Moreover, Peltzman 
pictures various interest groups vying for economic wealth 
by trying to control the regulatory process: "It is in this 
way that, de facto. Congress and its appointed regulators 
maximize political support"; any one regulator will utilize 
regulation "to redistribute income, reducing economic 
efficiency in the process" {pp. 123, 137).
Keeler posits a situation in which a regulator faces 
market failure, such as economies of scale, "so that 
marginal cost pricing would not necessarily recover total 
costs without subsidies" (p. 137). In this case, Keeler 
shows that a regulator striving to maximize political 
support can enhance economic efficiency through enacting 
regulation (or harm it; the harm "depends on the extent 
to which political support is concentrated among users of 
particular products, making inefficient transfers attrac­
tive"). But the point Keeler emphasizes is that both 
economies of scale and voter coalitions matter to this 
regulator; under increasing returns, he could "behave 
remarkably like a public-interest-oriented regulator" 
(p. 128) . Keeler explains the distinctives of his model in 
this regard:
. . . it is as if the governmental authority is
aware not only of the political support available 
from redistributing rents but also of the extra 
support it will get from enhancing economic 
efficiency through increasing either consumer or
producer surplus. Since it is well-known among 
economists that, in the presence of scale econo­
mies or externalities, well-being can be enhanced 
by government intervention, it follows immediately 
that an economically rational regulatory policy, 
even if it maximizes support among interest 
groups, will not ignore the extra surplus which 
can be gained by scale economies and externali­
ties, as would a public-interest-oriented regula­
tor (p. 123) .
Keeler focuses on deregulation of the three industries using 
these results, and goes on to show that even a regulator 
behaving under the case of no market failure "will have an 
incentive to reduce regulation if the efficiency cost of 
regulation increases (because of shifts in costs, demand, or 
technology)" (p. 138). A regulatory system which strives to 
maximize political support "will not throw away producer or 
consumer surplus without political gain, and efficiency 
considerations are not irrelevant" (p. 136).
The acknowledgment that both allocative and distribu­
tive concerns may matter in regulation is one key feature of 
our survey of theories of economic regulation. Other facets 
of the discussion stand out as well. They can be highlighted 
as we consider the key elements to be applied to our expla­
nation of the development of the conspiracies in restraint 
of trade doctrine in England and America in three different 
historical periods.
In applying the model of market failure, we will seek 
to discover in what ways the concepts of imperfect informa­
tion and externalities find application to regulation, 
particularly in regards to guild behavior. We will consider
the utilization of the concept of unequal bargaining power 
in explaining how labor law approached the questions of the 
right of labor unions to organize, the ineans which unions 
could utilize to achieve their purposes, and the place of 
collective bargaining. Along with these issues, we also 
consider other legal and economic principles which were used 
in the regulation of combinations of workers, such as 
restraint of trade and freedom of association, in light of 
the normative value of character formation set forth by the 
liberty and virtue component.
In addition, we consider the features of the demand and 
supply for regulation as found in the interest group theory. 
How well do the particular characteristics of labor markets 
and organized labor coalitions in relation to other interest 
groups explain statutory and common-law labor market 
regulation in the three periods? We will also utilize the 
elements of the rent-seeking component in regards to the 
role of monarchs and legislators in supplying regulation and 
the function of the judiciary in providing durability to the 
"deals" reached between legislators and organized interest 
groups in the labor market.
These elements of our survey then are some of the 
salient points of the models of economic regulation which 
will be utilized in our explanation of the development of 
the economic conspiracy doctrine as applied to the labor 
market. Since we have seen that regulators may be driven by 
both allocative and distributive concerns, it is likely that
neither the market failure nor the interest group theory 
will completely explain any one regulatory approach by a 
particular policymaker(s) in a particular era in a particu­
lar country. Yet our discussion of the two models, espe­
cially as they apply to the regulation of labor market 
combinations, leads us to expect they will find fruitful 
application in analyzing the changing ways in which the 
concepts of restraint of trade, legal privileges, and legal 
immunities were related to the economic conspiracy doctrine 
over time.
RESTRAINT OF TRADE IN THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW, 1500-1628
The models of economic regulation described in chapter 
one give some alternative frameworks to explain the approach 
taken in the English common law to labor market regulation. 
This chapter will apply the models to late sixteenth- and 
early seventeenth-century English labor legislation and 
court rulings. The primary focus will be on the legal and 
economic viewpoint of Sir Edward Coke, the most significant 
common law jurist of this era. In his approach we see the 
development of the concept of restraint of trade from its 
late medieval origins. It supplies a key element to the 
doctrine of conspiracy in restraint of trade which is 
applied in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to labor 
combinations.
The common law treatment of labor evolves over the 
period from 1400 until the middle of the seventeenth 
century. During this period the common law doctrine relating 
to restrictions of trade reflects economic developments as 
well as changing ideas of public policy.
In this chapter, various aspects of the guild system 
are examined, including the economic factors affecting the 
operations and status of guilds in sixteenth- and seven­
teenth-century England. Guild behavior was regulated by 
means of the common law; it punished guilds which raised 
prices too high or were unnecessarily exclusionary. These 
were practices which violated the substantive ends that
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guilds were supposed to serve. The concepts of conspiracy 
and restraint of trade and their merger into a common law 
doctrine originate in such concerns. This is part of the 
treatment of common-law rulings and legislation addressing 
guilds and corporations from the 1300s until the 1600s.
The common law exhibited an inherent hostility against 
trade restraint. As Holdsworth observes, from the middle of 
the fourteenth century onwards there is legal authority "for 
the principle that all persons ought to be allowed to carry 
on their trades freely," subject only to any regulations 
"which might be imposed by the common law or by statute 
law." The common law gave every man the right to practice 
his trade as he pleased, "free from arbitrary restrictions 
not recognized by law, whether those restrictions were im­
posed by the illegal actions of officials of the local or 
central government, or by the lawless acts of rivals in 
trade." At the same time, the state found it necessary to 
to impose regulations in order to secure the honest manufac­
ture of goods and skill among artisans in order to promote 
the public interest (1934, p. 369).
In the context of certain restrictive guild practices 
in the late sixteenth century, the common law right to 
pursue one's trade was broadened in a series of cases asso­
ciated with Sir Edward Coke (1552-1634). Coke is known as 
the outstanding jurist and statesman of the common law in 
his day. As Little notes, Coke "struck the path along which
the law would move for some time to come'1 (p. 173).1 More 
specifically, his decisions on the law of guilds and 
corporations in relation to freedom of trade and monopoly 
set the mold for legal interpretation for many generations 
to come. The approach taken to labor market regulation by 
the common law, and Coke's particular application of the 
principles of the common law, thus take on added signifi­
cance for an understanding of the development of this field 
of economic thought.
No little controversy has brewed over the basis for 
Coke's rulings and the implications for the common law 
approach to economic regulation. He has been seen as the 
promoter, either indirectly or directly, of economic 
liberalism in England. Heckscher (1935), Nef (1940), and 
Lipson (1961) argued that Coke's views foreshadow the rise 
of classical economic liberalism. They most often appealed 
to his narrow interpretation of laws regulating apprentice­
ship, his use of the concept of 'free trade,' and his 
disapproval of monopolies.
Wagner (1935, 1937) went further and interpreted Coke's
legal decisions as the work of a self-conscious economic 
liberal. Responding to Tawney's (1925) claim that the common 
law contributed to "the rise of economic individualism in
1 According to the legal historian Thorne, there was no 
other English judge "whose absence would have had more 
serious effects on the course of English law" (pp. 237-238). 
Following Coke, Lord Mansfield and Sir William Blackstone 
were important eighteenth-century jurists of the common law.
England" (p. 13) , Wagner claimed that what Coke and many 
common lawyers of his time in fact did wan reshape the 
common law in conscious anticipation of laissez-faire 
precepts. Wagner argued that the medieval common law had 
sanctioned monopolies, and Coke purposely misrepresented 
common law precedent in order to hold them illegal.2
Hill (1965) followed Wagner's understanding of Coke's 
rulings, and pictured Coke in league with other members of 
Parliament and the Puritans who sought common law sanction 
for their demands for free trade. Hill argued that "Coke's 
unspoken assumption that men have a right to do what they 
will with their own persons and skills represents the thread 
of continuity running through all his decisions. It explains 
his campaign for economic liberalism" (pp. 236-237).
Malament (1967) has challenged all of these related 
interpretations of Coke's thought. She affirms that Coke 
must be understood as a man of the Tudor age, concerned to 
maintain stability and not to introduce laissez-faire 
notions into the legal system. She feels that Wagner in 
particular mistakenly evaluated Coke's citations of prece­
dent in terms of preconceived, modern notions of 'free
2 Thorne (1957) endorsed the nation that Coke set forth 
'new' views on the regulation of trade "disguised in the 
clothes of the past" (p. 230) . Following this same line of 
thought, Letwin (1965) has argued that Coke directed a 
fundamental change in the common law away from an economic 
order based on privilege and the exclusive powers of 
guilds. Letwin contends that the common law changed direc­
tion beginning in the late sixteenth century, when jurists 
such as Coke began to nullify trade restraints.
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trade.1 Coke did not purposely attempt to weaken the 
enforcement of statutory regulations, distort precedent or 
arbitrarily impose his own views of 'liberty* in opposition 
to monopolies. Instead, Coke "drew upon the common law bias 
against individual forms of trade intervention and applied 
it to exclusive privileges conferred by the Crown"
(p. 1345).
Little (1969) has claimed that Coke's appeal to the 
common law in support of his objection to monopolies 
reflects an inherent tension in his thought. Little argues 
that there was not one consistent set of ideas at work in 
Coke's mind; indeed, there is a larger measure of ambiguity 
in the provisions Coke makes for guild regulation than 
Malament allows for.3 Coke decided in many cases against
3 Little argues further that the ambiguities reflected 
in the opinions of Coke "cannot properly be understood apart 
from the deep-seated antagonisms between Anglicanism and 
Puritanism and the divergent patterns of order they repre­
sent" (p. 30). Coke, though a strong Anglican, personifies 
both of these opposing tendencies. His rulings, in line with 
a spirit of free economic activity, are congruent with the 
Calvinist emphasis on the virtues of voluntary labor. None­
theless Coke believed he was upholding the traditional order 
of society in line with Anglican thought.
Little has contributed some powerful suggestions for 
further study of the common themes in the views of labor 
promulgated by Coke and English Puritans such as William 
Perkins. Coke had a passion equal to that of Perkins for an 
economic society in which men are not constrained in the 
exercise of their calling. In the English Puritans, who 
followed in the theological footsteps of Luther and Calvin, 
one finds a similar appeal to the virtues of voluntary 
labor. Another English Puritan, John Hooper, wrote that 
"unto every man is appointed his vocation; to one this, to 
another that; one to private, another to a public vocation; 
and each of them either is lawful or unlawful" (p. 456) . 
Little has shown how this emphasis on Christian freedom 
appeared to be closely aligned with the movement towards
"the long-existing political and economic controls." 
However, he also tried "to find a basis for these decisions 
in the feudal traditions of English corporation law and to 
harmonize his revolutionary 'Elizabethan ideas' with 
remnants and vestiges of medieval group life" (p. 31).
White (1979) focuses primarily on the parliamentary 
activity of Coke from 1621 to 1628 rather than his court 
rulings. He finds that Coke "was more generally opposed to 
monopolistic trading practices than Malament suggests" 
(p. 119, n.144). White believes that Coke made the concept
that 'trade should be free* into "a common-law maxim," while 
at the same time holding to the necessity of 'government of 
trade' (p. 113) .
A recent study of economic activity during the 'mercan­
tilist era' in England and France relies upon the rent- 
seeking component as an explanation of the internal economic 
regulation practiced in these countries. Ekelund and 
Tollison (1981) focus on the gains to economic agents of 
using the Tudor and Stuart state to acquire monopoly rents 
by obtaining royal patents. They understand Coke's rulings 
in regards to monopoly patents as "a telling example of the 
duplicity with which common law jurists approached free 
trade" (p. 54). In their view, Coke was especially concerned
more economic freedom in early seventeenth-century England. 
Hill has noted the closely related development of the 
doctrine of the dignity of labor in Puritans such as 
Perkins, John Preston, Dod and Clever, and Richard Baxter 
(1975, p. 234).
to insist that rights over trade were reserved to Parliament 
and not to the crown; he acknowledged the legitimacy of rent 
seeking, and sought to insure that Parliament be the 
recognized regulator of trade with the authority to collect 
rents, rather than the monarch.
There is no doubt some degree of viability in the 
interest group interpretation of the common law regulations. 
Coke was not a rigorous economic analyst. He was not trying 
to explain regulation in terms of economic theory. Rather, 
he was a practicing judge and legislator, and as such not an 
impartial observer of market or government behavior. His 
understanding of regulation promoting the 'public interest' 
must be considered carefully in this light.
Thus one must be cautious in examining Coke's treatment 
of labor market regulation. One obtains Coke's approach to 
regulation by examining his court rulings and statements in 
Parliament on guild by-laws and royal patents of monopoly, 
not by analyzing any lengthy discourse on the topic. At the 
same time, as White observes, throughout much of his career, 
"Coke was frequently involved in the process of economic 
administration." He became "well acquainted with the affairs 
of various London trade companies while acting in the 
capacities of private counsel, administrative arbitrator, 
and legal officer of the crown," Moreover, he investigated 
many economic problems as advisor and then member of the 
Privy Council, some of which involved manufacturing and 
marketing disputes over the trade privileges of boroughs and
corporations (pp. 284-285).4
There is a greater measure of coherence in Coke1s 
writings than several of these interpretations are willing 
to concede. Coke did legitimately find 'a bias against trade 
restraint* in past common law precedents which he applied to 
private trade restrictions and royal grants of privilege 
outside the guild system. Coke's rulings do not represent a 
radical departure from precedent, but instead are consistent 
with the regulations in the late medieval common law 
prohibiting attempts by guilds to artificially restrain 
trade to their own advantage.
Moreover, Coke cannot be set in the mold of forerunner 
to classical liberalism, nor is he correctly seen as simply 
an agent of Parliament defending its right to be the source 
of labor market regulation. Instead, it is better to under­
stand Coke as a common law jurist utilizing the distinction 
between arbitrary restraints and legitimate regulation of 
trade which is imbedded in the late medieval common law. 
Coke recognizes the efforts of guild artisans as organized 
coalitions to convince public authorities of the benefits to 
society of regulation and/or the deleterious consequences 
for the public health, safety, and welfare of relaxing 
controls on whoever may practice their trade. Coke invali­
dates guild ordinances which utilize such arguments to arbi­
4 Some examples include the making of glass, salt, and 
sail cloth, and abuses in the licensing of butchers and 
poulterers (White, pp. 286-287).
trarily exclude craftsmen from trades. But he upholds guild 
ordinances which are made for the 'good order and governance 
of trade.' Coke endorses the Statute of Artificers with its 
regulations designed to promote full employment, a lowering 
of the rate of vagrancy, and high standards of industrious­
ness and craftmanship. These features of character formation 
shape Coke's contribution to the development of the common 
law right of freedom to pursue one's trade.
In the eighteenth century, common law jurists began to 
hold that combinations entered into with the intention of 
depriving persons of freedom of trade were indictable 
conspiracies at common law. A consideration of Coke's 
approach to labor market regulation will enable us to better 
understand the late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century 
origins of this doctrine. We begin with an examination of 
the guild system and its relation to the late medieval 
common law.
I. THE ECONOMIC AND LEGAL BACKGROUND TO RESTRAINT OF TRADE 
The English "common law" takes its name from the fact 
that as the law of the royal court, it superimposed a unity 
on nearly all of the petty local and tribal peculiarities of 
which the law at the time of the Norman Conquest was full.
It became the one law common to all the realm. It is the law 
based on customs of the realm, embracing "those rules of 
civic conduct which originated in the common wisdom and 
experience of society, became in time established customs,
and finally received judicial sanction and affirmance in the 
decisions of the courts of the last resort" (Maitland and 
Montague, p. 213).
In regards to the common law treatment of economic 
activity, it is especially significant to observe its 
characteristic of flexibility. The evolution of the common 
law doctrine relating to restrictions of trade reflects 
economic developments, as well as changing ideas of public 
policy (Thorelli, p. 13). The common law evolved as the 
guild system changed over the period of the fourteenth 
through the sixteenth century.
A. THE GUILDS
In late medieval England, economic activity was 
organized around several different types of guilds. There 
were frith guilds (associations to promote stability in the 
private ownership of land); social-religious guilds; 
ecclesiastical guilds; and trade guilds. The four classes 
are not exclusive; for example, all guilds possessed 
religious and fraternal elements (Davis, 1, p. 130). Trade 
guilds consisted of merchant guilds and craft guilds. Kahl 
explains that a guild merchant was "an association of local 
craftsmen and of owners of the land on which the town was 
built."5 The craft guild was composed of artisans who "made
5 The merchant guilds were either replaced by the craft 
guilds, or were merged into the borough during the fifteenth 
and sixteenth centuries (Cooke, p. 31).
or processed goods with their own hands and offered them for 
sale in shops or at the weekly fair of the town." Such craft 
guilds "produced luxury wares or cloth and leather goods"; 
they were "goldsmiths, skinners, drapers, tailors, and 
saddlers." They raised capital, hired workmen, provided raw 
materials, and marketed the finished products (pp. 1-2). 
Clarkson notes that these guilds had grown up and flourished 
in the Middle Ages; and "by 1500 every borough in England 
possessed at least one such guild and sometimes a dozen or 
more" (p. 103).6
Guilds obtained their authority from one of two 
sources: either "from charters of incorporation granted by 
the town" or from charters gained "directly from the 
monarch" (Clarkson, p. 103). The grants from the king "often 
merely confirmed existing guild privileges for which there 
was independent authority in law or immemorial custom" 
(Thorelli, p. 21).7 As an example, in the reign of Henry VI, 
it became a common practice to grant charters to the London 
craft guilds. The charters "endowed the corporate structure, 
which the fourteenth-century craftsmen had developed through
6 Guilds were not always composed of the same type of 
craftsmen, as Clarkson explains: "In the larger towns most
crafts had their own gilds but in smaller places kindred 
occupations shared a common organization; and sometimes, 
when the total number of craftsmen was very small, complete­
ly different crafts combined together into a single gild" 
(p. 103) .
7 Thorelli observes that "Sometimes, however, such 
grants represented an enlargement of existing privileges or 
the creation of new ones" (p. 21).
a tradition of piety and charity, with privileges of 
regulating apprenticeship, prices, wages, and the quality of 
production . . ." (Kahl, p. 2).8 Guilds had the right to
issue by-laws which were for the proper 'ordering' of a 
trade; in this manner many trades were governed by self- 
regulation.
By obtaining their privileges from the king, guilds had 
an exclusive jurisdiction over their crafts within the 
limits of the town. The right to regulate the affairs of 
their members "by means of by-laws and resolutions had been 
attached to corporations in Roman law and appeared in 
English law at a very early period. The by-laws of a town 
were binding on all within its limits," and similarly guild 
by-laws were binding on all its members (Cooke, p. 69). The 
ordinances of craft guilds were aimed at promoting the 'good 
order and government' of their trade. There were ordinances 
drawn up to protect the public from poor quality and high 
prices; these stipulations governed standard of quality, 
apprenticeship, conditions of sale, and the position of 
foreigners.
Under their by-laws guild officials monitored workman­
ship and punished poor craftmanship (Cooke, p. 29). They 
would issue seals of approved work. They also had the
8 The perpetual, corporate character of the craft 
guilds was retained by regulated companies such as the 
Merchant Adventurers' Company of 1567 as well as "joint- 
stock companies like the Russia Company, first chartered in 
1555 . . . "  (Kahl, p. 3).
authority to search houses, shops, and stalls of all who 
practiced their trade for inferior or fraudulent wares, 
short weights and measures, and evidence of forestalling and 
high prices (Kahl, pp. 2, 15). The workshop of every guild
member was to be open to the guild officers at all times 
(Cooke, p. 29) . Thus the guilds regulated the production 
and marketing of the town workshops.
Guilds strived to provide for the training of future 
generations of craftsmen; they were the guardians of craft 
tradition. Nearly all craftsmen maintained one or two 
apprentices who gave cheap labor in return for the secrets 
of the craft. Prospective craftsmen faced apprenticeship 
rules. As originally instituted apprenticeship was often 
seen as an efficient means of what might be designated 
'technology transfer'; knowledge of the techniques of the 
'mystery' could be readily conveyed in the guild. Morris 
notes that "the indentures of apprenticeship obligated the 
master to employ the apprentice in his trade, generally 
narrowly construed, and to teach him its 'mysteries. ' In 
turn the apprentice promised not to reveal his master's 
trade secrets" (p. 378). The requirements of apprenticeship 
served as a more efficient means of transfer of technical 
skills than simple employer-employee relationships.
This system was intimately linked with the guild desire 
to maintain the quality of their product and thus maintain 
the integrity of the craft, as well as to limit competition 
between its members. Gregg explains some aspects of craft
ordinances in this regard:
The use of good materials was enjoined, and 
satisfactory conditions of production were 
insisted upon. Night work was prohibited - in the 
uncertain light of candles faults would escape 
notice and bad work pass for good; nor was holiday 
work permitted, perhaps on the grounds that the 
disgruntled or tired worker would not produce his 
best, perhaps to prevent the over-industrious from 
stealing a inarch on his more pleasure-loving 
competitors, perhaps for religious observance, 
perhaps merely to protect the rights of the 
apprentice (p. 131).
Not only did guilds seek to safeguard their trade's pros­
perity by ensuring proper materials and working conditions, 
they also prohibited "workmen whose capacity was unknown to 
work in the town until their efficiency had been proved"
(Hibbert, pp. 45-46).
'Freemen' were allowed to participate in the city's 
privileges, while 'foreigners' were not. Freemen were those 
who had finished their apprenticeship in the town and were 
citizens as well, while foreigners did not meet this 
criterion (Heckscher, 1, p. 224, 305). Ashley argues that
the clause in guild charters prohibiting any person from 
interfering with the mystery did not originally have an
exclusionary purpose, but it could be put to that use:
It is very likely that at first the terms of
admission were easy, and that the clause was 
inserted not in order to exclude rival craftsmen, 
but in order to force all craftsmen to join the 
association; although as early as 1321 the London 
weavers were accused of misusing this power to
demand heavy entrance-fees, and thereby unduly 
limit the number of licensed workmen (2, p. 75).
Postan observes that the guilds also gave preference to sons
of members as a means of limiting entry, but the apprentice­
ship rules constituted the central limitations. Achievement 
of the freeman status was not easy: after the long 
(typically seven years) apprenticeship period, an examina­
tion (the 'master* test) had to be passed, and "in the later 
Middle Ages young men without connections or funds often 
found it difficult to set up as masters even after they had 
passed their tests, and stayed on in their professions as 
'journeymen' or 'yeomen'" (p. 216). Of course, those who had 
not achieved such a status in a town were in an inferior 
position, being denied the ability to practice their trade; 
the disabilities imposed on 'foreigners' served to hinder 
the mobility of labor and capital, "by placing impediments 
in the way of those who sought to follow their occupation in 
another locality" (Lipson, 3, p. 344).
There are several ways to understand guild behavior. 
One can focus on the control of membership, conditions of 
apprenticeship, and hours and standards of work (Palliser, 
p. 240) as typical cartel behavior. Guilds preserved trade 
for themselves by being "slow to admit new members and quick 
to harry non-members who tried to trade in areas or goods 
regarded by the gilds as their own preserve" (Clarkson, 
p. 103). In this view guild practices were designed to 
secure the incomes of its members by regulating the supply 
of labor and the level of wages.
While recognizing that guild ordinances served these 
ends, they also should be seen in the light of a broader 
rationale. They were fashioned in a framework in which the
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various members of society were understood to be organically
dependent upon each other. Limitations on competition from
within and outside the guild were thought to best uphold
this relationship. As Appleby has observed, guild by-laws
recognized the artisan's function as critically interrelated
to others in the community:
A body of craftsmen was first of all a body of 
household heads whose families and apprentices 
depended upon a regular and regularized trade. The 
pitting of skilled workman against skilled workman 
would neither promote the practice of their craft 
nor the well-being of their households. Restric­
tions drawn up by companies of craftsmen and 
honored by the law supplied the direction sure to 
be lost if every one looked out for himself
(p. 28).
The broader purpose of the guild ordinances was often seen 
in terms of the organic body analogy. It was used to support 
the notion of order and certainty in feudal life.9 McNulty 
describes the main metaphor of this viewpoint: "Society was 
seen as a functioning organism in which each individual and 
group, like the various parts and organs of the human body, 
had its own function to perform" (p. 16) . Tawney adds that 
this perspective saw society as "held together by a system
9 The operation of the guild was consistent with what 
Thorelli calls "the quasi-feudal principle of status." 
Individuals could "acquire a status by learning a particular 
trade"; and within the status "the customs and rules of
the guild governed his activities" (p. 13). The economic
changes of the sixteenth century eventually led to signifi­
cant institutional disruption in regard to status. This 
great change in English society has been famously described, 
first by Sir Henry Sumner Maine (1901), as the movement from 
the status to contract form of organization; the decay of 
the guild organization in the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries comes within the scope of this rule (Cooke,
p. 29) .
of mutual, though varying, obligations'* (1962, p. 25).
The guilds were seen as performing certain integral 
functions in this body beyond economic sustenance. Guild 
by-laws were originally fashioned "in the light of a public 
service.” Their "industry” was essentially an "art,” or a 
"profession." Compulsory training was seen to protect "both 
the interests of the public and the interests of the skilled 
worker" (Lipson, 3, pp. 292-293). But the 'public good* was 
not understood to be simply sufficient product quality. The 
guild was also understood to be a training ground for 
obedience to God. While the guild satisfied economic needs, 
it claimed to subordinate them to spiritual interests. To 
the members of the guild "the social and spiritual were 
inextricably intertwined" (Tawney, 1962, p. 27).
The institutional roots of the English craft guilds can 
be traced to the parish guilds, which were unions of 
parishioners organized around their churches for miscella­
neous activities of mutual interest. Postan has noted that
In urban conditions the territorial scope of the 
parish gilds could easily be professionalized, 
since medieval craftsmen belonging to the same 
occupation tended to reside in the same neighbour­
hoods. In dealing with matters of common interest 
urban parish gilds would therefore find it only 
too easy to take action in matters concerning the 
parishioner's occupation, and in this way provide 
the cell from which the craft gilds proper were to 
develop (p. 217).
Various facets of craft guild life reflected its roots in
the parish guild. Kahl has observed that the members of
craft guilds were typically devoted to a patron saint; "they
regularly attended mass and thereafter dined together. They
assumed the responsibility of mutual assistance and provided
for their aged, poor, and disabled brethren” (p. 2). Sylvia
Thrupp further explains that
many trade gilds were based upon a fraternity life 
similar to that of the parish gilds. In common 
with the latter they gave expression not only to 
religious faith and conviviality but also to 
certain social needs and ideals . . . Industrial
gilds, for example, were at pains to cultivate a 
spirit of thrift and temperance and to discourage 
idleness. Brethren of their fraternities were 
eligible for relief only if their need were the 
result of circumstances beyond their control 
(p. 172).
Idleness meant one was not sustaining their calling from 
God. The discipline and rigor expected of guild members was 
part of their spiritual duties to God and their obligations 
to the community.
In sum, it is important to recognize that while guilds 
were units of functional economic organisation, they were 
also the "social foci of civic ceremony and ritual” (Cole­
man, 1975, p. 20). Guilds supplied their vocational training 
in an atmosphere that nurtured the cultivation of civic and 
moral virtues.10 Guild practices designed to deter sloth and 
wastefulness not only inculcated skill in producing quality 
products, but also dutifulness towards God and others. As 
will be seen, in their decline guilds moved away from these 
ends to fashion ordinances which were strictly restrictive 
in purpose. In doing so guild by-laws came to clash with the
10 Bernard Bailyn (1972) has shown how this was also 
true of early American craft apprenticeship.
common law, which found some of the ordinances to be 
arbitrary restraints on trade and not legitimate regulation 
in line with the true ends guilds were designed to serve.
B. REGULATION OF GUILD ACTIONS PRIOR TO THE 1560S
Guild activity from an early stage was subject to 
statutory and common law regulation. The common law regula­
tion was based on the customs of the realm. The statutory 
regulation often reflected the responses of legislators to 
economic events or circumstances. Legislation sought to 
promote order and stability in the face of economic change.
One way to understand the treatment of guilds in the 
common law is based on what is seen as a particular under­
standing of liberty in the Middle Ages. The medieval idea of 
liberty meant guaranteed privileges for certain estates, 
groups or corporations. In fact, some students of the law 
have gone so far as to maintain that each and every trade 
everywhere in ancient England was a privilege. According to 
Boudin, when the common law was first "embodied in written 
records (the Year Books) in the later Middle Ages," trade 
was seen as a privilege; the king "was the only one who had 
a right to trade, unless he gave part of that right to 
someone in particular as a special privilege" (p. 15).
It is true that privilege was the rule where trade was 
"narrowly regulated by explicit provisions or immemorial 
custom recognized by law" (Thorelli, p. 21). Nonetheless, as 
Holdsworth observes, one of the principles of the medieval
common law, though stated somewhat vaguely and infrequently, 
was that "prima facie trade must be free" (4, p. 350). Every 
subject had a 'common law right' in the use of his trade. 
While this right typically "was both protected and regulated 
by bodies on which the average individual exercised but 
little influence," as Thorelli contends, the same person 
"was not bound by arbitrary restraints not recognized by the 
law, and in the absence of explicit restrictions known to 
the law freedom was presumed to prevail. This is the essence 
of the economic liberty enjoyed by Englishmen from time 
immemorial . . . "  (p. 21). The principle of 'freedom of 
trade' as understood in this sense constituted part of an 
"age-old Anglo-Saxon heritage" going back to the Magna 
Charta (Thorelli, p. 20).
The principle that trade ought to be free from arbi­
trary restraints was implied in the clauses of Magna Charta 
which related to the liberty of the subject. As reflected in 
various judicial decisions, medieval jurists were hostile to 
arbitrary restrictions on personal liberty for which no 
legal justification could be shown. One of the means that 
the common law adopted to safeguard this principle was by 
application of the law (or doctrine) of conspiracy in 
restraint of trade.
The concept of 'restraint of trade' as applied in the 
seventeenth-century common law is best understood in light 
of its medieval origins. Thorelli has argued that the term 
itself "originally referred to stipulations not to compete
constituting a part of a major transaction or contract." 
Covenants in restraint of trade could be ancillary to a main 
contract such as an employment or partnership contract. One 
common use was as an agreement among craftsmen in which an 
artisan would agree not to use his craft within a geographi­
cal area. In order to enter in the contract, perhaps to gain 
needed training or raw materials, the artisan would have to 
endorse the non-competing provision. From the fourteenth 
century on such contracts were viewed with suspicion in 
England, and generally regarded as unenforceable. They were 
objected to on the grounds that they led to the loss of the 
livelihood of the individual agreeing not to practice their 
trade, and that the public would be deprived of another 
practitioner of the craft (Thorelli, p. 17). In the four­
teenth and fifteenth centuries, it was quite difficult to 
practice one’s trade in another municipality without being 
apprenticed to the guilds in that locale. As Letwin argues, 
if the artisan sought to practice another trade, "he would 
have to pass through an apprenticeship for seven years, or 
with great difficulty and expense satisfy a guild that he 
was a master of its craft . . . ** (1965, p. 41) .
The common law doctrine of conspiracy first began to be 
formulated during the fourteenth century. It originally 
dealt with "certain crimes whose common characteristic was 
concerted action, agreement or plotting among several 
individuals with the purpose of either affecting the rights 
of a third party or interfering with the functions of
government or with the course of justice" (Thorelli, p. 28).
The conspiracy concept was only tangentially linked 
with restraint of trade in the fourteenth century. Over the 
next two hundred years the doctrine of "conspiracy in 
restraint of trade" evolved. The principle form of non- 
ancillary restrictions addressed by the doctrine involved 
agreements among combinations which limited, obstructed, or 
eliminated competition (Thorelli, p. 20). In regards to the 
labor market, the linkage came with the common law applying 
the doctrine to combinations of workers which agreed 
together not to sell their services at less than a certain 
price (Hutt, 1975b, p. 97). But it was in the eighteenth 
century that the doctrine became widely applied to such 
combinations.
Statutory and common law regulation of concerted 
economic activities by workers and employers began in the 
Middle Ages. The Statute of Laborers11 was the first English 
legislation regulating labor markets. Passed in 1349, it was 
aimed against the increase in wages which followed the Black 
Death. Workers were forbidden from accepting more than the 
statutorily stipulated wage, and employers were likewise 
forbidden from paying more than this wage (pp. 165-166) . 
Fourteenth and fifteenth-century cases in the English 
courts involving trade restrictions by concerted action were 
generally decided against the combinations, whether of
11 The complete text is found in Bland et al., pp. 164-
167.
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masters or laborers. These agreements might involve price or 
wage fixing, as well as limitations on output, working 
hours, or "other material restrictions on trade not sanc­
tioned by statutory law or guild privileges." At the extreme 
such restrictions were seen as criminal; but generally they 
were held to be against public policy and thus unlawful and 
void. The common law condemned restraints on trade "arbitra­
rily engineered by private parties" (Thorelli, pp. 27-28).
Beginning in the fourteenth century, guild ordinances
invalidated as "restraints on trade" are found in both the
records of court proceedings against certain guilds for
agreements to fix prices, and the statutory enactments along
the same lines. Jones notes several examples of complaints
against restrictive guild trade practices in the courts:
in London the weavers were in the early part of 
the fourteenth century indicted for restricting 
output. In 1327, complaint was made that the 
Saddlers 'by conspiracy and collusion among 
themselves have ordained . . . that no one of the
aforesaid trades shall be so daring as to sell any 
manner of merchandise that unto their own trade 
pertains either to freemen of the city or to other 
persons, but only to themselves in the business of 
saddlery.' In 1435, the ironworkers gild was 
dissolved because it monopolized the supply and 
lowered the quality of the iron, to the injury of 
the other crafts using it (1926, p. 928).
Several statutes prior to the sixteenth century
prohibited conspiracies to raise prices or wages, or
otherwise interfere with trade in a manner not publicly
sanctioned. Under Henry VI, an act of Parliament was passed
in 1437 on the national level to deal with guilds in a
broader fashion. It stated that the guilds "make themselves
many unlawful and unreasonable ordinances . . . for their
singular profit and common damage to the people." This act 
"provided that all gild ordinances must be submitted to the 
justices of the peace or the municipal authorities" (Jones, 
1926, pp. 928-929). This law resulted in a strict super­
vision of guild practices in many municipalities. Guilds 
could pass ordinances regulating the economic practices of 
their members; but, as Jones explains, "the town authorities 
could refuse approval to rules which were unduly restrictive 
of the rights of individuals, or prejudicial to the public 
interest" (1927, p. 370).
In 1504, there was a re-enactment of this bill under 
Henry VII. A law12 was passed condemning the unreasonable 
ordinances of the guilds and directing that all such 
ordinances should be submitted to certain judicial officials 
who were national officers. All the ordinances of crafts, 
mysteries, guilds, or fraternities were disallowed unless 
they were approved by the chancellor, treasurer, the chief 
justices or any three of them, or by both the judges of 
Assize for that county in which the ordinance had been made 
(p. 102).13 The king's court of law began to exercise 
control over guild regulations; the guilds and corporations
12 The text is found in Tawney and Power, l, pp. 101-
1 0 2.
13 In his position as a judge, Coke was often involved 
in the affairs of trade companies on the basis of this 
statute; in accordance with this act, he confirmed the 
ordinances of the Salters, Saddlers, and other companies 
(White, p . 285).
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acted under the authority of the State (Clark, pp. 85-86).
Thorelli has observed that prior to this time, the 
prohibitions of conspiracies to interfere with trade in a 
manner not publicly sanctioned were part of the general 
regulatory scheme of trades under the direction of guilds. 
Beginning with the sixteenth century, as combinations grew 
more frequent, such measures were increasingly set forth as 
separate enactments. For the most part, they were "declara­
tory of the common law" (p. 28) . An important example was
the Bill of Conspiracies of Victuallers and Craftsmen 
(1549).14 It provided that cooks and any related mystery or 
craft which combined to fix prices would be fined or impri­
soned. In fact, the statute dealt with most types of 
economic agreements to restrict prices, output, or hours of 
work. It applied to
. . . any artificers, workmen or laborers [who] do
conspire, covenant or promise together, or make 
any oaths, that they shall not make or do their 
works but at a certain price or rate, or shall not 
enterprise or take upon them to finish that 
another hath begun, or shall not do but a certain
work in a day, or shall not work but at certain
hours and times (p. 291).
Section 2 stated that any such group of craftsmen which
combined to raise prices would find its charter immediately
dissolved.
Section 4 dealt with private restraints on the practice 
of a trade. It stated that no one was to interfere with the
14 The complete text is found in Appendix 2, Dickman, 
pp. 2 91-29 2.
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right of a skilled craftsman to practice his trade:
. . . no person or persons shall at any time
. . . interrupt, deny, let or disturb any free­
mason, roughmason, carpenter, bricklayer, plas­
terer, joiner, hardhewer, sawyer, tiler, paver, 
glasier, lime-burner, brick-maker, tile-maker, 
plummer or labourer, born in this realm or made 
denizen, to work in any of the said crafts in any 
city, borough or town corporate, with any person 
or persons that will retain him or them, albeit 
the said person and persons so retained or any of 
them do not inhabit or dwell in the city, borough, 
or town corporate where he or they shall work, nor 
be free of the same city, borough, or town; any 
statute, law, ordinance, or other thing whatsoever 
had or made to the contrary in any wise notwith­
standing (p. 292) .
The violation of this provision led to a fine. The common
law set forth rulings on restraint of trade consistent with
these provisions in the sixteenth century.
Restraint of trade was considered unlawful because, as
Boudin observes, "trade was regulated either by custom or
by statute as far as the common law was aware." For that
very reason it was particularly opposed to an understanding
of liberty of contract "which would permit people to impose
or enforce regulations not imposed by the law, customary or
statutory, but by agreement among private parties." Boudin
explains that there were two reasons such regulations were
considered harmful to the public:
first, because the community was interested 
in everyone having a chance to make a liveli­
hood by the exercise of his 'lawful' trade, that 
is to say, the trade which the law or custom gave 
him the privilege or right to exercise. And, 
second, because combinations or conspiracies in 
restraint of trade had the baneful tendency to 
raise the price of commodities (p. 23).
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Thus consideration of the 'public interest' was part of
the common law rule against restraint of trade from its
origins. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries it was
invoked in respect to the skill of men of various trades.
Handicraft was the main feature of these trades:
The smith, the schoolmaster, the carrier, the
barber-surgeon, plied their callings; the baker, 
the tailor, the dyer, the furrier received 
materials from their customers and to their 
'order' fashioned articles . . . The rule against
restraints was an assertion that skills, occupa­
tions, mysteries, callings were affected with a
public interest (Hamilton, 1940, p. 27).
In this era the public interest essentially meant that some
limited right of craftsmen to compete in the provision of
their services must be insured. It is no doubt true that, as
Boudin observes,
the interest which the common law evinced in 
competition was not some abstract notion of the 
rights of individuals either to trade or to 
contract, but the practical concern, based upon 
solid experience, that the lack of competition 
among traders meant high prices to the public 
(p. 24) .
The common law rule against restraint of trade originally 
had this very practical and fairly narrow consideration in 
mind. Gradually the rule was broadened into a more complete 
liberty of the individual, though this freedom was never 
grounded in an abstract foundation of absolute "freedom of 
trade."
Thus another facet to the rule against restraint of 
trade was its connection to the broad animus against the 
withholding of necessary goods and services by individuals
104
or groups in the economy. These practices made them less 
readily available and expensive. This attitude against 
private attempts to manipulate the market was consistent 
with the traditional medieval teachings of the Scholastics. 
They had argued that attempts at artificial restraint on 
trade transgressed the norms of the organic, corporate view 
of society. While the Scholastics acknowledged the role of 
guilds in promoting spiritual concerns and inculcating 
virtue, they were also suspicious of guilds as combinations 
which could engage in monopolistic practices.
In Scholastic thought, any good could be subject to 
regulation in the public interest. Private commodities, the 
indifferent goods, were set by the competitive price, that 
is, the going market price.15 The boundaries of what were 
construed to be public commodities widened and narrowed to 
include or exclude particular goods (bread, corn, etc.) due 
to economic determinants (such as factor endowments in a 
particular area). Laws against forestalling, regrating, and
15 Viner rightly contends that the Scholastics main­
tained a largely favorable attitude toward markets:
. it was a violation of commutative justice to sell at 
a higher price or buy at a lower price than the 'just 
price,' which they explained as the price according to 
'common estimation.'" That is, this price was determined by 
"common estimation in or by the market." The "market" they 
referred to was a competitive market, operating under normal 
circumstances. ThiB understanding is shown by the Scholastic 
condemnation of monopolies. It is also seen in various 
"exceptions they made for appeal to official or non-market 
determination of prices when abnormal conditions, such as 
famine or siege, or unusual absence of business skills or 
lack of bargaining power, made particular individuals unable 
to cope adequately with market processes" (1960, p. 53) . On 
this issue, see Baldwin (1972) and De Roover (1951, 1955).
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engrossing reflected these concerns.
Each of these three economic offenses against the 
public was largely concerned with the market for "essential 
commodities.” Forestalling took place when one bought up 
food items or other products before they reached the market 
in order to obtain the commodities more cheaply than in the 
market itself. In this way one avoided "competitive bidding 
by means of private dealing." The prohibitions on fore­
stalling were designed to limit the sale of goods to "open 
markets" so as "to insure effective competition among both 
buyers and sellers." Engrossing was the act of "buying-up of 
the whole or a large part of a commodity by one or by a 
number of persons," so as to curtail its supply and enhance 
its price (Mund, pp. 43-45). Regrating was the act of buying 
a good and reselling it at a higher price in or near the 
same market in which it was originally purchased (Thorelli,
p. 16).
These offenses were prohibited due to the fear, 
"founded on practical experience," that since transportation 
conditions were limited, there might arise "local 'corners' 
in vital commodities" (Thorelli, p. 16). The poor communi­
cations, road conditions, and other irregularities in the 
late medieval economy certainly enhanced the viability of 
such activities. Statutes prohibiting these actions were 
typically "enacted in times of great scarcity and then 
remained in force after the immediate crisis" (Malament, 
pp. 1333-1334). Guilds in particular were regulated with
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these concerns in mind, and the engrossing of trade was the
primary offense that was penalized:
. . . despite the professed ideals of the guilds
there was always the possibility of the craft as a 
whole, or a group within the craft, succumbing to 
the temptation to engross trade and raise prices 
in a period of scarcity. In the brewers', the 
butchers', or the bakers' trades the guilds could 
not exercise their monopoly without considering 
the interests of the public. The notions of just 
price, the Church's injunctions on engrossing, and 
the more primitive and immediate demands of 
townspeople operated very forcefully to bring the 
activities of these guilds under the scrutiny of 
government (Kahl, p. 13).
Thus there was a significant tradition of common law
opposition to arbitrary trade restraints by private groups.
Guild by-laws could be invalidated by the common law where
they were seen as the means to engrossing the labor market
in a craft to a certain group to the arbitrary exclusion of
others. Economic changes in the sixteenth century which
produced increased guild efforts in this regard led to
further statutory and common law regulation.
C. THE STATUTE OF ARTIFICERS AND THE DECLINE OF THE GUILDS 
National legislation came to be applied to guild activi­
ties in the 1560s, due to the increasingly significant role 
of labor in the economy. In the sixteenth century, the 
guild's function in the economy was affected by various 
types of economic forces, many of which led to increasing 
underemployment and inconstancy of employment. A population 
growth approaching 1 per cent a year at its peak created a 
surplus of labor that agriculture proved unable to absorb
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(Palliser, p. 264). Short- and medium-term forces led these
workers to turn to urban areas for employment. Enclosure
played a key role in this regard, as Furniss has underlined:
The supply of labor was increasing as men ceased to 
work their holdings; the larger farm unit proved more 
economical of labor than had the form of organization
it superseded; and in many cases enclosure was the
occasion of the change from tillage to pasture with a 
lessened requirement of day labor. For all of these 
reasons a mass of labor for which no local employment 
was forthcoming began to accumulate in the villages; 
the industrial population of the rapidly growing 
manufacturing centers of the north was recruited from 
these sources, the shift in the center of the popula­
tion which took place at this time recording how the 
laborer who had lost his hold upon the land sought in 
distant markets for employment (pp. 220-221).
Other forces that led to inconstancy of employment included 
trade depressions, growing international competition, and 
warfare. But it would be a mistake to attribute the preva­
lent concern with labor on the part of Tudor policy-makers 
to merely short- or medium-term forces, especially to the 
exclusion of the enduring long-term forces (Coleman, 1956, 
p. 292) .
Coleman (1956) has emphasized that during the late
sixteenth century and throughout the seventeenth century, a
key feature of the English economy was that "labour was
easily the most important factor of production" (p. 287).
This is evident when one considers the nature of production
in both the primary and secondary sectors of the economy.
Most forms of industry were labor-intensive. Coleman
describes the key features of production processes:
Not only in food production, but in the all- 
important cloth industry, labour was the most
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important item in direct production costs. Only in 
a small number of industries using more or less 
heavy fixed capital equipment, such as iron 
smelting or paper making, did such other items as 
fuel or raw materials take precedence over 
labour. Furthermore, the continuing backwardness 
of techniques meant not only that productivity 
per worker was low, but that the chances of 
increasing it by means of capital investment in 
labour-saving, and thus cost-reducing, devices 
were slender: even had there been the capital 
available, the scope for its application was 
slight (1975, p. 13).
Labor in the sixteenth-century was increasingly
employed in the putting-out system. In this system, a
merchant would give out raw materials (such as raw wool) to
individuals who labored in their own homes, and later
collect the product (such as cloth) from them "for sale or
for further processing" (Cipolla, p. 73). As Clarkson notes,
it was "a feature of a wide range of industry, especially
the woollen industry and many branches of metal-working." He
emphasizes its significance for the English economy:
The prevalence of putting-out underlines the 
importance of labour in so many branches of 
manufacturing. It enabled employers to tap 
supplies of cheap underemployed labour in rural 
areas and reduced the need for fixed capital.
Employees usually owned their own tools, although 
in a few occupations where machinery was expensive 
. . . employees rented machines from their employ­
ers . . . Putting-out facilitated the division of
labour (p. 101).
These different economic forces meant much work had the 
character of casual labor, given the problems of irregu­
larity of employment and chronic under-employment (Coleman, 
1956, pp. 288-292).
It was in this context that the need for full employ-
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ment came to be emphasized as a social goal. This is evident 
in the major piece of labor legislation of the era, the 
Statute of Artificers.16 This law, passed in 1563, repre­
sents a significant attempt to deal with the dynamics of
economic forces affecting labor in the sixteenth century.17 
The fact that wages lagged behind prices, the concern about 
pauperism due to enclosure, and "the mounting fear of over­
population" all would suggest that the growing supply of 
labor "was absorbed into employment only with difficulty" 
(Fisher, p. 3), The major provisions of the law reflect a 
concern with these conditions in light of "the medieval 
obligation to work" (Minchinton, p. 11). The Statute of
Artificers was an expression of the desire to prevent the
engrossing of indispensable necessaries; that is, it was
believed that "labor ought no more to be held back than food 
or raw materials" (Heckscher, l, p. 228).
This Act was a consolidation of previous labor laws. 
Most of the provisions of the foregoing statutes were 
retained and elaborated. Its new features included the 
abandonment of wage-fixing by direct statutory regulation 
(to be replaced by wage levels set and administered by local 
justices), and provisions for a careful regulation of 
apprenticeship. While it contained no provisions against
16 The text is given in Bland et al., pp. 325-333.
17 For a discussion of the background and actual 
enforcement of the statute, see Bindoff (1961), Davies 
(1956), Gay (1967), and Ramsey (1965).
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labor combinations, nonetheless this law "marks the highest 
point attained by state regulation of labor in England" 
until the end of the eighteenth century (Bryan, p. 116).
The Statute of Artificers was concerned to regulate the 
course of job training by establishing nationally the 
principle of apprenticeship for at least seven years, a 
practice which had previously been subject to municipal or 
guild control. The law attempted to raise the level of 
craftmanship in declaring that it was unlawful for any 
person to exercise any art, mystery, or manual occupation at 
that time exercised in England, unless they had previously 
served to it an apprenticeship of at least seven years 
(p. 331). The law explicitly sought to promote the 
advancement of virtues similar to those held in high 
esteem by the guilds. A commentary on it in Parliament 
declared that the provisions for apprenticeship would be a 
"very good means and help to advance husbandry, to banish 
idleness, to reform the unadvised rashness of licentious 
manners of youth, . . . [so that] the commonwealth will not
be in such short burdened, as it now is, with lusty beggars, 
rogues and vagabonds . . ." (Tawney and Power, 1, p. 363).
As we have seen, guild regulations at the local level 
had previously controlled entry into trades. This law 
"attempted to codify and strengthen these detailed regula­
tions." It outlined "the detailed enforcement duties of 
local justices of the peace, aldermen, and local administra­
tors" (Ekelund and Tollison, p. 31) . Indeed, the various
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aspects of the statute all stemmed from the application
nationally of local regulations;18 as Adam Smith explained,
"what before had been the bye-law of many particular
corporations, became in England the yeneral and publick law
of all trades carried on in market towns" (WN. I. x. c. 8). 
The law "treated the training of apprentices as a national 
question," disallowing local exclusiveness by not "requiring 
apprenticeship inside the same town where the trade was to 
be exercised" (Heckscher, 1, p. 230).
While recognizing the powers of the guilds to promote 
quality in craftmanship, the Statute also dealt with various 
abuses in the guild rules governing apprenticeship, such as 
those designed "to perpetuate the monopoly of trade in 
privileged families" (Jones, 1926, p. 930). As Heckscher 
notes, "One of the abuses which the guilds obstinately and 
persistently practiced was to admit sons of master-craftsmen 
to the craft without any apprenticeship" (1, p. 236).
What were the goals of this legislation? Students of
18 Ekelund and Tollison see an economic motivation 
behind the extension of local controls to a national 
level. It was an attempt by merchants and administrators of 
towns to prevent unapprenticed "interlopers" from practicing 
their trade in the local area; restrictions on competition 
were better enforced by uniformity in regulations, as they 
explain:
. . . the more immediate economic reason for the
move to national regulation was the inability of 
the towns to restrict cheating on local arrange­
ments. Towns, in other words, attempted to buy a 
nationally uniform system of regulation from the 
king, and local monopoly rights were to be 
protected against encroachment, especially by 
'foreigners' (p. 36).
sixteenth-century England have taken different approaches 
towards this question of economic policy. Some writers, such 
as Cunningham, Heckscher, Lipson, and Nef, saw government 
policy as operating with great consistency in changing the 
nature of the economy in accordance with ’mercantilist 
principles.1 Nef, for example, argued that the monarchs of 
this era looked at industrial problems in light of certain 
clearly established goals: strengthening the authority of 
the crown, promoting social justice, and improving the 
quality of industrial wares (p. 137). Palliser elaborates on 
the goals of Tudor economic policies as seen from this 
perspective: they included "ensuring sufficient native 
production of basic foodstuffs at reasonable prices, 
protecting urban industries from rural competition, and 
enlarging and strengthening urban guilds" (p. 320). Thus it 
is argued that the regulations imposed on the economy during 
this period reflect a government which was clear about the 
direction it wished the economy to proceed in (Clarkson, 
p. 191).19
The makers of social and economic policy in Tudor 
England were especially concerned with social stability. 
While economic intentions were part of this pattern, it 
should be understood, as Minchinton observes, that ". . .
Tudor governments were more concerned to regulate industry
19 Stone argues that the relentless pressure of war 
was key: "Security, not prosperity, was the main object of 
Tudor economic policy" (p. 119).
in the name of public order than to establish any unified
set of economic objectives” (p. 27). Having acknowledged
this qualification about policy, it nevertheless remains
true that the employment of as many people as possible was a
primary goal of legislators, both for social and economic
reasons. Sybil Jack argues that such a goal was consistent
with the perceived need "to control factors which lead to
social instability.” Regulations of the number of laborers
in the marketplace were consistent with this end:
. . . given a situation in which there was 
limited technological advance, regulations 
limiting the size of units, preventing masters 
from taking too many apprentices for fear they 
should find themselves lacking employment in later 
life, maintaining adequate standards of quality, 
all have an integrated and defensible rationale 
(P. 54) .
This legislation can be interpreted under the interest 
group theory as a product of the efforts of guilds to obtain 
economic privileges and the supply response of Parliament in 
offering protective legislation. Artisans, merchants, and 
other groups sought regulation in order to obtain monopoly 
privileges. Artisans possessed "inherent organizational 
advantages in lobbying for state regulatory protection from 
competition . . . relative to other groups, such as consu­
mers in general" (Ekelund and Hebert, p. 45). In this view 
the legislative authorities were not so much concerned with 
promoting the goal of full employment and social stability, 
nor were they acting shortsightedly and irrationally in a 
pursuit of power. Instead, the state was " . . .  a unified,
revenue-seeking leviathan, where fiscal needs {defense, 
court expenses, and so forth) prompted the sale of protec­
tive legislation" (Ekelund and Tollison, p. 24).
Such an approach has several commendable features. It 
seeks to avoid the facile identification of a 'homogenous' 
mercantile trade, employment, or population policy; it 
recognizes the role of economic interests in the actions of 
economic policymakers. Yet there is a fallacy in this 
explanation. It would be simplistic to ignore the social and 
religious preconceptions and motivations that animated Tudor 
economic policy. One must consider the dynamics of the 
social assumptions in which economic legislation was 
formulated. Economic problems were not considered apart from 
religious and political ends. The organic conception of 
society was explicitly upheld in Tudor England, as Bindoff 
explains:
When early Tudor writers felt the need of a word 
to denote this aspect of national life they 
adopted one with a distinctly political flavour.
This word was 'commonweal' or 'commonwealth.' It 
originally meant either the body politic or the 
general good, and in the second of these senses it 
had been the leitmotiv of many early sixteenth- 
century treatises (1955, p. 129).
Promotion of the 'commonweal' in Tudor England meant the
guarantee of social stability and full employment. Moreover,
it is clear that the sixteenth-century legislator was
following the long-standing desire to have orderly trade,
which in part entailed the manufacture of honest goods, and
skill in the workmen. There was a consistent desire to
obtain, as Holdsworth observes, "a reasonable supply of 
labour for the various callings which were necessary to 
secure the health and strength of the nation" (4, p. 319). 
The provisions of the law reflected the conception of the 
"public good" in Tudor society.
During the period when the Statute of Artificers was 
passed, the decline of the guild system was becoming 
increasingly evident. Economic historians generally recog­
nize that guilds became essentially very exclusive due to 
various economic changes in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. Such factors as the integration of national life, 
the widening of markets, and the mobility of the population 
began to transform the guilds (Thorne, p. 231). Guild 
arrangements to control labor were increasingly opposed and 
avoided as an increasing labor supply, expanding demand for 
particular goods, and the growth of new industries led to 
developments outside guild control (Coleman, 1977, p. 74). 
Coleman elaborates on the economic changes affecting the 
guilds in the era from 1500 to 1700:
If either the labour supply or the demand for
particular goods were to increase substantially, 
pressure for entry would mount or production would 
expand outside the gilds. This seems to have been 
happening by the beginning of the sixteenth
century, and it led in England to a gradual and 
piecemeal decline in the power and authority of
the gilds over the period as a whole . . . The
decay of the English gilds was probably hastened 
by the earlier move of the textile industry into 
rural areas, and by the failure of the urban-based 
gilds to establish their authority in such areas, 
although in some rural industries forms of gild 
control did continue to operate . . . (1975,
pp. 2 0-21).
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In addition, the guilds faced increased competition from 
independent traders and craftsmen, many of whom came along 
with inventors from continental Europe (Thorelli, p. 14). 
Such developments, alongside “the considerable extension of 
rural industry organized on the putting-out system . . .
tended to disrupt or simply bypass the guilds which, with a  
few exceptions, were unable to impose authority on rural 
manufacture or new industries" (Coleman, 1977, p. 74).20 
Since the guilds were often "geared" to a localized and 
limited market (Whitney Jones, p. 168), expansion in demand 
decreased the degree of control they exercised.
The provisions of the Statute of Artificers did not 
successfully stem the decline of the guilds. As the six­
teenth century neared its end, the difficulties in enforcing 
its provisions became evident. Several key features of the 
act were neglected by employers, as Nef observes:
Acts regulating methods of manufacturing, limiting 
the number of enterprises that might be esta­
blished in an industry, and the number of appren­
tices a master might employ, were even less 
successfully administered than acts dealing with 
prices and wages. Early in the seventeenth
20 London stands as a representative example of this 
development, as Kellett observes:
. . . by the end of the 16th century the gilds'
control over entry to London's crafts and indus­
tries had been seriously weakened by the rapid 
extension of the built-up area around the square 
mile of the old City and by the growth of urban 
production . . .  On the one hand the Corporation 
and the Companies were failing to curb the retail 
sale of goods by foreigners; on the other hand 
they were failing to restrict the practice of 
handicrafts to those who had secured an appren­
ticeship and were free of a Company (pp. 381-382).
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century, if not before, masters often took many
more apprentices than the law allowed (pp. 49-50).
Apprenticeship rules were often skirted, for several 
reasons. There would often be a need to quickly meet an 
increasing demand for various products and services. Workers 
were apt to take on secondary occupations without qualifica­
tion by apprenticeship not only when their primary craft was 
in a slump; if there was need for "a quickly enlarged supply 
of a commodity," in the absence of technological improvement 
"this required more workers" (Davies, p. 109). Apprentice­
ship requirements were particularly ignored by employers, 
because they hampered their ability to employ unskilled 
workers at low wages. This development inevitably led to the 
downfall of the guild system, for its power to supervise 
trade was bound up with its ability to enforce apprentice­
ship (Nef, p. 47).
Many guilds responded with measures which attempted to 
maintain the control of trade that they held within their 
own town.21 Ironically, their increasingly rigorous efforts 
to protect this control forced trade away and undermined 
their prosperity. As Jones notes, "The exorbitant entrance 
fees and other unwise regulations forced craftsmen out of 
the towns into the country and neighboring villages" (1926,
21 They were not aided by the fact that the Crown began 
to grant, "for sufficient compensation, immunity to tolls to 
the inhabitants of different towns, ecclesiastical orders 
and others," a policy which developed more widespread 
commercial intercourse throughout England (Jones, 1926, 
p. 923) .
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p. 929) . As new workers were recruited into industry to 
generate an increased output, many of these laborers were 
among those who could not afford to start their own busi­
ness. Faced with the high fees for entrance into the guild 
which established craftsmen had implemented, "a growing 
proportion" of the labor force "was obliged to work on 
behalf of others" (Clay, 2, p. 10). The financial and terri­
torial foundations of guilds thus came to be undermined.
The latter part of the sixteenth century, then, saw 
the implementation of more restrictive guild ordinances. 
Fisher observes that "many of the corporate towns recon­
structed their gild systems and tightened up their bye-laws 
in an effort to ensure full employment for their citizens by 
suppressing the enterprise of those who did not share their 
freedom" (p. 7) . Whereas they were once regulatory bodies 
which largely "concerned themselves with the quality of 
goods, fair dealing and high standards," the guilds increa­
singly became "combinations in restraint of trade" (Thorne, 
p. 231). In litigation over the validity of the guild 
ordinances passed in this context, the early seventeenth 
century common law increasingly distinguished between 
legitimate regulation and unlawful restrictions on trade.
II. COKE AND THE COMMON LAW COURTS ON RESTRAINT OF TRADE
The common law courts responded in two ways to the guild 
practices in the late sixteenth century. One direction 
jurists took was to apply the doctrine of the "public
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calling." From the fifteenth century on, the common law had 
recognized the public calling as an occupation distinct in 
nature from the private calling. The latter involved 
occupations in which so many persons plied the trade that 
there was no hardship in one practitioner's refusal to serve 
a consumer, for there was competition within the trade. But 
a person engaged in a public calling was under a legal 
liability to serve, and moreover to perform the trade with 
proper skill. This obligation was founded on "the indispen­
sability of the service performed and the existence of a 
monopoly in its provision" (Rubin, p. 33). The monopoly was 
based on the presence of a natural limitation of some sort, 
as well as some control of the market based on the character 
of the service (Wyman, p. 172).22
A trade operating as a ’virtual or natural monopoly’
22 Thus a carpenter was under no legal obligation to 
serve every customer who requested that a house be built for 
them, but a blacksmith (and an innkeeper) faced a severe 
penalty if they did not serve all that made a request of 
them. Wyman argued that this distinction was based on the 
different economic conditions of the two trades:
So far apart were they in the eyes of the courts, 
that the ordinary law was protection enough for 
those that dealt with the carpenter, while an 
extraordinary law was needed in behalf of those 
that came to the smith. There were builders 
enough to make the situation in that business 
virtual competition, so that there was no hard­
ship; but the farriers were so scattered that the 
conditions were those of virtual monopoly, which 
required therefore a special code, else a good 
horse might be ruined for want of a shoe if the 
wayside smith should take it into his head to 
refuse to serve (p. 158).
Certainly a primitive infrastructure contributed to the 
existence of a 'natural' monopoly in the provision of 
certain types of services.
120
would be subject to the law of public employments or public 
callings. The courts argued that guild arrangements would be 
necessary for the proper regulation of these type of trades 
for the public good. As public callings, these trades were 
obliged "to provide competent service at a reasonable price" 
(Rubin, p. 33) .
For purposes of understanding the development of the 
doctrine of conspiracy in restraint of trade, the other 
manner in which the common law responded is more signifi­
cant. The common law jurists broadened the rule against 
private trade restraints which had been formulated in the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Increasingly the law 
spoke of 'the liberty of the subject to pursue lawful and 
established trades' as over against restrictions on trade 
promulgated by craft associations. By voiding guild ordi­
nances which limited the freedom of trade of guild members 
and non-members, jurists were widening the lines of ille­
gality, range of offenses, and prohibitions upon guild 
conduct all delineated by the common law. Their rulings were 
still grounded in the ancient writs. But these judges were 
establishing more fully the right to work as a fundamental 
tenet of the common law (Hamilton, 1940, pp. 26-27) . Thus 
the principle (or common right) of freedom of trade deve­
loped alongside economic changes which allowed for greater 
competition.
Royal grants of privilege relating to trade also came 
under the scrutiny of this common law principle during this
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era. These included "grants of exclusive rights relating to 
foreign trade," as well as "grants of such rights in 
particular domestic trades or manufactures conferred upon 
individuals or associations outside the guild system."
During the latter part of the sixteenth and early part of 
the seventeenth century, certain aspects of all these grants 
"came to be challenged on the ground that they interfered 
with lawful trade" (Thorelli, pp. 21-22). These challenges, 
especially those regarding the royal prerogative in regards 
to monopoly grants, increased in frequency and intensity 
during the later years of Elizabeth's reign and continued 
under James I and Charles I.
Appealing to past precedents, common law jurists found 
various private ordinances and royal grants of privilege to 
be unacceptable restraints of trade. Thus the common law 
courts curtailed the powers of guilds and municipal corpora­
tions, and the prerogative power of the crown in the sphere 
of economic activities. The regulatory apparatus of Tudor 
and Stuart England provided the backdrop for the controversy 
over the legitimacy of both private and royal trade privi­
leges .
A. THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF THE COMMON LAW RULINGS 
Students of the English judiciary note that three 
common law courts had evolved in the period between the 
Norman invasion and the early seventeenth century: the Court 
of King's Bench, the Court of Common Pleas, and the Exche­
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quer. These civil courts "were initially under the crown's 
direct control." Ekelund and Tollison add that "During the 
thirteenth through the fifteenth centuries, however, the 
courts became increasingly independent of the crown . . . "  
Toward the end of the fourteenth century the Court of King's 
Bench became simply a common law court. This functional 
separation intensified the growing "cleavage of interests 
between the king's council, the Court of King's Bench, and 
the Parliament" (p. 48).
The common law courts believed that they had adequate 
precedent in the wisdom of the past, which they understood 
to stand against restraints of trade. Ekelund and Tollison 
summarize the history of the interaction between monarch and 
judiciary in this era (as seen by Heckscher) : the king 
attempted "to avoid the common law courts by establishing a 
royal court system centered in the Privy Council (the court 
of the Star Chamber), which gave the crown an administrative 
elasticity to enforce grants of national monopoly" (p. 51).
Sir Edward Coke was at the center of the common law 
movement which evaluated the guild ordinances and royal 
patents in the early seventeenth century labor market. Coke 
and other common law jurists argued that common law was 
superior to statute law, especially in matters of economic 
legislation. Coke in particular attempted to subordinate the 
royal prerogative to common law. The common law jurists were 
the most powerful force in the resistance to economic abuses 
perpetrated by the monarchy and its agents in early seven­
teenth-century England. They aligned with Parliament in 
attacking the royal economic policy. Their alliance "first 
achieved prominence when Coke rose from Attorney General to 
Chief Justice." Coke presided originally in the Court of 
Common Pleas (1606) and later at the Court of King's Bench 
(1613), "the two principal courts of common law" (Heckscher,
1, p. 280).
Coke and other common law jurists drew upon a legacy of 
English legislation and rulings in the common law which were 
opposed to private intrusions on liberty in trade. The 
second part of Coke's Institutes contained a commentary on 
Magna Charta and some 38 other charters and statutes. Coke 
concluded from the Magna Charta that "all monopolies 
concerning trade and traffic are against the liberty and 
freedom, declared and granted by this great charter, and 
against diverse other acts of Parliament" (p. 62b) . Other 
common law judges similarly appealed to what they saw as a 
longstanding perspective on economic freedom in English 
statutes and the common law which interpreted them. Heck­
scher argues that it was this understanding that was 
significant, whether or not it was in fact exactly accurate:
Magna Charta and 14th-century English legislation 
gave rise to the opinion held by later generations 
that economic liberty had therein an age-old 
basis. They thought that every compulsion in 
economic activity was illegal from of old. This 
idea had numerous consequences quite apart from 
the question whether those medieval decisions were 
correctly interpreted or not. The very fact that 
later generations interpreted them in this manner 
had important results (1, p. 274).
To what extent did Coke misunderstand or misuse common law
precedents? Several observations can be made on this issue,
It should be noted that Coke's effort to substantiate
legal rulings on the basis of precedent was characteristic
of the common law courts, which espoused a fundamental
belief in the antiquity of the common law (Pocock, p. 46).
These courts were "the repository of the wisdom of the
past." They operated under the premise that "they could not
create law, only interpret it, and that the law 'grows'
through such applications of old principles" (Ekelund and
Tollison, p. 51). In regards to Coke, there is no doubt that
he relied upon "very old sources" for his precedents; as
Holdsworth adds, Coke thought "the older the source . . .
the purer the law." Holdsworth further observes that
He naturally represented the law of his own day as 
the logical outcome of the law laid down in these 
older sources. The newer decisions had not changed 
the law - they had merely developed or explained 
the truth to be found concealed in the oldest 
authorities. This way of reasoning, which is found 
not only in Coke but also in the writings of many 
later generations of lawyers, has tended to mis­
lead historians who are not lawyers (5, p. 473).
Thus it is helpful to consider the opinion of legal his­
torians in regards to Coke’s use of precedent.
Legal authorities have made a mixed evaluation of
Coke's appeal to the older common law. Holdsworth contends 
that Coke tended to be "uncritical in the use of his author­
ities" and at times was led to "misrepresent their effect." 
Coke's belief in the antiquity of the common law was so 
strong that he attributed little or nothing of this law to
the Conqueror and hie successors; this law rested "behind 
the meagre statements of the Anglo-Saxon codes and early 
Norman costumals" (5, p. 475) . But his rulings have been ac­
cepted in the vast majority of cases by later jurists. Along 
these lines Bowen, Coke's biographer, follows Holdsworth in 
observing that neither of Coke's opponents, Bacon or Lord 
Ellesmere, could find any "serious errors in the Reports 
except in political or semipolitical cases" (p. 515).23
B. COKE AND THE COMMON LAW ON FREE TRADE AND MONOPOLY 
Coke'b view of 'freedom of trade' followed the 
common law rule which opposed arbitrary occupational 
restrictions that prevented 'free ingress' into a trade. 
"Freedom of trade," Coke said, "is the reason that the Low 
countries so prosper. They are not troubled with Impositions 
to burden trade nor Monopolies to restrain it" (Commons 
Debates, 5, p. 94) . The latter part of this statement is
especially noteworthy. It leads us to consider Coke's under­
standing of 'monopoly.' He defined monopoly as follows:
A monopoly is an institution, or allowance by the 
king by his grant, commission, or otherwise to any 
person or persons, bodies politique, or corporate, 
of or for the sole buying, selling, making, 
working, or using of any thing, whereby any person 
or persons, bodies politique, or corporate, are 
sought to be restrained of any freedom or liberty 
that they had before, or hindered in their lawful
23 For the purposes of this study, there are two 
relevant cases: Coke's view of the legality of the dispensa­
tion in the Case of Monopolies, and of the power of the 
common law to control Acts of Parliament in Bonham* s Case.
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trade (Institutes. 3, p. 18l).24
Coke did not always use the term ’monopoly' in a way 
that was entirely consistent with his own definition (White, 
p. 119, n.144). That is, in his rulings, monopoly could
involve not only "exclusive trade privileges bestowed by the
crown," but also "private acts of hoarding" (Malament,
p. 1340).25 Coke opposed certain kinds of restrictive mea­
sures, whether public or private.26 "He regarded monopolies
24 According to Boudin, when Coke uses the term 
'freedom of trade,' consistent with his definition of 
monopoly, he means the privilege of trading:
. . . Coke did not say that there is such a thing 
as freedom or liberty of trade generally . . .
What Coke said is that the king has no right to 
create a monopoly which would take away from per­
sons or bodies politic or corporate any freedom or 
liberty of trade 1 that they had before' (p. 17).
Believing that all freedom of trade was based on privilege, 
Boudin does not "recognize that trade might be lawful, and 
hence 'free,1 even though it was not based on guild regula­
tions, grants of privilege or other explicit expressions of 
public or semi-public sanction” (Thorelli, p. 21, n.49).
25 The economic writer Edward Misselden was a contem­
porary of Coke, and he defines a monopoly as follows:
Monopoly is a kind of commerce, in buying, 
selling, changing or bartering usurped by a few 
and sometimes but by one person, and forestalled 
from all others, to the gain of the monopolist and 
the detriment of other men. The parts then of a 
monopoly are two: the restraint of the liberty of 
commerce to some one or a few; and the setting of 
the price at the pleasure of the monopolist to his 
private benefit and the prejudice of the public.
Upon which two hinges every monopoly turns 
(p. 57).
Misselden's objection to monopoly occurred when private 
persons created such a circumstance on their own without 
public sanction; he had no objections to monopoly created 
by the royalty or Parliament (pp. 61-72).
26 Heckscher errs in this connection when he argues 
that Coke and the common-law courts "decided according to 
the legal title which the monopoly could claim and not
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established by royal grants as only particular instances of 
a more general economic grievance,” that by which one was 
'hindered in their lawful trade.' This could involve 
"statutory monopolies and the monopolistic privileges of 
corporate boroughs" (White, p. 117) . He opposed measures 
based on all of these sources whenever he found them to be 
arbitrary restraints of trade.
Coke’s understanding of freedom of trade and monopoly 
reflects the late medieval common law treatment of restraint 
of trade and Tudor social conceptions. Both of these 
features of his approach invoked "the ideal of the body 
politic with its emphasis on public good over private gain" 
(Malament, p. 1346). In this view, the ruthless pursuit of 
private gain should be prohibited in order to promote the 
public good. This ideal pervaded much of Tudor thought. It 
was applied to the grievance to the commonwealth involved in 
acts of hoarding or price fixing.
Coke utilized the concepts found in the ancient laws 
against forestalling, regrating, and engrossing in his 
approach to restraints of trade. He discusses these laws in 
the third part of his Institutes. where he observes that 
"every practice or device by act, conspiracy,27 words or
according to its existence or to its economic character" (1, 
p. 284).
27 Coke does not elaborate on this aspect of these 
crimes. But he does discuss the concept of conspiracy in a 
non-economic context elsewhere. In part three of the 
Institutes. Coke defines conspiracy as
a consultation and agreement between two or more,
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news, to enhance the price of victuals or other merchandise, 
was punishable by law" (p. 196) . Coke endorsed the common 
law penalties against these practices. Sixteenth century 
legislation dealing with both food and labor had emphasized 
the particular detriment caused by engrossing; as Heckscher 
observes, it was argued that "it should not be permissible 
for one person to retain what could suffice for many and so 
the expression 'ingrossed into few men's hands,' was very 
common” (1, p. 272). In the same manner, Coke spoke out in 
the Parliament of 1621 against engrossing. He listed six 
categories of people who would come to grief; among them 
were "monopolists who engrosseth by themselves what should 
be free to all people” (Heckscher, 1, p. 272). As a jurist 
Coke ruled against the 'engrossing of labor' by exclusionary 
guild ordinances.
No precise precedent existed for actions in law against
to appeal or indict an innocent falsely and mali­
ciously of felony, whom accordingly they cause to 
be indicted and appealed; and afterward the party 
is lawfully acquitted by the verdict of twelve 
men (p. 142).
This narrow understanding of the offense was expanded in the 
famous Poulterers * case (1611) which Coke reported. There it 
was stated that the mere agreement falsely or maliciously to 
indict constituted the substantive offense of conspiracy; 
trial and acquittal was not a necessary condition. The 
essence of the offense was in the confederacy itself for the 
commission of a crime, and not in the actual commission. 
This led to a wider extension of the doctrine of conspiracy 
against combinations in the eighteenth century (Mason, 
pp. 2 5-2 6; Bryan, p. 59). Coke noted that malice was a key 
incident in conspiracy (Reports. 9, p. 55); this element was 
emphasized in the English trade union cases in the nine­
teenth century and is an integral element of the common law 
approach to combinations in restraint of trade.
royal grants of monopoly, "because it was not until 1601 
that royal patents became actionable at common law" (Mala- 
ment, p. 1340).28 In stating his opposition against this 
form of monopoly, Coke relied upon the common law hostility 
towards individual forms of trade restraint such as en­
grossing. Exclusive privileges conferred by the Crown could 
engross into a few hands a trade which should be open to 
all qualified craftsmen.
On the other hand, Coke did approve of certain kinds of 
guild privileges or royal patents to parties outside of the 
guild system. In opposing monopolies, Coke was opposing 
regulations of trade which were in fact restrictions of 
trade; but he did endorse the principle that trade must of 
necessity be regulated for the good of the commonwealth, for 
"true trade and traffic cannot be maintained or increased 
without order or government" fReports. 8, p. 125a). Coke's
understanding of freedom of trade was qualified; he did not 
equate freedom of trade with absolute economic liberty. 
"Free trade" was trade that was "not limited by unfair or 
unreasonable restraints" (White, p. 137).29
28 Malament explains that "Cases involving the Crown 
prerogative had previously come before the Star Chamber and 
Privy Council; only the popular and parliamentary outcry 
induced Elizabeth to concede common law jurisdiction" 
(p. 1340).
29 Some economic writers of the early seventeenth 
century espoused a very similar conception of freedom of 
trade. It is true that many statesmen mouthed platitudes 
about the evils of monopoly and the virtues of free trade, 
and thus one must be careful in an examination of the 
meaning of these terms. Nonetheless, Raymond De Roover has
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III. AN ANALYSIS OF COKE AS LABOR MARKET REGULATOR
In his involvement with labor market regulation as a 
jurist and legislator, Coke distinguished between legitimate 
regulation of trade and restraint of trade. He applied this 
distinction to guild by-laws, municipal corporate ordi­
nances, ordinances of foreign trading corporations, and 
royal patents for operations outside the guild system. 
Considering the economic factors affecting the ebbing of the 
guild system, this sort of distinction was quite significant 
in the economic and legal thought of Tudor and Stuart 
England. As Malament observes:
It was the difference between setting just as 
opposed to extortionate prices; between enforcing 
standards of quality as opposed to adulterating 
goods. And most important, it was the difference 
between harmonious government in a trade and acri­
monious dissension caused by the exclusion of many
pointed out that the term 'free trade' had a particular 
meaning to the economic writers who were contemporaries of 
Coke such as Gerard de Malynes, Edward Misselden, and Thomas 
Mun:
. . . in their parlance, 'freedom of trade' was
not the opposite of protectionism - which was not 
yet an issue - and had nothing to do with the 
absence of trade barriers between countries,
'Freedom of trade' was the antithesis of 're­
straint of trade* and of monopoly. The accent, 
instead of being on rivalry, as in 'competition,' 
was on the freedom of ingress into a profession or 
a trade and, more than that, on the absence of all 
hindrances to trade (1951, pp. 292-293).
De Roover overstates the case when he claims that these men 
opposed "all" hindrances to trade. As one example, consider 
Misselden's remarks on good order in trade: "want of
government in trade opens a gap and lets in all sorts of 
unskillfull and disorderly persons; and these not only sink 
themselves and others with them; but also mar the merchan­
dise of the land, both in estimation and goodness" (p. 85). 
But their understanding of free trade certainly is in line 
with the common law view.
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who sought membership and training in the craft of 
their choice (p. 1341, n.114),30
In order to understand the criteria by which admissible and
inadmissible kinds of market regulations were distinguished,
we must undertake an analysis of certain cases in Coke's
Reports and his statements in Parliament.
We have seen that in the organic conception of society
which was held in sixteenth-century England, the purpose of
guilds was to promote quality workmanship and moral virtue.
The statute of Artificers reinforced this end of labor
market regulation. It made the institution of apprenticeship
compulsory on all engaged in industry. As a memorandum on
the law put it, a seven year's apprenticeship was necessary
in order that an apprentice "should grow into greater
knowledge and perfection in the art or occupation that he
was brought up in" (Tawney and Power, 1, p. 356). Moreover,
this legislation sought by means of required apprenticeship
30 Little challenges the viability of this distinction, 
especially in regards to the last instance mentioned by 
Malament. He denies that the economic practices of the 
guilds can be usefully divided between restriction and 
regulation: "The widespread and thoroughly accepted practice 
of 'regulating' the number of guild members undoubtedly 
looked like 'restriction' from the point of view of those 
excluded from the guild, or those compelled to join"
(p. 196) . Little does not consider that the issue is really
the standpoint of the common law jurist. He does concede 
that Coke claims "Ordinances for the good Order and Govern­
ment of Trades and Mysteries are good, but not to restrain 
anyone in his lawful Mystery" (Reports. 11, p. 54a). He con­
siders this statement of small consequence, and remarks that 
Coke does not give "any criterion by which to decide between 
'order' and 'hindrance'" (p. 206). Little does not consider 
Coke's opposition to forestalling, regrating, and engrossing 
and his support for the regulation of goods in the public 
interest.
"to advance husbandry, to banish idleness, to reform the 
unadvised rashness of licentious manners of youth" (Tawney 
and Power, 1, p. 363). Because he held these same goals in 
mind (Reports. 11, p. 53b), "most of coke's criticism of
guilds was directed against ordinances which were either 
more stringent" than the Statute of Artificers or which 
conflicted with other of the Tudor national policies 
(Malament, p. 1335, n.86).
The Statute of Artificers "provided a standard for the 
regulation of trade which may have helped to check the more 
extreme restrictive attempts of particular corporations" 
(Davies, pp. 266-267). Such attempts included guild ordi­
nances that required a craftsman to apprentice with a 
particular company. As will be seen in several of his court 
rulings, it is evident that Coke shared the Tudor aim of 
protecting the social fabric from the disruption caused by 
corporate by-laws which suppressed the enterprise of 
qualified craftsmen*
Coke's rulings followed the principles of the common 
law that, as Holdsworth observes, held that the freedom of 
trade "could only be curtailed by definite regulations known 
to and recognized by the common law." The freedom referred 
to here was "freedom from arbitrary restraints not recog­
nized by the law." The power of the chartered borough 
represented a limitation upon the freedom of trade, which 
"in the interests of public policy" was recognized by the 
common law. The same was true of the "prerogatives of the
crown to act for the commercial interest of the nation" (its 
stated justification) by means of grants of monopoly for new 
inventions or for special trading privileges to corporations 
(Holdsworth, 4, p. 350). In the following two sections trade 
regulations by means of guild ordinances and the prerogative 
acts of the king will be discussed in turn.
A. GUILD ORDINANCES AND APPRENTICESHIP REGULATION
Litigation against guild restraints made a dramatic 
upturn in the late sixteenth century, when in their decline 
guilds resorted to practices which distorted their true 
purpose (Malament, p. 1341). Guild ordinances which had no 
clear warrant in law or custom were sharply challenged as 
the common law courts began to broaden the rule against 
restraints of trade.
The first significant case was Davenant v. Hurdis 
(1599).31 Here the common law court dealt with the validity 
of a particular guild ordinance in the cloth business. The 
by-law, declared in 1571, was entitled "An Ordinance for 
Nourishing and Relieving the Poor Members of the Merchant 
Taylors Company." It begins with a preamble invoking the 
proper ends of the guild: " . . .  it is the duty of every
Christian society to help and relieve every willing la­
bouring brother in the Commonwealth, and especially such as 
are incorporated, grafted, and knit together in brotherly
31 The complete text is given in Fox, pp. 311-313.
society . . . (Clode, 1, p. 393) . To achieve this end, the
guild called for every member of the Merchant Taylors to 
hire other guild members to fashion at least half of their 
cloth or pay a fine.
In this case Coke represented the plaintiff, Davenant, 
who had refused to submit to the by-law. Davenant brought an 
action in trespass after he was assessed a fine and had 
goods equal in value to the fine taken by Hurdis, the 
guild's representative.
Coke's made two claims about the by-law: it was 
unreasonable, and it was illegal. It was unreasonable 
because, as Letwin summarizes Coke's thought, "it absolutely 
required the merchants of the company to give their business 
to the clothworkers who belonged to the company, but it did 
not require the latter to provide quick service, good 
workmanship, or reasonable prices for this business" (1965, 
p. 25). It was illegal because it tended to create a 
monopoly, as Coke explained: "for every subject, by the law,
has freedom and liberty to put his cloth to be dressed by 
what clothworker he pleases, and cannot be restrained to 
certain persons, for that, in Effect would be a monopoly 
. . (Reports. 11, p. 86b). Coke was particularly con­
cerned to maintain employment opportunities and the right of 
skilled artisans to practice their craft. The exclusion of 
other cloth makers outside the company could potentially add 
to unemployment if this practice was allowed to persist, for
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under the same reasoning the Taylor's Company might very
well appropriate the whole of the trade for themselves.
Hurdis's attorney conceded that the ordinance would be
void if it did in fact create a monopoly, and that was the
judgment in the case; "it was against the common law because
it was against the liberty of the subject" (p. 312). The
defendant's counsel did not claim that the creation of a
monopoly was consistent with the common law; his concession
"suggests a consensus about the prior state of the law."
Moreover, Coke saw no need to cite "the few early decisions
against guild restrictions" (Malament, p. 1342). This was an
example of a guild action "for which there was no clear
warrant in law or custom" (Thorelli, p. 22). Instead, Coke
"counterposed regulations made in the public interest with
the ordinance of the Merchant Taylors" (Malament, p. 1342).
Coke cited a number of cases in which ordinances or
patents had been upheld by the law because they were for the
public good. These were privileges granted to boroughs and
guilds in the law to make ordinances for the government of
trade. The precedents Coke appealed to included
a regulation that all shipB must harbor in one 
port and no other, a grant by the King giving a 
Bkilled foreigner the sole right to make sailing 
canvas, and another giving a skilled projector 
exclusive right to drain lands, a by-law that all 
cloth sold in London must first be inspected and 
passed at Blackwell Hall, a by-law of St. Albans 
requiring each inhabitant to pay a contribution 
toward cleaning the town, and by-laws for the 
maintenance of bridges, walls, and similar public 
works (Letwin, 1965, p. 25).
All of these cases affirmed the right of municipal corpora­
tions to make laws which carried out local customs provided 
they were consonant with law and reason.32 The Taylor’s 
ordinance was not a reasonable by-law, hence it established 
a monopoly. Coke concluded that "by-laws that establish 
monopolies are against common law and void” (p. 312) . 
Regulations of trade were lawful and reasonable if they were 
made in the public interest.
Coke construed the public interest in Davenant v. Hur- 
dls "to mean full employment of skilled craftsmen” (Mala­
ment, p. 1342) - Public policy of this era required that all 
be usefully employed. On this basis, the judges ruled in 
Coke's favor: "a rule of such nature as to bring all trade 
or traffic into the hands of one company, or one person, and 
to exclude all others, is illegal" (p. 312). Thus the court
held that certain privileged individuals could not be 
permitted to deprive others of their trade by means of an 
arbitrary private restraint.
32 Coke discussed occupational regulation based on 
immemorial custom in a case which he reported but did 
not preside over. This case supplied one of the by-laws 
which coke cited. In the Chamberlain of London Case (1590) 
it was laid down that the city of London had the power to 
demand of all sellers of cloth that they bring it to be 
inspected at a common market in Blackwell Hall. The cloth 
had to be deemed of high enough quality before it was put 
upon the market. Coke said such an ordinance, a custom 
confirmed by act of Parliament, was "consonant to law and 
reason.” But Coke reports that customs of London "which are 
contrary or repugnant to the laws or statutes of the realm 
are void and of no effect” I Reports. 5, pp. 62b-63a) . Ordi­
nances that were valid without a custom or royal charter 
were those made for the public good, such as reparation of a 
church or a common highway.
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Two more cases illustrate Coke's concern that those
properly qualified to practice a trade or craft not be
hindered in their pursuit of that occupation. As Chief
Justice of the King's Bench, Coke ruled on the case of
Taylors of Ipswich v. Shennlnq (1614) . The Merchant Taylors
had an ordinance requiring that any apprenticed craftsman
had to obtain their permission if he sought to practice his
trade in the town. The defendant, a private tailor to a
"freeman of Ipswich," refused to obtain a license from the
company. Coke ruled against the Taylor's ordinance, but not
against the right of the guild under its charter to make
ordinances in general. Speaking of by-laws such as the one
in this case, he declared that they are
. . . against the freedom and liberty of the
subject, and are a means of extortion in drawing 
money from them, either by delay or some other 
subtle device, or of oppression of young tradesmen 
by the old and rich of the same trade, not
permitting them to work in their trade freely 
. . . fReports. 11, p. 54a) .
Coke added that "the Common Law abhors all Monopolies, which 
prohibit any from working in any lawful Trade" and further 
that "at the Common Law no Man could be prohibited from 
working in any lawful Trade . . ." Coke opposed a situation
in which one who was completely qualified by apprenticeship 
could be denied entry into a trade by some artificial pre­
text, for "the Law abhors Idleness" (Reports. 11, p. 53b).
Coke was not rejecting the apprenticeship provisions of 
the Statute of Artificers. Referring to this requirement, 
Coke supported his decision by stating that the Statute
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. . was not enacted only to the Intent that Workmen
should be skilfull, but also that Youth should not be 
brought up in idleness, but brought up and educated in 
lawful Sciences and Trades" (Reports. 11, p. 54a). This was
a legitimate labor market regulation. Coke objected to the 
fact that a man fully qualified to practice his trade under 
the Statute could be kept from doing so by an arbitrary 
guild ordinance, i.e., a private restraint on trade (Mala­
ment, pp. 1336-1337). This is evident in Coke's additional 
statement that "Ordinances for the good Order and Government 
of men of Trades and Mysteries are good, but not to restrain 
any one in his lawful Mystery" (Reports, 11, p. 54a).
Similarly, in the case of Norris v. Straps (1616), the 
weavers of Newbury had made a by-law that no person should 
weave at Newbury unless he had been apprenticed with the 
town. The weavers sought to impose a penalty on one who had 
ignored the by-law. An action was brought to recover the 
penalty, and the judgment went against the weaver's by-law.
On the bench for this case, Coke objected to this ordinance 
as an unnecessary restraint of trade. As in the previous 
case, this ordinance was "far more restrictive than the 
Statute of Artificers" (Malament, p. 1355, n.194).
These two cases show that Coke applied the apprentice­
ship provisions of the Statute of Artificers fairly closely. 
Another case provides additional evidence on how he con­
strued the law. In Rex and Allen v. Toolev (1615),33 a citi­
zen of London was sued because he had practiced upholstering 
whereas he was apprenticed as a woolpacker. As we have 
noted, the relevant provision in the Statute of Artificers 
had stated that none was to exercise any craft, mystery, or 
occupation, except those who had apprenticed for at least 
seven years. Coke declared that the provision did not cover 
upholstering because it was neither a "trade nor a mystery 
and did not require any skill" (p. 382). The whole scope of 
the law concerned only such industries as demanded profes­
sional skill. The previously mentioned memorandum on the 
Statute of Artificers had declared that the purpose of the 
apprenticeship provisions was to prevent "ignorance and 
imperfection in diverse arts and occupations" and promote 
"good and perfect workmanship and knowledge in occupations" 
(Tawney and Power, p. 3 55). Thus the law sought to encourage 
a certain standard of skill among craftsmen. Coke was simply 
following this same interpretation of the law; he found that 
upholstering was an occupation requiring no training and 
hence was outside the scope of the Statute of Artificers.34
33 This case is reported in Tawney and Power, 1, 
pp. 378-383.
34 Contrary to Heckscher (p. 292) , Coke was not 
initiating an exclusion of crafts from the apprenticeship 
regulations. As Malament observes, "The occupation of buying 
and selling had been excluded twice in different decisions," 
and, like the Toolev decision, "it had been excluded on the 
ground that it required no special skill" (p. 1337; cf. 
Davies, p. 241). Explaining the nature of legislative and 
judicial relations on matters of this sort, Malament claims 
that in the Statute of Artificers, "Parliament's intention
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It is difficult to gain much further insight into the 
basis of Coke's exclusion of this trade by utilizing the 
features of modern models of regulation. Why did it require 
no skill? The upholsterer "has all things made to his hand, 
and it is only [up to him] to dispose them in order after 
such time as they are brought to him . . . his art resting
merely in the overseeing and disposition of such things 
which other men work . . . "  (p. 382). Management did not 
require regulation to insure the proper level of quality. 
Coke argued that trades such as brickmakers, potters and 
millers were excluded from the apprenticeship clauses for 
lack of requirement of skill also. On the other hand, 
brewers and bakers were within the rules of the Statute of 
Artificers, because their work concerned the health of men's 
bodies, and required skill in the exercise of the profession 
(pp. 382-383). Coke expressed this same principle in another 
case, finding it ". . . necessary that brewers should have
skill and knowledge in brewing good and wholesome beer, for 
that does much conduce to men's health" (Reports. 8,
p. 131). Apparently Coke thought quality concerns become 
much more significant when dealing with public health 
issues.
While Coke did not use technical economic categories, 
it is apparent that he did have some criterion in mind that 
resembles modern market failure notions in distinguishing
was stated in general terms and it was up to the courts to 
determine which trades fell within their scope" (p. 1338).
between cases where labor market regulation was and was not 
needed. The principle of distinguishing between legitimate 
regulation and unlawful restraint of trade was also utilized 
by Coke after he left the bench and became a member of the 
House of Commons.
B. ROYAL PATENTS AND EXCLUSIVE TRADING PRIVILEGES
In Parliament from 1621 through 1628, Coke addressed 
many crucial economic issues in England. Coke dealt with 
labor market regulation as found in royal patents and 
privileges granted to trading companies. As a parliamen­
tarian Coke relied on the same distinction between arbitrary 
restraint and legitimate regulation. His remarks on the 
apprentices patent evidence his concern for legitimate 
occupational regulation. In the debate over this patent in 
Commons in 1621, Coke argued that the purposes of the 
Statute of Artificers were to be esteemed, for "it breeds a 
corruption of manufactures that men should exercise that 
[trade] wherein they have no skill" (Commons Debates. 4,
p. 92}. Appealing to the apprenticeship requirements in that 
legislation, Coke claimed that a patent granting four 
persons the right to give men licenses "before they be of
their crafts masters [is] to the great hurt of trades"
(Commons Debates. 2, p. 250).
Coke indicated the length he was willing to go in order 
to have legitimate regulation for the public health in a 
debate in 1624 over the Apothecaries' charter. As White
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remarks, Coke contended that "Parliament should limit the 
access to occupations requiring skill, even if they were not 
trades within the Statute of Artificers" (p. 123). Origi­
nally the Apothecaries were members of the Grocers' Company. 
However, in 1617 "they had received a separate charter 
granting them the exclusive right to make and distribute 
medicines within seven miles of London" (White, p. 123; cf. 
Commons Debates, 7, pp. 77-85) . White adds that Coke "was 
highly sympathetic to the Apothecaries' argument" that they 
should retain this monopoly when the Grocers' complaint 
against it was heard in Parliament (p. 123). Coke conceded 
that it took away "the greatest part of the Grocers' trade" 
and that merchants in general "had a great wrong by it." 
Nonetheless, Coke reported that the Commons Committee on 
Grievances supported a charter granting exclusivity in trade 
to the Apothecaries, on the grounds that "such physical 
composures or potions as are to be taken by sick persons 
should be composed and made by men of skill and experience"
(Journals. 1, p. 756).
Coke's ruling on an important case some sixteen years 
earlier illustrates that he did not always find the exercise 
of privileges based on patents to be legitimate regulation 
promoting the public health. In Bonham1s Case (1608-10), 
Dr. Bonham had received a medical degree from the University 
of Cambridge. But he was not allowed to enter the Royal 
College of Physicians in London and practice medicine. The 
King had granted a patent to the College which had been
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confirmed by Parliament (Hamilton, 1940, p. 28). One clause 
in the statute stated that "no one should practice medicine 
in the city of London and district if he be not admitted by 
the letters of the president and college" (Reports. 8,
p. 109a). Coke argued that a proper construction of the 
statute indicated that the censors did not possess the power 
to fine and imprison unlicensed, as distinct from incompe­
tent, physicians. Bonham was a competent physician. The 
charter of the College did not extend to the denial to a 
competent practitioner of his right to pursue his calling 
(Hamilton, 1940, p. 28). Furthermore, Coke stated that this 
would make the Censors of the College at once judges and 
parties, which was unjust, and so this clause in the Act was 
void (Reports. 8, p. 118a).
Thus Coke invalidated the patent. In doing so, Coke 
made a quite significant assertion. He stated that
it appears in our books, that in many cases, the 
common law will control Acts of Parliament, and 
sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void; for 
when an Act of Parliament is against common right 
and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be 
performed, the common law will control it, and 
adjudge such Act to be void . . . (Reports, 8,
p . 118a).
The common law jurist had the right to overrule a Parliamen­
tary statute, i.e. the right of judicial review. As will be 
seen in chapter four, this principle was applied in a 
parallel way in American jurisprudence by Supreme Court 
judges who overruled legislation reflecting the state's 
police powers to govern the public health, safety, and
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morals. In both instances, the jurists found some legisla­
tion governing occupations to be arbitrary restraint of 
trade and not legitimate regulation under the state's police 
powers.
Many of Coke's speeches in Parliament in the 1620's 
dealt with the requests of trading companies and individuals 
for monopoly grants, either to "order trade" or for the 
purpose of introducing a new invention. Coke's responses to 
them made a distinction "between restraints on free trade, 
which he believed to be illegal and inconvenient, and 
government of trade, which he regarded as both lawful and 
beneficial to the commonwealth" (White, p. 89). Each of 
these type of monopoly patents will be considered in turn.
Coke argued that the institution of a corporation of 
merchants or others for the increase and advancement of 
trade, but not for its hindrance and diminution, was legiti­
mate (Reports. 8, p. 125a). The privileges given to such
corporations "were generally of the commercial and not of 
the manufacturing order; and they were not regarded as 
grievances" (Holdsworth, 4, p. 351). Coke recognized the 
royal prerogative in granting trading companies the right to 
regulate a trade, for "trade and traffic cannot be main­
tained or increased without order and government" (Reports.
8 , p. 125a) . He also claimed that such a grant by the king 
would be subject to the regulation of the common law.
Coke was cautious in endorsing the claims that foreign 
trading companies such as the Merchant Adventurers, the
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Staplers, the East India Company, and municipal corporations 
such as the borough of Shrewsbury, actually provided "good 
government in trade" in their own particular cases. Some 
trading companies no doubt promoted good government in 
trade, and Coke sought to uphold this principle; but others 
"ignored the public good by exporting wool or cloth of poor 
quality or . . . created demand for useless luxuries
imported from abroad" (White, p. 114). Speaking of such
claims to serve the public good, Coke observed that "new 
corporations trading to foreign parts, and at home, which 
under the pretence of order and government, in conclusion 
tend to the hindrance of trade and traffic and in the end 
produce monopolies" (Institutes. 2, p. 540). Coke was often
sceptical about the claims of some regulations of trade 
to promote the public good and provide good order in trade; 
Coke "recognized that certain groups, like the Merchant 
Adventurers, fallaciously claimed to be providing good order 
for trade when they were actually restraining it, promoting 
their own private interest, and undermining the public good" 
(White, p. 115). Coke and other common law jurists were 
"quite prepared to see that these bodies used their power 
for the purposes for which they were given." Holdsworth 
further explains that "they refused to uphold their by-laws, 
though sanctioned as required by the Act of Henry VII, if 
they seemed to restrict unduly the common law right of every
man to use his trade" (4, p. 352).
In regards to the other type of patent, Queen Elizabeth
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had initiated a policy of granting exclusive rights of 
production in 1562 to "'industrious' denizens who either 
imported or invented new processes" (Malament, p. 1357). 
Holdsworth notes that, as originally instituted, the royal 
grant of patent "did not create a monopoly of selling, but 
of manufacturing the product" (4, p. 345), This type of 
grant differed from the medieval grant of special privileges 
to those who introduced a new industry. Such grants were 
made in the weaving, woollen, and other industries. The 
common law recognized the validity of these type of grants 
"if it could be shown that they were clearly for the welfare 
of the realm" (Holdsworth, 4, p. 344). Holdsworth adds that 
"the crown made the grant and kept the privileged industry 
under its sole control." Under these new grants, however, 
"the patentee applied for the grant, and, having got it, was 
left free to act under the powers conferred by it" (4, 
p. 346) .
It was not until Elizabeth's reign that this type of 
grant became common. The Queen sold patents "irrespective of 
the fact that neither the commodity itself nor its 
manufacture represented an innovation in the realm."
Thorelli further observes that "by the end of the 16th 
century patents in no way related to invention covering the 
sale or manufacture of, among other things, such necessities 
as soap, salt, starch, saltpeter, glass, iron, steel and 
paper had been issued" (p. 25). The monopoly system began to 
be abused; there were hindrances to trade and manufacture,
high prices, and inferior goods. The grants by the crown 
simply got out of hand, becoming objects of personal 
profit. Patentees were delegated the right "to search the 
localities of competitors and even individual homes and the 
right to seize 'contraband' goods" (Thorelli, p. 25).
Protests against the patent abuses in Parliament led to 
a debate in the House of Commons over the power of the crown 
to make such grants. Those aggrieved by these patents 
thought that "the common law did not warrant these infringe­
ments of liberty to trade . . (Holdsworth, 4, p. 348).
Elizabeth decided to leave the validity of the patents to 
the judgment of the common law. The latter was called upon 
to settle the question in the Case of Monopolies (16C2).
In the Case of Monopolies (also known as Darcy v. 
Allen), Darcy brought suit against Allen for infringing his 
privilege (based on a royal grant) to make, import and sell 
playing cards. The King’s Bench invalidated the patent. An 
exclusive privilege "founded on custom or by Parliament was 
held to be legitimate under the common law, while monopoly 
founded by royal grant was not" (Ekelund and Tollison, 
p. 54) .
The rent-seeking interpretation of this case, as set 
forth by Ekelund and Tollison, argues that "the relevant 
issues concerned the legality of certain monopoly rights and 
who had the legal right to supply these rights, Parliament 
or the crown." Coke's report of the case "attacked the pre­
rogative of the crown in the grant of monopoly or of special
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trading privileges to corporations . . . Ekelund and
Tollison emphasize that Coke insisted instead "that rights
over trade are reserved to Parliament.'* They claim that:
Coke's decision states that Elizabeth had no 
prerogative to regulate playing cards as "things 
of vanity," in part because this would constrain 
individuals from practicing a trade that had been 
protected and recognized by Parliament. In other 
words, only Parliament could act as regulator 
(p. 54).
Following the rent-seeking component's view of the indepen­
dent judiciary, Ekelund and Tollison contend that patentees 
faced uncertainty concerning their monopoly rights. The role 
of the common law courts was to enforce the long-term 
contract between Parliament and rent seekers. Coke's role 
must be understood in this light; as they claim,
Obviously the legitimacy of rent seeking was not 
the central issue to Coke; rather, it was a 
question of which organ of government had the 
authority to collect rents. Other judgments of the 
common law courts also supported Parliament's 
power to supply regulation in output markets 
(p. 55) .
Ekelund and Tollison reject the application of modern public 
interest style arguments to the action of the courts in this 
case. They do recognize that "Parliament and the courts may 
have regarded the public interest as identical to the 
removal of patent-granting power from the Crown" (p. 55, 
n.lB), but they do not see this as the primary motivation 
for these actions: "in these ruder times, what other goal of 
regulation could there have been except unvarnished rent 
seeking? To apply conceptions of the 'public interest* to 
the historical context of mercantile England requires a
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great stretch of the imagination" (p. 42).
However, one can argue that the actions of the common 
law courts can be better understood in light of these 
jurists' understanding of the public interest, rather than 
that of the twentieth-century. Coke's conception of "free 
trade" was more complex than opposition simply to royal 
patents; it was not merely based on a political argument. 
Coke opposed certain forms of monopoly irregardless of their 
source. Ekelund and Tollison’s analysis suffers from a lack 
of any consideration at all of the other cases in which they 
claim the courts "rescinded monopoly rights in labor 
markets" (p. 52) . Most of these other cases are ones which
Coke decided. As we have seen, in them Coke refers to 
considerations of quality in workmanship and the promotion 
of industriousness; these are ends that serve "the good of 
the commonwealth." Monopoly rights are rescinded because 
they are hindrances to trade, and stand in the way of full 
employment.
Moreover, other aspects of Coke's report on The Case of 
Monopolles elaborate more fully that the decision in this 
case rested on an appeal to the "public policy of the common 
law" (Malament, p. 1343). The Court referred to Davenant 
v. Hurdls and general statements of principle to nullify 
monopolies.35 The King's Bench held that all trades provi-
35 One of the sources for these principles was the 
Scriptures. Noting the Court's citation of Deuteronomy 24:6 
(No man shall take the nether or the upper millstone to 
pledge: for he takes a man's life to pledge), Coke comments
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ding employment to the Queen's subjects, "which prevent 
idleness . . . and exercise Men and Youth in Labour . . .
are profitable to the Commonwealth." An exclusive grant to 
exercise such a trade was "against the Benefit and Liberty 
of the Subject." The grant of manufacture was void because 
it was a "monopoly, and against the common law" (Reports, 
11, p. 86a). Coke elaborated on this reason. Monopolies are 
against the common law, not only because they are damaging 
and prejudicial to the traders excluded, but they are also 
harmful to the public generally because of their 'three 
inseparable incidents': "the price of the same commodity 
will be raised," "the commodity is not so good and merchan­
table as it was before," and "it tends to the Impoverishment 
of diverse artificers and others" (Reports. 11, p. 86b).
Higher prices and lower quality merchandise were 
produced by the abuses of royal patents. As seen in our 
study of the late medieval common law, these had long been 
seen as economic offenses.36 They were means by which 
certain individuals could gain at the expense of others in
in the Institutes that this passage showed that ". . . a
man's trade is accounted his life, because it maintains his 
life; and therefore the monopolist that takes away a man's 
trade, takes away his life and therefore is so much the more 
odious . . ." (3, p. 181).
36 Malament observes that Coke might have cited "any 
number of cases on behalf of the common law's bias against 
attempts by individuals to manipulate prices." In her view, 
"That he did not do so suggests that Coke (and the court 
whose decision he was reporting) assumed the parallel 
between the offenses of engrossing and forestalling and 
monopolies would be obvious to his contemporaries"
(p. 1345).
the commonwealth.
Coke reports that the jurists also made an explicit 
appeal to the obligation to prevent unemployment and idle­
ness among craftsmen in the commonwealth, as well as a cer­
tain level of workmanship. As Malament observes, the Statute 
of Artificers "sought to enforce full employment." The 
liberty or right to work upheld in the common law was inte­
grally related to this obligation. As we have seen, both the 
Statute of Laborers and the Statute of Artificers required 
that all be usefully employed, and thus, as Malament notes, 
"certain privileged individuals could not be permitted to 
deprive others of their trade." These laws created the 
obligation, and the courts upheld the right by voiding 
monopolies which created unemployment (p. 1344). For Coke,
as for the legislators who passed the Statute of Artificers, 
skill in one's trade was important, as was the full employ­
ment of the labor force. The liberty or right to freedom of 
trade meant freedom from artificial restraints on trade 
which hindered the achievement of full employment. Coke 
observed that Darcy's patent was a "dangerous Innovation" 
(Reports. 11, p. 87a), because it extended monopoly privi­
leges to an untrained and unskilled person, while excluding 
the trained artisans. The proper governance of trade 
required regulations to insure skilled persons would be 
employed in the various trades; these sort of regulations 
served the public good.
Monopoly grants issued by James I grew significantly in
152
the next two decades. The monarch sought to bring industry 
under royal control by means of patent grants for smelting 
ores, dyeing textiles, making gunpowder, and a host of other 
economic processes. The petitioners for new companies were 
" . . . given, or allowed to buy, a monopolistic right to
supervise a trade, to conduct it, and to pocket (or to share 
with the crown) the fines, fees, and profits" so produced 
from the enterprise (Heaton, p. 378).
Coke construed the case for monopoly patents based on 
inventions fairly narrowly. Such patents were legitimate if 
"the grantee had introduced a new invention into the kingdom 
and had thereby created a new industry," thus furthering 
trade. Holdsworth elaborates on the distinction made by 
common law jurists such as Coke: "small improvements upon 
existing processes were not regarded as fit subjects of a 
grant" (4, pp. 350-351). Coke declared that "such a privi­
lege must be substantially and essentially new invented; but 
if the substance was in esse before, and a new addition 
thereunto, though that addition make the former more 
profitable, yet it is not a new manufacture in law" (Insti­
tutes . 3, p. 184). As we have seen, various abuses began to
appear in the patent system in the 1580's. Malament notes 
the deleterious effects of the granting of privileges to 
practice well-established trades: "Craftsmen who hitherto 
enjoyed the right to work found themselves unemployed or 
forced to pay a considerable sum to the patentee. Prices 
rose and often the quality of goods deteriorated." Coke saw
this as inextricably related to "the bestowal of monopolies 
on court favorites, sycophants and others who knew nothing 
of the trade which they controlled and who injured craftsmen 
who did." Coke and his allies in Parliament "sought to 
remedy the ills which had developed in the administration of 
the patent system, but not to destroy the system itself" 
(p. 1357). 37 Coke valued inventions in so far as they con­
tributed to the public good without artificially restraining 
trade.
In 1623 Parliament enacted the Statute of Monopolies38 
(introduced by Coke in Parliament as "A Bill for Free 
Trade"). The law came as a response to "King James' flagrant 
disregard for the common law . . ." (Malament, p. 1351).
The Statute was in the main declaratory of the common law; 
it stated 'the ancient and fundamental law' of the realm. As 
Thorelli puts it, the Statute "reflected the general 
aversion of the law to monopoly based on special privilege, 
an attitude which knew only certain clearly defined excep-
37 Coke wanted to nullify patents granted for more than 
a seven year period. As White observes, "The rationale 
underlying this argument was that subjects who were appren­
ticed to the patentee for the usual term of seven years in 
the first year of the patent's execution would otherwise be 
barred later from what was or had become their trade." Coke 
also spoke out in Parliament against those monopoly patents 
which either excluded "subjects from their ancient trade," 
or "barred the practitioners of that trade from using a 
different method of making the same product as the patentee" 
(p. 140). Coke would no doubt object to the length of patent 
life today on the grounds that such a system gives many 
firms an entrenched monopoly position.
38 The text is given in Bland et al., pp. 465-468.
tions" (p. 26). The Statute began with a sweeping statement
declaring the illegality of monopolies and then proceeded to
make exceptions to the rule.39
In Section 1, the law declared that
. . . all monopolies and all commissions, grants,
licenses, charters, letters patent heretofore made 
or granted to any person or persons, bodies
politic or corporate whatsoever, of or for the 
sole buying, selling, making, working or using of 
anything within this realm . . . are altogether
contrary to the laws of this realm, and so are and 
shall be utterly void and none effect, and in no
wise put in use or execution (p. 466).
This statement "seemed to void all institutions exercising 
exclusive control of any product or form of commerce" 
(Malament, p. 1351). In Section 2, the Statute went on 
to declare that all such "commissions, grants, licenses, 
charters, letters patents, restraints," were to be 
"examined, heard, tried, and determined by and according to 
the common law of this realm and not otherwise" (p. 466).
The comprehensiveness of Section 1 was constrained by 
certain exceptions. Section 5 allowed for "the sole making 
of new manufactures"; thus the law "recognized the legiti­
macy of a copyright patent" (Malament, p. 1352). The Statute 
rejected patents of monopoly that did not confine themselves 
to new industries. But Section 10 of the law did not void
39 Coke introduced the bill in the Commons in 1621. He 
did not include any provisos in this version, so that it 
must be used with care as a guide to his view of monopolies. 
Coke was probably willing to support the bill with the 
provisos "because he believed that they validated no 
monopolies but simply excepted them out of the bill" (White, 
p. 132). See Foster (1960) for a discussion of Coke's role 
in the formation of the Statute of Monopolies.
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patent grants "relating to printing, the manufacture of 
saltpeter or gunpowder . . . " and certain other products
(p. 468). Holdsworth argues that these exceptions were 
consistent with "the common law principle that certain forms 
of control must be exercised by the crown in the interests 
of the state" (4, p. 353).
Furthermore, Section 9 protected the "liberties" and 
"customs" of corporations and all "grants, charters, and 
letters patents" made for the ordering of trade in London.
In fact, the prohibition against monopoly was not to apply 
to any other "town corporate," that is, to any privileges 
granted to them or to "any corporations, companies or 
fellowships of any art, trade, occupation or mistery, or to 
any companies or societies of merchants within this realm 
erected for the maintenance, enlargement or ordering of any 
trade or merchandise . . (p. 467) . In these cases
regulations could be made, but only those consistent with 
the principle of "good order and government" of trade. Along 
these same lineB Coke had declared three years earlier that 
the "Common good is to be preferred before any particular 
town, and monopolies which restrain trades are to be taken 
away as well when they are for the benefit of the towns as 
when they concern but simple (single) persons" (Commons 
Debates, 4, p. 252).40
40 It should also be pointed out that Section 9 
"excepted companies which enjoyed the exclusive privilege of 
trading with specific countries or in specific commodi­
ties. Since most foreign trade was controlled by corpora­
The Statute of Monopolies served to underscore by 
legislative declaration the common law rule against re­
straints of trade and the elevation of the common law above 
the royal prerogative. Hamilton adds that there were some 
specific beneficiaries from its provisions. He acknowledges 
that "it had the support of those who wished to curb the 
grant of royal favors." However, "it had also support from 
persons who wished to arrest further grants of letters 
patent lest they encroach upon their own privileges" (1940, 
p. 28, n.24). These trades and individuals benefited from
the list of exceptions. In this sense the Statute was a 
product of interest group pressure which locked in monopoly 
rights under the protection of Parliament.
C. AN EVALUATION OF COKE'S APPROACH
Having considered the development of the doctrine of 
restraint of trade in the rulings and statements of Coke, we 
can now consider how each of the models of labor market 
regulation fare in explaining his contribution to public 
policy. Again it is crucial to observe that Coke was a 
practicing jurist and legislator, not a theorist attempting 
to understand regulation. We are concerned with whether
tions, this provision excluded a particularly large class of 
monopolies" (Malament, p. 1352). The companies Coke called 
monopolies "were simply those whose membership was too 
restrictive." As Malament observes, "exclusiveness led to 
unemployment and disorder and generally hindered trade 
whereas the true function of companies was good 'order and 
government'" (p. 1354).
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Coke's approach Is best characterized as consistently being 
concerned with redistributing wealth between various groups 
desiring regulation, or as being driven by substantive good 
principles.
The rent-seeking component of the interest group model 
interprets Coke's role in the supply of regulation in Tudor 
and Stuart England as a practicing jurist and legislator. 
Coke was zealous to maintain the common law and Parliament's 
positions as provider of monopoly rights to individuals in 
the oversight of trade.
This component cannot adequately explain Coke's 
approach. Coke was not simply involved in a jurisdictional 
battle over the proper source of occupational regulation. He 
found objectionable guild and municipal ordinances which 
restrained trade, as well as royal prerogatives. Moreover, 
he could on occasion accept a royal patent as a legitimate 
means of "ordering a trade." Coke's approach goes beyond a 
political conflict; he had genuine concerns about labor 
market regulation of a substantive nature.
But the interest group model's depiction of the demand 
for regulation does highlight certain features of Coke's 
judicial reports and statements in Parliament. Coke draws 
conclusions about efforts to seek regulation which are quite 
similar to those falling out of this model. Coke recognized 
the existence of a demand for protective legislation on the 
part of well-organized groups. Corporations sought to con­
vince regulators of the benefits to English society associa­
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ted with granting them a monopoly. They attempted to culti­
vate a perception of 'disorder* in their own trade, and the 
recognition of the need for a desired type of regulation to 
sucessfully cope with this problem; or if they already had a 
monopoly, they tried to convince public authorities of the 
disastrous consequences of opening their trade to others.
Coke scrutinized carefully the appeals for regulation, 
and often found them merely attempts to obtain protection 
from competition. As White notes, in Parliament Coke had to 
consider several such appeals:
under the pretense of maintaining good order in 
trade, companies like the Merchant Adventurers 
were using their privileges and powers to harass 
their competitors; and . . . towns like Shrewsbury
were also trying to justify their monopolies by 
arguing that they were not restraining trade but 
simply governing it {p. 138).
As a jurist Coke found that the Merchant Taylors guild
sought to impose rules on competitors which were a burden on
competing craftsmen, a . . means of extortion in drawing
money from them, either by delay or some other subtle
device, or of oppression of young tradesmen by the old and
rich of the same trade, not permitting them to work in their
trade freely . . ." (Reports. 11, p. 54a). Coke does not
ratify the Taylors' ordinance, but rather finds it to be an
arbitrary restraint of trade based on common law principles.
Residency requirements, high license fees and other
means to exclude others from the practice of a trade were
not unknown to the jurists of the common law. They had long
been seen as attempts to impose exclusionary restraints on
competitors. Thus Coke was dubious of the claims of many 
regulatory measures; "he would not necessarily accept as a 
justification for a monopoly the fact that the economic 
activity placed under monopolistic control was said to be in 
a state of disorder” (White, p. 140). Moreover, Coke was 
sceptical about the claims of some guilds that certain 
exclusionary ordinances actually served the public interest. 
He recognized that some occupational groups made claims to 
the possession of a true 'mystery* when the level of skill 
involved in the craft was not significant.41
Nonetheless, Coke in many different instances affirmed 
the need for 'good government in trade.' Coke often referred 
to 'government of trade for the good of the commonwealth. ' 
The proper governance of trade required regulations to 
insure skilled persons would be employed in the various 
trades. Guild ordinances upheld by the law were an important 
means to this end.
It is difficult to explicitly link Coke's approach to 
market failure arguments. Coke does not refer to the 
presence of natural monopoly in any of his writings or 
speeches. He does stress an obligation to serve with skill 
all who utilize the services of a trade, but not for 
'natural monopoly* reasons. Coke desires to see that those
41 His cautiousness applied to individuals as well; 
"Coke argued against the legality of monopolies granted to 
men who lacked the skill necessary to execute them and 
monopolies over activities that could not possibly be 
executed by the patentees themselves" (White, p. 140).
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dealing with the "health of men's bodies" perform their 
tasks well. They ought to have sufficient knowledge and 
skill. Coke does not allude to any informational advantage 
on the part of physicians or external effects in the perfor­
mance of their services. In general Coke expresses a desire 
to maintain the level of skills in various crafts, as well 
as to maintain the quality of workmanship, and thought that 
guild ordinances could be legitimately made to serve that 
end.
But the presence of poor quality did not always require 
special privileges to certain producers. Coke did not claim 
that the presence of abuses in a trade was the sole ground 
for the grant of a exclusive license to practice. At one 
point, Coke argued that "If the existence of abuses in a 
trade were to constitute grounds for establishing a monopoly 
. . . then trades like those of butchers and bakers (and
presumably others as well) might be 'put down' and 'sole 
selling' established in their places" (White, p. 122; 
cf.Commons Debates. 5, p. 59). Coke recognized that the
grant of a monopoly in a trade led to higher prices for 
consumers, and higher incomes for those obtaining the 
privileges. Furthermore, Coke could appeal to the concept of 
consumer sovereignty and the discipline provided by the 
market mechanism. In the Tavlors of Ipswich case, he argued 
against the guild ordinance, in part because ". . . if he
who takes upon him work is unskillful, his ignorance is a 
sufficient punishment for him" (Reports. 11, pp. 53b-54a).
Such a craftsman would get no clients. Competition then 
could be a means to promote product quality.
Coke * s approach, then, cannot be explained simply in 
terms of the market failure model. Rather, it is better 
understood in light of the liberty and virtue component of 
this model. This component makes the best sense out of the 
distinction between regulation and restriction which Coke 
consistently relied upon. It also describes most closely the 
normative features of Coke’s approach.
Coke recognized at least three possible legal bases for 
the government of trade: custom, statute, and royal charter, 
while he recognized the legality of customary regulation of 
trade, he insisted that such regulations "were illegal if 
they were unreasonable" (White, p. 139). Moreover, Coke 
stood ready to declare void certain statutes that confirmed 
the power of corporations to enforce their economic privi­
leges. In the Parliament of 1624, he reinforced the distinc­
tion between regulation and restriction by saying "If a 
Corporation, for the better Government of the Town, not 
contrary to the Law; but, if any sole Restraints, then gone" 
(Journals, 1, p. 770). Malament notes that for Coke, the
danger of 'any sole Restraints' was "arbitrary power and 
unemployment." These considerations underlay Coke's anta­
gonism to some royal patents of monopoly for individuals and 
trading companies, as well as to privileges for corporate 
towns, boroughs and guilds (pp. 1354-1355). Moreover, Coke 
"looked to corporate bodies to administer national policies"
(such as those embodied in the Statute of Artificers), "but 
not to take the initiative, especially if it proved in­
jurious" (p. 1358, n.217). At the same time, Coke firmly
supported the right of guilds to make "Ordinances for the 
good Order and Government of men of Trades and Mysteries 
• . (Reports. 11, p. 54a).
These underlying considerations are best understood in 
light of the economic and social factors forming the 
background to Coke's approach. These factors shaped the 
precedents in the common law and the relevant statutes of 
England which Coke relied upon.
One of the most important pieces of labor legislation 
for Coke was the Statute of Artificers. Coke applied this 
law with a special emphasis on its aims of promoting full 
employment, industriousness, and eliminating vagrancy. Most 
significant for him were its appenticeship provisions, which 
required the acquisition of the necessary level of skills 
and knowledge of a trade, mystery, or occupation.
Coke was concerned with maintaining full employment in 
the face of increasing social instability in early seven­
teenth-century England. Social stability and public order 
appealed to Coke's legal mind; measures to advance trade and 
employ the maximum number of people won his support 
(Travers, p. 30) . This was consistent with the common law 
response to the unemployment in England of the late six­
teenth and early seventeenth century. As Knafla observes, 
instead of "entrenching local privileges and interests," the
law responded by "maintaining the regulatory functions of 
local corporations and preventing restrictive practices." He 
adds that "a guild or corporation could regulate the prac­
tice of trade to prevent poverty, idleness, social disloca­
tion, or local dissent; but it could not prescribe restric­
tive penalties against men who were qualified to practise 
their trade" (p. 150) . Certain guild stipulations appeared 
to Coke to be merely trade restraints, not promoting quality 
production, but hindering qualified craftsmen from pursuing 
their trade. In Coke's view, men should be free to pursue 
their lawful trades.
Coke's arguments against restraints of trade by both 
private and royal means are not arbitrary, sporadic restric­
tions against market interference. 'Grievances in trade' 
were created by guild restrictions or corporate by-laws 
which artificially hindered qualified persons from pursuing 
their lawful trade or 'calling.' Such restrictions became 
increasingly evident as guilds came to be challenged by new 
methods of production. By creating unemployment, unne­
cessarily exclusionary guild ordinances vitiated a key 
purpose of the Statute of Artificers (Malament, p. 1355, 
n.194). Moreover, these by-laws violated the norm of 
fairness; Coke desired to afford individuals the opportunity 
to practice a trade based on the qualities relevant to the 
occupation itself.
Coke legitimately appealed to the antipathy in the 
common law towards attempts by guilds to artificially
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restrain trade to their own advantage. Coke had adequate 
legal precedent for the limitations he placed upon the 
regulation of trade, whether it was by custom, Parliament or 
royal prerogative.
However, Coke still sought to remove economic grievan­
ces by use of legitimate regulation. This reflected his 
paternalistic outlook. In the Tudor perspective which Coke 
held to, challenging these regulations would amount to 
challenging "the entire underpinning of the social fabric" 
(Malament, p. 1332). Coke's normative goals were consistent 
with Tudor moral precepts which stressed the public good 
over private gain; this was ultimately the distinction 
between trade regulation and trade restraint. He followed 
the traditional hostility in the common law towards guild 
ordinances which "fixed prices at extortionate levels or 
lowered quality or excluded an unreasonable proportion of 
applicants . . ." (Malament, p. 1340).
Coke's viewpoint towards the relation between economic 
freedom and regulation is reflected in his use of the 
concepts of 'free trade' and 'the good government of trade.' 
Coke regarded these notions "as complementary, and not 
antithetical, principles of economic policy." Coke thought 
that "absolute economic freedom could be and should be 
restrained in the name of government of trade . . . "  
(White, p. 115). Coke could argue that "government of 
trade, like freedom of trade, promoted the public good" 
(p. 137). In addition, White notes that Coke "sometimes used
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the phrase 'free trade' to refer to trade that was not 
limited by unfair or unreasonable restraints" (p. 137} . Coke 
did not claim that "every subject's unbounded exercise of 
economic liberty necessarily promoted the public good" 
(p. 136). The 'liberty' of the common law was a much 
more limited obstacle to any type of government interference 
with private economic activity than the 'liberty* which is 
the end of the interest group model. The common law recog­
nized the role of the state in making regulations which 
fostered the public health and morals, and which facilitated 
an industrious way of life. Thus when Coke referred to 
'government of trade for the good of the commonwealth,' he 
was referring to regulations designed not only to prevent 
shoddy craftmanship, idleness and unrest, but also to foster 
virtue by means of the fraternal life and discipline
acquired through guild apprenticeships fReports. 11,
pp. 53b-54a).
Coke acknowledged that guilds could make ordinances for 
the good order and government of a trade, provided that 
these by-laws were in agreement with the laws of the realm, 
and subordinate to the common law fReports. 10, pp. 30-31).
Coke objected to restrictive guild practices which stood in 
the way of the Tudor policy of full employment. Faced with 
guilds in their period of decline, Coke's attitude towards 
them reflected his belief that they should not arbitrarily 
restrain the individual worker. But he thought their
existence was necessary for the purpose of regulating
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their own particular art or mystery.
Coke's approach to the regulation of guilds and other 
corporate bodies stressed the need for the promotion of 
industriousness and virtue. Guilds had long been seen as 
institutions which promoted character formation. By means of 
requiring prospective craftsmen to apprentice with a guild, 
labor market regulation would foster industriousness, 
civility and other virtues.
There is no doubt that there are elements of each of 
the models intertwined in Coke's rulingB and speeches in
Parliament. Nonetheless, the liberty and virtue component 
best explains the approach of the common law to labor market 
regulation. By distinguishing between legitimate regulations 
and arbitrary restrictions, Coke sought to strike a balance 
between the goals of full employment, quality in workman­
ship, character formation, and liberty.
Coke's opposition to restraints on trade had a dif­
ferent basis from that of the classical liberal thinkers of 
the eighteenth-century; "he accorded the State a positive 
and beneficent role" which they denied (Malament, p. 1347). 
Unlike Adam Smith, who was quite sceptical as to the need 
for labor market regulation and therefore urged the repeal 
of the Statute of Artificers and its apprenticeship laws, 
Coke validated this regulation. Such legislation as properly 
interpreted and applied by the common law would prevent the
public from suffering from "disorder in trade" in the form
of higher prices, lower quality products, and the exclusion
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and impoverishment of qualified craftsmen by private 
restraints. Moreover, the public good would be promoted by 
means of guild practices and ordinances which fostered civic 
and spiritual virtues.
Coke's contribution to the doctrine of conspiracy in 
restraint of trade derives largely from his notion of 
freedom of trade. Coke was a moving force in the broadening 
of the common law right to pursue one's lawful trade. In his
rulings and speeches, Coke emphasized the role of the common
law in reviewing and overruling private and royal arbitrary 
restraints of trade while sustaining legitimate regulation. 
This principle of understanding liberty within a framework 
which accounted for the legitimate role of governmental
powers in regulating the labor market was manifested in 
American jurisprudence in the nineteenth century. As will be 
demonstrated in chapter four, it is seen in the American 
legal notions of "substantive due process" in regards to 
economic freedom and the legitimate role of governmental
"police powers" in promoting the public good. These concepts 
are a key part of the American development of the economic 
conspiracy doctrine as applied to labor unions.
Coke's approach to freedom of trade also significantly 
influenced the British development of the economic con­
spiracy doctrine. The common law hostility to arbitrary 
restraints of trade was extended in the eighteenth century 
to combinations in the labor market. In conjunction with the 
concept of freedom of association, the broadening of the
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common law right to pursue one's trade contributed to the 
evolution of the doctrine of conspiracy in restraint of 
trade in the nineteenth century. These two concepts shaped 
the English common law of labor relations.
CONSPIRACY IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE IN ENGLAND, 1800-1906
This chapter will examine the development of labor law 
in England from the late eighteenth century through the 
early twentieth century. The changing status of labor 
combinations will be considered in light of both statutory 
and common law. Our central focus will be on analyzing the 
changes in the law in terms of its treatment of labor unions 
as conspiracies in restraint of trade.
The eighteenth century saw the increase of common 
law rulings against labor combinations as illegal criminal 
conspiracies. The Combination Acts of 1799 and 1800 genera­
lized the previous statutory prohibitions against labor 
combinations. These provisions were overturned in the 
Combination Acts of 1824 and 1825. In a series of cases 
which interpreted these statutes, the issue became not the 
legality of unions per se. but the legality of certain types 
of union activity to achieve their ends. The courts utilized 
the concept of conspiracy as a tort in ruling that certain 
agreements between workers and employers were unenforceable. 
Then during the 1870s unions were legitimized by statute, 
but subject to civil conspiracy charges in the courts. 
Finally, in the early part of the twentieth century, unions 
obtained complete immunity from all forms of conspiracy 
charges. Both the liberty and virtue component and the 
interest group theory contribute to an explanation of these 
changes. The former model especially applies to legislation
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in the 1870s and the common law rulings interpreting those 
statutes. The latter model is more applicable in under­
standing organized labor efforts to obtain special privi­
leges before the law which culminated in the Trade Disputes 
Act of 1906.
It was Adam Smith who first extensively examined the 
economic aspects of attempts by interest groups to obtain 
exclusive privileges in the law. The discussion of the 
English approach to combination law thus begins with Smith’s 
writings on guilds and corporations, and his evaluation of 
apprenticeship laws and labor combinations. Smith argues 
that both types of laws are ineffectual in their aims; he 
offers a coherent case against the granting of special 
privilege to organized craftsmen and organized laborers in 
general, as well as to organized employer groups. Smith's 
approach is best understood to be a combination of elements 
of both the liberty and virtue component and the interest 
group models. Both Smith's emphasis on interest group 
pursuit of labor market regulation and his understanding of 
how to achieve the ends of the 'public good* are compared 
and contrasted to the perspective of the common law, and 
particularly that of Coke, on these same issues. A consi­
deration of the changed economic circumstances of eigh­
teenth-century England helps to explain the dissimilarities 
in the two approaches. An appreciation of Smith's classical 
liberal approach to labor market regulation is crucial, 
because it made a significant contribution to the arguments
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over the nineteenth century legislation regarding labor 
combinations.
I. SMITH AND THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL VIEW OF LABOR MARKETS 
Economics in the classical liberal tradition is often 
said to have begun with the writings of Adam Smith in the 
eighteenth century. In the era preceding Smith, there were 
elements of the classical liberal stress on the role of 
markets. In seventeenth-century English economic thought, 
one finds a movement towards treating land, loans and labor 
as matters for market-type analysis.1 At the same time, the 
perspective towards 'governance of trade' held by earlier 
traditions came to be increasingly questioned by those 
writing pamphlets on economic issues. Josiah Child was among 
the advocates of the removal of constraints on trade. He 
proclaimed that "to improve and advance trade" we must 
"begin the right way, casting off some of our old mistaken 
principles in trade, which we inherit from our ancestors who 
were . . .  unskilled in the misteries of and methods to 
improve trade." Among the 'common errors' of his day, he 
included the notions that "none shall use any manual occu­
pation except he has been apprentice to the same," and that 
"to suffer artificers to have as many apprentices as they
1 Appleby (1978) has shown that this conception of 
these crucial economic elements came to be articulated as 
part of the explanation of and justification for a market 
economy.
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will is to destroy trade" (cited in Lipson, 3, p. 293).2
In The Wealth of Nations.3 Smith took up this same 
theme and elaborated it further. He argued that under the 
system of natural liberty, there would be a close harmony 
between the interests of individuals and the public 
interest. Interference by government would often impair the 
attainment of the public interest, especially the consumer's 
interest. Thus in regards to occupational regulations, Smith 
claimed that both the Statute of Apprenticeship (another 
name for the Statute of Artificers) and the exclusive 
privileges of corporations obstructed the free circulation 
of labor from employment to employment and from place to 
place (I. x. c. 42), and thus limited competition. Open 
competition would lead to an enhanced national prosperity. 
Smith called for a policy which would "break down the exclu­
sive privileges of corporations, and repeal the statute of 
apprenticeship" (IV. ii. 42).
2 Letwin argues that Child's declaration that the 
monopolistic privileges of cities, guilds, and trading 
companies should be eliminated, as well as his call for 
the repeal of the apprenticeship laws, were ". . . advocated
on the score of particular advantages they would procure to 
merchants and the nation rather than being deduced from any 
general and systematic doctrine" of laissez-faire (1963, 
pp. 46, 214).
3 All references to Smith's works are to the Glasgow 
Edition of the Works and Correspondence. Generally accepted 
abbreviations and citation codes are used.
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A. APPRENTICESHIP REGULATION
Though there were many statutory regulations still
in place in late seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
England, a good number of them were only inconsistently 
enforced. Moreover, the Statute of Artificers' apprentice­
ship requirements had in general been confined rather than 
extended by the resolutions of the courts of the seventeenth 
century (Blackstone, 1, p. 428). Tawney observes that by the 
end of this century, it appears to have been established 
that the relevant clauses of the Statute of Artificers 
"applied only to trades (i) in existence in 1563, (ii) 
requiring some degree of specialised skill, (iii) carried on
in boroughs" (1925, p. 12, n.4). The reasons for these
tighter interpretations were stated in 1759 by the great 
common-law jurist Lord Mansfield:
If none must employ, or be employed, in any branch 
of trade, but who have served a limited number of 
years to that branch, the particular trade will be 
lodged in few hands, to the danger of the public, 
and the liberty of setting up trades, and the 
foundations of the present flourishing condition 
of Manchester will be destroyed. In the infancy 
of trade, the Act of Queen Elizabeth might be well 
calculated for public weal, but now when it is 
grown to that perfection we see it, it might 
perhaps be of utility to have those laws repealed, 
as tending to cramp and tie down that knowledge it 
was first necessary to obtain by rule (cited in 
Holdsworth, 11, p. 420).
Parliament also did not desire to strictly enforce the 
Statute of Artificers. Holdsworth notes that in 1702 a group 
of wool combers and weavers petitioned Parliament, "com­
plaining that intruders had come into their trade who had
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only been apprenticed for a year or two . . . " The House of
Commons responded that "trade ought to be free, and declined 
to take any action" (11, p. 421). In 1751 a committee of the 
House of Commons made a report opposing the apprenticeship 
requirements and particular corporate by-laws which amounted 
to restraints on trade. Citing its observations as recorded
in the House of Commons Journals. Lipson notes that the
committee referred to both public and private ordinances 
when it stated that "the most useful and beneficial manufac­
tures are principally carried on, and trade most flourish­
ing, in such towns and places as are under no such local 
disabilities." The committee also observed that while 
apprenticeship laws were
at first well intended for securing the goodness 
and consequently the value and estimation of our 
several manufactures in foreign parts, and to 
prevent the disparagement of them by unskillful
workmen. But since the improvement of trade in 
general, it is found that all manufactures find
their own value according to their goodness 
. . . (3, p . 290) .
Smith articulated a carefully reasoned rationale for a
virtually complete dismantling of these same regulations not
being fully enforced in the England of his day.4
4 It has been argued that Smith was largely unaware 
of the actual state of English occupational regulation. 
Grampp has suggested that
Smith deplored the regulation of trade in a way 
that has made many believe he was arguing against 
his age. If he was, he must have had the Elizabe­
than Statute of Apprentices in mind. When enacted 
it provided for extensive regulation, but after 
1660 it was administered in a way that weakened 
both the principle and the practice of regulation; 
and by 1700 the courts refused to enforce it. It
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What lay behind Smith's opposition to the Statute of
Apprentices and the exclusive privileges of corporations? In
general, it was but one aspect of Smith's distrust of the
'corporation spirit,' as James Becker has observed: "Smith
regards all clubs, cliques, cabals, joint stock companies,
and other social guilds as corporations having in common
certain properties that render them positively harmful, or,
at best, of dubious social utility" (p. 70) . Though Smith
himself was a "clubbable" man, he viewed combinations of
guild artisans as especially suspect because of their
pursuit of higher incomes by means of laws restricting
competition from independent laborers.
More specifically, Smith was dubious of the efficacy of
appprenticeship requirements in most industries. For
example, he doubts the need for such regulation in the
weaving industry:
it was imagined that the cause of so much bad 
cloth was that the weaver had not been properly 
educated, and that therefore they made a statute 
that he should serve a seven years apprenticeship 
before he pretended to make any. But this is by no 
means a sufficient security against bad cloth 
[U(B) 306].
Smith's empirical observations of the practices of corpora-
was not repealed until 1814. Its history illus­
trates the distinction between enactment, admini­
stration, and enforcement (1964, pp. 130-131).
However, as Hollander has observed, in Smith's discussion of 
the apprenticeship requirements it is evident that he under­
stood it to be interpreted in practice "to apply only in 
market towns and to those trades established prior to 1563" 
(p. 259). It was not extended to trades established subse­
quent to that time, such as those practiced in Manchester, 
Birmingham, and Wolverhampton (WN I. x. c. 9).
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tions led him to argue that many presented an undue burden
on prospective craftsmen:
Long apprenticeships are altogether unnecessary.
The arts, which are much superior to common 
trades, such as those of making clocks and 
watches, contain no such mystery as to require a 
long course of instruction . . . How to apply the
instruments and how to construct the machines, 
cannot well require more than the lessons of a few 
weeks, perhaps those of a few days might be 
sufficient. In the common mechanical trades, those 
of a few days might certainly be sufficient (WN 
I . x . c . 16).
Apprentices are likely to be idle because they receive 
no direct benefits from their labor. Smith thought that if a 
young person started out as a journeyman, being paid in 
proportion to his work, that he would practice with much 
more diligence and attention than if he were forced to serve 
as an apprentice for seven years. Not only would his 
education be more effectual, this approach would also 
increase the number of competitors by making the trade more 
"easily learnt," and thus: "The trades, the crafts, the my­
steries, would all be losers. But the publick would be a 
gainer, the work of all artificers coming in this way much 
cheaper to market" (WN I. x. c. 16).5
 ^ Pike has observed that Smith's views toward the 
apprenticeship system were no doubt influenced by his 
contact with James Watt when Smith was a professor at 
Glasgow. Pike notes that Watt was "forbidden by the Corpora­
tion of Hammermen to practice his craft of mathematical 
instrument-maker in the town because he had not served 
as apprentice to one of their members." Smith stood up in 
Watt's defense, "with the result that Watt was provided by 
the university with a workshop in its precincts, where he 
carried out those experiments on steam-power that were of 
such vital importance in the development of the steam- 
engine" (p. 85) .
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In sum, Smith believed that the apprenticeship system 
interfered with a man's right to employ his "strength and 
dexterity in what manner he thinks proper without detriment 
to his neighbour," it gives no security against "insuffi­
cient workmanship," and it had no tendency to "form young 
people to industry" (WN I. x, c. 12-14). Smith was concerned 
with the total development of the worker as a person. The 
apprenticeship laws had a deleterious effect upon the 
worker's character.
Smith observed that the supply of labor for skilled 
occupations was restricted by limitations on the number of 
apprentices and by making the period of their training much 
longer than it need be:
The exclusive privilege of an incorporated trade 
necessarily restrains the competition, in the town 
where it is established, to those who are free of 
the trade. To have served an apprenticeship in the 
town, under a master properly qualified, is 
commonly the necessary requisite for obtaining 
this freedom. The bye-laws of the corporation 
regulate sometimes the number of apprentices which 
any master is allowed to have, and almost always 
the number of years which each apprentice is 
obliged to serve. The intention of both regula­
tions is to restrain the competition to a much 
smaller number than might otherwise be disposed to 
enter into the trade. The limitation of the number 
of apprentices restrains it directly. A long term 
of apprenticeship restrains it more indirectly, 
but as effectually, by increasing the expence of 
education (WN I. x. c. 5).
As Hollander comments, "Smith was confident that the market
process could be relied upon to generate appropriate
supplies of skilled labour" (p. 260) . Smith believed that
"to the greater part of manufactures . . . there are other
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collateral manufactures of so similar a nature, that a
worker can easily transfer his industry from one of them to
another" (WN IV. ii. 42) . This process depended on freedom
of entry into the different trades.
For Smith, freedom of entry was "the most reliable
measure of the competitiveness of an industry or trade." As
Anderson and Tollison go on to explain, Smith thought that
barriers to entry produced monopoly:
Free competition did not imply a particular number 
of competitors; free competition was compatible 
with any number of suppliers so long as entry into 
the industry was free. The constraint on the 
process of free competition that interfered with 
the operation of the self-organizing system of the 
market and was of primary concern to Smith was 
monopoly produced by government regulation (1982, 
p. 1239) .
In Smith*s view, the majority of corporation laws in fact 
were established to restrain such competition and thus 
prevent a reduction in wages and profit. The clamour and 
sophistry of merchants and manufacturers persuaded others, 
such as the landlords, farmers, and laborers of the country, 
that "the private interest of a part, and of a subordinate 
part of the society, is the general interest of the whole" 
(WN I. x. c. 25). Smith found no merit in their argument 
that the corporation provided the proper ordering of a 
trade. The exclusive privileges of corporations led to 
several deleterious effects: . . the goods themselves are
worse; as they know none can undersell them so they keep up 
the price, and as they know also that no other can sell so 
they care not what the quality be" ti^(A) ii. 35].
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Smith also referred to "enlarged" monopolies, which
existed, as Mund has noted, where those practicing a
particular trade excluded "certain sellers or certain
suppliers of goods" and thus gave "the favored sellers a
higher return than they otherwise would secure." Mund
further explains that "they created an artificial scarcity
similar to that created by a concerted action among sellers,
though not in the same degree" (p. 80). As Smith put it:
The exclusive privileges of corporations, statutes 
of apprenticeship, and all those laws which 
restrain, in particular employments, the competi­
tion to a smaller number than might otherwise go 
into them, have the same tendency, though in less 
degree. They are a sort of enlarged monopolies, 
and may frequently, for ages together, and in 
whole classes of employments, keep up the market 
price of particular commodities above the natural 
price, and maintain both the wages of labour and 
the profits of the stock employed about them 
somewhat above their natural rate (WN I. vii. 28).
Companies and associations of people in the same trade
encouraged and facilitated efforts to restrict competition.
Smith considered two kinds of situations, those where
corporations had the power to enact by-laws and those where
voluntary combinations of people in the same trade existed.
The former arrangement gave rise to greater monopoly power:
"the majority of a corporation can enact a bye-law with
proper penalties, which will limit the competition more
effectually and more durably than any voluntary combination
whatever" (WN I. x. c. 30). But even where trades were not
incorporated, Smith observed that "the corporation spirit"
would surface in towns:
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the jealousy of strangers, the aversion to take 
apprentices, or to communicate the secret of their 
trade, generally prevail in them, and often teach 
them, by voluntary associations and agreements, to 
prevent that free competition which they cannot 
prohibit by bye-laws.
By combining not to take apprentices, these trades would
"engross" the employment to themselves (WN I. x. c. 22) and
thus enjoy the benefits of some monopoly power.
Such combinations prevailed in urban areas. The
putting-out system arose in part as a response to the higher
costs of production associated with corporate towns. Though
putting-out entailed time, travel, and transactions costs,
relying on independent artisans was cheaper for the merchant
than production controlled by guilds. Thus production
expanded "in suburbs around the towns controlled by guilds"
(Olson, 1902, p. 128). In observing this phenomenon, Smith
made explicit his view that freedom of market activity, as
over against guild regulation, provides the best assurance
of quality workmanship in the consumer’s interest:
The pretence that corporations are necessary for 
the better government of the trade, is without any 
foundation. The real and effectual discipline 
which is exercised over a workman, is not that of 
his corporation, but that of his customers. It is 
the fear of losing their employment which re­
strains his frauds and corrects his negligence. An 
exclusive corporation necessarily weakens the 
force of this discipline. A particular set of 
workmen must then be employed, let them behave 
well or ill. It is upon this account, that in many 
large incorporated towns no tolerable workmen are 
to be found, even in some of the most necessary 
trades. If you would have your work tolerably 
executed, it must be done in the suburbs, where 
the workmen, having no exclusive privilege, have 
nothing but their character to depend upon, and 
you must then smuggle it into the town as well as
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you can (WN I. x. c. 31).
The elimination of exclusive privileges would lead to 
greater consumer sovereignty; under the discipline of the 
market, craftsmen would be penalized for producing shoddy 
goods, and thus be led to a more industrious approach to 
their work.6
6 Smith's attitude towards exclusive privilege and the 
professions is best illustrated in his letter to William 
Cullen as given in Rae's Life of Adam Smith. The College of 
Physicians of Edinburgh sought to prohibit the universities 
from granting any medical degrees to any person "without 
first undergoing a personal examination into his profi­
ciency, and bringing a certificate of having attended for 
two years at a university where physic [medicine] was 
regularly taught" (p. 273). Smith opposed any suppression of 
competition, and he defended with "great vigour and vivacity 
the most absolute and unlimited freedom of medical education 
. . ." (p. 271). He wrote that "The monopoly of medical
education which this regulation would establish in favour of 
universities would, I apprehend, be hurtful to the lasting 
prosperity of bodies corporate. Monopolies very seldom make 
good work . . . "  (p. 274). In Smith's view, consumers were
more knowledgeable than the physicians perceived, and 
non-degreed practitioners were not as bad as they thought 
either.
Smith makes a comparison between medical degrees and 
the practice of guild apprenticeships, noting some signifi­
cant similarities:
A degree which can be conferred only upon students 
of a certain standing is a statute of apprentice­
ship which is likely to contribute to the advance­
ment of science, just as other statutes of 
apprenticeship have contributed to that of arts 
and manufactures. Those statutes of apprentice­
ship, assisted by other corporation laws, have 
banished arts and manufactures from the greater 
part of towns corporate. Such degrees, assisted by 
some other regulations of a similar tendency, have 
banished almost all useful and solid education 
from the greater part of universities. Bad work 
and high price have been the effect of the 
monopoly introduced by the former; quackery, 
imposture, and exorbitant fees have been the 
consequences of that established by the latter.
The industry of manufacturing villages has 
remedied in part the inconveniences which the
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Smith did not in every instance appeal to the principle
of consumer sovereignty. In a few cases, he favored quality
control by government-appointed inspectors. He argued that
this method was much more efficacious to secure the quality
of goods than relying upon corporate regulations: "the
sterling mark upon plate, and the stamps upon linen and
woollen cloth, give the purchaser much greater security than
any statute of apprenticeship" (WN I. x. c. 13) . Protection
from fraud was not served by self-regulation.
Nonetheless, Smith was often dubious of governmental
efforts to regulate trade, due to the speciousness of many
claims of the need for "order in trade." He observed that
when the state regulates an activity, it usually does so not
in the public interest but rather in the interest of
particular business groups seeking some benefit or trying to
thwart competitors or potential competitors. Smith described
guild efforts in this regard:
The government of towns corporate was altogether 
in the hands of traders and artificers; and it was 
the manifest interest of every particular class of 
them, to prevent the market from being over­
stocked, as they commonly express it, with their 
own particular species of industry; which is in 
reality to keep it always understocked (WN
I. x . c . 18).
monopolies established by towns corporate had 
occasioned. The private interest of some poor 
Professors of Physic in some poor universi­
ties inconveniently situated for the resort of 
students has in part remedied the inconveniences 
which would certainly have resulted from that sort 
of monopoly which the great and rich universities 
had attempted to establish (pp. 277-278) .
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The best policy would be to give complete freedom to 
internal trade without such group regulations. But Smith 
feared that private interests would prevent the complete 
restoration of free trade in Great Britain.
It should be observed that Smith did not oppose all 
governmental intervention. Alan Stone has noted that Smith 
was not an ideologue "seeking to show that state action is 
always harmful; rather he focused on the public benefits 
that would result if competition prevailed and was undirec­
ted by state regulation." He adds that "The principal focus 
of Smith's enmity was monopoly, especially those monopolies 
and cartels that were created and protected by state action" 
(p. 44). Smith's critique of the apprenticeship laws was not 
based on "an undiluted program of laissez-faire," but was 
grounded in his conviction that such laws "prevented the 
dominant force of self-interest from working itself out in 
socially desirable ways" (McNulty, p. 60).
B. COMBINATIONS IN THE LABOR MARKET
During Smith's time the relations between partici­
pants in the labor markets were changing. The 'friendly 
societies' of artisans and craftsmen in the same trade, 
which were composed of self-employed journeymen or masters, 
often had to revert to being employed as wage-earners as the 
early forms of manufacturing began to appear. Mathias notes 
that "Effective trade societies were first confined to male 
skilled handicraft workers," sometimes referred to as the
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"aristocracy of labor" (p. 334). As the eighteenth century
progressed, journeymen among many diverse trades, such as
the ironworkers, papermakers, and millwrights, began to form
unions, known then as labor combinations, which could bring
their members out on strike against their employers in order
to obtain higher wages (Mantoux, pp. 444-445).
In considering the determination of the general
level of wages, Smith emphasized the workings of competitive
forces. He did not contend that employers benefited from an
asymmetry of power in the payment of wages to their workers.
But when he examined "the mechanism for setting individual
wage transactions," Smith described competition in the labor
market "in terms of unequal bargaining power" (Dickman,
p. 42) . In the course of explaining that in the short run
wages are determined by bargaining, Smith claimed that
employers held the advantage over their employees:
What are the common wages of labour depends every 
where upon the contract usually made between those 
two parties, whose interests are by no means the 
same. The workmen desire to get as much, the 
masters to give as little as possible. The former 
are disposed to combine in order to raise, the 
latter in order to lower the wages of labour. It 
is not, however, difficult to foresee which of the 
two parties must, upon all ordinary circumstances, 
have the advantage in the dispute, and force the 
other into a compliance with their terms. The 
masters, being fewer in number, can combine much 
more easily; and the law, besides, authorises, or 
at least does not prohibit their combinations, 
while it prohibits those of the workmen. We have 
no acts of parliament against combining to lower 
the price of work; but many against combining to 
raise it (VQ*. I. viii. 11-12).
The employers' smaller numbers facilitated combination (even
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cartelization). This was largely unopposed by the law, while
the sane did not hold true for labor combinations. In
addition, the employee's disadvantage stemmed from his
lesser wealth as compared to the employer:
In all such disputes the masters can hold out much 
longer. A landlord, a farmer, a master manufac­
turer, or merchant, though they did not employ a
single workman, could generally live a year or two 
upon the stocks which they have already acquired.
Many workmen could not subsist a week, few could 
subsist a month, and scarce any a year without 
employment. In the long-run the workman may be as 
necessary to his master as his master is to him; 
but the necessity is not so immediate (HJf. I. 
viii. 12).
Smith went on to say that employers combine so as to 
facilitate their intentions to pay workers a subsistence 
wage:
We rarely hear, it has been said, of the combina­
tions of masters; though frequently of those of 
workmen. But whoever imagines, upon this account, 
that masters rarely combine, is as ignorant of the 
world as of the subject. Masters are always and 
every where in a sort of tacit, but constant and 
uniform combination, not to raise the wages of 
labour above their actual rate. To violate this 
combination is every where a most unpopular 
action, and a sort of reproach to a master among 
his neighbors and equals. We seldom, indeed hear 
of this combination, because it is the usual, and 
one may say, the natural state of things which 
nobody ever hears of (WJI I. viii. 13).
Smith found that it was the obvious interest or desire of
employers to combine together to lower wages:
Masters too sometimes enter into particular 
combinations to sink the wages of labour even 
below this rate. These are always conducted with 
the utmost silence and secrecy, till the moment of 
execution, and when the workmen yield, as they 
sometimes do, without resistance, though severely 
felt by them, they are never heard of by other 
people (WN. I. viii. 13).
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What did Smith mean by his reference to such tacit employer 
combinations? Was Smith implicity making a case for monop- 
sonistic exploitation by employers, which could imply the 
need for a legislative grant of 'countervailing power' to 
labor combinations to insure a decent wage for workers?
Smith most likely did not have such an argument in 
mind, but rather was referring to the drive on the part of 
masters to employ workers at the current market wage and not 
a higher rate. W.H. Hutt argues that Smith's dictum essen­
tially is that . . masters will not pay more than they
believe to be necessary to get the labour they desire . . . "  
(1975b, p. 24). Along the same lines Grampp suggests that 
Smith was referring to the notion that "employers keep an 
eye on each other so that none need pay more than the compe­
titive or 'actual' wage . . . that they sometimes combine to
pay even less; but that they succeed only in the short run 
. . . " (1979, pp. 508-509). Nonetheless Smith's reference
was taken as an equivocation on the benefits of free 
competition and utilized by those in the nineteenth century 
who sought after protective legislation for labor unions.
Smith noted that workers also organize; their combina­
tions are sometimes "defensive." Laborers organize to offset 
employer combinations. They may also ". . . without any
provocation of this kind, combine of their own accord to 
raise the price of their labour." The reasons the workers 
give include "the high price of provisions; sometimes the 
great profit which their masters make by their work" (WN.
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I. viii. 13).
The non-defensive combination of those in the same
trade could lead to significant monopoly power. As we have
noted previously, Smith observed that where they could not
prohibit free competition by means of by-laws, people of the
same trade might voluntarily agree to limit competition.
Smith wrote that
The trades which employ but a small number of
hands, run most easily into such combinations.
Half a dozen wool-combers, perhaps, are necessary 
to keep a thousand spinners and weavers at
work. By combining not to take apprentices they 
can not only engross the employment, but reduce
the whole manufacture into a sort of slavery to
themselves, and raise the price of their labour 
much above what is due to the nature of their work 
(WN. I. x. c. 22).
There were numerous other examples of such combinations in
the late eighteenth century. Mantoux notes that the Kent
papermakers refused to work with men outside their
combination, and "would leave the workshop in a body if the
others were not dismissed. The millwrights adopted the same
tactics . . ." (p. 445).
Despite his recognition of the monopoly power possessed
by these type of labor combinations, Smith did not directly
endorse the various eighteenth-century statutes prohibiting
combinations by laborers. While Smith did say combinations
of employers were more effective than combinations of
laborers, he did not recommend that Parliament should be
concerned only with combinations of employers. He was
apparently not in favor of laws forbidding combinations of
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either type. This is suggested by a famous passage in which 
he wrote:
People of the same trade seldom meet together, 
even for merriment and diversion, but the conver­
sation ends in a conspiracy against the publick, 
or in some contrivance to raise prices. It is 
impossible indeed to prevent such meetings, by any 
law which either could be executed, or would be 
consistent with liberty and justice. But though 
the law cannot hinder people of the same trade 
from sometimes assembling together, it ought to do 
nothing to facilitate such assemblies; much less 
to render them necessary (WN. I. x. c. 27).
Combinations of employers and of laborers arise naturally. 
Smith thought it was impossible to prevent such combinations 
by any law possible of enforcement or consistent with 
liberty and justice. The latter consideration is charac­
teristic of Smith's normative perspective on regulation, as 
will be shown in the next section.
Thus Smith believed that legislation should treat 
individuals and groups impartially, regardless of their 
position in the labor market. And it seems clear that Smith 
opposed the facilitation of employer or employee combina­
tions, such as by granting them special legal privileges.
C. THE NORMATIVE FEATURES OF LABOR MARKET REGULATION
What values informed Smith's evaluation of labor 
market regulation? Smith pronounced that competition for the 
satisfaction of consumer demands should prevail over the 
regulations of guilds, corporations, and other groups. But 
what are the normative ends that this system of natural 
liberty is to serve? Smith placed a significant emphasis on
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an expanding output as a criterion by which to evaluate the
regulation of trades. This notion is captured in his
emphasis on "widening the market." Smith writes that
The interest of the dealers . . .  in any particu­
lar branch of trade and manufactures, is always in 
some respect different from, and even opposite to, 
that of the publ ic. To widen the market and to 
narrow the competition, is always the interest of 
the dealers. To widen the market may frequently be 
agreeable enough to the interest of the public; 
but to narrow the competition must always be 
against it (WN I. xi. p. 10).
Elzinga explains that Smith was warning that "dealers could 
be expected to try and restrict the activities of their 
competitors, that is, to 'narrow the competition.'" But 
these same dealers also "could be expected to pursue 
actions, both singly and jointly, that would expand the 
number of customers in their market, thereby making produ­
cers and consumers better off . . ." (1980, p. 109). For
Smith, competition was "never established as an end; output 
and consumption were the ends" (1980, p. 110). Competition 
was the means that most efficaciously secured a greater 
output for consumers. Thus efforts to restrict competition 
should be prevented, without barring efforts to expand the 
market.
But focusing on greater economic output alone is mis­
leading. For Smith, the end of producing the greatest output 
in the most efficient manner is complemented by another 
goal, as Buchanan explains:
Smith's great work, The Wealth of Nations. has 
been widely interpreted as being informed norma- 
tively by efficiency criteria. This emphasis is
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broadly correct, provided that the efficiency norm 
is not given exclusive place. Smith's purpose was 
to demonstrate how the removal of restrictions on 
free market forces and the operation of his 
'system of natural liberty' would greatly increase 
the total product of the economy and, more 
importantly, how this would generate rapid 
economic growth, thereby improving the lot of the 
laboring classes. What is often missing from this 
standard interpretation is Smith's corollary 
argument, sometimes implicit, to the effect that 
this system of natural liberty would also promote 
his ideal of justice (1976, p. 68).
A key manifestation of justice for Smith is in the recogni­
tion of one of the most sacred rights of mankind, the 
"property every man has in his own labour." Smith declares 
that corporate by-laws that restrict the worker's freedom to 
labor are a manifestation of injustice:
. . . to hinder him from employing this strength
and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper 
without injury to his neighbour, is a plain 
violation of this most sacred property. It is a 
manifest encroachment upon the just liberty both 
of the workman, and of those who might be disposed 
to employ him (VQ$ I. x. c. 12).
Instead of such by-laws, the employer should have discretion 
as to whether or not the worker is fit to be employed. 
Statutory apprenticeship rules established by political 
authorities 'for the public good' were both impertinent and 
oppressive. In general, "Smith's arguments for economic 
liberty . . . were linked with an insistence on justice";
this connection was made "for reasons any reader familiar 
with natural law jurisprudence might readily have under­
stood" (Teichgraeber, p. 156).
Smith looked to competition and the market principle to 
promote justice, as Billet explains, by undermining "politi­
cally determined sources of economic advantage." Competition
would also "prevent the entrenchment of established industry
which, he thought, always has a tendency to seek official
'protection,' i.e., legal means of preservation from the
possibility of competitive displacement" (p. 89). Billet
stresses Smith's concern with "effective and not merely
'formal' economic justice and liberty." According to Billet,
Smith exposes and aims to reform all those public 
policies, institutions, laws and rules of taxation 
which, 1) help to create, encourage or sustain 
enterprises or incorporations of capital or labor 
which can escape the competitive pressures of the 
market place and impose an unjust and 'absurd tax 
on their countrymen' through higher prices and 
profit, or 2) which effectively restrict access to
certain types of employment and investments or new
uses of capital and other factors of production, 
thereby preventing or inhibiting alternative 
goods, methods or processes from arising and 
competing with established ones (p. 97).
In Smith's view, the system of political economy which is
most just is the one "which allows the greatest scope for
persons to labor in accordance with their capacities and
aims, and which, as much as possible, enables them to gain
the reward or 'produce' of their labor" (Billet, p. 91).
Smith's preference for the 'system of natural liberty'
meshed with the importance of the competitive regime, which
minimized "those forms of economic oppression that arise
from monopoly privilege or conspiracy" (Winch, p. 97).7
7 Smith believed that liberty was integral to the
progress of the economy. There is a vital "complementarity 
between individual freedom and the economic progress of
society," as Hutchison explains:
Smith uses his system of natural liberty as a
historically 'dynamic' model in that it is
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D. AN EVALUATION OF SMITH’S APPROACH
Is Smith's approach to labor market regulation best 
explained by the market failure model? Smith appears at 
times to be critical of the unhampered operation of the 
market. For example, Smith disapproves of the dehumanizing 
tendency of "a system of natural liberty."8 Smith also 
recognizes the potential presence of unequal bargaining 
power in the labor market.
Even though Smith recognized these defects, he nowhere 
brings together in a systematic way a case for regulation 
which would ameliorate undesirable features of the labor 
market. Indeed, he argued that the law should not facilitate
concerned not only with the progress of the
economy - an essential part of Smith's central 
theme. What Smith's Inquiry is primarily about is 
how the simple system starting from individual 
initiative allocates, accumulates, and reallocates 
resources via free markets so as to release
and stimulate more effectively than any other
'system' the economic forces which make for
progress (p. 517).
8 Smith's purpose in his advocacy of the removal of 
market restrictions is not only increased productivity and 
economic growth, but also a more subtle end: the market was 
"the crucial instrument for securing civil society through 
the way in which it forced men to recognize natural right" 
(Lewis, p. 22). But Smith also observed, as Lewis notes, 
that the market "has the potential for vitiating its most 
important consequence by destroying men's capacities for the 
use of natural right" (p. 42) . The consequence upon a man 
who spends his whole life performing a very few simple 
operations include the loss of understanding and invention 
by way of lack of exertion. He is unable to conceive "any 
generous, noble, or tender sentiment" (VQJ V, i. f. 50) . To 
remedy this situation, Smith recommends not political inter­
ference with the market, but instead "a combination of 
educational subsidies and legal requirements to oblige 
parents to see that their children receive at least a 
rudimentary education" (Lewis, p. 42).
laborers organizing into combinations. Smith was not willing 
to grant guilds or other forms of organized labor special 
privileges. Public policy ought to neither prohibit nor 
encourage the efforts of employees in this regard.
The market failure model does not do full justice to 
Smith's approach to labor market regulation. Though Smith 
acknowledges various instances of non-harmony between 
private interests and the public interest, he lays much 
greater stress on government failure as opposed to market 
failure. Indeed, Smith's statements in this regard lead one 
to turn to the interest group model as a viable explanation 
of his writings in this area.
Throughout his writings Smith made numerous observa­
tions of the force of self-interest. He applied this 
principle to the pursuit by laborers in the same trade of 
legal protection from competition. Self-interest led some 
groups to demand regulation as a means of transfering income 
in their own direction. These groups would appeal to the 
deleterious consequences for the 'public interest' of 
relaxing controls on entry to their occupation or trade.
Stigler (1982) has examined the Wealth for Smith's use 
of the principle of self-interest as an explanation for the 
economic behavior of merchants, manufacturers, legislators, 
and other groups. Stigler notes that in Smith "the merchants 
and manufacturers are singled out for the unusual combina­
tion of cupidity and competence which marks their legisla­
tive efforts" (p. 137). Stigler's analysis leads him to
question, though, why Smith did not make a strong proposi­
tion along these lines: "All legislation with important 
economic effects is the calculated achievement of interested 
economic classes." Stigler contends that Smith "implicitly 
rejected the use of self-interest as a general explanation 
of legislation" (p. 139) ; Smith did not fully develop a
self-interest theory of the emergence and maintenance of 
governmental restrictions on markets.
In fact, Stigler points to instances in which Smith 
pictures self-interest as failing to guide people's be­
havior, and not just in the political arena (p. 144) . For 
example, there is the case where "The individual knows the 
'facts' but fails to anticipate the consequences of his 
actions"; thus Stigler notes that Smith argues "The appren­
ticeship system does not give appropriate incentives to the 
apprentice to be diligent in his work" (p. 144). The guilds 
have failed to reason correctly; their requirements do not 
achieve their desired ends.9
But the key issue for the purposes of our study 
revolves around the fact that Smith recognized the power of
9 Coats argues that Smith in fact observes a difference 
between the role of self-interest in economic as opposed to 
political affairs; Smith thought that "in political affairs, 
men often do genuinely believe themselves to be acting for 
the public good" and thus Smith warns that the individual 
seeking his own interest "frequently promotes that of the 
society more effectually than when he really intends to 
promote it" (2, p. 136). Coats argues that Smith did not 
conceive of self-interest in "perfectly cold-blooded and 
rational" terms. Hence, it is not surprising that Smith 
observes several types of failure of self-interest.
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governmental coercion to implement regulation which was in 
the interests of guilds and corporations and "against those 
of potential new entrants and the customers of industry" 
(West, 1979, p. 143). But, as Stigler points out, Smith did 
not inquire into the domination of self-interest in politi­
cal undertakings (1982, p. 136). West describes one example 
of the paradox Stigler finds in Smith's work: Smith was
aware that the owners of corporations were the main benefi­
ciaries of legislation such as the Statute of Artificers, 
but when Smith prescribed policy he apparently forgot this 
lobby and "addressed himself to some ideal government. He 
failed to remember that party governments need votes and the 
spoils of office" (1979, p. 144).10
10 West responds to this criticism by pointing out that 
Smith was operating predominantly at the constitutional 
level of what West calls "the economics of politics." 
Smith's economics of politics is concerned with constitu­
tion making, and not the post-constitutional dimension which 
involves "legislative tactics within given majority rules, 
given property rights, and given electorates" (1979, 
p. 132). West defends Smith against the charge of neglect of 
self-interest: "there was something in Smith that could best 
lead to the public interest, and that was a wise constitu­
tion and a firm rule of law" (p. 145) . He adds that in 
Smith's time
Only 2 percent of the population yet had the vote. 
Smith's concern was to stop Stigler's nightmare 
world from developing . T o  do this required that 
errors in the emerging constitution should be 
anticipated and checked by those in a position to 
do so. This is a normative position no doubt, but 
an unavoidable one nevertheless (p. 144).
As West adds, that Smith was interested in the constitu­
tional dimension is evident by the fact that he discusses 
the law as "general rules of just conduct." Smith thought he 
had a method of disarming the various special interest 
groups. He favored a repeal of this law; he addressed 
himself "to a change in the rules, that is, in the constitu­
tion" (p. 145).
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Smith recognized that various producer groups had 
succeeded in obtaining regulations that served their own 
interest. But this does not mean he believed that government 
would always be ’captured' by these groups, so that it could 
not pass legislation for the interest of the public. Smith 
proposed to eliminate the special privileges of existing 
monopolies. H ,  12
The interest group model provides new insights and 
explanatory power towards Smith's approach to labor market 
regulation. It should not be overlooked that "Smith was 
extraordinarily sensitive to the varying capacities of 
different groups to organize to obtain the advantages of 
monopoly, whether through concerted action in the market or 
by exerting pressure on governments" (Olson, 1976, p. 107,
11 Smith expressed his advice in this regard with some 
caution. He remarked that any expectations of entirely 
restoring freedom of trade in labor and product markets were 
"dangerous" as well as utopian. Free trade was hampered in 
Britain because "not only the prejudices of the public, but 
what is much more unconquerable, the private interests of 
many individuals, irresistably oppose it" (VQI IV. ii. 43). 
The "master manufacturers" had a powerful influence in the 
Parliament against measures promoting more competition. Thus 
Smith sought "a reasonable way of eliminating the worst 
regulations" (Teichgraeber, p. 167).
12 Smith's practice as a commissioner of customs in 
some ways belies his proposals in his writings. Anderson et 
al. (1985) note that in this position "Smith may have had 
ample opportunity to observe interest group behavior at 
first hand as a determinant of economic policy" (p. 755) and 
to resist measures which favored particular producer 
groups. However, having examined the "records of Scottish 
customs for the period of Smith's tenure," they observe that 
Smith's commission, among other things, prosecuted smugglers 
and imposed duties on imported goods. They find "no convin­
cing evidence of Smith as a deregulator" (p. 757).
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n.l).13 Among the factors influencing the acquirement of 
privilege, Smith referred to location and the degree of 
dispersal (W|? I. x. c. 2 2- 23); the size of the group (WN I. 
x. c. 61); and previous governmental regulation (WN I. x. 
c. 27-28). However, Smith's insights "on what makes it 
possible for a group to organize to serve its interests 
monopolistically or politically" are scattered (Olson, 1976, 
p. 107) . It does not make for a fully integrated model of 
rent-seeking.
While Smith commented on various efforts to alter the 
distribution of income, he was concerned primarily with 
questions of allocative efficiency. Greater output to 
provide consumers a wider variety of choice was his goal, in 
conjunction with the freedom of individuals to pursue their 
own desired occupations. As Viner has observed, to Smith 
occupational restrictions such as corporate privileges were 
objectionable either because they kept labor (and other 
resources) "from following the channels in which they would
13 Smith's analysis of the impact of self-interested 
efforts to restrict competition was fairly sophisticated. 
West (1978) observes that while Smith's perception of the 
costs of monopoly was not framed in terms of the deadweight 
triangle, it recognized such effects. Moreover, Smith's 
analysis was not merely static, but extended also to the 
dynamic aspects of attempts to restrict competition 
(p. 841) . Smith emphasized the fact that "people will use 
resources to profit themselves by actions outside the rules 
or directed to changing the rules" (p. 842). West further 
explains that "Smith was as much interested in monopolizing 
as in monopoly. And he was impressed by the fact that in the 
process of monopolizing (in the sense of attaining the 
narrow, neoclassical monopoly) the law and the constitution 
itself were dependent variables" (p. 841).
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otherwise go, or because they attract to a particular 
species of industry a greater share of the factors 
[resources] than would ordinarily be employed in it*' (1928, 
p* 134). Smith criticized producer promoted regulations 
because they did not serve the interest of the public. Smith 
did not stress the principle of market failure; the 
'interest' of the public was greater output and greater 
liberty. Smith's approach then is best understood to be a 
combination of the normative elements of the liberty and 
virtue component and the positive and normative elements of 
the interest group model.
II. COMBINATION LAW IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
The labor market regulation of the nineteenth century 
cannot be understood apart from an appreciation of develop­
ments in the law regarding combinations in the prior 
century. In the eighteenth century Parliament began to pass 
statutes which penalized combinations in particular trades. 
While there were common law rulings against combinations of 
employers and laborers in the eighteenth century, statute 
law was directed solely against combinations of workers 
until 1799. In that year and the next Parliament passed the 
first general acts against combinations both of employers 
and laborers.
Three facets of these developments are emphasized in 
this section: the interaction between the classical liberal 
and common law norms governing regulation, the economic
forces leading to abandonment of apprenticeship regulations 
and the rise of combinations, and the beginnings of the 
application of the concept of conspiracy to combinations.
A. SMITH'S APPROACH AND THE COMMON LAW
Smith's treatment of apprenticeship regulations and 
the combination laws had an important influence on the 
nineteenth century labor law. An examination of the simi­
larities and dissimilarities between Smith’s approach and 
that of the common law in the early seventeenth-century (as 
represented by Coke) further highlights the role of public 
good and interest group arguments regarding regulation.
Coke recognized that guilds and other corporate 
groups would attempt to impose exclusionary restraints on 
others in their own self-interest. He accordingly was 
judiciously sceptical about guild claims that certain 
regulations served the public interest. Smith applied the 
principle of self-interest in a more extensive manner. 
Corporate by-laws are an evidence of the spirit of monopoly 
at work: " . . .  it is in the interest of the freemen of a 
corporation to hinder the rest of the inhabitants from 
employing any workmen but themselves . . ." (WN IV. iii.
c.10; cf. WN I. x. c. 18). Coke found that the good govern­
ment of trade could be a legitimate reason for regulations, 
arguing that ’manufactures' would be corrupt if men exer­
cised trades in which they had no skill. Smith found no 
credibility in the reasons expounded by merchants for 'or-
200
dering * trade: "I have never known much good done by those 
who affected to trade for the public good” (WJI IV. ii. 9).
As discussed in chapter two, Coke thought of the public 
good in terms of character formation. Coke employed a 
paternalistic approach to virtue. He stressed the nature 
of the character formed by certain occupations. In essence, 
Coke was affirming what later came to be known as the police 
powers function of the state in promoting virtuous charac­
ter.14 Smith likewise emphasized the development of moral 
virtue and the formation of character, but did not think 
that the guilds achieved such ends.15 In Smith's view,
14 Blackstone, a contemporary of Smith, affirmed the 
need for laws dealing with offenses against public trade 
such as forestalling, regrating, and engrossing, while 
Smith's digression on the corn laws appears to be a careful 
refutation of the reasoning supporting such laws. Further­
more, in the same section (part 4, chapter 12), Blackstone 
noted that the exercise of a trade without serving a seven 
year apprenticeship was considered to be "detrimental to 
public trade, upon the supposed want of sufficient skill in 
the trader," (p. 160) where Smith saw the requirement itself 
as injurious to the public interest. Interestingly, Black­
stone went on immediately in the next chapter to consider 
sumptuary laws and other regulations dealing with offenses 
against the public health. While his paternalism had 
definite bounds, these type of laws Blackstone considered 
part of the "public police and oeconomy." which he explained 
was
the due regulation and domestic order of the 
kingdom: whereby the individuals of the state, 
like members of a well-governed family, are bound 
to conform their general behaviour to the rules of 
propriety, good neighbourhood, and good manners; 
and to be decent, industrious, and inoffensive 
in their respective stations (p. 162).
Blackstone followed Coke in emphasizing character formation 
as the proper end of regulation.
15 In fact, one may generalize that "in virtually every 
instance in which Smith contemplates collective or corporate 
activity, those values that should be paramount either amdng
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guilds were secretive, inclined to think in terms of 
'mysteries' (the trade secrets of technology). Smith was 
aware of pride and avarice as fundamental features of human 
nature, and also how these features worked themselves out in 
institutions, as for example, in the guilds' desire for 
regulation. Smith instead appealed to the market, the funda­
mental institution which provides a device for channeling 
pride, vanity, and the desire for self-approval into 
socially useful purposes. The workmen in the suburbs could 
not depend on corporate exclusionary privileges. Open 
competition in the marketplace disciplined them to produce 
quality work, and not be negligent or fraudulent in charac­
ter. 16
What do the differences in these two approaches imply 
about the development of labor market regulation in the
the members of the corporation or within society at large 
are somehow subverted” (Becker, p. 71) . "The usual corpora­
tion spirit, wherever the law does not restrain it, prevails 
in all regulated companies," Smith wrote (WN. V. i. e. 7). 
This passage is a good example of a habit to which Smith 
adhered uniformly, which was "regarding monopoly, i.e., 
monopoly practice, as an off-shoot of the corporation 
spirit itself" (Becker, p. 72).
16 In Cropsey's view, Smith places such a high value on 
free competition in a market society because "competition 
is the element in commercialism that directly replaces 
virtue"; in the area of the provision of quality in the 
production of goods and services, "competition rather than 
the artificial regulations of gild and state is to guarantee 
probity in manufacture and sale.” For the traditional 
virtues are substituted "the controlled passions of self- 
preservation through gain, the unhampered motion of which 
is commerce" (p. 72). Yet this interpretation is inadequate 
because it ignores the fact that Smith is disagreeing with 
the means to achieve high character, not the end itself.
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries? This question is best 
answered by considering certain aspects of their positive 
and normative differences: the contrast in key aspects of
the economic setting in which Coke and Smith each lived? and 
the role of liberty with regard to the goals of regulation.
There were significant changes in economic conditions
between the late sixteenth century and mid-eighteenth
century. Coke lived during a period in the English economy
when the monopolistic control of guilds over trades was only
beginning to be challenged by the putting-out system and
rural industry. The great concern in his time was with the
social instability, poverty, and unemployment accompanying
the first stages of significant commercialization. By the
latter half of the eighteenth century, the advances in
technology and the availability of capital turned attention
away from underemployment, poverty and starvation as great
societal concerns. In addition, advances in road and river
transport combined with improved communications to reduce
the monopolistic power of trade corporations; by 1750 the
volume of inland trade had increased significantly (Holder-
ness, p. 145). As Smith observed,
Good roads, canals, and navigable rivers, by 
diminishing the expence of carriage, put the 
remotest parts of the country more nearly upon a 
level with those in the neighbourhood of a town.
They are upon that account the greatest of all 
improvements. They encourage the cultivation of 
the remote, which must always be the most exten­
sive circle of the country. They are advantageous 
to the town, by breaking down the monopoly of the 
country in its neighbourhood (WE I. xi. b. 5).
Smith then was sceptical of regulations sponsored by various 
groups in the economy to promote the public interest. Unlike 
Coke, his concern was not with full employment per se but 
with breaking down barriers to entry so as to promote 
greater output and individual liberty.
Changes in the methods of manufacture and the costs of 
production interacted with the application of the tenets of 
the classical liberal policy which flowed out of Smith's 
analysis. Wesley C. Mitchell has observed that in the 
eighteenth century, there were numerous Englishmen "who were 
pursuing profitable trades without having served a regular 
apprenticeship." They disregarded the guild regulations and 
statute law which prohibited a man who had not been "duly 
initiated in a certain mystery from exercising the trade." 
Many businessmen found better and cheaper ways of producing 
things than the craft guilds' methods. Mitchell argues that 
"It was this pursuit of private profit, whether it ran 
counter to law or not, that was responsible for a change in 
practice that occurred a considerable time before the change 
in theory and policy" (1, p. 118). Mitchell further claims 
that "the promulgation of Adam Smith's kind of thought led 
men to believe that the laws were wrong and ought to be 
changed, and what they had been doing was not only right and 
profitable for themselves, but advantageous to the country 
as a whole." Smith spoke for the interests of the new 
businessmen at the proper time: "[he] came forward as the 
philosophic champion of a doctrine that justified a system
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under which everybody would be free to follow his own
interests'* (1, p. 119).
Mitchell's argument correctly emphasizes the role of
changing technology in changing attitudes toward guild
regulations. But his portrayal of Smith is misleading, in
that it ignores Smith's own discussion of changes in the
need for types of labor market regulation. Smith made
several observations on the older arguments for the
necessity of the exclusive privileges of corporations.
Speaking of trades in the Middle Ages, he wrote that
It is found that society must be pretty far 
advanced before the different trades can all find 
subsistence, that is, before those trades which do 
not immediately procure food of some sort, such as 
bread, flesh, etc., or even most of these, can be 
depended on for a subsistence. A carpenter or a 
weaver could not trust entirely to his work in 
that way; he would only take in this trade as a 
subsidiary one . . . [IaI(A) ii. 40}.
The division of labor was limited in societies with primi­
tive technology. The need for a regularized trade which 
assured a steady income to the craftsman spurred on the 
formation of guilds with their various restrictions on 
competition. But advances in capital formation made such 
regulations unnecessary:
To bring about therefore the separation of trades 
sooner than the progress of society would 
naturally effect, and prevent the uncertainty of 
all those who had taken themselves to one trade, 
it was found necessary to give them a certainty of 
a comfortable subsistence. And for this purpose 
the legislature determined that they should have 
the privilege of exercising their separate trades 
without the fear of being cut out of their 
livelihood by the increase of their rivals. That 
this was necessary therefore in the first stages
of the arts to bring them to their proper perfec­
tion, appears very reasonable and is confirmed by 
this, that it has been the general practice of all 
the nations in Europe. But as this end is now 
fully answered, it were much to [be] wished that 
these as well as many other remains of the old 
jurisprudence should be removed [I*Z(A) ii. 40-41].
The privileges of corporations, though once conducive to the
interest of the country, were now prejudicial to it. In the
same way, "all fairs, however necessary they then were, are
now real nuisances. It is absurd to preserve in people a
regard for their old customs when the causes of them are
removed" [L*J(B) 305]. He adds that "All monopolies and
exclusive privileges of corporations, for whatever good ends
they were at first instituted, have the same bad effect"
[LJ(B) 306].17
In Smith's view, the old regulations no longer served 
their avowed normative ends either. Smith argued that virtue 
would be promoted by the liberty and responsibility of inde­
pendent men. But liberty was just as crucial an end in 
itself as virtue. Each man had a natural right to dispose of 
his labor as he wished (WH* I. x. c. 12). Moreover, as we
17 Smith found some exclusive privileges relatively 
harmless. A patent given to an inventor of a new machine was 
a "reward for his ingenuity." Likewise the exclusive 
privilege for an author to publish and sell his book "may do 
some good" by serving "as an encouragement to the labours of 
learned men" [LJ (A) ii. 30-33]. However, Smith thought that 
the exclusive privileges of corporations could be severely 
detrimental to the wealth of the nation. By increasing "the 
difficulty with which the several necessaries of life are 
procured," monopolies tended "to promote the poverty" of the 
country in which they were located. The exclusive trading 
privileges of corporations in towns had made "all sorts of 
necessaries so much more uncomeatible" [IJ(A) ii. 34-35].
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saw in his comments on the inefficacy of any anti- 
combination laws 'consistent with justice,' Smith upheld 
the principle of voluntary exchange for groups as well. In 
essence Smith advocated that, as long they do not make use 
of force or fraud, individuals or groups should not be 
restrained from making agreements to purchase or sell 
property or services on whatever terms are mutually agree­
able. The law would promote justice by expanding the 
individual’s area of freedom. This was the classical liberal 
philosophy in regards to economic freedom.
By way of contrast, the common law did not extol 
liberty as the highest good. It did not uphold absolute 
freedom as a normative criterion. It set forth a concept of 
freedom of trade as freedom from arbitrary restraints on 
trade not sanctioned by the law. It opposed the unreasonable 
exercise of monopoly power secured by government privilege.
As seen in chapter two, from the late medieval period 
on, the English common law tradition was suspicious of 
attempts by private combinations such as guilds to arbitra­
rily restrain trade to their own advantage. It invalidated 
measures which violated the public good by means of raising 
prices or lowering the quality of products or services. The 
economic freedom which the common law affirmed was "freedom 
from arbitrary restraints not sanctioned by the law" 
(Holdsworth, 1934, p. 372). Common law principles developed 
over the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to "favor a 
great deal of contractual freedom." However, "such rules
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were always subject to the legislature's overriding . . .
•police power'” to impose proper regulation of trade 
(Dickman, p. 52). Freedom to associate was fundamental 
to the common law; but it "has always exercised the right to 
regulate the constitution and activities of certain kinds of 
association" (Keeton, p. 220).
What Smith was suggesting, that public policy ought to 
neither encourage nor prohibit labor efforts to combine, was 
not the approach of the eighteenth-century common law. This 
principle did manifest itself in the statutory law of the 
nineteenth century.
B. STATUTORY LAW AND THE RISE OF COMBINATIONS
State regulations on entry into occupations and on 
wages were implemented by statute or by charter grants to 
craft guilds from the fourteenth century to the beginning of 
the nineteenth century. Besides the Bill of Conspiracies in 
1548, sixteenth-century and seventeenth-century statutory 
legislation was largely silent on the freedom of combina­
tions. It was only in the eighteenth century that statutes 
against combinations among laborers were passed with any 
frequency. As Hutt has observed, the development of this 
legislation stemmed in part from the difficulty of enforcing 
the general law against conspiracy. This led employers 
during the eighteenth century to petition Parliament for 
special legislation to outlaw combinations "in their 
specific trades" (1975a, pp. 97-98).
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The first of these statutes,18 passed in 172 0, was 
directed against combinations among journeyman tailors. It 
stated that
all contracts, covenants and agreements . . . made
or entered into . . .  by or between any persons 
brought up in, or professing, using or exercising 
the art or mystery of a taylor, or journeyman 
taylor . . . shall be and are hereby declared to
be illegal, null and void to all intents and 
purposes (p. 17) .
It also fixed the hours of work and wage rates.
The statutes against combinations were part of an 
increasingly futile attempt by the state to regulate 
industry in the face of a growing capitalist enterprise. In 
fact, the provisions against combinations in particular 
trades often were passed as an extrinsic part of broader 
legislation regulating rates of pay to laborers. The clauses 
dealing with combinations were incidental to this main 
purpose (Holdsworth, 1934, pp. 370, 379). As Grampp 
observes, combinations interfered with the main purpose of 
the laws, which was the fixing of wages, because combina­
tions of workers or employers sought to secure different 
wages than those set by public authorities. There were also 
some instances in which laws were passed to prevent "a 
particular combination from having a damaging effect** (197 9, 
p . 503).
The latter type of statutes sought to regulate abuses 
which had appeared in the conduct of some particular
18 Citations from statutes and cases in this chapter 
are found in Sayre, unless otherwise noted.
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trade. One statute passed in 172 5 was entitled "An act to 
prevent unlawful combinations of workmen employed in the 
woollen manufactures, and for better payment of their 
wages." it provided that contracts, agreements, and ordi­
nances made and entered into by such laborers for regulating 
the prices of their goods, or increasing their wages, or 
shortening their hours of labor, should be "illegal, null 
and void to all intents and purposes." Subsequent acts made 
like provision against combinations of workmen in the 
manufacture of textiles (1749), the weaving of silk (1773), 
the manufacture of hats (1777), and in the paper trade 
(1799) (Bryan, pp. 118-119; Holdsworth, 1934, p. 383), No 
doubt Smith had some of these statutes in mind in his 
discussion of laws against people of the same trade making 
agreements. Smith was certainly correct as to their ineffec­
tiveness .
As the eighteenth century progressed, combinations 
"became more frequent and more permanent," This phenomenon 
may be attributed to the growth of capitalism and the 
factory system, as well as the lack of enforcement by 
Parliament of the older regulations regarding labor market 
relations between employers and workers (Holdsworth, 1934, 
p. 384). The growing number of new manufacturers and indus­
tries were increasingly difficult to bring under the old and 
weakening system of guild controls. At the same time, by the 
middle of the eighteenth century, unions (then small local 
societies of workers) were seeking to negotiate their wages
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and working conditions with their employers. Supply and 
demand increasingly governed labor markets without inter­
ference of legal sanction (Holdsworth, 1934, p. 379). 
Holdsworth further argues that workers organized in order to 
obtain a wage in line with the regulations of the older 
guild system, and employers responded with their own 
combinations. He contends that the labor combinations sought 
to compel employers to
. . . concede that fair wage which the older
legislation had endeavoured to compel them to 
give. Nor is it surprising that combinations of 
employers should also be formed to regulate 
prices, and to resist the demands of their 
workmen. It was these new conditions which 
produced the rise of the modern trade unions and 
combinations of masters on the one hand, and, on 
the other hand, the enactment of more general and 
more stringent laws against these combinations of 
masters and men, which were attempting to regulate 
wages and hours of work (1934, pp. 379-380).
As industries were increasingly organized on a capi­
talistic basis, there were also demands by employers to be 
freed up from obsolete apprenticeship regulations. Brentano, 
who was a late nineteenth-century student of guilds, argued 
that trade unions largely originated with the non-observance 
of the regulations of the Statute of Apprenticeship (prior 
to its repeal in 1814). He declared
It is evident that, as long as the regulations of 
the Statute of Apprentices were maintained, the 
position of the workmen was secure. The long term 
of service assured them the regularity of employ­
ment, which they desired above everything . . .
the restrictions as to apprentices prevented a too 
great competition from lowering the skilled 
workmen to the level of common labourers (pp.
103-104).
Using the woollen industry as his primary example, Brentano 
describes how the introduction of machinery brought a change 
into this regularity of employment. In the mills it became 
usual to employ workers who had served no apprenticeship, 
their labor being "much cheaper than that of skilled 
workmen." The employment of great numbers of children and 
journeymen who had served no apprenticeship, along with the 
greater irregularity of employment and reductions in wages, 
led to the formation of trade societies (pp. 107-109).
After 1760, the independent journeymen in various 
trades faced a rapidly growing labor force along with the 
increasing invention and application of machinery in produc­
tion. This weakened the ability of combinations to obtain 
their demands from employers (Henry Phelps Brown, p. 30) . 
Both combinations of laborers and employers increasingly 
came to call on the state for regulation. Lincoln notes that 
"As late as 1796 labourers petitioned Parliament for the re­
gulation of wages and working conditions" (p. 17). The em­
ployers' interests frequently won out, as legislation often 
was specifically directed against combinations of workmen.
The combinations also found themselves in conflict with 
the common law. This created quite an ironic situation. 
Brown explains that many independent artisans formed combi­
nations as a means to secure their livelihood and save their 
independence. Thus, as he points out, "one way in which the 
trade union arose was as an endeavour to maintain men's 
common law right to do what they would with their own
labor. But the union once set up would be viewed by the 
common law as a conspiracy" (p. 30) . A consideration of the 
principles of the common law as applied to the new circum­
stances of the eighteenth-century labor market will expand 
upon this irony.
C. COMBINATIONS AS CONSPIRACIES IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE
Up until 17 21, there were few instances in which 
"combinations among workmen to raise their wages or other­
wise to alter the conditions of labor" were actually 
regarded as criminal conspiracies at common law (Bryan, 
pp. 125-126). Bryan adds that "As long as conspiracy 
retained its original technical meaning and narrow scope," 
combinations of labor remained outside of the scope of court 
consideration. The frequency of the statutes dealing with 
labor combinations in the eighteenth century seems "to
indicate a belief that the combinations prohibited were
being made unlawful for the first time" (p. 126).
On the other hand, during the sixteenth and seven­
teenth centuries the crime of conspiracy was being "enlarged 
and generalized." As Holdsworth further explains, "It was 
extended to apply not only to all combinations to do acts 
which amounted to a crime or a tort, but also to acts which 
were regarded as illegal because they were contrary to 
public policy." As seen in chapter two, in the early
seventeenth-century common law courts, the jurists ruled 
that involuntary restrictions on freedom of trade "were
contrary to public policy.” They were "illegal unless they
could be justified by a valid local custom, or by some
recognized principle of the common law" (1934, p. 373).
Similarly, voluntary restrictions on the freedom of
trade (contracts in restraint of trade) were illegal because
they were contrary to public policy, "unless it could be
proved that they were reasonable as between the parties to
them and not detrimental to the public" (Holdsworth, 19 34,
p. 3 73). Holdsworth adds that
In these circumstances it was inevitable that the 
courts should hold that combinations of masters 
which were entered into in order to force down 
wages or force up prices, or combinations of men 
which were entered into in order to force up wages 
or diminish the length of the working day, were 
indictable conspiracies. These combinations 
attempted to effect their objects by the pressure 
of numbers, and so infringed the liberty of 
masters and men to make what contracts they 
pleased (1934, pp. 373-374).
A further expansion in the conception of conspiracy 
took place in the eighteenth century. One significant change 
was that, as Dickman observes, "The agreement or combination 
itself to perform a criminal act became the offense; it was 
no longer necessary to actually commit the crime." Even more 
significant was the evolution of the 'conversion' principle: 
"Under the law of conspiracy, some acts that, if done by an 
individual alone, would be merely tortious - civil wrongs 
for which the tortfeasor could be sued - might be criminal, 
that is indictable, if done by a combination." Consistent 
with this principle, ". . . there were certain activities an
individual could lawfully do alone (such as fix a price on
his own goods) , which, if done (or even contemplated) by a 
group of individuals, would not be lawful" (p. 55). Two 
cases illustrate the outworking of these principles in the 
eighteenth century common law.
The case of the Kina v. The Journeymen Taylors of 
Cambridge arose in 1721 just after the passage of the law 
dealing with combinations among tailors. These men had 
combined to refuse to work for less than a certain sum per 
day. In this case the court convicted them of conspiring to 
raise wages. The court declared that a combination to raise 
wages was a conspiracy at common law, and a conspiracy of 
any kind was illegal. An attempt to raise wages on the part 
of any one individual was not unlawful, but a conspiracy on 
the part of more than one worker was an "offense at common 
law" (p. 34).
As a result, the language of subsequent acts dealing 
with labor combinations underwent a change. As Bryan notes, 
"the language of the statutes passed after 1721 unmistakably 
indicates that the combinations attacked were looked upon as 
contrary to common law, and that the purpose of the acts was 
to declare the law and to make 'more effectual provision 
. . . against such unlawful combinations'" (p. 129).
Later in the same century, in the case of Rex v. Eccles 
(1783), Lord Mansfield ruled that certain workers conspired 
to prevent a man from practicing his trade, and hence were 
guilty of a criminal offense (p. 35). He argued that
The illegal combination is the gist of the
215
offense, persons in possession of any articles of 
trade may sell them at such prices as they 
individually please, but if they confederate and 
agree not to sell them under certain prices, it is 
conspiracy; so every man may work at what price he 
pleases, but a combination not to work under 
certain prices is an indictable offense (p. 36).
This is probably the strongest common law authority against 
labor combinations as conspiracies in restraint of trade 
(Abrahams, p. 19).
These cases should not be taken to suggest that the 
common law was opposed simply to labor combinations. Indeed, 
there were several common law rulings against combinations 
of employers as well. Moreover, it should be noted that 
during the eighteenth century hostility to labor combina­
tions should be traced, "not primarily to the courts, but to 
the legislature" (Keeton, p. 218). Statute law was directed 
solely against combinations of workers until 1799. In that 
year and the next Parliament passed the first general acts 
against combinations both of employers and laborers.
It seems that the eighteenth-century common law was 
holding labor combinations to be conspiracies due to the way 
in which it was applying the principle of freedom of trade.
The way that this principle worked out in this context was 
that labor combinations were seen to restrain the trade of 
individual workers attempting to compete with them for jobs 
available from employers. Holdsworth argued that the 
specific eighteenth-century statutes presuppose "the general 
principle of the common law that trade ought to be free from 
restraints unless those restraints had been imposed by
law.” He further explains that
they enforce that principle, first in the case of 
particular trades, and later in the case of all 
trades, because it appeared that its enforcement 
was necessary by reason of the prevalence of 
combinations to raise or lower wages or to alter 
hours of labour, which infringed it (1934, 
p. 379).
The principle was enforced in all trades in the 1799 
and 1800 Combination Acts. But the principle of freedom of 
trade in the common law was to take another direction later 
in the century. This was due to the influence of classical 
liberalism in conjunction with another common law principle, 
the concept of freedom of association. These forces 
gradually led the common law towards a more lenient view of 
union activity. The existence of labor unions came to be 
consistent with freedom of trade, though many of the labor 
agreements were neither enforceable nor illegal.
III. ENGLISH LABOR LAW FROM 1799 UNTIL THE 1850S
A. THE COMBINATIONS ACTS OF 1799 AND 1800
The statutory approach toward particular combina­
tions was written into a general law in the Combination Acts 
of 1799 and 1800. The motivation for these statutes has been 
attributed to several sources. One was the English fear 
that trade combinations were inspired by the revolutionary 
associations of late eighteenth-century France; another was 
"the subordination of the interests of the state to the 
interests of employers." But these laws are best understood 
as products of the land-owning aristocracy, for it was the
politicians "who brought in the first Combination Bill," 
with manufacturers having little say in the matter (Dobson, 
pp. 121, 123).
The Combination Act of 179919 originated with a 
petition by a group of master millwrights to the House of 
Commons. It complained about a combination among mill 
workers which existing legislation did not adequately 
suppress. Spurred by a legislative move by Wilberforce, 
Parliament turned out a more comprehensive bill dealing with 
all combinations (Holdsworth, 1934, p. 385; Mantoux, 
pp. 446-447). Unlike the earlier eighteenth century 
statutes, this law was not directed against combinations as 
interfering with the general attempts to implement public 
regulation of industry.
Two provisions of the 1799 Act are most significant. 
Section 3 made it a criminal offense for members of a 
combination of workers seeking an advance of wages to 
endeavour to induce others "to quit work" or prevent an 
employer from hiring whatever workers they "think proper" 
(p. 627). Section 4 expressly stated that these prohibitions 
were "for the more effectual suppression of all combinations 
among journeymen" which had as their object to obtain an 
advance of wages or otherwise fix the terms of employment 
(Bryan, p. 120).
In 1800 petitions protesting against the Act came in
19 The text of this statute is found in Bland et al. , 
pp. 626-627.
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from all parts of England. The Act was reconsidered, and in 
1800 a second Combination Act was passed which repealed the 
previous statute (Holdsworth, 19 34, p. 386). In Section 1, 
this law did reaffirm the previous statute's provision which 
declared all contracts or agreements between workers for 
obtaining "an advance of wages," for "lessening" the hours 
or quantity of work, "preventing or hindering" an employer 
from hiring anyone, or in "anyway" to control an employer's 
conduct of his business "to be illegal, null, and void 
. . . " (p. 19). But the 1800 statute expressed Parliament's
opposition to every kind of trade combination, for Section
17 imposed a penalty upon combinations among masters "for 
the reduction of wages or for an increase in the hours or 
quantity of work" (Dicey, 1904, p. 516). The net result
of the two statutes "was to render illegal and criminal any
and every combination among masters or workmen to fix the 
wages or alter the conditions of labor" (Bryan, p. 121).
The law of conspiracy stood behind the 1800 Combination 
Act (Dicey, 1904, p. 516). At common law all combinations 
for illegal purposes, and all combinations which interfered 
with the freedom of trade, were indictable conspiracies.
Thus "a combination for any purpose made or declared 
criminal by the Combination Act, 1800, e.g. a combination to 
collect money for the support of men on strike, was in 1800 
an undoubted conspiracy" (Dicey, 1905, p. 98).
The courts inconsistently applied these statutes, for 
in fact unions were quite active for the next two decades.
Dorothy George (1927) has given numerous examples of 
successful union strikes for higher wages which were not 
prosecuted in this era.20 Moreover, the period from 1800 
until the repeal of the Acts in 182 4 was marked by numerous 
representations to Parliament made by organized workers for 
"the control of wages, hours, and conditions of employment 
of their members" (Lincoln, p. 18). However, the trade 
combinations sensed that their appeals to the courts and to 
Parliament were useless; they turned to a demand, not for 
the enforcement of the older apprenticeship laws, but for 
radical reforms of the anti-combination legislation. At the 
same time, there were increasing demands laid on Parliament 
by employers and others to repeal the older apprenticeship 
regulation. The influence of Smith's classical liberalism 
was evident in the legislation passed dealing both with 
labor combinations and the apprenticeship laws.
Smith's influence was seen in the way nineteenth- 
century political economists argued about the proper labor 
market policy. He provided them "with a text that became the 
foundation for a mode of economic discourse that was more 
dogmatic and deductive, yet also more urgent and rigorous, 
than the Wealth of Nations had been" (Teichgraeber, p. 174). 
Classical economists applied their analytical rigor to labor
20 However, Thompson has observed that the success of 
combinations of workers in obtaining higher real wages 
during this period "was not as smooth nor as continuous as 
is sometimes implied. It was closely related to the success 
or failure of trade unionism in each industry . . . "
(p. 242).
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market regulation,21 extending Smith's insights into both
21 One important economist who followed Smith in the 
classical liberal approach to this area was Jean-Baptiste 
Say. In his work on political economy (1827) there is a 
special emphasis on the need for occupational freedom. The 
public interest is best served by allowing workers the 
freedom to pursue the trades they desire; regulation of 
trades should be limited to merely insuring that the laborer 
demonstrates his skills in the marketplace. This approach 
was a feature of the French classical liberal tradition. It 
is most explicitly manifested in the doctrine of the
"right to work." Ironically, this concept had its roots in 
the European guild system, in which, as Machlup has noted, 
"licences, charters, and organized trade bodies formed the 
basis of a detailed government regulation of economic life 
. . ." Machlup has observed that the origins of this notion
are to be found in grants of privilege by the state:
One of the oldest and most widespread methods of 
government regulation is to prohibit specified 
activities without the express permission of the 
government. In the 16th century King Henry II of 
France carried this type of regulation to its 
extreme limit, at least in theory, when he
declared that the right to work was itself a 
1 droit roval1 - a privilege bestowed by the 
king (pp. 287-288).
Beginning in the eighteenth century, "right to work" 
developed broader connotations. Spengler (1968) has illus­
trated that the right to work involved two distinct fea­
tures: one was the droit au travail. which argued that 
unemployment was due to factors such as "the deficiency of 
the demand for labor and market imperfections," and the 
other was the droit de travalller. which was based on the 
notion that unemployment was "traceable mainly to monopo­
listic restraints upon entry into various crafts and occupa­
tions" (p. 172). The latter 'right' was "directed most 
specifically against the guild system" (p. 177).
Smith's condemnation of the guild system was couched in 
a natural-law philosophy shared by French political econo­
mists (Spengler, p. 177). Smith wrote that "all systems of 
preference or of restraint" suppress "the obvious and simple 
system of natural liberty." As we have already seen, Smith 
believed that "by not leaving things at perfect liberty," 
exclusive privileges produce distortions in the movement of 
workers among employments and violate "the property which 
every man has in his labour" (WN I. x. c. 12). Quesnay, 
Turgot, and Smith, as well as Say and other English and 
French economists in the classical tradition, thought that 
removal of artificial obstructions to the pursuit of any 
employment would lead to the emergence and persistence of 
full employment (Spengler, p. 180).
the inefficacy and the detrimental features of labor laws.
The classical liberal economist J.R, McCulloch 
described several harmful aspects of the apprenticeship 
requirements in Europe. Laborers were forced to serve as 
apprentices for a longer period than was commonly required 
to obtain a knowledge of the trades they meant to exercise. 
McCulloch contended that this practice resulted in a double 
injury to the public; first, since the wages of labor are 
proportioned in part to the expenses involved in learning a 
trade, the employers are injured by artificially higher 
wages; second, "it injures the workmen from its tendency to 
generate idle and dissipated habits, by making them pass so 
large a portion of their youth without any sufficient motive 
to be industrious" (pp. 387-388).
The early nineteenth-century parliamentary debate over 
the repeal of the Statute of Artificers served as a forum 
for the classical liberal opposition to most forms of labor 
market regulation to clash with older conceptions of the 
need for such regulation. Commenting on the debate,
McCulloch remarked that the law had been passed to comply 
with the solicitations of various guilds. Even though the 
injurious operation of this law was long obvious, "so slow 
is the progress of sound legislation, and so powerful the 
opposition to every change affecting private interests, that 
its repeal did not take place until 1814" (pp. 388-389).
The "private interests" utilized long-standing
rationale to oppose the abrogation of the statute.22 One of 
the arguments revolved around the moral value of apprentice­
ships. William Playfair cited the example of towns "where 
apprenticeships have no particular privileges, and where the 
trades can be most easily learnt," yet the respectable 
inhabitants nevertheless preferred to apprentice their 
sons. Why? "They bind them apprentices to keep them from 
becoming vagabonds and blackguards" (p. 81).
Somewhat ironically, the promoters of repeal utilized 
the threat of workmen’s combinations as a rallying force 
against the Statute of Artificers. Instead of observing that 
the nonenforcement of apprenticeship regulations led to the 
formation of labor combinations, the Bermondsey fellmongers 
declared that "the general apprehension of the masters is, 
that if men were compelled to be bound for seven years, and 
those who have been so bound were to combine together, that 
let their demand be ever so exorbitant we must comply with 
that demand, or have our goods perish." A master manufac­
turer added that any restraining law on the free movement of 
workers furnishes a "never-ceasing motive to all denomina­
tions of journeymen to congregate in dangerous bodies and 
engender injurious measures to the peace and prosperity of 
the country" (p. 86). The manufacturer’s arguments won out, 
as the statute was repealed in 1814.
But these liberal notions regarding apprenticeship
22 The citations from the debate are taken from Derry,
p p .8 1 -8 6 .
regulations meant that to be consistent, one would have to 
allow for the freedom of workers to combine. The notion of 
the "right of association" developed alongside freedom from 
the older labor market regulations. The interaction of these 
ideas shaped the drive for the Combination Act of 1824.
Dicey observed that the right of association had not 
been well known under this label in England, but it was 
labeled as such in France and continental Europe. It is the 
right of two or more citizens "to combine together by 
agreement among themselves for the attainment of a common 
purpose" (1904, p. 512). In its classical liberal form it 
was known as the principle of 'free labor.* Dicey saw the 
changes in the combination laws from the 1799 and 1800 Acts 
to the 1824 and 1825 Acts as a series of attempts to resolve 
the problem of the conflict between the rights of two or 
more individuals "to combine freely together for any purpose 
not definitely illegal," and the right, on the other hand, 
of every individual not to be deprived by the concerted 
action of others of the right "to manage his own affairs in 
his own way . . ." (1904, pp. 514-515). This latter right is
essentially an expression of the common law principle of 
freedom of trade; it is freedom from restraint of trade 
which would harm individuals in the labor market. The 
alterations in the statutes dealing with combinations are 
thus seen as "attempts to fix the limits of the right of 
association in regard to trade disputes" (Dicey, 1904, 
p. 515).
B. THE COMBINATION ACTS OF 182 4 AND 182 5
Legislation in the early nineteenth century was 
successful in impeding the growth and activities of combina­
tions, but did not put an end to them (Holdsworth, 1934, 
p. 381). During the same period, classical liberals who 
favored freedom of trade tried to achieve their other aim of 
equality before the law by giving workers as well as masters 
freedom to associate. Some, such as Letwin, have argued that 
the advocates of the 1824 Act erred in their approach. By 
allowing freedom of combination, the labor market would 
necessarily be characterized by the exercise of monopoly 
power. Letwin contends that "By rejecting the alternative 
that would have achieved both their objectives, by not 
denying the right of combination to workers and masters 
alike, they wasted an opportunity to secure economic freedom 
against attack by monopolies of either" (1965, pp. 47-48).
Instead, the Combination Acts of 1799 and 1800 were in 
effect repealed by the Combination Act of 1824.23 This law 
resulted largely from agitation by reformers who were 
followers of Jeremy Bentham and his radical individualism.
The chief organizers of the repeal campaign were the 
working-class radical Francis Place and middle-class radical 
Joseph Hume. As Langer observes, they managed to bring 
together the Ricardians and several trade union leaders 
(p. 167). Arguing before Parliament, they sought the repeal
23 Citations from the Combination Acts of 1824 and 1825 
are taken from Cole and Filson (1965).
of the Combination Acts on two grounds. They claimed that 
these laws were "unjust and oppressive," and that "they were 
unnecessary and inexpedient." Langer further explains that 
"They argued that they were unjust because masters could 
combine their capitals and employ them jointly in whatever 
manner they chose but that the laws prohibited the workers 
from doing the same" (pp. 169-170). Place and Hume believed 
that not allowing 'free labor' in the law would be oppres­
sive to workers, as Langer notes:
They argued that laborers ought to be as free 
jointly to negotiate the terms of their employment 
as employers are to combine their capitals and 
thus jointly offer employment. They also used the 
principles of political economy to show that in 
the absence of such freedom wages would be 
prevented from attaining their 'natural levels.'
This, they argued, was not only 'oppressive* to 
the laborer but also prejudicial to the progress 
of the nation's wealth (pp. 167-168).
In general, their arguments were consistent with classical 
liberal political economy in two important respects, liberty 
and equality: "the belief that trade in labour ought to be 
free as any other kind of trade . . . [and the] conviction 
that there ought to be one and the same law for men as for 
masters" (Dicey, 1905, p. 195) .
Furthermore, Place and others argued that "the dis­
orderly, violent strikes occurring in the late 18th and 
early 19th centuries were the result of the unfair and 
unequal laws which prohibited employees from combining to 
resist employer combinations" (Dickman, pp. 61-62). They 
thought that if workers were allowed to combine in friendly
associations that they would desist from all violent and 
monopolistic activities.24
Place acquired the support of McCulloch in the repeal 
campaign. McCulloch was the leader among the classical 
economists in approving of and encouraging peaceful trade
unions (O'Brien, p. 366). McCulloch believed that the repeal 
of the combination laws was consistent with the principles 
of political economy. Along with other classical political 
economists, he thought that combinations of workers were 
basically ineffectual in remedying their members' working 
conditions or increasing their wages, yet insisted that
"workers had the right to freely associate" (Dickman, 
pp. 60-61). David Ricardo seconded that opinion, stating 
that the combination laws which prevented such actions were 
"unjust and oppressive to the working classes, and of little 
real use to their masters" (8, p. 316).
Grampp has described the contributions of workers and 
employees to the discussion in Parliament of the repeal. The 
workers were the most outspoken group, insisting that the 
combination laws "held down wages and that repeal would 
raise them."25 Some 150 petitions were presented to the
24 Place himself thought the repeal of this law would 
lead to the end of organized labor. By giving labor unions 
legal freedom to combine, he believed that they would
realize the futility of all combinations bigger than
friendly societies (Cole, p. 60).
25 Grampp observes that some of the labor groups wanted 
to secure the right to organize "as a means to an end," that 
is, " . . .  they believed that the workers by combining 
could do for themselves what the state was supposed to do
House of Commons in 1824, and almost all of them were from 
laborers. Grampp notes that only two petitions "were in 
favor of retaining the laws, and they came from employer 
groups." Otherwise employers were not heard from in the 
debate (1979, p. 517).
In a relatively short and quiet repeal campaign 
(Langer, p. 167), Place and his supporters successfully 
urged Parliament to pass the Act that gave combinations of 
laborers immunity from all statutory and common law prohibi­
tions against such combinations. Combinations of laborers to 
"obtain and advance or to fix the rate of wages, or to 
lessen or alter the hours" of work, or otherwise interfere 
with the management of a business were no longer liable to 
prosecution for conspiracy. The statute also ruled out 
combinations of employers who sought to lower wages or 
raise the hours of work from prosecution as a criminal 
conspiracy under the common or the statute law. Section 5 
made illegal violence, threats, or intimidation by a 
person or by a group to "maliciously force another to 
depart" his work or "regulate the mode of carrying on any" 
employer's management of his business (pp. 184-185).
Unions were rendered immune from prosecution for 
peaceful acts under the common or statute law of criminal 
conspiracy. But the statute left it up to the judiciary to 
decide "what exactly constituted 'threats' or 'intimida-
for them but had not. That was to take the determination of 
wages away from the market" (1979, p. 517).
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tion'" (Dickman, p. 61). Consequent upon being given a 
greater freedom of combination, unions engaged in an 
unprecedented flurry of organizing workers. However, 
contrary to the desires of the designers of the legislation, 
there was also an epidemic of violent strikes.
Responding to petitions by employers, Parliament 
repealed this legislation in 1825 and replaced it with 
another statute which restricted the right of combination. 
Employers and workmen retained a right to combine as in the 
1824 law. But the 1825 statute made this right subject to 
the common law in regard to conspiracies in restraint of 
trade. Members of combinations were not criminally liable so 
long as their actions came within the permission given by 
the statute. Section 3 made strikes and lockouts subject to 
prohibitions against "violence, . . . threats or intimi­
dation." Section 4 in essence stated that a union's activity 
was to be confined to questions of wages and hours (Lincoln, 
p. 23) . Laborers did have the right to agree among them­
selves "for the purpose of fixing the rate of wages" or the 
hours of work (pp. 186-188). They were limited by the 
statute in their attempts to get other workers to concur 
with their demands (Dickman, p. 64).
Both of the Combination Acts reversed the statutes of 
1799 and 1800. The 1824 and 1825 enactments in part reflect 
competing interest group pressures; laborers were more 
effective in the former statute, while employers succeeded 
in having their demands met in the latter statute. But the
laws also embodied classical liberal principles that 
affirmed the norm of liberty in the labor market. Even in 
repealing the previous legislation, the 182 5 Act conceded 
the right of employers and employees to "discuss and agree 
together as to the terms on which they will sell or purchase 
labour." It affirmed the idea that "the sale or purchase of 
labour should be as entirely a matter of free contract as 
the sale or purchase of boots and shoes.” Moreover, neither 
individuals nor combinations were to "interfere with the 
right of each person freely to enter into any labour 
contract which may suit the contracting parties” (Dicey, 
1905, pp. 191-192). However, in practice the government 
failed to provide much protection for independent workers 
(interlopers) who did not wish to join the union (Hutt,
1936, p. 189, n.1).
The statutes saw the implementation into law of the
principles of freedom of trade and the right of association. 
Nonetheless, these principles were circumscribed by the con­
straint of the common law. Combinations which did not fall 
within the limitations of the Act of 182 5 were subject to 
the law of conspiracy in restraint of trade. Thus at this 
point in English history, a trade union was "at best a
nonlawful society, i.e., a society which, though membership
in it was not a crime, could not claim the protection of the 
law" (Dicey, 1905, p. 194). This distinction was further 
formulated in several court cases which ruled on the 
statute. English unions continued to be prosecuted under the
conspiracy laws over the next 50 years.
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IV. ENGLISH LABOR LAW FROM THE 18 50S THROUGH 19 06
A. THE COURTS AND LABOR LAW FROM 1850 THROUGH THE 187OS
In a series of cases in the 1850s which interpreted 
the Combination Act of 1825, British jurists still used 
the common law doctrine of conspiracy against labor combina­
tions, not regarding conspiracy as a crime, but rather as a 
tort. The underlying agreement between workers and employers 
thus was held by the courts to be nonenforceable. Cole notes 
that the courts held that "although no one could be indicted 
under the common law merely for forming or joining a Trade 
Union," so that a union was "no longer 'criminal' in 
itself," the taint of illegality still rested on the unions 
as being in 'restraint of trade' (Cole, p. 202).
In Reg v. Duffield (1851),26 Judge Erie maintained 
that under the Combination Act, the act of combining itself 
by workmen for their own protection and to obtain such wages 
as they choose to agree to demand was not a crime. But any 
combination was a conspiracy that interfered with "the free 
course of trade," as when workers conspired together for the 
purpose of inducing others to leave their jobs in violation 
of their employment contracts (p. 549). During this era 
even peaceful strikes could be regarded as an illegal means 
to obtain the purposes of the combination (Bryan, p. 145).
26 The text for this case is found in Cole and Filson, 
p. 549.
Organized workers who relied on these means were guilty of 
conspiracy where it was believed that their actions would 
"injure nonstriking workers, employers, or the public" 
(Dickman, p. 64).26
Another significant case was Hilton v.Eckersl ey (1855), 
which dealt with the legality of a cartel of employers "set 
up to defend themselves against labor unions." Eighteen mill 
owners agreed among themselves to settle wages and hours by 
majority rule. Their combination in essence stated that they 
would implement a general lockout in the case of a strike by 
a union against any one employer in the group. Dickman adds 
that "Each employer posted a bond to insure that he would 
abide by the decision of the majority" (p. 66) . The purpose 
of the arrangement was mutual protection against labor union 
actions.
Under Judge Crompton, the Court refused to enforce the 
agreement, and gave as its reason that the parties were not 
left free to trade on their own terms. The Court declared 
that if Parliament had not passed the Combination Act of 
1825, it would have found the employer's combination 
"illegal and indictable at common law." Dickman adds that 
the statute exempted the combination itself from indictment
26 In Reg, v. Pruitt (1867) , Judge Bramwell declared 
that "the liberty of a man's mind and will to say how he 
should bestow himself and his means, his talents and his 
industry, is as much a subject of the law’s protection as 
that of his body." Those men that agree to "coerce that 
liberty of mind and thought by compulsion and restraint" are 
guilty of conspiracy against that same liberty (p. 183).
as a conspiracy in restraint of trade. The combination was
lawful in the sense that "it was not punishable"; but action
against the breach of the contract between the employers
could not be legally enforced. As Dickman observes, Judge
Crompton meant for this principle to make agreements between
workers unenforceable as well. The principle invoked was the
longstanding common law principle of freedom of trade; its
application in this case had widespread impact:
. . . after Hilton v. Eckersley the general under­
standing in England and America came to be that, 
even if they were not otherwise illegal, agree­
ments between employers, or between laborers, or 
between employers and unions, to fix prices or 
wages were not enforceable. as being contrary to 
the public policy favoring competition (p. 67).
As a consequence of the court rulings prior to the 
1870s, labor unions found that much of their organizing
activity was constrained. Brown summarizes the way in which 
union actions were seen by the courts. Workers were "free to 
agree together not to work for less than certain wages, and 
to withhold their own labour in concert" if they did not 
obtain those wages. But if they "tried to secure the with­
drawal of other men" working for lower wages, they were seen 
as "passing over from the legitimate pursuit of their own 
interests to an indictable conspiracy to inflict injury."
The courts might treat such union actions as "recruiting or
picketing . . .  as interference and obstruction." Workers 
threatening a strike might be charged with "coercion and 
molestation" (p. 28). This approach was not satisfactory to 
the growing trade union movement; they wanted the conspiracy
doctrine as a criminal offense to be eliminated and the 
right to organize other workers more clearly spelled out.
In 1868, a Royal Commission heard spokesmen for the 
Trades Union Congress skillfully present "evidence establi­
shing the beneficial industrial functions of the unions 
. . (Lincoln, pp. 24-25). The Commission's majority
report recommended that the law more explictly recognize 
unions as lawful associations and acknowledge their right to 
combine (pp. 566-567); the minority report recommended that 
Parliament should rescind the criminal sections of the 1825 
Combination Act which made unions subject to the common law 
doctrine of conspiracy (p. 569).
This report spurred the passage of legislation three
years later which largely followed the minority report. The 
new statute was generated no doubt in part due to the
demands of organized labor upon legislators for regulation 
giving unions protection from the demands of the common 
law. The General election of 1868 was the first in which
large numbers of workmen were able to vote. A considerable
number of candidates pledged to support trade union initia­
tives, and after the election organized labor ceaselessly 
lobbied the members in the House of Commons. The period 
between 1867 and 1875 was also a time of "widespread indus­
trial unrest," as well as a time of significant growth for 
existing unions and the formation of many new unions (Cole, 
p. 215).
But there were other forces at work in the new legisla­
tion as well. To many legislators, certain changes in the 
characteristics of labor markets meant that the application 
of common law principles regarding restraint of trade was no 
longer appropriate. The 1871 Parliament faced the question 
of whether or not to fully legitimize the increasing number 
of trade unions in a different economic setting from that of 
the previous century. Trade unions in the 1860s and 1870s 
were "probably less able to obstruct the economy by the 
exertion of monopoly power" than some of the trade societies 
and labor combinations (particularly among skilled workers) 
"had been in the narrower [trade] channels" of the 
eighteenth century (Brown, p. 20). The dramatic increase in 
the introduction of mechanization during the nineteenth 
century (as compared to the previous century) also limited 
the ability of unionB to extract higher wage rates.
At the same time, the range of accepted activities of 
labor combinations had been limited by the statutory and 
common law of the previous 50 years. This seemed to leave 
workers in a weak position relative to their employers, 
especially as the scale of industry grew. The common law 
constraints on the activities of unions diminished the 
ability of workers to maintain their power in negotiating 
wages relative to that of their employers. Brown explains 
how economic forces seemed to put the laborer in a squeeze 
relative to his or her employer due to the way actions by 
each party were perceived by the common law:
. . . as firms grew larger, and fluctuations of
trade brought on changes in pay from year to year, 
many workers found their rates of pay being set 
unilaterally, take it or leave it, by the emplo­
yer. Whatever their possibilities of moving in the 
longer term, in the foreseeable future their 
livelihood depended on their keeping their present 
jobs. Inherent in their employer's position was a 
form of economic power* They joined in a union to 
attain countervailing power. The sole buyer of 
labor then had to come to terms with a sole 
seller: monopsony was met by monopoly. But it is 
in the nature of the common law, as it 'operates 
between individuals' that the worker's monopoly 
being achieved by combination is overt as the 
employer's is not, and the attention of the law is 
drawn to it (pp. 30-31).
What is suggested, then, is that the positive response of 
legislators to union demands in 1871 was based to some 
extent on an appreciation of a labor market failure 
requiring corrective regulation.
In fact, the Trade Union Act (1871) reflected a 
compromise balanced in the favor of trade combinations. It 
did contain severe penal clauses against obstruction and 
intimidation by labor unions. But its main thrust was aimed 
in the direction that organized labor desired. In Section 2, 
the statute declared that the "purposes of any trade union 
shall not, by reason merely that they are in restraint of 
trade, be deemed to be unlawful, so as to render any member 
of such trade union liable to criminal prosecution for con­
spiracy or otherwise" (p. 22). Likewise a strike was no 
longer to be considered a criminal conspiracy if its purpose 
was a restraint of trade. Thus with this statute Parliament 
attempted to eliminate the application of the criminal 
conspiracy doctrine by the courts to the use of peaceful
means in a trade dispute.
Nonetheless, the courts in the early 1870's still found 
that some types of organized labor actions constituted a 
conspiracy in restraint of trade. Trade union activities in 
several instances were held to constitute civil conspira­
cies. In the most famous example, the London Gas Stoker * s 
case (1872),27 the Court found that seven union leaders were 
guilty of criminal conspiracy for intimidating others to 
break their employment contracts (p. 575). Unions reacted 
very strongly to this ruling and petitioned Parliament for 
redress.
As a result Parliament passed the Conspiracy and 
Protection of Property Act in 1875. This Act eliminated the 
criminal conspiracy aspect of the common law restraint of 
trade doctrine from labor disputes (with certain excep­
tions) . The threat by an individual or a union to break an 
employment contract was now legal, as was the threat "to 
induce another to break his or her employment contract" 
(Dickman, pp. 68-69). Furthermore, Section 3 contained a key 
provision, which stated that
An agreement or combination by two or more persons 
to do or procure to be done by any act in fur­
therance of a trade dispute between employers and 
workmen shall not be indictable as a conspiracy if 
such act committed by one person would not be 
punishable as a crime (p. 23).
Thus the statute restricted the application of the ' con­
27 The text of the trial of this case is found in Cole 
and Filson, pp. 575-577.
version principle' in conspiracy law. Only a limited number 
of definite acts remained punishable under the rubric of 
intimidation.
The statute gave explicit legal sanction to strikes and 
picketing. It facilitated "combined bargaining on the part 
both of men and of masters" (Dicey, 1905, p. 269). The 1871 
and 1875 laws had the effect of legalizing all combinations 
of workers and employers alike, provided those combinations 
were formed to settle labor disputes and to negotiate hours 
and conditions of labor. This meant the reversal of the 
common law ruling in Hilton v. Eckerslev; the Act authorized 
majority rule agreements among employers or laborers.
Labor unions received the two statutes enthusiastically 
and "were satisfied that their demands had been met" (Lin­
coln, p. 26). One labor historian argues that at this point 
organized labor appeared to have "adequate legal status and 
immunity in the conduct of industrial disputes" (Cole, 
pp. 214-215) . But the 1875 Act was a compromise; there was 
still a question as to the effect of the compromise as it 
spoke to the protection of individuals, whether employers or 
workers, "whose legal liberty of action might be infringed 
by trade combinations" (Dicey, 1904, p. 528).
B. THE "TRILOGY CASES" AND THE TRADE DISPUTE ACT
The common law responded to this issue in a fashion 
that evoked great hostility from organized labor. For in the 
remainder of the nineteenth century the courts reproscribed
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"virtually all of their decriminalized activities under the 
laws of tort and civil conspiracy" (Dickman, p. 69) . In one 
way or another their activities brought them into the courts 
on such common law offenses as conspiracy, breach of con­
tract, restraint of trade and intimidation (Lincoln, p. 27).
In the area of labor relations, "the tort of inducing a 
breach of contract was applied to employment contracts at 
will as well as employment contracts by the term" (Dickman, 
p. 69). A 'by term' employment contract meant that employees 
"could not quit, nor could they be fired, without notice"; 
violation meant that the employee or the employer was 
"liable to suit for damages" (Dickman, p. 202).
The implications of the famous "Trilogy cases" {Mogul 
Steamship Qo^ v. McGregor. Allen v. Flood. and Quinn 
v. Leathern  ^ generated a great outcry from organized labor. 
These cases developed the doctrine that certain actions 
(such as secondary or tertiary boycotts) "causing damage 
would be actionable if done for a purely malicious purpose, 
whereas the same acts would not give rise to liability if a 
legal justification could be shown" (Bryan, p. 153). They 
were widely seen as invoking a double standard, because the 
courts found a union's 'restraint of trade* activities to be 
malicious, while they did not hold a business liable for the 
same type of activities. Union leaders felt the courts 
"unfairly limited their collective freedom of action in 
labor disputes" (Dickman, p. 200).
The first of these cases was Mogul Steamship Co. v.
McGregor (1889). In this instance, a combination of ship­
owners "offered rebates to all shippers who used their 
lines exclusively." However, they "refused to ship the goods 
of anyone who used their competitors" (Dickman, p. 201). 
This was a type of secondary boycott, hence the combined 
shipowners were sued by a rival.
The majority of the Court ruled that the shipowners 
were innocent of conspiracy in restraint of trade. It was 
determined that "a combination of shippers could act to 
exclude rivals by predatory pricing even though their inten­
tion was to inflict economic harm in order to secure their 
own self-advancement" (Epstein, p. 1367). The conspiracy 
concept was held not applicable as there had been no 
combination to do an unlawful act, nor to do a lawful act by 
unlawful means. Judge Bowen held that the doctrine of 
restraint of trade did not apply, for the doctrine "does not 
prohibit the making of such contracts; it merely declines, 
after they have been made, to recognise their validity" 
(p. 258). The agreement was held to be unenforceable at 
common law.
This decision was relied on heavily by the majority in 
Allen v. Flood (1898). In this case one group of workers 
announced through their union agent "their refusal to 
continue to work . . . for an employer unless he discharged 
all members of a rival union" working under contracts at 
will (Dickman, p. 201). The case wound up in the House of 
Lords. They ruled that this threat of a secondary boycott
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did not constitute "a civil wrong," even if it stemmed from 
a malicious motive (p. 279), As Epstein observes, the majo­
rity view "treated both malice and combination as wholly 
immaterial to the question of liability." What constituted 
illegal means under the Allen doctrine then was "force, 
fraud, and inducement of breach of contract." Epstein argues 
that the Court was saying that "As long as workers, either 
alone or in combination, do no more than withhold or threat­
en to withhold labor that they are not bound by contract to 
supply, they have not trenched upon the rights of rival 
workers, even if rival workers suffer as a consequence" 
(pp. 1367, 1369).
In Quinn v. Leathern (1901), the House of Lords appeared 
to reverse direction. In this instance, a group of workers 
tried to unionize "the labor supply of an employer's shop, 
although they didn't have any members in the shop to begin 
with. They did so by threatening to strike one of his
customers." This was a tertiary boycott threat (Dickman, 
p. 201). Leathern, a Belfast butcher, then offered to require 
his men to join the union and "to meet any demands made on 
them by it. His offer was refused and Leathern brought an
action for conspiracy" (Lincoln, p. 29). Both the contracts
"between the employer and his present employees" and 
"between the employer and his customer" were "at will" 
(Dickman, p. 201).
The Court ruled that the union threat was an illegal 
conspiracy in restraint of trade (p. 296) . The House of
Lords upheld the judgment of the court. They established 
that if two or more persons combine together, without legal 
justification, to injure another, and by so doing cause him 
damage, they are liable in an action for conspiracy 
(pp. 295-296).
In response to these rulings, the intellectual suppor­
ters of organized labor argued that there seemed to be "one 
law for business competition and a more restrictive law for 
labor disputes" (Dickman, p. 201), Sidney and Beatrice Webb 
observed in 1897 that at the present moment "the elastic and 
indeterminable law of criminal conspiracy" had more than 
usual uncertain limits to it. The Webbs contended that this 
law was often capriciously applied by biased jurists:
The case in doubt is that in which a combination 
for lawful purposes, contemplating and using only 
lawful means, violates some actionable private 
right. Such a combination, besides giving ground 
for a civil action, might, in the opinion of some 
authorities, be indictable as a criminal con­
spiracy, if the private right is one in which the 
public has a sufficient interest. So long as this 
view is not definitely negatived, there will 
always be danger, especially in periods of 
reaction, of the law of criminal conspiracy being 
invoked and enforced against any association which 
is unpopular, or against which the judges or the 
governing classes are prejudiced (pp. 857-858).
The Webbs believed that jurists of their time had a bent
towards narrowing the scope of Section 3 of the 1875 Act in
such a way as "to bring many ordinary incidents of a strike
once more within danger of the criminal law" (p. 858) .
According to the WebbB, in the Allen case the judges
"formed a new weapon for the employer's use": holding unions
liable for third party damages even when the union official 
was persuading workers to take actions within their legal 
rights. Furthermore, in the Mogul case it was decided that a 
combination of traders who sought "for their own profit, to 
exclude a particular rival from trade . . . was not ac­
tionable." It was not liable for the damage it incidentally 
did to a third party (p. 860). The Webbs observed a double 
standard at work in these three cases:
. . . because the combination was a Trade Union,
not aiming at commercial profit, the judges 
refused to recognise that its members had any 
adequate lawful motive for jointly exercising 
their admitted rights, by their duly appointed 
agent, to the incidental detriment of other 
persons (p. 860).
The judges failed to acknowledge that the unions' intentions
"of increasing their own wages'* and of seeing that their own
unemployed members be employed in the place of other workers
"constituted as real, immediate, and direct a pecuniary
interest as the trader's hope of profit" {pp. 860-861).
There are true incongruities in the reasoning in these
cases. Some have argued that the difference in the Allen and
Quinn cases was that the latter was characterized by the
element of conspiracy which was lacking in the former case
(Bryan, pp. 154-155), However, this does not truly resolve
the discrepancy. As Epstein has observed, there are real
conflicts between the decision in Quinn and the other cases:
rAlien! itself could be transformed easily into a 
conspiracy case given that the defendant Allen 
represented a union, all of whose members were 
prepared to strike over the work issue. In 
addition, Quinn seems difficult to reconcile with
Mogul given that the union's actions were well
calculated to serve the self-interest of its 
members, both by placing current members in high
paying jobs and by choking off the powerful
economic competition from non-union shops 
(p. 1368).
The labor statutes of the 187 0s had removed provisions which 
"made actions by trade unions crimes in themselves." But the 
right of association in the common law still involved 
tensions when it came to union activities, as Lincoln 
observes:
The right to associate freely for every con­
ceivable legal reason or purpose is basic to the
Common Law, and the removal of criminal law
hostility to industrial associations was in this 
sense a victory for the Common Law. But, para­
doxically, the collective purposes and methods of 
the unions conflicted with the Common Law and 
involved, and continue to involve, both the law 
and the unions in unresolved differences, contra­
dictions and perplexities (p. 27).
Beyond these tensions, it remains clear that at this 
point the statutory and common law did not treat trade 
unions as exclusive bargaining representatives. There was no 
legislation compelling unions and employers to bargain 
collectively. Dickman notes correctly that unions in England 
"remained fully voluntary associations representing only 
their members, and employers were under no obligation to
bargain with them" (p. 200) . It was in 1906 that the law
began to intervene in labor disputes.
This change came about with the passage of the Trade 
Disputes Act. It was a reaction to the developments in the 
law courts after the 1875 Act. The late nineteenth century 
was a time in which organized labor exerted increasingly
powerful influence in Parliament. Labor unions sought a 
reversal of court rulings which used the doctrines of tort 
and civil conspiracy for the same ends as previously 
accomplished by the law of criminal conspiracy (Dickman, 
p. 201) . They campaigned vigorously for a "return of their 
rights" (Lincoln, p. 30). Their objections were finally 
acted on after a House of Lords' ruling on a significant 
case in 1901.
The Taff Vale Railway Co. v. The Amalgamated Society of 
Railway Servants case involved a suit for damages against a 
union in South Wales "whose members had participated in a 
disorderly, violent strike." The employees of the railway 
were hired 'by term.* Dickman adds that " . . .  the company 
sued the union in its common name for the acts committed by 
agents on the union's behalf . . . "  The House of Lords 
allowed the suit to stand, and the union was assessed 23,000 
pounds sterling in damages (p. 202). Thus it was decided 
that a trade union could be sued for tortious acts (pp. 527- 
533), Brown comments that "The torts of civil conspiracy and 
procuring breach of contract were now powerfully sanctioned 
by the possibility of proceeding not against the individual 
members or officials who took the wrongful action but 
against their union . . (p. 32),28
20 Brown observes that few firms did in fact proceed 
against unions so as to recover damages from them that would 
be crippling; "there was no employer's offensive, no 
concerted action, nor any spontaneous move to take advantage 
of the new law" (p. 32).
This case, along with the decision in Quinn which 
sharply qualified a union's ability "to induce others via 
secondary boycotts to make union rules stick," provoked a 
great outcry from organized labor. As Dickman adds, "the 
English Trade Unions Congress launched a crusade to rewrite, 
once and for all, the conspiracy law" (p. 202). Pressure was 
brought to bear on members of Parliament, aided by the fact 
that in 1902 many trade unions started political funds of 
their own (Pelling, pp. 122-123; Cole, p. 298). They sought 
to influence the elections and legislation through the newly 
formed Labor Representation Committee.
Parliament appointed a commission to investigate the 
question in 1903. The Royal Commission on Trade Disputes 
heard from employers, workers, and legal experts alike. 
Brown notes that employers contended that since the Taff 
Vale judgment, trade disputes had been easier to settle and 
strikes were less frequent. The labor groups, which were 
much more numerous than the employers, opposed the court 
decision because it would limit a union's ability to 
strike. Some of the lawyers "objected on principle to the 
conferment of legal privileges on any section of the 
community" (pp. 35-36).
The Commission issued a report that "contained a mixed 
bag of recommendations" (Dickman, p. 202) . It did make the 
point that there had been "no assurance of immunity" in the 
law ever held out to unions by public commission, legisla­
ture, or jurist (Lincoln, p. 31). The Commission recommended
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"abolishing the 'conversion principle* of civil conspiracy
in labor disputes as the 1875 Act had earlier abolished it
from the law of criminal conspiracy." It endorsed limiting
the right of action for conspiracy when the act being
questioned was done in furtherance of a 'trade dispute.' It
also "suggested pruning back the tort of interfering with
contractual relations so as to permit strikes and picketing"
on a wider basis (Dickman, p. 202).
When the Liberal government proposed legislation
"following fairly closely the lines of the Commission's
Report," many unionists reacted strongly against it (Cole,
p. 302). The Labor Representation Committee had scored
important victories in the general election of 1906 and thus
the union resistance had a major impact, as Cole explains:
The Labour Party, with almost unanimous Trade 
Union support, pressed strongly for its own 
alternative Bill, in which it was laid down simply 
that 'an action shall not be brought against a 
Trade Union . . . for the recovery of damage
sustained by any person or persons by reason of 
the action of a member or members of such Trade 
Unions.' As soon as the Government produced its 
Bill, it appeared that the Trade Unions had done 
at the General Election a good deal of effective 
work besides promoting the return of their own 
candidates. A very large number of Liberal 
Members, it was found, had pledged themselves to 
the complete reversal of the effects of the Taff 
Vale decision. Not a few Conservatives, hard 
driven by Trade Union pressure in their consti­
tuencies, had done the same. The Government was 
unwilling to incur the unpopularity of resisting 
the Trade Union claims. It hastily dropped 
overboard both the Royal Commission's Report and 
its own scheme, and capitulated almost entirely to 
the Trade Unions (pp. 302-303).
There was "no effective opposition" to the union efforts to
obtain the law they desired (Cole, p. 303).
There were several arguments used by supporters of the 
organized labor cause in Parliament in favor of the new 
act. It was said that "to reverse the Taff Vale judgment was 
not to take a leap in the dark or confer a novel privilege, 
but simply to return the trade unions to the position that 
they had held under the law" for the 3 5 years since the 
Trade Union Act (Brown, p. 35). It was also stated that due 
to their unequal bargaining power, trade unions should not 
have their hands tied by the law in an unequal struggle with 
employers. They felt the right to strike was empty without 
immunity from action for damages caused by the strike. As in 
America, the spokesmen for labor unions relied on a market 
failure type of argument to justify legal privileges.
The Trade Disputes Act of 1906 (TDA) largely followed 
the directions suggested by organized labor. It abolished 
the civil law aspect of the common law conspiracy in 
restraint of trade doctrine from labor disputes. It elimi­
nated entirely the 'conversion' principle. According to 
Section 1, "an act done in pursuance of an agreement or 
combination . . . shall, if done in contemplation or
furtherance of a trade dispute, not be actionable unless the 
act, if done without any such agreement or combination, 
would be actionable" (p. 24). The law would no longer 
recognize a difference between individual acts and group 
acts (Dickman, p. 203). Thus the "tort of conspiracy in the 
furtherance of a trade dispute" was treated "exactly as the
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187 5 Act" treated the crime; there was "no privileged group"
created at this point (Lincoln, pp. 33-34).
Section 3 eliminated any basis for civil action "on
the ground only that it induces some other person to break, a
contract of employment or that it is an interference with
the trade, business, or employment of some other person, or
with the right of some other person to dispose of his
capital or his labour as he wills" (p. 24). The tort of
"procuring a breach of an employment contract, whether the
behavior was engaged in by an individual or by a union
. . was done away with. This applied "not only for
prospective contracts, and not only for employment contracts
terminable at will - but in all cases" (Dickman, p. 203).
Strike action was thus set outside the scope of civil
conspiracy, as the Act of 1875 had set strike action outside
the scope of criminal conspiracy.
Furthermore, the TDA provided that trade unions were
immune from any liability for torts. Section 4 stated that
An action against a trade union, whether of 
workmen or masters, or against any members or
officials thereof on behalf of themselves and all 
other members of the trade union in respect of any 
tortious act alleged to have been committed by or 
on behalf of the trade union, shall not be 
entertained by any court (p. 24).
As Dickman notes, "The range of privilege created by this
last provision was very large" (p. 203). The union's
immunity applied to 'any tortious act . . . committed by or
on behalf of the trade union . . . ' Lincoln emphasizes that
the union's immunity was not limited to "acts done in
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furtherance of a trade dispute." This provision reversed the 
Taff Vale judgment (p. 35).
C. AN EVALUATION OF ENGLISH LABOR LAW
How are the court rulings following the 1870s 
statutes and the TDA to be understood in light of the models 
of economic regulation? The market failure theory would 
understand this legislation to be grounded in the unequal 
market power of workers compared to their employers. Labor 
unions need complete civil and criminal immunities from 
conspiracy in the law in order to pursue tactics that will 
enable them to obtain their wage objectives. The Webbs 
advocated such changes in the law in the late 1890s (thus 
anticipating the provisions of the TDA). They contended that 
laborers should be free to peacefully combine (and organize 
to refuse to work) in order to enhance their bargaining 
position with employers without facing liability for damages 
caused to employers or to third parties. Deleterious 
consequences should be handled by stricter labor market 
regulation:
It may well be that combinations of workmen, or 
combinations of capitalists, lawfully and peace­
fully pursuing what they conceive to be their own 
corporate or class interest, will insist on terms 
in their bargains which are detrimental, not only 
to other parties, but also to the common weal. In 
that case the remedy is not to shackle one of the 
contracting parties by civil liabilities to 
individuals who may feel aggrieved by the exercise 
of the right, but to protect the community from 
such consequences of legal freedom of contract by 
definitely prescribing, by Factory Act or other­
wise, any conditions of employment or trade that
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are deemed necessary in the public interest
(p. 862).
A similar way of understanding the common law rulings 
in the "Trilogy cases" and the TDA is given by those who see 
the latter as the response of Parliament to jurists who were 
systematically prejudiced against the working class. Cole 
offers a spirited defense of the immunities given to unions 
in the 1906 Act. Utilizing the 'capture' approach, he 
affirms that
. . . the judges have, again and again, been
actuated by a strong anti-Trade Union bias. Any
compromise would therefore have been likely to be 
interpreted in the courts in such a way as to 
concede as little as possible to the Trade
Unions. The only effective way of tying the
judges1 hands was to get a simple and inclusive 
declaration from which legal subtleties would 
offer no way of escape (pp. 304-305).
Cole's case is appealing only insofar as one recognizes the
persuasion of Parliament in the early 1900s to this view of
the jurists' biases. It can be granted that there are
certain inconsistencies in their rulings, though in light of
Allen it is hard to argue a systematic prejudice against
labor on their part. But what is more significant is the
interest-group explanation which highlights the power of
organized labor to influence legislators along the lines
that Cole suggests.
The interest group model would understand the TDA as a
product of the pursuit of trade unions for protective
legislation in order to enhance their position in the labor
market. Brown notes that " . . .  the severity of the
depressions in each decade from the 1870s onwards" (pp. 42-
43) played a key role in this regard. Complete immunity in
the law was more intensely sought as the vagaries of the
business cycle came to increasingly affect working people.
Brown notes that during the late nineteenth century
The British economy was losing its industrial 
ascendancy; its staple manufacturers which had 
dominated the markets of the world were losing 
ground to foreign competitors, and it was failing 
to develop the new industries as they did. The 
depressions went deeper in the United Kingdom than 
in those other industrial countries, and lasted 
longer. They brought severe unemployment. In 
absolute numbers this increased in successive 
depressions, and it became increasingly resented; 
it intensified what contemporaries noted as 'the 
spirit of unrest* (p. 43).
Thus, consistent with Peltzman's observation that organized
interest groups are more successful in securing protective
legislation during recessions/depressions, unions intensely
competed for and gained favorable regulation in 1906.
Union interests outcompeted employer interests in the
early 1900s due in part to superior organization. The unions
utilized the rationale of unequal bargaining power in a most
persuasive fashion; convinced of the weaker condition of the
worker compared with the employer in bargaining for wages
and conditions of employment, Parliament "readjusted the
power relationship between capital and labor" (Rimlinger,
p. 216). As a consequence the Labor Party saw its affiliated
membership rise to over a million in 1907 (Cole, p. 305). In
the years from 1910 until 1914, trade union membership grew
at an unprecedented rate (to over 4 million workers in
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1914). At the same time, while "between 1900 and 1909 there
were relatively few industrial disputes," industrial turmoil
reached an unprecedented level between 1910 and 1914
(Rubinstein, p. 63).
The interest group theory no doubt sheds some light on
labor market regulation in this era, but it does not do full
justice to the features of the law in this period. Other
facets of the changes in labor law are better explained by
the liberty and virtue component. Consider the notion of
character formation as an end of labor market regulation.
Brown notes that in Victorian England trade unions commended
themselves to legislators in several ways. They provided
"various forms of social insurance" for their own members.
In a line of thinking no doubt influenced by John Stuart
Mill, many policymakers also saw labor unions as a vehicle
for "attracting the most skilled and responsible workmen,
and exerting a steadying and uplifting influence on their
members generally." The implication for the employer was
that the labor which "received the full trade union rate"
was "highly productive." Brown argues that "This was all the
more so, because the unions actually strengthened the
character and improved the performance of their members."
The Victorians laid great stress on this consideration
(p. 23). Alfred Marshall wrote that
. . . the power of Unions to sustain high wages
depends chiefly on the influence they exert on the 
character of the workers themselves . . . Unions 
all can, and most of them in fact do, exercise an 
elevating influence by punishing any member who
conducts himself badly, or who is frequently out 
of employment from excessive drinking (pp. 401, 
402-403).
Hence in the 1870s it made sense to give unions a freer hand 
by lifting the doctrine of criminal conspiracy off their 
backs. This meant that with the Trade Union Act and the 
Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act labor unions would 
have no special taint of criminality resting on them, but no 
special immunities in the law either.
The 1871 and 187 5 statutes were interpreted by the 
courts in light of the common law principles of conspiracy 
and breach of contract. The construction put upon the 1875 
Act marked "a reaction not against the provisions of that 
Act," but against the tendency to construe them as confer­
ring "upon trade unions a position of privilege" (Dicey, 
1904, p. 531). Labor unions remained liable as any other 
group of citizens "for any criminal acts they might commit" 
(Lincoln, p. 27). As any other association they were liable 
"to pay damages for wrongs done by themselves or by their 
agents . . ." (Dicey, 1904, p. 531).
Since the 1870s unions came to engage in much more 
impeditive practices than had been previously seen. Yet in 
1906, as Brown observes, it seems that Parliament relied on 
a parochial view of unions which did not recognize that they 
had become much more insistent on upholding restrictive 
practices, especially when those were regarded as protective 
of employment. This was clearly evident in the union 
reaction to "the heavy unemployment in the cyclical depres-
sions from the 1870s onwards . . . "  (p. 46). Union leaders
were less deferential to employers, and union members became 
more militant (p. 42) . Brown adds that "The type of union 
that had gained approval" in the 1870s "accepted the 
existing order in industry and society, whereas many 
unionists of 1906 rejected it as unfair and denied the 
legitimacy of profit" (pp. 46-47). Furthermore, the miner's 
strike in 1893 had shown that unions could impose widespread 
disruption in the community (p. 44). Parliament under­
estimated both the "actual power" of unions and "the will of 
their members to use it" (p. 47) .
Apart from the TDA, the English trade union law was 
based on the assumption that it applied to "free contracting 
parties." This ruled out the imposition of "compulsory 
unionism under the immunity of voluntary association . . . "  
Unions allowed to engage in intimidatory practices as a 
means to secure membership would no longer be "workers' 
mutual aid associations" (Lincoln, p. 67). But if the TDA is 
thought of as remedying a temporary imbalance of power in 
the labor market, so that unions might continue to perform 
their socially beneficial functions, perhaps it is not 
incongruous with the traditional common law understanding of 
legitimate regulation. Lincoln interprets the TDA along 
these lines. He contends that Parliament desired to compen­
sate for organized labor's weakness by "weighting the 
position of the unions with legal immunities thereby 
securing them a measure of equality with the employers when
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it came to bargaining over contract terms" (p. 36). Lincoln 
further argues that the legal immunity given to the unions 
was not "a grant of right." but "a grant of necessity due to
the inferior state of their power and as such subject to
adjustment as that power grew" (p. 54). In a similar fashion 
Brown has observed that the 'unequal bargaining power* argu­
ment loses its force "as unions grow in power and in their 
ability to enforce their demands not only by withdrawing 
labour from the employer but by imposing losses on third 
parties and disrupting the life of the community" (p. 48).
Recognizing that there are elements of each model of 
regulation at work in this period, it would be helpful to
evaluate the labor law of this period by means of a com­
parison and contrast between the explanations offered by 
each approach. Advocates of both models would argue that the 
termination of the application of the concept of criminal 
conspiracy in restraint of trade to labor unions in the late 
nineteenth century was appropriate; both would favor 
retaining the tort concepts of economic liability as 
applicable to unions as well as to any other property 
holders. The two approaches differ as to whether or not the 
concept of ’restraint of trade* should be eliminated 
altogether with regards to labor unions.
As seen in chapter one, those who utilize the interest 
group model most often emphasize freedom as the normative 
criterion by which to evaluate regulation. The libertarian 
understanding of labor law exemplifies this approach.
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Epstein (1983) offers a libertarian 'normative account of
labor relations' grounded in entitlement theory. He argues
that "common law rules in their ideal form make legal
entitlements among strangers without reference to personal
status" (p. 1364). Epstein contends that the English common
law has taken the position that "Every person owns his own
person and can possess, use and dispose of his labor on
whatever terms he sees fit" (p. 1364). Thus when individuals
create voluntary arrangements, it is "never the occasion for
increased state regulation of private transactions apart
from the faithful enforcement of their agreement, be it in
employment relations or anything else" (p. 1366). Thus
Epstein claims that there is no reason to justify the
existence of labor unions other than on the grounds of
voluntary arrangements that apply to any other parties in
the marketplace:
As the identities of the contracting parties and 
the terms on which they contract are of no special 
concern to the state, a contract between an 
employer and an employee is indistinguishable from 
one between two prospective employees. The 
protection of labor unions from doctrines of 
criminal conspiracy, therefore, should not depend 
upon any elaborate affirmative social justifica­
tion for their use. If A could enter into a 
contract with a prospective employer, then there 
is no reason he cannot enter into a contract with 
his potential rival, B, to present a united front 
against the employer. Similarly, the voluntary 
formation of labor unions need involve neither the 
use of force and fraud nor the inducement of 
breach of contract. There is therefore no need to 
appeal to special justification to account for the 
legality of labor unions, as it is already 
accounted for by a general theory of entitlements 
(p. 1366).
If the common law thus does not offer a basis for 
special privileges for any one party in the marketplace, 
then how do we understand the conflicts presented by the 
"Trilogy cases"? Epstein contends that the more significant 
question is not the harsher rules for labor than for
business, but the doctrine of conspiracy in restraint of 
trade itself. He argues that "Labor unions should not be 
considered criminal conspiracies not because they operate in 
restraint of trade - many do - but because restraint of 
trade itself should not be illegal." In Epstein's view, 
. . legislation that secures the rules of Allen is
appropriate, even if more massive labor legislation is not" 
(p. 1369).
The liberty and virtue component's understanding of the 
common law principle of freedom of trade does not hold
liberty as its overarching normative criterion. Hence it 
would not dismiss outright the possibility of applying the 
concept of conspiracy in restraint of trade to labor (or
business) groups when economic circumstances warrant. Thus 
this model would evaluate the implications of the "Trilogy 
cases" and the TDA in a different (though not completely 
dissimilar) fashion.
In regards to the latter, there were several alterna­
tive routes Parliament could have taken that would have been 
consistent with the common law tradition. Brown suggests 
that Parliament could have created a "catalogue of prac­
tices" (or economic torts) which would be specifically
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immune from tort liability. The case for "providing the
complete immunity . . .  is a case for simplicity and cer­
tainty"; unions were spared from "the unforeseeable develop­
ments of case law." Still, there is no question that in 
providing complete immunity, Parliament was deciding that, 
uniquely among British institutions, "trade unions and
industrial relations should be exempt from regulation by 
law" (p. 51). Brown explains that
. . . Parliament had denied itself the possibility
of distinguishing between different actions by the 
trade union, according to the balance between the 
union's need of those actions in order to fulfill 
its functions, and the damages they inflicted on 
others. It had denied itself also the possibility 
of adapting regulations to new practices and
problems as they emerged (pp. 51-52),
Brown goes on to suggest that with regards to such practices
as the secondary boycott, the sympathetic strike, and the
withdrawal of labor by reason of a dispute between groups of
workers, Parliament could have "drawn the boundary by
statute" (pp. 52-53). He argues that
Within it the unions would have enjoyed all the 
shelter of the actual settlement of 1906. In any 
action they took outside it they would have been 
exposed to the civil law relating to combinations 
of whatever form. The intensity of trade union 
opposition to later proposals for such regulation 
does not show that if it had been adopted in 1906 
they would have found their bargaining power much 
reduced by it (p. 53).
Brown does acknowledge that a distinction between fair and
unfair labor practices would likely not have been enacted in
1906, because organized labor "commanded too many votes" and
thus obtained complete immunity (p. 54). Nonetheless, the
distinction follows nicely in the common law tradition of 
distinguishing between legitimate regulation and 
unreasonable restraints of trade as seen in chapter two.
What is the problem raised by giving unions special 
privileges in the law? By excluding "industrial contracts, 
trade union and employers' agreements from the scope and 
protection of the law . . . the whole concept" of contract
law is weakened (p. 70) . Thus Lincoln argues for amending
Section 4 of the TDA "to cover only the privileged occasions
as in Sections 1 and 3"; he contends that "The unions' total
immunity, constituting them a privileged group. should be 
repealed" (p. 68) . Instead, the union member would still 
have secured by law "his contract rights and his freedom of 
association." The union itself would benefit from "legally 
established negotiation rights and status" (p. 70) . Much 
like Epstein, Lincoln believes that "the Common Law hinders 
the trade unions not in their restraint of trade activities 
but in their pursuit of the 'closed shop'" (p. 71).
The liberty and virtue component considers freedom as 
an important, but not penultimate, normative criterion. 
Freedom of trade is understood as freedom from arbitrary 
restraints on trade not sanctioned by the law. It opposes 
the unreasonable exercise of monopoly power secured by 
government privilege. Yet there is a role for regulation in 
promoting substantive ends such as character formation. 
Likewise, the right of association is highly valued as an 
end of public policy. Thus, the liberty and virtue component
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shares the notion with the interest group model that public 
policy ought to neither encourage nor prohibit labor efforts 
to combine by the grant of special legal privileges or immu­
nities. This rule can always be overridden, however, by the 
legislature's police power to regulate the labor market when 
public good considerations warrant such regulation.
There are some interesting parallels to the British 
experience in the development of American labor law over the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Chapter four will 
examine the various arguments about the proper position of 
the law regarding immunities and privileges granted to 
organized labor in America from the early 1800s until the 
1940s. The role of the concept of substantive due process in 
labor disputes, and its relation to governmental police 
powers in applying regulation, offers an enlightening 
comparison and contrast to the British development of the 
doctrine of conspiracy in restraint of trade.
CONSPIRACY IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE IN AMERICA, 1800-1941
This chapter will examine the development of the 
doctrine of conspiracy in restraint of trade in nineteenth- 
century and early twentieth-century American law. It applies 
the models of regulation to the treatment of organized labor 
in U.S. statutory and common law. Of particular importance 
will be the concept of substantive due process in regards to 
labor. The tension between the legitimate use of police 
powers in labor markets and the protection of economic 
rights from the use of those powers as artificial inter­
ference in the marketplace will be a central theme. 
Restraint of trade as violation of substantive due process 
in regards to labor unions is a key element of the American 
conspiracy doctrine.1
A central issue to be explained by the application of 
the models of regulation will be the changed status of labor 
unions in the law and in economic policy. The social and 
economic policy toward labor combinations in America went 
from the taint of illegality associated with criminal con­
spiracy in the early nineteenth century, to the recognition 
of the right to organize laborers in 1842 and a limited 
application of the conspiracy concept until the 1930s, to
1 Substantive due process may also restrain laws fixing 
prices, minimum wages, hours of work, etc. I shall deal with 
cases pertaining to these issues only insofar as they shed 
additional light on the nature of police powers vis a vis 
substantive due process in relation to labor unions and 
labor market entry.
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the mandatory requirement that employers bargain with 
elected union representatives and elimination of the concept 
of the labor union as conspiracy as expressed in the New 
Deal labor legislation. It was a change which spanned a 
quite significant era in American legal and economic 
history. At the beginning of this period there was no 
special set of rules for labor cases. They were governed by 
common law principles which applied also to contract and 
tort issues. Towards the end of this era, with the advent of 
the New Deal, these common law principles largely gave way 
to "a complex body of statutory and administrative law" that 
treated labor law "as a separate and self-contained subject" 
(Epstein, p. 1357).
Both the liberty and virtue component contribute to the 
explanation of this phenomemon prior to the 1930s. The 
latter theory most clearly explains the passage of the labor 
legislation of the 1930s. Neither model completely explains 
the development of labor law over the entire period.
The argument of this chapter may be summarized as 
follows. American courts sought to adapt to labor disputes 
English common law rules in regards to freedom of associa­
tion and the freedom to pursue one's trade. In the first 
half of the nineteenth century, American common law recog­
nized the right of unions to organize workers. This was not 
a grant of special privilege or immunity to unions in the 
law. During the nineteenth century American common-law 
jurists still examined the purposes of unions and the
legitimacy of the means they utilized to attain their 
objectives.
Later in the nineteenth century federal statute law 
established its opposition to combinations or conspiracies 
in restraint of trade. Under the interpretation followed by 
the Supreme Court of the application of the Sherman anti­
trust law to organized labor, union activity was treated in 
much the same manner as any other combination. The issue of 
the legality of the means of unions to obtain their 
objectives was ruled on. In several key cases the Court held 
that the use of the secondary boycott or strikes, due to 
their effect on interstate commerce, could constitute a 
union as a conspiracy in restraint of trade.
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, 
organized labor opposed the use of yellow-dog contracts, in 
which workers agreed they would not join a union, and the 
use of the injunction to enforce such agreements. The 
Supreme Court overthrew state legislation banning such 
agreements and upheld the principle of equality of bar­
gaining power in the fashioning of contracts between 
employer and employee. As Dickman observes, this principle 
as applied to freedom of contract "did not assume that men 
had to be equal in position or wealth in order for the 
bargains between them to be fair. It assumed only that they 
were equally free" (p. 18).
The economic due process principle predominated in 
these high Court decisions. Indeed, this period of
Supreme Court rulings has been called the era of substan­
tive due process (1885-1937). In several key rulings, the 
Court overturned statutory enactments which under the guise 
of the legitimate use of police powers by the state instead 
actually served private interests. As nullifications of 
legislative enactments, these rulings are not easily 
explained on the basis of the interest group model. The 
independent judiciary failed to ratify legislative agree­
ments between politicians and labor groups. Yet the Court 
affirmed the usage of legitimate regulation for the public 
good under the police powers of the state. These judicial 
rulings are better explained utilizing the liberty and 
virtue component.
Faith in competition diminished during the latter part 
of the nineteenth century, and "the idea grew that unions 
were not merely tolerable, or desirable, but were indispen­
sable if workers were to obtain fair wages and working 
conditions" (Dickman, pp. 7-8). Moreover, the market failure 
argument in regards to the labor market was increasingly 
accepted, i.e., that the employer held an advantage in 
bargaining with his employee, and that immunities in the law 
needed to be granted to labor unions to redress this 
imbalance.
Organized labor began to utilize such arguments against 
both court injunctions and the application of antitrust law 
to unions. In the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, American 
unions first secured legal immunity from the application of
the common law conspiracy doctrine in regards to labor 
disputes. Organized labor generated a particulary effective 
demand for regulation in securing this legislation.
With the onset of the Great Depression, union propo­
nents heightened their insistence "that the 'right to 
organize' under the common law was not enough." They 
demanded that the state also restrict "employer's freedom 
not to associate with unions or their members." The National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) established this "positive right" 
by establishing "compulsory collective bargaining" (Dickman,
p. 8) .
While in 193 5 the Supreme Court overturned the National 
Industrial Recovery Act with its favorable provisions for 
organized labor, in 1937 it upheld the NLRA. Political 
pressure from President Roosevelt ultimately swayed the 
majority of the Supreme Court to interpret the New Deal 
labor legislation consistent with the desires of organized 
labor. The New Deal labor legislation is best explained by 
means of the interest group model.
I. AMERICAN LABOR LAW FROM 1800 THROUGH THE 1920S
A. THE CONSPIRACY DOCTRINE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
We have discussed the development of the concept of 
conspiracy in the English common law as applied to labor 
combinations. We have emphasized the significance of the 
common law principle of conversion: a legal action by one 
individual can become illegal it is performed by a group of
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individuals. As in Great Britain, this characteristic of the 
conspiracy doctrine had particular import in the American 
labor conspiracy cases. Workers could set a price on their 
own labor services individually, but such an action would be 
illegal if performed by a group of individuals. As Dickman 
observes, the primary significance of the conversion princi­
ple for workers was "its impact on their right to organize 
into unions," and on "the use of their organized power 
through primary or secondary boycotts" (Dickman, p. 56). In 
the late eighteenth-century English common law, a group of 
laborers organized into a combination to raise wages was 
declared a conspiracy. The British Combination Acts of 1799 
and 1800 set forth generalized provisions against labor 
combinations which acted in a conspiratorial manner against 
the public interest by striking to obtain higher wages.
While labor combinations were increasingly being formed 
in England (despite legal opposition) in the latter part of 
the eighteenth century, the labor movement was also 
springing up in America. Labor combinations were first 
formed among the craft workers, which had skills that "were 
not easily learned," and thus "employers could not readily 
replace them" (Taylor and Witney, p. 16). Almost every time 
there was a combination of workers, it sought "to obtain, 
or retain, a monopoly of the labor supply through a closed 
shop . . ." (Dickman, p. 74). Some of the laborer's tactics
were relatively simple; efforts by employers to hire 
inferior workmen were met by a "social boycott," i.e. craft
association members "refused to live in the same boarding­
house or to eat at the same table with nonassociators" 
(Rayback, p. 55) . In other instances there was more direct 
pressure put on employers to recognize and hire only members 
of the labor association.
Employers objected to these tactics and brought suit 
against the labor groups, charging them with being illegal 
combinations. The American common law of conspiracy was 
first established in these early nineteenth century trials 
of labor combinations. The individual laborer's right to 
bargain for his own labor services had been "firmly en­
trenched" in American law based on English law and custom. 
But it was an uncertain matter as to "how far American law 
(either common or constitutional) protected the rights of 
combinations" ; thus "the applicability of the English common 
law of conspiracy to labor combinations" was tested in a 
series of state cases involving "journeyman trade unions in 
various crafts" (Dickman, pp. 73-74).
There are two competing interpretations of the thrust 
of the rulings in these cases in regards to the status of 
labor combinations in American common law. An older view 
which was widely held argued that in the early 1800s 
American common law viewed labor unions which sought to 
increase their wages or otherwise alter their working condi­
tions as illegal conspiracies. It was thought that only in 
1842 did the Hunt case overthrow "these archaic doctrines" 
and move the legal focus from the legitimacy of a labor
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combination itself to the question of the lawful means which 
unions might utilize to better their conditions (Witte, 
1926, p. 825).
This view laid a great emphasis on the fact that labor 
combinations were prohibited by the early eighteenth-century 
British statutes. Prosecutors in several of the early Ameri­
can labor cases "urged that English law established a prece­
dent for American courts" (Taylor and Witney, p. 17).2
A second interpretation emphasizes the fact that it was 
only in a few scattered instances in these early labor union 
cases that combinations of workers were declared illegal as 
such. It was never the established American common law that 
labor unions "are illegal per se. 11 The cases of the early 
nineteenth century "did not turn upon the legality of the 
unions per se, but on the methods which they employed to 
gain their ends." The legal theory that it was unlawful for 
workers to combine to raise their wages was abandoned early
2 More broadly speaking, Thorelli has observed that 
prior to the late nineteenth century "British attitudes 
towards restrictions of trade influenced American policies 
in the field in a number of ways." He explains that
Some of these influences were direct and tangible, 
others rather indirect and intangible; all were 
interrelated. To the group of indirect influences 
belong such maxims as the desirability of greatest 
possible individual liberty compatible with social 
order and the consequent aversion to excessive 
concentration of power in few hands. The greatest 
direct and tangible influence of the old mother 
country no doubt was on the development of 
American common law on the subject. This was 
natural because until the 1880s there were 
comparatively few statutory enactments of signifi­
cance, state or federal, relating to private 
restrictions (p. 36).
in American common law and "never attained the status of 
generally accepted law" (Witte, 1926, pp. 825-826).
The evidence seems to suggest that there was develop­
ment in the law, which initially declared labor combinations 
to be illegal but never established this doctrine as the 
rule of the land. Two of the most significant of the early 
cases did declare labor combinations to be outright illegal 
conspiracies. An examination of these cases will help to 
answer the question of how unions were originally thought to 
prejudice the rights of others or of society under the 
common law of conspiracy.
In 1806 the Philadelphia shoemaker employers charged 
that unions were conspiracies, and as such, were unlawful 
combinations. The shoemaker union (cordwainers) tried "to 
force their employers to fire all journeymen who did not 
belong to the union" and also "attempted to prevent non­
members from entering the trade" (Baird, p. 30) . In the 
trial of this case (Commonwealth v. Pull is).3 the prosecu­
tion affirmed the individual laborer had the right to 
bargain for his own wages; they did not intend "to introduce 
the doctrine that a man is not at liberty to fix any price 
whatsoever upon his own labor" (3, p. 68). The charge was 
that the attempt to combine all shoemakers to obtain an 
increase in wages constituted the cordwainers as a
3 Citations of the first two labor conspiracy cases in 
this section are from Volumes 3 and 4 of Commons and Gilmore 
(1958) .
270
conspiracy: "Our position is that no man is at liberty to 
combine, conspire, confederate, and unlawfully agree to 
regulate the whole body of workmen in the city" (3, p. 68).
While the defense pointed to "the positive contribu­
tions that labor unions could make to the economic and 
social life of the community" (Taylor and Witney, p. 19), 
the jury focused on the attempts to "restrict the lawful 
acts of non-union workers" (Baird, p. 30) and found the 
union guilty of being a criminal conspiracy.
In the Pittsburgh Cordwainer * s (Commonwealth v. Morrow  ^
case of 1815, which revolved around similar concerns, the 
judge contended that "a conspiracy to prevent a man from 
freely exercising his trade, or particular profession, in a 
particular place, is endictable. Also, it is an endictable 
offense, to conspire to compel men to become members of a 
particular association, or to contribute towards it" (4, 
p. 82). The jury upheld the charge that "the master shoe­
makers, the journeymen, and the public were endangered by 
the association of journeymen and returned a verdict of 
guilty of conspiracy . . (Walton and Robertson, p. 274).
There were a total of seventeen labor conspiracy trials 
in the period from 1806 until 1842 (Taylor and Witney, 
p. 18) . Generally, the decisions in these cases did not 
follow the stringent construction seen in the previous two 
cases, as Dickman observes:
Except insofar as state law prohibited them, 
virtually all the courts granted workmen the 
common law right to organize for mutual protection
and betterment. But virtually none of them granted 
the unions the right to seek or maintain the 
closed shop through strikes or strike threats
(P- 74).^
In addition, Witte explains that "In several of these early 
conspiracy cases the prosecution or the court, or both, 
stated that it was the methods which the defendants had used 
which rendered their combination illegal." But it was not 
until 1842 that the distinction "between the legality of the 
combination per se and the methods which it employed was 
clearly expressed" (1926, p. 828).
The Commonwealth v. Hunt5 case of that year was highly 
significant for the economic conspiracy doctrine as applied 
to labor unions. A lower court found a group of organized 
shoemakers guilty of conspiracy because they would not work 
for an employer "who hired a shoemaker not a member of their 
union"; they were indicted because their actions "interfered 
with the right of the nonunion shoemaker to practice his 
trade" (Taylor and Witney, pp. 20-21).
Chief Justice Shaw ruled that the union was not to be 
seen as a conspiracy based on a 'conversion principle' 
rationale. He stated that "every free man, whether skilled
4 It was during this era that national labor organiza­
tions appeared and the first federation of labor unions was 
founded. This organization, the National Trades' Union, 
"sought to unite in one organization every local union, city 
central, and national labor union in the nation." It 
disappeared during the depression of 1837 (Taylor and 
Witney, p. 20) .
5 Citations from this and other cases and statutes in 
the remainder of this section are found in Sayre (1923), 
unless otherwise noted.
laborer, mechanic, farmer, or domestic servant, may work or 
not work, or work or refuse to work with any company or 
individual, at his option, except so far as he is bound by 
contract" (p. 108) ; he added that, "In this state of things, 
we cannot perceive, that it is criminal for men to agree 
together to exercise their own acknowledged rights, in such 
a manner as best to subserve their own interests" (p. 106).
Justice Shaw emphatically affirmed that labor unions 
may exist for either pernicious or laudable and public 
spirited purposes. A union may advance the general welfare 
of the community by raising the standard of life of the 
members of the union. In fact, what the union was after, "to 
induce all those engaged in the same occupation to become 
members of it," was not unlawful since the power this state 
of affairs would give the organization "might be exerted for 
useful and honorable purposes." Shaw declared that labor 
organizations "might be used to afford each other assistance 
in times of poverty, sickness, or distress; or to raise 
their intellectual, moral, and social conditions; or to make 
improvements in their art; or for other proper purposes" 
(pp. 105-106). There is a striking parallel here with the 
attributes of the medieval guild; Shaw was affirming a 
'public good* perspective towards labor combinations.
Shaw ruled that for the union to be convicted under the 
conspiracy doctrine, it had to be shown that either the 
"intent" of the union, or the "means" it used to accomplish 
its intent, was "unlawful" (pp. 105-106). Dickman comments
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that "by unlawful, Shaw clearly meant conduct or behavior 
that might only be actionable by a private suit, such as for 
fraud, breach of contract, or tort" (p. 75). Shaw ruled that 
the prosecution did not demonstrate such "unlawful means" or 
an illegal purpose on the part of the union in this case.
It is probably correct to say that Shaw "did not elimi­
nate, nor did he intend to eliminate, the law of conspiracy 
in restraint of trade as it applied to unions (or to 
any other group in the economy)" (Dickman, p. 76). The 
doctrine could still be utilized by jurists who applied the 
traditional common law principles of freedom of trade and 
the right of association. Shaw observed that a labor 
"association might be designed for purposes of oppression 
and injustice . . . injurious to the peace of society or the
rights of its members. Such would undoubtedly be a criminal 
conspiracy, on proof of the fact, however meritorious and 
praiseworthy the declared objects might be" (p. 106). Shaw
was following in the common law tradition in recognizing a 
distinction between labor combinations which served their 
proper ends and those which arbitrarily restrained trade. A 
combination in which a group of workers combined to break 
their employment contract would be unlawful and indictable.
This case applied the principle of freedom of associa­
tion "about as far as any 19th century American judge was 
willing to apply it to labor unions" (Dickman, pp. 75-76).
The ruling in this case recognized the right of a union to 
organize workers. As Dickman further explains, this ruling
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did not recognize the right of unions to force non-union 
workers to join the organization, nor was there a duty 
imposed on employers to bargain with the union or even hire 
union workers. The right of the union recognized by Judge 
Shaw was "primarily a legal claim that 'ran* against the 
government." It did not imply any obligation on the part of 
the state to aid labor in seeking its ends, as Dickman 
explains:
[It was] a claim that the government refrain from 
doing something to an individual (or a group of 
individuals) , not a claim that the government do 
something for an individual (or group) at someone 
else's expense (i.e., at the expense of someone 
else's freedom of action or of his material 
resources). As such, the right to organize implied 
no positive (affirmative) obligations on employers 
or non-union workers (outside the criminal law)
(p. 7) .
As in the nineteenth century British common law cases, 
American justices in this era expressed a commitment to the 
principle of freedom of association, for both employees and 
employers.
The Hunt case narrowed the applicability of the con­
spiracy doctrine to labor unions. As Taylor and Witney note, 
"Labor organizations taken by themselves were declared law­
ful organizations . . .  In general, most other courts, 
though not bound by the Massachusetts decision, followed the 
doctrine established by Shaw" (p. 21). The Hunt case 
expressed the conspiracy doctrine in a form which was usual 
for the next 90 years, "namely, that the legality of a com­
bination depends upon the purposes sought to be accomplished
and the means used to affect these ends" (Witte, 1926,
p. 828) .
Thus the conspiracy doctrine was still employed to 
constrain certain union actions. For example, there were 
eighteen labor conspiracy trials during the period from 1863 
to 1880 (Witte, 1926, p. 829). If a jurist in a particular 
case thought that a union was pursuing an illegal objective 
(such as a closed shop), judicial action was undertaken to 
oppose the union (Taylor and Witney, pp. 21-22). While
Justice Shaw defended the closed shop, not all of the other
state courts were willing to legitimize such an arrangement, 
for, as Dickman notes, "strikes or strike threats to obtain 
or maintain a closed shop were held in some states (as in 
England during this period) to be an unlawful attempt to
injure other employees, employers, or the public interest in 
competition" (p. 76).
The peristence of judicial inquiry into the activities 
of labor combinations led labor organizations to demand the 
enactment of legislation to abrogate the economic conspiracy 
doctrine, as Witte has observed. Laws along this line were 
passed in Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey and Maryland. 
In Pennsylvania, an act was passed which declared that 
laborers "might singly or collectively refuse to work for 
any employer, but also that this should not be construed as 
legalizing attempts to hinder others from working." However, 
all the statutes "failed to end prosecutions for conspiracy 
premised upon participation in strikes" (1926,
pp. 829-830).6
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, while 
there were still some rulings unfavorable to union activi­
ties, there was gradual recognition of the legality of 
peaceful strikes. Moreover, labor disputes after the 1880s 
were the source of "comparatively few criminal prosecutions 
for conspiracy" (Witte, 1926, p. 832) . By the end of the 
century, as will be discussed shortly, the key issues in 
labor law revolved around the use of the injunction by 
employers and the application of federal antitrust statutes 
to labor union activities.
In sum, to this point we have seen that the American 
development of the conspiracy law as applied to labor unions 
has been somewhat different from what took place in Great 
Britain. English labor unions were declared to be illegal 
conspiracies in the late eighteenth century. However, this 
situation changed in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century. Several key pieces of legislation, including the 
Trade Union Act of 1871, the Conspiracy and Protection of 
Property Act of 1875, and the Trade Disputes Act of 1906,
6 As a consequence the late nineteenth century saw the 
rise of several national labor organizations, one of which 
was the Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions of 
the United States and Canada, formed in 1881. It declared 
that "it would encourage the formation of trade and labor 
unions on a local and national scale, and seek * to secure 
legislation favorable to the interests of the industrial 
classes.'" At the head of the list in its legislative 
program was the "legal incorporation of trade unions - in 
order to remove labor organizations from the operation of 
state conspiracy laws" (Payback, p. 157).
rendered unions as legal combinations and eliminated the 
criminal and civil aspects of the common law doctrine of 
conspiracy in restraint of trade as applied to labor unions. 
In addition, with the TDA, labor unions were exempted from 
all liability for tortious acts committed in their behalf.
In America, it was never "generally accepted as law 
that labor unions are unlawful," although there were a few 
attempts to apply the late eighteenth-century British animus 
toward "all combinations to raise wages." But the American 
courts generally accorded laborers "the right to organize 
for their mutual economic betterment, and scrutinized only 
the measures they adopted to gain their ends" (Witte, 1926, 
pp. 836-837). In America, the doctrine of organized labor as 
criminal conspiracy was a "phantom tort" (Petro, p. 546).
Nonetheless, English law supplied a wider range of 
freedom regarding union activities than that which labor 
combinations had recieved prior to the New Deal labor 
legislation. Speaking of the period from the founding of 
America up until 1926, Witte wrote that "As regards substan­
tive rights, the law of labor combinations in the United 
States has remained unchanged, except as to details, 
throughout its entire history." He added that "The funda­
mentally important changes which have occurred, relate to 
remedies, not to substantive rights." After the first 
American labor union case and up until the 1880s, "practi­
cally the only remedy was a criminal prosecution for 
conspiracy." Then in the 1880s the injunction was employed,
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and after 1910 the damage suit came into usage (1926, 
p. 837). Thus in England there was a much wider swing in the 
views of the courts towards organized labor and its activi­
ties, from illegality to significant government privileges, 
than what took place in America.
Taking a broader perspective on developments in 
nineteenth-century American law, Thorelli notes that "The 
principal use of the common law conspiracy concept in regard 
to trade restrictions for quite some time before the passage 
of the Sherman Act in 1890 was in the field of torts rather 
than in criminal law." The term 'conspiracy' signified 
"concerted action for a purpose not sanctioned by the law" 
(that is, concerted efforts to restrict competition); and 
conspiracy "was freely used much in the same sense as 
'combination,' or at times with a somewhat more odious taint 
than that concept." Thorelli adds that by 1890 it was 
recognized that "courts had for long been speaking of 
'conspiracy to monopolize' and 'conspiracy in restraint of 
trade' as well as 'combination in restraint of trade'" 
interchangeably, all refering to concerted actions to 
monopolize (p. 39). The concepts of 'conspiracy in restraint 
of trade' and 'attempt to monopolize' "were often used 
interchangeably in one and the same case," Referring to both 
notions, Thorelli observes that "The rule applied in a 
majority of cases was that such combinations were 'against 
public policy' and the underlying agreements therefore void 
and unenforceable" (pp. 39-40). The generalization of the
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doctrine of restraint of trade has been greatly significant
in the development of American policies against monopoly,
especially in contrast to the British experience: "Whereas
the extension of the restraint of trade concept in England
marked the beginning of a continuous relaxation of public
policy, American courts moulded the broadened doctrine into
a useful, if imperfect, general antimonopoly instrument"
(Thorelli, pp. 52-53).
Before 1890, how did the courts treat arrangements
involving restraints on business competition, as compared to
labor combinations? Many of the former were invalidated
(Thorelli, p. 40); in the latter case the situation was
somewhat ambiguous.7 Thorelli adds that
some judges, especially around the middle of the 
19th century, were prone to regard labor combina­
tions as instruments of restriction as objec­
tionable as business combines. Nevertheless, it is 
probably true that by the time the Sherman Act was 
passed the right of labor to organize, to strike 
for higher wages or improved working conditions 
and to engage in most types of not overly coercive 
activities typical of labor market relations was 
generally not questioned at common law (p. 41).
However, for over thirty years after the passage of 
America's first national antitrust law, jurists following 
basic common law principles found the concept of restraint 
of trade fully applicable to certain types of labor activi­
ties. We must consider the relevant statutes and Supreme
7 Boudin makes the unqualified and incorrect remark 
that combinations to raise wages as well as "any other means 
of interference by employees with their employers as part of 
a labor dispute" were entirely beyond the scope of the 
restraint of trade concept (pp. 50ff.).
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Court cases in this era to determine whether this approach 
stemmed from the application of market failure or 'public 
good' principles by the judiciary, or from highly organized 
rent-seeking activity by organized labor groups.
B. LABOR UNIONS AND ANTITRUST POLICY
After 1880, the courts infrequently made use of the
conspiracy doctrine in labor disputes. But antitrust laws
entered the picture and played a significant role in the
legal status and rights ascribed to labor unions.
The Sherman Act of 1890 did not specifically mention
labor unions. Sections 1 and 2 of the statute declared:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust 
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade 
or commerce among the several States, . . .  is 
hereby declared to be illegal . . . every person
who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or 
combine or conspire with any other person or 
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or 
commerce among the several States . . . shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor . . . (p. 112).
However, it must be noted that these two key parts of the
law did not specifically exclude unions from consideration
as combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade. There
was much debate over whether "combination" or "persons"
referred to labor unions as well as to business firms
(Taylor and Witney, pp. 43-44). Berman (1930) argued that
Congress intended to exclude unions from the law; Mason
(1925) thought the legislators wanted to include unions in
the scope of the law. It is no doubt true that "the Sherman
Act was not intended to abolish labor unions, or declare
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them per se combinations in restraint of trade." But it is 
not the case that "nothing unions could do in the context of 
a labor dispute could be held to be an illegal restraint of 
trade . . . Even the passage of the Clayton Antitrust Act
. . . failed to accomplish that end" (Dickman, pp. 230-231).
In the early part of the twentieth century, a more 
interesting argument was raised on behalf of labor unions. 
The defenders of organized labor contended not only that 
"unions weren't meant to be subject to the Sherman Act, but 
that they shouldn't be: unions deserved special privileges
and immunities because of larger public policy considera­
tions." After the enactment of the TDA in 1906, "progressive 
intellectuals" relied on this argument "and unionists 
agreed" (Dickman, p. 231). The most common reason given was 
the market failure notion of unequal bargaining power in the 
labor market. Combinations of workers should not be subject 
to laws against restraint of trade because public policy 
should aim to strengthen worker's bargaining power vis-a-vis 
employers. Arguing along these lines, Witte (1932) argued 
that organized labor should be exempt from the Sherman 
law. He contended that "The antitrust laws may serve a 
useful purpose in the business field but have no proper 
place in labor controversies." Restraint of trade should not 
apply to organized labor actions, for "labor unions are not 
trusts and should not be treated as such. Their activities 
should be judged by their social effects, not on the basis 
of incidental restraint of trade which they may involve"
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(p. 293, n.3).
Union leaders such as Samuel Gompers denounced the 
application of Sherman Act antitrust principles "because 
they violated freedom of contract, particularly their right 
to seek and maintain a closed shop." Organized laborers had 
"the right to refuse to work" with non-union laborers as "an 
exercise of their own right of contract." Moreover, "the 
right to contract implied the right not to contract," thus 
it was "insisted that the right to boycott be absolute." 
However, the demands by Gompers, Louis Brandeis and others 
"for an absolute right by unions to boycott employers were 
not matched by an equal respect for employers' right to 
boycott unions" (Dickman, pp. 232-233),
The Supreme Court in the 1890s and for many years 
thereafter applied the Sherman Act to labor unions. It will 
be instructive to consider the nature of the union activi­
ties which were restrained and the philosophy of the Court 
in respect to restraint of trade in labor markets. The 
Court's rulings can be explained fairly consistently 
utilizing the liberty and virtue component.
In the early years after the passage of the Sherman 
Act, the Supreme Court tended to make little distinction 
between union and business restraints on competition. One of 
the first applications of the antitrust law to labor union 
activities was in the Danbury Hatters (Loewe v. Lawlor) case 
(1908). This case was one of the most famous of a series in 
which the Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act applied to
283
labor unions.
The United Hatters of North America had organized 70 
out of the 82 firms manufacturing hats; in these firms 
wages, hours, and other conditions of employment were 
determined through collective bargaining with the union as 
the worker's agent, in 1902 the United Hatters attempted to 
organize Loewe and Company. As Taylor and Witney note, "The 
union requested that the company recognize it as the 
bargaining representative of its employees," and also "that 
only union members be permitted to work in the firm." The 
company turned down the union's demands. As a consequence, 
"the union called 250 workers out on strike" (a minor 
percentage of the entire working force) , but "the company 
found replacements for the striking workers and was able to 
operate successfully" (pp. 46-47).
The Union Hatters next resorted to a nationwide boycott 
against the company's products. As Taylor and Witney recount 
the facts of the case, "By widespread publicity the union 
induced retailers and wholesalers not to handle the firm's 
hats." Moreover, "the general public was requested not to 
purchase any item from retailers or wholesalers handling 
Loewe's products." The boycott succeeded; in one year the 
company claimed a loss of $85,000 (p. 47).
In 1903 Leowe & Company sued the union for damages 
under the Sherman Act. In its ruling, the Supreme Court held 
that the union's secondary boycott "had the effect of 
restraining trade within the meaning" of Section 1 of the
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statute (Taylor and Witney, p. 47). The Court stated that
the combination described in the declaration is a 
combination ' in restraint of trade or commerce 
among the several states' in the sense in which 
those words are used in the act . . . and [this]
conclusion rests on many judgments of this court, 
to the effect that the act prohibits any combina­
tion whatever to secure action which essentially 
obstructs the free flow of commerce between the 
States, or restricts in that regard, the liberty 
of a trader to engage in business (p. 121).
This decision led to increased prosecution of unions on an
antitrust basis (Taylor and Witney, p. 47).
The Court held that the secondary boycott was in
restraint of trade. Taylor and Witney contend that "this
resulted in a decline in the effectiveness of the collective
bargaining process." Taking the unequal status of labor in
the bargaining process as a given economic circumstance,
they observe that the Court
was not sensitive to the fact that the boycott was 
instigated as a last resort in an effort to 
establish a bargaining relationship with the 
United Hatters. Essentially, the high court was of 
the opinion that 'the liberty of a trader to 
engage in business' was equal to the liberty of 
workers to move to other economic endeavors to 
improve their standard of life if a particular 
pursuit was deemed unsatisfactory (p. 48).
The Court did not subscribe to this type of market failure
argument, or at least did not think it applied in this
case. However, that does not mean that labor law in this era
was insulated from interest group pressure.
Organized labor resolved to change the doctrine
stemming from this case. Union leaders reasoned that
Supreme Court justices held life tenure, and as a conse­
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quence "were relatively insulated from whatever political
pressures unions could bring to bear." They concluded that
"political action to influence elective officials was the
only effective weapon at their disposal." They sought to
"change the law to preclude prosecution of labor unions
under the antitrust statute" (Taylor and Witney, p. 48).
The American Federation of Labor (AFL) pushed for
legislation designed to promote a more favorable environment
for collective bargaining. The AFL sought to fashion a
'public interest' rationale for regulation by appealing to
unbearably long hours and intolerably low wages. As Taylor
and Whitney explain, it pushed labor unions to pledge
their support to Woodrow Wilson "due to his campaign pledges
approved by the AFL" in the presidential campaign of 1912.
In 1914 the Democratic party "acted swiftly to fulfill its
obligations to organized labor," and passed the Clayton
Act. Labor leaders thought the Act would provide unions
relief from the Sherman law (pp. 49-50).
The Clayton Act explicitly addressed the issue of
the application of antitrust restraint of trade provisions
to labor union actions. Section 6 declared that
the labor of a human being is not a commodity or 
article of commerce. Nothing contained in the 
antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the 
existence and operation of labor . . . organiza­
tions, or to forbid or restrain individual members 
of such organizations, from lawfully carrying out 
the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such 
organizations, or the members thereof, be held or 
construed to be illegal combinations or conspira­
cies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust 
laws (p. 145) .
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As Taylor and Witney observe, Samuel Gompers, president of 
the AFL, declared that Section 6 was labor's "Industrial 
Magna Charta upon which the working people will rear their 
construction of industrial freedom" (p. 50) . This led some 
in organized labor to conclude that unions were now com­
pletely excluded from the provisions of the antitrust laws.
President Wilson considered his campaign promises to 
labor fulfilled with the passage of this statute; along with 
the leaders of the House, he "resisted union pressures for 
outright exemption from the Sherman law" from union leaders 
who later realized that the Act still allowed the judiciary 
to determine the lawfulness of union activities and purposes 
(Taylor and Witney, p. 51) . Thus the Clayton Act did not 
fully satisfy labor's demands; indeed, Section 6 merely 
restated what was true already in American common law. The 
courts since 1842 had held labor unions in themselves to be 
legal organizations, and the Sherman Act did not change this 
status. Taylor and Witney observe that this provision of the 
law had to be understood in light of the Court cases of that 
time bearing on labor and trade restraints:
In the antitrust cases the Supreme Court did not 
deny that employees had the right to form labor 
unions. As a consequence the statements 'nothing 
contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed 
to forbid the existence and operation of labor 
organizations' and 'nor shall such organizations 
or the members thereof, be held or construed to be 
illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint 
of trade, under the antitrust laws' added nothing 
new to labor law . . . The Supreme Court declared 
that the implementation of a boycott by a labor 
union did not constitute a lawful activity under 
the Sherman law. All Section 6 did in this respect
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was to affirm the right of the courts to decide 
the questions of lawful and unlawful union 
activities and objectives (pp. 51-52).
In some ways the labor union's position was made worse by 
this law. Though the statute constrained the bounds of the 
use of injunctions in labor disputes, it also "provided 
that private parties as well as law-enforcement officers of 
the federal government could obtain injunctions in antitrust
cases. This meant that the ability of employers to obtain
injunctions against unions was considerably increased" 
(Taylor and Witney, p. 52).
The Supreme Court had its first opportunity to wrestle 
with the application of the antitrust law to labor unions 
following the passage of the Clayton Act in a 1921 case. The 
Duplex Printing Press Company had refused to recognize a 
union or negotiate with it on a voluntary basis. The 
International Association of Machinists called an organiza­
tional strike, which proved totally unsuccessful because 
"only a fraction of the workers responded." The union
decided to undertake a secondary boycott against the
products of the Duplex Company; specifically, it sought "to 
eliminate the firm from the New York market with the effect 
of encouraging Duplex customers to purchase presses manufac­
tured by companies with which the union had contracts." As 
Taylor and Witney go on to observe, "the economic circum­
stances surrounding the Duplex case were strikingly similar 
to those involved in the Danburv Hatters case." The Court 
ruled that the action of the union constituted restraint of
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trade under the Sherman act (p. 55) .
The Court declared that there was nothing in Section 6
of the Clayton Act to exempt a union from accountability
where it departed "from its normal and legitimate objects"
and engaged "in an actual combination or conspiracy in
restraint of trade." The Court went to link its interpeta-
tion of the Clayton Act to previous statutory law:
. . . and by no fair or permissible construction
can it be taken as authorizing any activity 
otherwise unlawful, or enabling a normally lawful 
organization to become a cloak for an illegal 
combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade as 
defined by the antitrust laws (p. 444).
Unions lacked a corporate status; "thus each union member
was held liable under the Sherman Act roi the unlawful acts
in restraint of trade committed by all the others" (Dickman,
p. 420, n.74).
After the decision was rendered, organized labor went 
before the Court in six antitrust cases. Taylor and Witney 
note that "Before 1921 the federal courts applied the 
antitrust statutes only to railroad strikes and union 
secondary boycott activities. After 1921 and the Duplex 
decision, the courts applied the Sherman law to ordinary 
factory and coal strikes" (p. 56) . The most significant of 
these antitrust cases was the Coronado case, which was a 
sort of American Taff Vale (Dickman, p. 420, n.70).
In the early 1920s the United Mine Workers (UMW) sought 
to expand labor organization in the coal industry. It faced 
off with the Coronado Coal Mine, which decided in 1914 to
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operate its properties under the open shop principle. The 
company "closed down a number of unionized mines and planned 
to open them on a nonunion basis.*' There was a violent 
confrontation between union and non-union employees which 
resulted in the destruction of the entire mine. The opera­
tors of the mine sued the UMW, "charging a violation under 
the Sherman law"; they requested treble damages (Taylor and 
Witney, p. 57).
The Supreme Court decided the first Coronado case in 
1922 and held that the actions of the UMW were not in
violation of the Sherman Act. It claimed that the company 
submitted no evidence by which it could be found that the 
union committed actions "in a conspiracy to restrain or 
monopolize interstate commerce" (p. 46) . As Taylor and 
Witney observe, "It was not sufficient to show that a strike 
may have indirectly reduced the amount of coal in commerce, 
but proof must be adduced that the unionists conspired to 
restrain trade or suppress competition." However, they also 
note that the Court suggested that a more satisfactory case 
against the union could be made if Coronado Coal Mine could 
demonstrate that the UMW intended to eliminate the sale of 
nonunion products (p. 58).
In the second Coronado case (1925),8 the Supreme Court
8 In this chapter, citations from the second Coronado 
case, the Slaughterhouse cases, the Butcher * s Union case, 
Munn v. Illinois. Ylck Wo v. Hopkins. and NLRB v. Jones & 
Lauahlin Steel Corp. are found in the lawyer's edition of 
the United States Supreme Court Reports.
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held that the 1914 strike did violate antitrust statutes.
The Court stated that
the purpose of the destruction of the mines was to 
stop the production of nonunion coal and prevent 
its shipment to markets in states other than 
Arkansas, where it would by competition tend to 
reduce the price of the commodity and affect 
injuriously the maintenance of wages for union 
labor in competing mines . . . (69, p. 970).
The judges concluded that "a conspiracy existed to reduce 
the amount of coal in commerce" (Taylor and Witney , P- 59).
This ruling suggested that strikes could very readily 
bring labor unions into violation of antitrust law. The 
Court declared in the second Coronado case that when the 
intent of those preventing "the manufacture of production is 
shown to be to restrain or to control the supply entering 
and moving in interstate commerce, or the price of it in 
interstate markets, their action is a direct violation of 
the Anti-Trust Act" (69, p. 970). Taylor and Witney contend 
that, as a consequence, organized labor feared that "every 
important strike could be subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Sherman law by virtue of the far-sweeping implications of 
the Coronado doctrine" (p. 60).
After this decision, the next major phase in the 
development of the concept of restraint of trade as applied 
to specific labor union activities was the Korris-LaGuardia 
Act of 1932, which served to restrict labor union prosecu­
tion under the antitrust law'*. Before considering this law 
and other labor legislation of the 1930s, there is another 
feature of the development of the conspiracy doctrine in
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labor markets which must carefully be considered. This 
facet of American labor law revolves around the concept of 
restraint of trade as violation of substantive due process.
II. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND POLICE POWERS
As seen in chapter two, the English common law did not
hold to freedom of trade or 'liberty' as absolute rights
above all others. American common law is based on the
English common law; it shares a similar approach to economic
freedom. As Dickman observes, both in American common law
and in the U.S. Constitution, limits were set on economic
liberty, as well as on the powers of government to interfere
with economic freedom in the public interest:
From the juristic standpoint, property and 
contract rights in the Anglo-American common law 
tradition have virtually always been recognized 
and protected from government interference not on 
the basis of a political philosophy of natural 
rights, but only insofar as they were consistent 
with or did not conflict with a 'larger' 'public 
interest* or 'public policy' consideration . . .
The political philosophy of natural rights reached 
its height in America when the Constitution was 
written; and among its fundamental goals, the 
Constitution was written to secure individual eco­
nomic liberties (individual property rights) from 
legislative invasion, particularly by the states.
This was accomplished, or so the framers of the 
Constitution believed, by prohibiting the states 
from passing laws impairing the obligation of 
contracts, by guaranteeing that the citizens 
of each state would be entitled to all the 
privileges and immunities of citizens in the 
several states, by making domestic free trade the 
constitutional norm, and by reserving to Congress 
alone the power to regulate commerce among 
the several states (p. 219).
Later, as Letwin notes, the Fifth Amendment prohibited "the
federal government from depriving any person of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law." He adds 
that "The constitutions of some states set an equivalent 
or identical limit on the power of state government, and 
this limit was extended to all the states by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, ratified in 1868" (1979, p. 30-31). The Four­
teenth Amendment declared that
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws
(p. 800).
Furthermore, the Constitution did qualify three broad 
economic powers that have always been seen as integral to 
the sovereignty of the state. These are the trinity of the 
power of taxation, the power to take private property for 
public purposes (eminent domain), and the police power 
(Dickman, p. 219) . The latter power is especially signifi­
cant for our consideration of the way in which the doctrine 
of restraint of trade in labor markets was affected by the 
Supreme Court*s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
for a period of seventy years after its passage.
The post-Civil War Court had to determine the extent to 
which it would interpret the due process requirement "as 
subjecting legislation only to a procedural test as against 
calling for a determination of its substantive merits" 
(Kahn, l, p. 4). What the Court did in many cases was move 
towards a substantive due process interpetation. Among other
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things, the Court reconsidered and imposed new limitations 
on the scope of the states' police powers; as McCurdy 
observes, "the outcome was a constitutional revolution that 
set the legal basis of government-business relations upon an 
entirely new footing" (p. 971) .
Some have taken this to mean that private business 
interests were deliberately enhanced by the jurists. Roche's 
analysis of this era reflects this type of "capture" 
perspective. According to Roche, the new principle of 
"entrepreneurial liberty'' became entrenched in constitu­
tional law against what had previously been held in the 
common law:
Essentially this doctrine was a break with the 
common law and the common law premise of the 
overriding interest of the community, or police 
power. The right to use one's property, to 
exercise one's calling, was given a natural law 
foundation - in a philosophically vulgar fashion - 
over and above the authority of the society to 
enforce the common weal. The consequence of this 
doctrine was not a laissez-faire universe, but one 
dominated by private governments which demanded 
(and to a great extent received) freedom for their 
activities and restraints on the actions of their 
competitors, e.g., trade unions, regulatory 
commissions, or reform legislatures. In historical 
terms, 'free enterprise* thus involved two 
concomitant propositions: freedom of the entrepre­
neur to follow his calling, and a governmental, 
constitutional protection of the entrepreneur from 
his institutional enemies, public and private 
(pp. 433-434).
It seems that Roche has misinterpreted the common 
law. He does not consider the distinction it sets forth 
between legitimate regulation and arbitrary restraint of 
trade. It is no doubt true that during the 'substantive due
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process era* "the concept of contract was broadened to 
include the substantive right to pursue a calling,” and that 
"the right to make contractual arrangements to exercise 
one's calling became a 'property* right protected from state 
infringement by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment” (Roche, p. 412) . But this did not mean that all 
regulation of labor markets was overruled, or that business 
interests made the judiciary their captive ally.
A. ECONOMIC DUE PROCESS IN THE LATE NINETEENTH-CENTURY
SUPREME COURT
The S1auqhterhouse Cases first brought the due- 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment before the 
Supreme Court. The original cases arose from a challenge to 
a Louisiana law passed in 1869. As McCurdy recounts the 
facts of the cases, New Orleans city boosters had advocated 
"the construction of efficient slaughtering facilities that 
could withstand the competitive pressures imposed by packers 
in St. Louis and Chicago." These commercial interests 
ultimately succeeded in procuring an exclusive grant by 
"improperly influencing members of the state legislature" 
according to the Louisiana Supreme Court (p. 976). This act 
granted to a corporation of 17 persons for a 25 year period 
an exclusive franchise for the slaughtering of animals for 
meat in New Orleans and the two next adjacent parishes 
(Hamilton, 1938, p. 171). This meant that other butchers who 
for years practiced this trade were no longer free to follow
it. They challenged the law in the courts, and argued before 
the Supreme Court that it "deprived them of property 
contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment" (Letwin, 1979, p. 31).
John Campbell represented their position before the 
Court. In his argument, Campbell sounded themes familiar in 
the English common law. He claimed that man has a right to 
labor "which right is property." The property of the 
butchers without privilege was destroyed by the act; it was 
destroyed not by due process of law, but by a grant of 
monopoly privilege to a sole company, for "the rights, 
privileges, and immunities of the citizen have been dimi­
nished and impaired, that this corporation shall have a 
monopoly" (21, p. 397). Campbell argued that no state can 
deprive a man of his right to work by an "unreasonable" 
ordinance (21, pp. 395-399).9
The majority of the Court did not accept Campbell's 
usage of the Fourteenth Amendment against the one corpora­
tion. Delivering the majority opinion, Justice Miller argued 
that "the wisdom of the monopoly granted by the legislature
9 Strong (1986) argues that "Campbell's emphasis on 
English and American hostility to monopoly, which he 
ultimately related to Due Process, was to him as significant 
as was his contention based on Privileges and/or Immunities" 
(p. 58). Campbell's briefs reviewed the English constitu­
tional struggle over monopoly grants. He notes Coke’s 
statements on the deleterious consequences of monopoly. 
Campbell's survey of legal history also included an appeal 
to Turgot's decree in 177 6 and the decree of the French 
Assembly of 1791, both of which abolished all special privi­
leges of corporations, guilds, and trading companies. 
Campbell also appealed to Adam Smith's concept of the 
"property every man has in his own labor" (21, p. 396).
may be questioned" as to whether or not granting an exclu­
sive privilege was the proper method to be utilized for 
protecting the public health. Nonetheless, it was not a 
monopoly that deprived butchers of "the right of labor in 
their occupation." The state had granted the company "the 
slaughter-house privilege." But it did not thereby "prevent 
the butcher from doing his own slaughtering." The company 
was required, "under a heavy penalty, to permit any person 
who wishes to do so, to slaughter in their houses . . . [for
a] reasonable compensation" (21, pp. 403-404). Miller seemed 
to be distinguishing "between destroying property and regu­
lating it" (Letwin, 1979, p. 31). Siegan takes a slightly 
different interpretation, claiming that "at that time the 
majority was not prepared to regard a person's calling, 
trade, occupation, or labor as property, or the right to 
engage in it as liberty (or property)" (p. 51).
Letwin has observed that the slaughterhouse Cases are 
part of a series of cases in the late nineteenth-century 
Court distinguished by starkly contrasting dissenting 
opinions, with those of Justice Field particularly standing 
out (1979, p. 32). Each dissent in the Slaughterhouse Cases 
"viewed property and liberty in the more expansive terms 
that would in time become judicially acceptable" (Siegan, 
p. 51) . There are several interpretations of this develop­
ment of judicial rulings in regards to economic activity. 
Justice Field's positions are often the focal point of the 
discussion. Some see the jurists of this era, and Field
especially, as advocates of absolute property rights and
enemies of all forms of government regulation; Scheiber
(1971) describes Field as the "paragon of judicial activism
on behalf of laissez-faire doctrine" (pp. 348). others push
this viewpoint further and claim that Field and the other
jurists were the spokesmen for business interests which in
effect were "private governments." This is basically an
inchoate version of the Marxian capture theory applied to
the judiciary, without the economic apparatus of the supply
and demand for regulation spelled out. Roche's view is
characteristic of this interpretation:
While Field never denied the existence of the 
police power, his whole position was based on the 
proposition that in any conflict between private 
economic rights and public authority the burden of 
proof rested on the state. The state, in other 
words, had to demonstrate to the satisfaction of 
the Court that its regulations were justified 
(p. 413).
Porter notes that "most standard histories and accounts of 
the Court between the 1880s and the 1940s assume a pro­
business, anti-labor bias on the part of the majority" of 
the justices (p. 138). McCloskey (1962), Twiss (1942),
Jacobs (1954), and Corwin (1948) offer variations on the 
theme that laissez-faire was written into the Constitution 
by a conspiracy of lawyers and/or business-minded jurists, 
though Corwin offers a more balanced treatment of the issue. 
Others such as Brown (1927) and Hamilton (193 8) see no 
way to make sense of the different rulings of the Court in 
this period; they claim there are no consistent, clear-cut
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principles which the judges followed in deciding the limits 
of the police powers of the state and the extensiveness of 
economic due process.
A more viable interpretation is that, as McCurdy 
suggests, Field dealt as sensibly as he could with "the
great underlying problem" of his day: what was "government's 
legitimate role in American economic life"? McCurdy contends 
that Field set forth "an extraordinarily consistent body of 
immutable rules designed to separate the public and private 
sectors into fixed and inviolable spheres" (p. 973). Letwin 
adds that Fieldfs opinions are "constitutional objections to 
excessive regulation of economic activity, for to portray 
Field as a doctrinaire opponent of all regulation is
radically to distort the truth" (1979, p. 32). Field is a
jurist with a commitment to certain principles which rise
above political considerations; these principles are 
consistent with the liberty and virtue component.
Field attributed a "broad scope" to the police power 
(Letwin, 1979, p. 32). As he stated in the Slaughterhouse
cases: "That power undoubtedly extends to all regulations 
affecting the health, good order, morals, peace and safety 
of society, and is exercised on a great variety of subjects, 
and in almost numberless ways" (21, p. 412). This power
could be misused when legislation only masqueraded in the 
public interest. In the case of the Louisiana law, its title 
stated that it was "An Act to Protect the Health of the City
of New Orleans . . ." (21, p. 403). Field argued that
"the health of the city might require the removal from its 
limits and suburbs of all buildings for keeping and slaugh­
tering cattle, but no such object could possibly justify 
legislation removing buildings from a large part of the 
state for the benefit of a single corporation." As Letwin 
comments, if the public health was "protected by having one 
slaughterhouse outside the city, then it would have been 
equally well protected by allowing many . . . "  (1979, 
p. 32). Field concluded then that "the pretense of sanitary 
regulations . . .  is a shallow one" (21, p. 412).
Following Campbell's argument, Field referred to Coke's 
report of the Case of Monopolies. Field noted that grants 
of monopoly which restrained "persons from getting a honest 
livelihood" were "held void at common law" because they 
"restrained [individuals] of the freedom or liberty they 
previously had in any lawful trade . . . "  The Louisiana 
monopoly grant "equally restrains the butchers in the 
freedom they previously had, and hinders them in their 
lawful trade." Moreover, this grant violated the privileges 
secured to every U.S. citizen by the Fourteenth Amendment 
"against abridgement" by the creation of a monopoly (21, 
p. 417) . As Strong observes, Field claimed that "freedom 
from monopoly in the common callings was one of the funda­
mental rights now constitutionally protected against state 
action" by the Fourteenth Amendment (Strong, p. 61).
Justice Bradley joined in Field's dissent. Bradley 
also contended that the Louisiana statute was not a legiti­
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mate public health regulation. He stated that
To compel a butcher, or rather all the butchers of
a large city and an extensive district, to
slaughter their cattle in another person's 
slaughterhouse and to pay him a toll therefore, is 
such a restriction upon the trade as materially to 
interfere with its prosecution. It is onerous,
unreasonable, arbitrary, and unjust. It has none 
of the qualities of a police regulation (21, 
p. 422) .
In addition, Bradley appealed to the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. He argued that the butcher's trade
was a "lawful employment" (21, p. 42 3) and "the keeping of a
slaughter-house is part of and incidental" to that trade 
(21, p. 422). The butcher had liberty to follow this trade, 
and thus
a law which prohibits a large class of citizens 
from adopting a lawful employment, or from 
following a lawful employment previously adopted, 
does deprive them of liberty as well as property, 
without due process of law. Their right of choice 
is a portion of their liberty; their occupation is 
their property (21, p. 423) .
The restrictions upon entry into a legitimate occupation 
constituted a violation of due process.
The differences between the majority and minority of 
the jurists in ruling on the Slaughterhouse Cases essen­
tially boiled down to this issue: Was the Louisiana grant
"an authentic exercise of the police power, carrying with it 
an incidental, questionable, but not unconstitutional grant 
of monopoly," or was it "a pretended exercise of the police 
power, a mere subterfuge for an unconstitutional grant of 
monopoly, which excluded a thousand men from part of their 
trade in order to benefit the seventeen incorporators of the
company"? (Letwin, 1979, p. 33). Strong observes that the 
majority of the Court "accepted a view of substantive due 
process as protective of property against expropriation, 
violation of which they did not find in the Louisiana law 
. . However, they "wholly rejected the concept of
substantive due process, pressed by Campbell and embraced 
most completely by Bradley, as guaranteeing freedom of 
participation in the common callings." Strong adds that the 
majority of the Court in this case did not accept the 
English common law precedent appealed to by Field and 
Bradley, for . . the majority did not repudiate the
American concept of expropriation as a denial of substantive 
due process; what it did spurn was reception in American 
constitutional law of the English view of monopoly as 
deprivation of substantive due process" (p. 62).
A new constitution was implemented in Louisiana in 
1879, which "withdrew the power of regulating slaughtering 
from the state legislature, transfering it to local authori­
ties . . (Letwin, 1979, p. 33). Moreover, the slaughter­
house monopoly was stripped of its franchise; other butchers 
were again free to follow their trade. The Crescent City 
Company challenged this action. They claimed they were 
denied "liberty and property without due process of law" 
(Hamilton, 1938, p. 177).
In Butchers* Union Co. v. Crescent City Co. (1884), the 
Supreme Court upheld the new action by the Louisiana 
legislature. Bradley argued that the privilege given to the
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seventeen butchers "was not a valid contract" to begin with 
(28, p. 588). Field agreed, and stated that "the Act, in 
creating the monopoly in an ordinary employment and busi­
ness, was to that extent against common right and void" (28, 
p. 592).
Field concurred with Justice Miller's official "opinion 
of the court" that "the Legislature cannot, by contract with 
an individual or corporation, restrain, diminish or surren­
der its power to enact laws for the preservation of the 
public health or the protection of the public morals" (28, 
p. 590) . He joined with all the other jurists in holding 
that, as Letwin notes, "although in general a legislature 
could not act so as to abrogate the rights of contract, this 
limitation did not operate with respect to the police power" 
(1979, p. 33). Moreover, Field and the rest of the Court 
"agreed that the police power did not generally or neces­
sarily come into conflict with the due-process clause" 
(1979, p. 33-34). In addition, it should be noted that Field 
did not view the union as an illegal conspiracy; on the 
other hand, he did not think the state of Louisiana should 
grant the union a favored position under the law without 
sufficient justification.
In the previous decade the Court had utilized the 
notion of a 'business affected with a public interest' in an 
important case which shaped the concept of economic regula­
tion for many years. In Munn v. Illinois (1876), the state's 
regulation of grain warehouse rates was sustained because
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this was a 'public calling.' Writing the opinion for the 
Court in the case, Chief Justice Waite quoted from the 
English common law jurist Lord Hale. In his tracts on De 
Jure Maris and De Portibus Marls. governmental regulations 
of rates and usage were justified where there existed a 
''virtual" monopoly, that is, public not private monopoly 
(Strong, p. 72) . The Court declared that grain warehousing 
was not an ordinary calling, but a 'business affected with a 
public interest' because of its significance for the 
nation's commerce. It was similar to the many 'public 
callings' that could be regulated at common law (as discus­
sed in chapter two). These included "ferries, common 
carriers, hackmen, bakers, millers, wharfingers, innkeepers, 
etc. . (24, p. 84), The Court also ruled that the grain
warehouse business was a "virtual" monopoly because the nine 
firms controlling the fourteen grain elevators in Chicago 
did not directly compete, but set prices jointly (24, 
p. 86). Due to the existence of a 'virtual* monopoly, the 
state had the power to regulate the rates charged by the 
grain warehouse.
It was a case in which "substantive due process squared 
off against private monopoly in constitutional combat"; and 
"Due process, the ancient enemy of monopoly, became a sword 
undergirding, rather than a shield undercutting, governmen­
tal power" (Strong, p. 72). An employment or business that 
was a 'virtual* or practical monopoly was subject to 
regulation by the legislative power. As Strong observes,
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this was substantive due process as "sword" against private 
monopoly (p. 72).10
In this era substantive due process was also utilized 
as shield against public monopoly in cases involving labor 
market regulation. The most significant case in this regard 
was Ylck Wo v. Hopkins (1886) , which involved a suit by an 
Oriental who was denied the right to work as a launderer. A 
San Francisco board of supervisors had denied permission to 
practice laundering to some 200 Chinese applicants. But it 
had allowed 80 non-Chinese individuals to practice the trade 
(30, p. 223). The Court noted that the board admitted the 
fact of discrimination. It was illegal discrimination 
because "no reason exists for it exists except hostility to 
the race and nationality to which the petitioners belong, 
and which in the eye of the law is not justified." The board 
thus had denied the Oriental "equal protection of the laws" 
and had violated the Fourteenth Amendment (30, p. 228) . In 
this case, the Court held that "major discrimination with 
respect to entry could suggest monopoly intent" (Strong, 
p. 63) ,
Perhaps the most famous instance in which the Supreme
10 Consistent with his other opinions, Field's dissent 
in this case stressed "the inclusiveness of due process." As 
Siegan comments, Field "maintained that the Fourteenth 
Amendment's due process clause prohibits regulation of 
prices charged by public warehouses. He interpreted the 
provision as safeguarding from government regulation a wide 
variety of economic activities." In sum, Field "denied the 
power of any legislature to fix the price that a person 
should receive for his property, regardless of what that 
property might be" (p. 54).
Court overturned a labor market regulation occurred in 1905. 
It involved a case dealing with a New York labor statute. 
Lochner, the owner of a small bakery, violated the statute 
which had limited the hours of employees in bakeries to ten 
hours a day and sixty hours a week. In Lochner v. New York. 
speaking for the majority of the Supreme Court, Justice 
Peckham argued that the right of freedom of contract between 
employer and employees was a part of the liberty of the 
individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, which a 
state might not deprive a person of without due process of 
law. He also contended that, on the other hand, . .the
State, in the legitimate exercise of its police power, has 
the right to prohibit" a contract and "it is not prevented 
from prohibiting it by the Fourteenth Amendment" (p. 827).
Justice Peckham gave several grounds by which the
statute would be justified as an exercise of the police 
power. As Letwin observes, they included three instances:
"if bakers needed special protection because they were 
unable to look after themselves, because the occupation 
threatened their health, or because the conditions of their 
work threatened the public health" (1979, p. 49). The Court 
dismissed the first and third possiblities rather quickly; 
the remaining question was whether the work of a baker 
endangered his health. Peckham's opinion was that the hours 
of bakers had little or no relation to their health:
In looking through statistics regarding all trades
and occupations, it may be true that the trade of
a baker does not appear to be as healthy as some
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other trades, and is also vastly more healthy than 
still others. To the common understanding the 
trade of a baker has never been regarded as an 
unhealthy one. Very likely physicians would not 
recommend the exercise of that or of any other 
trade as a remedy for ill health . . .  It might be 
safely affirmed that almost all occupations more 
or less affect the health (p. 829) .
Peckham claimed that "Statutes of the nature of that 
under review, limiting the hours in which grown and intel­
ligent men may labor to earn their living, are mere meddle­
some interferences with the rights of the individual . . . "  
They could only be upheld if there was "some fair ground, 
reasonable in and of itself, to say that there is a material
danger to the public health, or to the health of the 
✓
employes, if the hours of labor are not curtailed . . . "
(p. 829). Such ground was "negated by the evidence that
baking was neither absolutely nor relatively perilous" 
(Letwin, 1979, p. 50).
In Peckham's mind, as Letwin notes, the statute "could 
not rationally have been intended to protect the health of 
bakers." Thus, it must have "aimed at some other objective." 
Letwin observes that the judge 1ikened it to other recent 
laws, including those purporting "to regulate and license 
the trade of horseshoeing." Peckham argued that while such 
statutes purported to be health laws, they were in reality 
passed from other motives. This was to be inferred from the 
outcome of their implementation, not from their stated 
intention (1979, p. 50). Peckham held that the New York law 
was not a "health" measure but an unconstitutional violation
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of liberty of contract. As Letwin observes, in holding this 
opinion the judge followed the claims of Lochner's attor­
neys, who maintained that the statute was never meant to 
promote the public health but was enacted as a labor law 
alone. They produced a great deal of evidence which showed 
that "the ten-hour day had been demanded by bakers, that a 
bill had been promoted in the New York legislature by the 
secretary of the Journeymen's Bakers Union, and that the 
union continued to work for it until the act was passed in 
1896." Moreover, the legislature "included its provisions 
not in the consolidated Public Health Act" but in the New 
York Labor Law. Letwin suggests that the way Peckham saw the 
issue, "restricting all bakers to ten hours a day was a 
regulation by which the legislature tipped the scales 
against bakers who wanted to work more than ten hours . . .
which constitutionally amounted to unjust discrimination if 
not outright unfairness" (1979, p. 53).
Peckham was concerned to scrutinize carefully labor 
regulations passed under what was claimed to be the police 
power for the purpose of protecting the public health or 
welfare in order to protect economic freedom. He believed 
that labor markets were in general characterized by "liberty 
of contract" which included both parties, buyers and sellers 
of labor services. Thus, in evaluating labor market laws, 
the question will necessarily arise, as Peckham put it:
Is this a fair, reasonable and appropriate 
exercise of the police power of the State, or is 
it an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary
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interference with the right of the individual to 
his personal liberty or to enter into those 
contracts in relation to labor which may seem to 
him appropriate or necessary for the support of 
himself and his family? (p. 827).
Peckham echoed some of the same criteria which Coke had used 
to evaluate guild regulations in his allusion to the 
question of arbitrary restraint of trade and the need to 
protect the right of individuals to freely earn a liveli­
hood. In Peckham's view, these regulations were, again in 
terms of the common law, arbitrary and unreasonable 
restraints of trade in favor of certain labor groups, laws 
which masqueraded as legitimate labor market regulations.11
In sum, considering the doctrine of substantive or 
economic due process as applied by the Court to labor, it is
11 This case is also famous for its statements in 
dissent by Justice Holmes. He accused the majority of 
interpolating economic doctrine; he insisted that "a 
constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic 
theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of 
the citizen to the State or of laissez faire." He causti­
cally stated that "The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact 
Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics" (p. 832). Letwin 
observes that this was in fact a gratuitous remark; "Spencer 
was not cited as authority by anyone in the case, and Social 
Statics had no direct bearing on it" (1979, pp. 53-54). It 
missed the point to argue, as Holmes did, that "this case is 
decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the 
country does not entertain" (p. 832). Letwin comments that 
It was decided, no doubt, by justices who held 
economic views, but they decided the case on a 
well-established constitutional principle that a 
health law would be constitutional where there was 
a danger to health and unconstitutional where the 
danger to health was insubstantial (1979, p. 54). 
However, as Roche observes, Holmes "did not deny that there 
might be circumstances when the Court should reject state 
regulations as violative of due process." Roche argues that 
"Holmes was not opposed to judicial oversight per se. but he 
was ready to give the wisdom of the legislature far greater 
weight than most of his colleagues" (p. 432).
clear that the jurists of the late nineteenth century held 
to a doctrine of economic liberty balanced by public good 
considerations. They were dubious of claims that legislation 
always promoted the public good, without completely rejec­
ting every such statute. Justice Field was representative of 
the viewpoint of the majority of the Court in several 
cases. He affirmed that government's police regulations had 
to provide 'general benefits',12 so that private interests 
might not gain special privileges by imposing burdens on 
other groups, as McCurdy has observed:
. . . Field imposed limitations on the police
power not to protect individuals from enactments 
designed to 'promote . . . the general good,' but 
rather to prevent powerful socioeconomic in­
terests, through the use of corruption or the 
force of sheer numbers, from utilizing the 
legislative process as a weapon to improve their 
own position at the expense of other individual's 
'just rights' (p. 981).
Moreover, the view that business interests captured the
judiciary and procured favorable rulings does not stand up
under scrutiny. As Letwin observes, "at no time, not in 1873
or 1905 or 1922 , did the Supreme Court subscribe to the
dogma, often ascribed to it, that the Fourteenth Amendment
made property immune to all regulation" (1979, p. 34). The
question in the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century
courts revolved around the proper types of and general
12 In other cases of this era, Field wrote that, under 
the 'pretense of prescribing a police regulation,' states 
could not create monopolies in the 'ordinary trades' or 
"solve unemployment problems by forbidding Chinese workers 
to work for railroad companies" (McCurdy, pp. 980-981).
bounds to labor market regulation in light of substantive 
due process.
Field, Bradley, Peckham, and the other jurists often 
affirmed the legitimacy of different types of labor market 
regulations as proper uses of the police power. Indeed, 
Field was joined by a majority of the rest of the Court in 
sustaining "all challenged labor legislation" during his 
time on the bench, with the exception of the Lochner case 
and the Adair case (which dealt with the yellow-dog con­
tract) (Porter, p. 142) . An examination of the outworking of 
this perspective in several Supreme Court rulings on the 
yellow-dog contract and the labor injunction will add to our 
understanding of the American development of the economic 
conspiracy doctrine.
B. LABOR UNIONS AND LIBERTY OF CONTRACT
By the end of the 1880s, there was legislative and 
judicial recognition that "the long range goal of union 
organizations had always been job control; that is, the 
power to require union membership as a condition of employ­
ment" (Roche, p. 416). As a result employers began to 
increasingly respond with court injunctions. An injunction 
may be described as "a court order directing a person, and 
if necessary his associates, to refrain from pursuing a 
course of action" (Taylor and Witney, p. 26) . Taylor and 
Witney further explain that in the great majority of 
injunction cases involving labor, the protection of property
rights was the issue. When a labor union interfered "with 
the free access of an employer to labor and commodity
markets," there was "damage to property." If a strike,
picketing, or a boycott reduced "the opportunities for 
profitable operation of the business," there was "an 
injury to property" (pp. 26, 30).
Strikes, boycotts, and picketing threatened "future 
expectancies or good will," such as profits from sales to 
costumers. Rayback adds that "By 1895 the courts were 
beginning to recognize the principle that these expectancies 
were property rights with a market value." Moreover, the 
principle was being established that strikes, picketing, and 
boycotts were illegal by way of the common-law cospiracy 
doctrine, as Rayback goes on to explain: "The old doctrine 
was that conspiracy was a criminal offense because it
threatened the public. The new doctrine being developed from
the old was that conspiracy was a civil offense because it 
endangered the property involved in probable expectancies" 
(p. 205).
Again adopting the capture explanation, Roche argues
that by granting injunctions on this basis state and federal 
judges rushed "to the aid of corporations having difficul­
ties with a labor union. . . (p. 414). He contends that
when the Supreme Court ruled in favor of economic due
process ("incorporated . . . the dogma of entrepreneurial
freedom into the Fourteenth Amendment") it crippled the
efforts of the trade unions to organize (p. 420). The Court
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in general based its rulings on what Roche sees a fictionary 
equilibrium between labor and management, that is, that a 
labor contract was "the outcome of bargaining between 
equals" (p. 414).
We will consider and evaluate some of the more signifi­
cant Court decisions which used "liberty of contract" as the 
rationale for overturning state laws which forbid employers 
from requiring a person, as a condition of employment, to 
agree not to become or remain a member of a labor union.
This agreement was known as the yellow-dog contract. The 
capture perspective is inadequate to fully explain the 
Supreme Court's philosophy of regulation of this institu­
tional feature of labor markets; it is better understood in 
light of the traditional common law view of labor relations.
The first important example of Congressional action on 
the yellow-dog contract occurred after the Pullman strike of 
1894. When the Pullman Company refused to enter into collec­
tive bargaining negotiations with its workers, they struck 
the railroads. The various strikes resulted from both 
demands by railroads that workers execute yellow-dog 
contracts, and from the discharge of workers because of 
union activities.13
13 The case that followed the Pullman boycott, In re 
Debs (1895), was important "because it gave the highest 
legal sanction to the growing concept that conspiracy in 
restraint of trade was not only a criminal but a civil 
offense." Henceforth, "labor activities could be forestalled 
by civil action" (Rayback, p. 206).
Congress passed the Erdman Act (1898)14 in response to
the Pullman boycott. It set up "a voluntary arbitration
system to help prevent the violent and destructive strikes
that had occurred on the railroads" (Dickman, p. 233) .
Section 10 of this law contained two significant provisions:
it declared that the requirement of yellow-dog contracts
was now a "misdemeanor" which "shall be punished by fine
. . . and it made it unlawful for an employer to "threaten
any employee with loss of employment, or . . . unjustly
discriminate against any employee because of his membership
in a labor corporation, association, or organization" (30,
p. 428). Over twenty states in the 1880s and 1890s also
enacted laws either declaring the yellow-dog contract a
criminal offense or "prohibiting in some way or another
employers from discharging or otherwise discriminating
against employees for union membership or activity." These
measures typically relied on the police power rationale of
the laborer's unequal bargaining power (Dickman, p. 234).
In several key cases, a majority of the Supreme Court
overturned state laws prohibiting yellow-dog contracts.
Dickman notes that
The Court maintained that these laws were not a 
proper exercise of the legislature's inherent
police power, but an arbitrary Invasion of
constitutionally protected property rights and 
personal civil liberties. And because the inter­
ference was arbitrary, the court claimed that it 
was a denial of due process of law and of equal
14 The text of this act is found in United states 
Statutes at Large. 30, pp. 424-428.
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protection of the law (p. 234).
Moreover, it might, be argued, along the lines suggested by 
Taylor and Witney, that "the jurists were not impressed with 
the social and economic factors justifying the attempts of 
government to protect workers in their employment relation­
ship." The Supreme Court during the 'economic due process' 
era "was not convinced that collective bargaining was a 
needed institution in light of its definition of individual 
property rights. Economic welfare was determined by the 
manner in which property was utilized." As we will see, they 
are correct in contending that the Court believed that 
"interference with the use of property could stifle competi­
tion" and reduce the nation's economic welfare (p. 136).
In Adair v. United States (1907),15 a railroad agent 
had been convicted of violating the Erdman Act by dis­
charging an employee for belonging to a union. In its 
defense the railroad claimed that this statute was unconsti­
tutional, partly on the basis that the banning of the 
yellow-dog contract was a violation of the due process 
clause of the Fifth Amendment as an infringement of "liberty 
of contract." A majority of the Court concurred, and 
reversed the decision, stating that Congress could not 
make criminal the firing of an employee because of "his 
membership in a labor organization" (pp. 238-239).
Speaking for the majority, Justice Harlan declared that
15 Citations from this case are found in Raushenbush 
and Stein (1947).
the power to regulate labor contracts was not "within the 
power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce" (p. 240) . 
In addition, Section 10 of the Erdman Act deprived both the 
railway operators and their employees of their property 
without due process of law. Harlan contended that freedom of 
contract is a liberty guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment; the 
legislature could pass no law that deprived people of their 
freedom, including "the right to make contracts for the sale 
of one's own labor" (p. 238).
intellectual opponents of the yellow-dog contract in 
the Progressive movement objected to the court's reasoning. 
As Reynolds observes, many claimed that "the yellow-dog 
contract gave employers a psychological edge, intimidated 
some workers, deluded workers into believing that they had a 
moral obligation to abide by a contract, or that the tactic 
discredited unionists" (1984, p. 98). But the most frequent­
ly mentioned objection was that the Court assumed that there 
was already balanced power between employer and employee. A 
typical critical response to the Court was that in fact the 
employer, "who possesses infinitely greater economic power 
than the worker, could use his power to deny the worker his 
right to collective bargaining" (Taylor and Witney, p. 138). 
Following this line of reasoning, Justice Holmes dissented, 
arguing that the statute was "a very limited interference 
with freedom of contract, no more" (p. 241).
In Coppage v, Kansas (1915), a majority of the Court 
overturned the conviction under a Kansas statute of a
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railroad agent for firing "an employee who would neither
sign an agreement to withdraw from a union nor resign from
it" (Siegan, p. 122). The jurists utilized the Adair
decision as a precedent to strike down the Kansas law; as
Dickman notes, "the Court gave short shrift to the argument
that parties who are not equal in wealth, power, or position
cannot or do not bargain equally" (p. 235).
Moreover, the Court found a significant "disparity
between the standards an employer might use to choose his
employees and those a union might use to choose its
members" (Dickman, p. 235). The majority opinion proclaimed
Can it be doubted that a labor organization - a 
voluntary association of working men - has the 
inherent and constitutional right to deny member­
ship to any man who will not agree that during 
such membership he will not accept or retain 
employment in company with non-union men? Or that 
a union man has the constitutional right to 
decline proffered employment unless the employer 
will agree not to employ any nonunion man? . . .
And can there be one rule of liberty for the labor 
organization and its members, and a different and 
more restrictive rule for employers? We think not 
. . .  (p. 847).
The Court ruled that the Kansas statute held no relationship 
to the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the 
state, as it asked " . . .  what possible relation has the 
residue of the Act to the public health, safety, morals, or 
general welfare?" The Kansas law was not . . a  legitimate 
object for the exercise of the police power" (p. 846) . In 
addition, the Kansas law arbitrarily interfered with "the 
liberty of contract" of employers and employees "without due 
process of law" in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
(p. 845).16
Those who adopt the perspective of monopsony power see
both Court decisions as maintaining, if not augmenting, the
superior bargaining powers of employers. Noting that the
Court said that the railroad worker had the right not to
accept employment under yellow-dog conditions, Taylor and
Witney find the Court to have been mistakenly implying that
the employee was free to pursue other employment:
What the Court failed to consider was that the 
worker might have few alternative employment 
possibilities. Either he worked for the railroad 
or he was forced to seek another job, which might 
be an inferior alternative. The facts of economic 
life might have forced him to sign the agreement 
even though he objected vigorously to such an 
employment agreement (p. 137).
But there is another side to this market failure critique. 
For example, there is reason to believe that the Court had 
serious questions about the effectiveness of state regula­
tions which were intended to offset inequalities. The Court 
apparently thought that "the labor market itself would 
operate to support the welfare of both workers and emplo­
yers." Since both decisions came at a time when less than 9% 
of the labor force belonged to a union (Siegan, p. 123), it 
is likely that the Court was not impressed with the ability 
of organized labor to deal with unequal bargaining power
16 Holmes again dissented, stating that "In present 
conditions a workman not unnaturally may believe that only 
by belonging to a union can he secure a contract that shall 
be fair to him"; this belief ". . . may be enforced by law 
in order to establish the equality of position between the 
parties in which liberty of contract begins" (p. 848).
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even if given special privileges by law.17
These two cases stand out among a number of labor 
injunction cases in the federal and state courts involving 
unions and employers between 1880 and 1932. The courts 
enjoined unlawful union conduct because it was in restraint 
of trade under the common law. Following English precedents, 
American courts came to recognize the tort of inducing or 
procuring a breach of contract. This was the context in 
which the courts utilized the notion of 'liberty of 
contract' in evaluating labor market regulation.
As we have seen, one of the most controversial applica­
tions of the tort of interfering with contractual relations 
involved the yellow-dog contract. In a highly significant 
1917 ruling, the Supreme Court held that the labor injunc­
tion could be employed to enforce the yellow-dog contract. 
The concept of conspiracy in labor markets resurfaced in 
this case by being tied to freedom of contract.
The case was Hitchman Coal and Coke Co. v. Mitchell.18 
in which the Court sustained an injunction prohibiting the
17 There is perhaps another facet to the background to 
the court's substantive due process rulings. According to 
Nelson (1974), judges who had begun their professional 
careers during the Civil War era were influenced by the 
antislavery movement which espoused liberty of contract for 
both employer and employee. Some judges feared that unions 
would destroy a worker's right "to bestow his labor as he 
pleased," and replace slaveholders by issuing orders that 
workers were under constraint to carry out (p. 557).
18 Citations from this case and other cases and 
statutes in the remainder in this chapter are found in 
Raushenbush and Stein (1947), unless otherwise noted.
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United Mine Workers from attempting to organize non-union 
coal workers. The Hitchman company contended that such an 
effort amounted to a conspiracy to induce breach of con­
tract. Hitchman could not resolve its differences with 
striking UMW workers at one mine, so it had opened the mine 
on a non-union basis. Subsequently the UMW sought to 
organize the workers at this mine (Reynolds, 1984, p. 98;
Taylor and Witney, p. 38).
As in previous cases, the Court relied upon the notion
of equal liberty in labor markets:
Whatever may be the advantages of 'collective bar­
gaining' , it is not bargaining at all, in any just
sense, unless it is voluntary on both sides . . .
the employer is as free to make nonmembership in a 
union a condition of employment, as the working
man is free to join the union, and . . . this is a
part of the constitutional rights of personal 
liberty and private property, not to be taken away 
even by legislation, unless through some proper 
exercise of the paramount police power (pp. 100- 
101) .
In essence, the Court ruled that "by inducing a breach of
contract, the labor organization was interfering with the
right to contract." Thus the Court enjoined the union "from 
further interference" with this right (Taylor and Witney, 
p. 39) .
The critics of the Court's ruling contend that with 
this opinion "the labor movement was effectively barred from 
ever attempting to unionize workers who had signed 'yellow- 
dog* contracts"; in addition, this ruling "enshrined the 
injunction as the primary weapon against unionization" 
(Roche, p. 420). Both implications from the Court opinion
are seen to be unreasonable due to the nature of labor 
markets in the early twentieth century. For example, it is 
said that because close to 10% of manufacturing and mining 
workers were unemployed, this would cast doubt on the 
Court's declaration that the workers in this case "volun­
tarily made the agreement and desired to continue working 
under it" (p. 102). Taylor and Witney ask how in this 
situation could these contracts be signed "with the free 
assent" of the employee, when they had "no actual liberty to 
refuse to execute the agreement"? (p. 38)
There is no question that the economics of the labor 
markets of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
cannot be ignored. Did the nature of labor markets at this 
time mean that the application of common law notions was 
unrealistic? The American economic historian Don Lescohier 
has shown that in the period of 1890 to 1930 there were a 
limited number of employers in some markets due to consoli­
dations of businesses, no serious enforcement of antitrust 
regulations against employer cartels, low educational levels 
among workers, and a tremendous inflow of immigrant labor 
(pp. 293-302). As Posner observes, these factors could be 
seen to lead in turn to certain consequences. For example, 
"if many workers were ignorant of their alternative employ­
ment opportunities, wages would frequently have been below 
the competitive level." Moreover, "if many workers (espe­
cially, perhaps, older workers) would have incurred heavy 
costs by changing jobs . . . employers would have monopsony
power, and the workers might be paid less than the competi­
tive wage" (1984, p. 991).
In response, it can be said that while these conditions
may have been common, there was nonetheless also a chronic 
excess demand for labor in the period from 1870 through 
1920. Moreover, as Posner points out, "wages were much
higher in the United States than in the rest of the world";
thus, "competition for workers must have been intense and 
should have limited the extent of monopsony power in labor 
markets" (1984, pp. 991-992).
Hence it does not seem reasonable to suppose that the 
yellow dog contract was unfair to the worker due to his or 
her 'weak' economic position. Any worker who accepted such a 
contract would likely "demand some compensation for giving 
up the possibility of the gains of union membership" 
(Epstein, p. 1382). The laws struck down in Adair and 
Coppage would have denied many employees the opportunity to 
receive this compensation, as Siegan observes:
Workers who rejected joining unions and/or worked 
for employers who overestimated the union threat 
received more than they relinquished when they 
bargained away their right to join a union. Nor 
would union membership necessarily be more
materially rewarding. The Coppage Court believed 
that workers benefited from having the right to 
enter into such agreements (pp. 124-125).
Along these same lines Epstein comments that, "One has to
assume an enormous degree of incompetence or ignorance by
workers to ban the yellow dog contract on paternalistic
grounds" (p. 1382).
But this interpretation can be pushed too far by those 
who take a libertarian understanding of the common law. 
Dickman contends that the Court's decisions on state 
legislation supporting the ban of yellow-dog contracts 
appear to be put in no uncertain terms. The Court had set 
forth "seemingly impregnable, absolutist condemnations of 
interference with liberty of contract" that, nonetheless, 
"were far less than they were cracked up to be, either by 
critics or supporters," since the Court "littered its 
decisions with repeated affirmations of the legislature's 
police power." According to Dickman, the precedents of these 
cases "were a dead letter even before the New Deal began" 
(p. 236) ; leaving the door open to the legitimate exercise 
of police power meant it was also open to social engineering 
as took place in the 1930s.
But this is not an argument against the police power 
per se, unless one accepts the premises of libertarianism 
with freedom and efficiency as one's ultimate normative 
criteria. For example, Justice Harlan explained in Adair 
that, while "personal liberty, as well as . . . the right of
property, [is] guaranteed by" the Fifth Amendment,
. . n o  contract, whatever its subject-matter, can be 
sustained which the law, upon reasonable grounds, forbids as 
inconsistent with the public interests, or as hurtful to the 
public order or as detrimental to the common good . .
(p. 238). Dickman asks, "who was to say what is reasonable, 
if not the legislature acting under its police power? The
Court had in numerous cases sanctioned legislative inter­
ference with, or regulation of, contract and property 
rights, including those in employment" (p. 236). Of course 
there may be different interpretations of the police power 
with regard to various economic issues, such as discrimina­
tion against unions or monopoly grants of power to occupa­
tional associations,* this is part of the tension of the 
liberty and virtue approach.
The Adair. Coppage, and Hltchman decisions led union 
leaders and progressive intellectuals who supported the 
cause of organized labor to step up their efforts "to 
prohibit employer boycotts of union labor while providing 
virtually limitless power to unions to boycott nonunion 
labor" (Dickman, p. 237) . Thus in the AFL Reconstruction 
Program of 1918 was included a request for new laws making 
it a criminal offense for any employer to interfere with 
union efforts to organize workers (Dickman, p. 238).
The efforts of organized labor to obtain such privi­
leges bore fruit in the early 1920s. At this time many 
railroad corporations established "closed shop company 
unions maintained by a compulsory dues checkoff" (Dickman, 
p. 245). These actions were a factor in the support of labor 
for the independent LaFollete presidential campaign in 1924 
(Rayback, p. 299). The Congress elected in this campaign 
eliminated the Railway Labor Board and replaced it with the
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Railway Labor Act of 1926.19 It was drafted largely by a 
railway union attorney, Donald Richberg, who played a
controversial role during the administration of the National 
Recovery Act (Dickman, p. 245) (and became quite critical of
unions later) . As a result the law "was passed by Congress
almost in the identical form agreed on by the railroad
unions and the major railroads" (Reynolds, 1984, p. 96). The
chief purpose of the law was to establish a variety of
procedures, including mediation and voluntary arbitration, 
to reduce labor conflict in the railroads (p. 101). Railroad 
employees had a right to organize, and also freely elect
collective bargaining representatives, with whom their
employers were required to negotiate in order to settle
labor disputes (p. 102) . While it did not prohibit company
unions, nonetheless it was the first durable legislative 
help for unions (Reynolds, 1984, p. 95).
A suit was brought to test the constitutionality of the
Railway Labor Act. It was upheld by the Supreme Court in the 
Texas & New Orleans Railroad case (1930). The Court ordered 
this railroad to stop "interfering with the right of workers 
to choose whatever bargaining agents they wished" (Taylor 
and Witney, p. 144) . The Court stated that promotion of 
labor organizations and the collective bargaining process 
was of the "highest public interest," for such a procedure 
prevents "the interruption of interstate commerce by labor
19 The text of this act is found in Labor Relations and 
the Law, pp. 100-113.
disputes and strikes” (p. 245), Moreover, the Court declared
that the law did not violate the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment:
The Railway Labor Act of 192 6 does not interfere 
with the normal exercise of the right of the 
carrier to select its employees or to discharge 
them, The statute is not aimed at this right of 
the employers but at the interference with the 
right of employees to have representatives of 
their own choosing. . . [the railroad carriers] 
have no constitutional right to interfere with the 
freedom of employees in making their selections 
. . . (p. 248) .
While the Court denied it, in effect, the jurists 
overruled the Adair and Coppaae decisions, finding this 
doctrine no longer applicable in railroad disputes (Dickman, 
p. 246). The Court had begun to turn away from applying the 
common law principles of labor relations. This was even more 
evident in several Court rulings on labor legislation 
enacted during the New Deal.20 As will be seen in the next 
section, since 1937 the Supreme Court has explicitly
20 As discussed infra. later in the same court term, 
the National Labor Relations Act, which also required
employers to bargain exclusively with the union selected by 
a majority of workers, was also sustained against due 
process attack. The line of reasoning utilized by the court
in these cases was also expressed in West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish (1937), which upheld a minimum wage law for 
women. Summarizing the majority opinion of Justice Hughes, 
Siegan notes that Hughes contended that "legislative
restraints were consistent with, and not antagonistic to, 
the liberty contemplated by the due process clause"
(p. 185). Hughes essentially stated that his only concern 
was whether or not the regulation of minimum wages for women 
was reasonable: "[The legislative judgment] cannot be 
regarded as arbitrary or capricious, and that is all we have 
to decide. Even if the wisdom of the policy be regarded as 
debatable and its effect uncertain, still the legislature is 
entitled to its judgment" (p. 445).
rejected "the view that a legislature might deprive a person 
of property in a manner that justified redress in accordance 
with the due process clause" (Letwin, 1979, p. 23).21
III. LABOR CASES AND LEGISLATION IN THE 1930S
The period from around 1880 to 1930 was characterized 
by the inception and growth of modern labor unions. The 
chief preoccupation of unions during this time was the
extension of their organizations. In the political arena, we 
have seen that their efforts were largely aimed at elimina­
ting the labor injunction and in discouraging the use of the 
Sherman Act against them in the federal courts. Until the 
late 1920s, organized labor "did not fully appreciate the 
importance of co-ordinated political pressure to achieve 
their ends" (Gregory and Katz, p. 184).
The decade of the 1930s saw a significant increase in 
union political activities. Of course, this was also the era 
of the Great Depression, which had an important influence on 
attitudes toward competition in the labor market. In 
addition, this period witnessed some key changes in American 
labor law. The task of this section is to explain the labor
21 Letwin argues that substantive due process was ruled 
out "for unconvincing and indeed dangerous reasons" (1979, 
p. 23). Hayek's rule of law "requires something more than
rule by statutes rather than fiat; it requires that the 
statutes themselves should be rational and general, not
arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or discriminatory." Letwin 
believes that American courts seem to have forgotten this 
general proposition in the field of economic regulation
(1979, p. 73).
legislation and Supreme Court rulings from 1930 through 1941 
in light of the models of economic regulation. We have to 
consider the role played by each of the features mentioned 
above in undergirding both the elimination of the concept of 
conspiracy as applied to union activities and the affirma­
tion in law of the union's right to collective bargaining.
The economic rationale for labor law in this era 
stemmed in part from the increased scepticism towards the 
social utility of widespread competition among individuals. 
An increasing number of people contended that "institutional 
defects in the economic environment rather than personal 
inadequacies caused business failure, unemployment, and 
poverty" (Taylor and Witney, p. 71). As a consequence, some 
proponents of labor legislation believed that giving 
enhanced privileges to unions was the right method to raise 
living standards. While the "sole motive of unionists and 
their political allies" appeared to be "political idealism," 
the political opponents of the labor legislation were 
generally seen as "motivated by self-evident financial gain 
rather than deep ideological commitment" (Reynolds, 1984, 
P- 93).
But another explanation of this labor legislation 
relies on the notions related to interest group politics. 
Labor leaders, bureaucrats, politicians, and a minority of 
big businessmen played key roles in "fostering a major 
expansion in the labor-representation industry, a develop­
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ment that was essentially in their financial and non- 
financial interests" (Reynolds, 1984, p. 93). This explana­
tion has stronger evidence in its favor, as will be shown 
below.
A. THE NORRIS LA-GUARDIA ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT
The fact that federal courts upheld the use of 
injunctions by employers against labor beginning in 1894 
henceforth gave rise to a campaign by the AFL to engineer 
the passage of state and federal legislation "designed to 
provide protection from the equity power of the courts" 
(Taylor and Witney, p. 72). Section 20 of the Clayton 
Act had provided that the federal courts could not restrain 
employees involved in a labor dispute from "persuading 
others in a peaceful manner" to strike, nor restrain them 
from engaging in a peaceful boycott. Yet this law also 
stated the conditions for the issuance of injunctions; they 
could be "necessary to prevent irreparable injury to 
property, or to a property right, of the party making the 
application . . . "  (Sayre, pp. 145-146). Seeing this mixed 
success on the federal level, organized labor leaders pushed 
for state anti-injunction laws. During the immediate years 
following the Clayton Act, there were some states that 
enacted such legislation. However, after 1921, there were no 
such state laws passed, for the Supreme Court declared an 
Arizona anti-injunction law unconstitutional (Taylor and 
Witney, pp. 72-73).
Moreover, based on the Duplex decision of 1921, the 
principle was laid down that the restrictions on the use of 
injunctions in the Clayton Act were not operative when labor 
unions restrained trade within the meaning of the Sherman 
Act. Thus for the next decade "the antitrust laws served as 
a basis for the issuance of labor injunctions." As a result 
organized labor sought legislation "which would effectively 
limit the equity power of the courts in labor disputes and 
stand the test of constitutionality" (Taylor and Witney, 
pp. 74, 79-80).
There was significant intellectual aid to labor in its 
crusade against the use of the injunction in labor disputes. 
Felix Frankfurter and Nathan Greene wrote an influential 
treatise, The Labor Injunction (1930), which contended that 
too many judges habitually found actual or threatened 
violence and other specifically unlawful conduct where 
nothing of the sort had occurred or was imminent as the 
basis of issuing injunctions against unions. Their work 
served as the intellectual basis for labor's crusade against 
"government by injunction" (Dickman, p. 238).
This facet of the labor movement "sought to eliminate 
restraint of trade in labor disputes," and to ban employer 
discrimination against union members. As Dickman points out, 
the crusade essentially achieved its victory before the New 
Deal began. It was implemented in legislation that was the 
American analogue of the TDA, for it essentially eliminated 
restraint of trade (under the Sherman Act) "as it applied to
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unions involved in labor disputes” (p. 238).
In 1932 this legislation, known as the Norris-LaGuardia 
Federal Anti-Injunction Act, was passed by Congress and 
signed by President Hoover. Among its provisions, most 
significant were those which declared yellow-dog contracts 
unenforceable in U.S. courts (Section 3); relieved labor 
organizations from any applicability of the conspiracy 
concept as well as liability for wrongful acts under the
antitrust law (Sections 4,5); and nullified the equity 
powers of federal courts in labor disputes (Sections 7-12).
Congress justified this act by pointing to the need for 
collective bargaining. This was the theory (cast in a public 
interest rationale) for the legislation. In fact this 
statute fairly explicitly makes the market failure case for 
labor's unequal bargaining power. In Section 2, the law 
states that
. . . under prevailing economic conditions,
developed with the aid of governmental authority
for owners of property to organize in the cor­
porate and other forms of ownership association, 
the individual unorganized worker was commonly 
helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract 
and to protect his freedom of labor . . . (p. 78).
The authors of the law reasoned that a job to a worker was
infinitely more important than was a single employee to a
modern corporation, and thus there existed "no liberty of
contract between single workers and employers in modern
industry, as was assumed in litigated cases prior to
1932.” The single employee was said to have "little or no
freedom in selling his labor"; despite the fact of quitting
or preparation for better jobs, the typical individual 
worker tended to remain at his job as long as the employer 
would keep him (Taylor and Witney, p. 80).
Section 2 also argued that workers tended to increase 
their bargaining strength by forming labor unions (p. 78) . 
while an employer was not greatly affected by one worker 
leaving his employment, he would likely be vitally concerned 
when all his employees ceased working. Thus, "by organizing 
into labor unions, workers are in a better position to 
sell their services . . ." (Taylor and Witney, pp. 80-81).
By checking the power of the courts to intervene in labor 
disputes, this law facilitated the ability of labor unions 
to act as effective collective bargaining agencies and 
rectify what was perceived to be an inherent inequality 
of bargaining power between employers and employees.
In addition, the Norris-LaGuardia Act stated that 
yellow-dog contracts are not enforceable in any U.S. court. 
Since "they could no longer serve as the basis for an 
injunction," this provision nullified the effect of the 
Hitchman decision (Dickman, p. 239). section 3 of the law 
condemned the yellow-dog contract as "contrary to the public 
policy of the United States", which was support and endorse­
ment of the collective bargaining process (p. 78). While it 
did not directly outlaw this type of employment agreement, 
nonetheless this provision of the law removed an important 
obstacle in the path of unionization of the workforce.
Most significantly, this legislation abolished the
conspiracy law as applied to labor disputes. Section 4 
specified actions persons might commit "singly or in 
concert" which were exempt from the use of injunctions. 
These activities included joining a union, striking, 
threatening to strike, "causing or inducing without fraud or 
violence" anyone else to strike or otherwise break a 
yellow-dog contract, and picketing "without fraud or 
violence" (pp. 78-79). Section 5 abolished the ’conversion* 
principle. There was no longer any circumstance wherein the 
actions described in Section 4 done "in concert" would make 
the participants into an unlawful "combination or con­
spiracy” (p. 79) .
The statute did state that the worker "should be free 
to decline to associate with his fellows." However it went 
on to emphasize the role of freedom of association as a 
positive freedom. The worker seeking to organize other 
laborers should be free from employer interference:
. . . it is necessary that he have full freedom of
association, self-organization, and designation of 
representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate 
the terms and conditions of his employment, and 
that he shall be free from the interference, 
restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or 
their agents, in the designation of such represen­
tatives or in self-organization or in other 
concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection 
. . .  (p. 78) .
In this statute. Congress's intention was to provide 
unions with the benefits they had wished for under the 
Clayton Act but were denied by reason of its interpreta­
tion by the federal courts. As a result of this law, all
labor union activities were virtually eliminated from 
antitrust liability. The legislation "virtually destroyed 
the ability of private parties to secure injunctions to in­
fluence the outcome of labor disputes" (Taylor and Witney, 
pp. 95, 100); its effect ". . . was to prohibit or severely
limit federal courts from protecting employers who sought to 
exercise their rights to resist unions" (Dickman, p. 239).
It is true that this law "did not provide labor unions 
with any new rights. It merely allowed them a greater area 
in which to operate free from court control." Nonetheless, 
there is no question that "the statute was passed to promote 
the union movement and collective bargaining . . .  It is 
extremely doubtful that the growth of the union movement 
could have taken place in the absence of an effective law 
controlling the use of injunctions in labor disputes" 
(Taylor and Witney, pp. 81, 97).
In the Hutcheson v. United States case (1941), the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act was interpreted in a manner that 
allowed for secondary boycott actions by unions. This case 
centered around a jurisdictional controversy involving the 
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America and 
the International Association of Machinists. As Taylor and 
Witney note, "The dispute was over the issue of which of 
these unions was to install and dismantle machinery in the 
Anheuser-Busch property in St. Louis." The Carpenters union 
lost the job; as a result it refused to permit its members 
to work on new construction taking place on the property,
and initiated a secondary boycott against the company's beer 
(pp. 102-103).
The Supreme Court ruled that the action of the Carpen­
ters Union was protected by the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 
Justice Frankfurter, who wrote the majority opinion of the 
court, contended that this legislation "reasserted the 
purpose of the Clayton Act and broadened its terms" (Taylor 
and Witney, p. 104). The concept of "labor dispute" had been 
expanded by Congress; it now included prosecution of a union 
involved in an interunion jurisdictional dispute (p. 192). 
The controversy was a labor dispute within the meaning of 
the statute, and for this reason the courts were not permit­
ted to restrain the activities of the labor unions.
Moreover, secondary boycotts by unions in order to keep 
non-union goods or goods produced by members of other unions 
out of the market were held immune from the Sherman Act, 
provided the union acted in its self-interest and did not 
conspire with non-labor groups (pp. 192-193). The Court also 
affirmed that the statute was a disapproval of the Duplex 
case as an authoritative interpretation of Section 20 of the 
Clayton Act (p. 193). Organized labor was thus permitted to 
"undertake economic activities to expand the area of collec­
tive bargaining" (Taylor and Witney, p. 104).
B. NEW DEAL LABOR LEGISLATION AND THE SUPREME COURT
The status of labor unions in the law changed 
significantly with the Norris-LaGuardia legislation, since
it limited the power of the courts in labor disputes. How­
ever, as Taylor and Witney note, it set up no blanket 
prohibition on interferences with a union's right to engage 
in collective bargaining. Some contended that there was 
significant evidence of "practices calculated to prevent 
workers from the enjoyment of this right"; hence, it was 
believed that "the government should protect the right of 
workers to self-organization and collective bargaining"
(p. 117).
There were several arguments by which collective 
bargaining reforms were enacted during the 1930s. The 
Norris-LaGuardia Act itself gave one such rationale; as seen 
previously, it contended that individual employees were 
helpless to exercise actual freedom of contract. They must 
be organized into unions in order to increase their 
bargaining power and obtain decent wages. Dickman asserts 
that thiB notion was extended into the argument that 
"The government must guarantee the right to organize, 
strike, and bargain collectively against private discrimi­
nation by employers, in order to secure the public interest 
in promoting industrial peace by removing the cause of 
industrial strife . . . "  With the onset of the Great 
Depression in the early 1930s, it was also argued that 
public policy towards organized labor ought to promote 
stabilization of wage rates and purchasing power in order to 
prevent underconsumption and unemployment. These ideas about 
the roles of both the state and labor unions "were held by a
culturally and politically significant cross-section of 
Americans on the eve of the New Deal” (pp. 257-258).
After the election of President Roosevelt in 1932, the 
federal government implemented a variety of legislative 
measures designed to secure economic recovery. A common 
purpose of these new federal actions was to increase 
people's purchasing power so as to bolster the demand for 
goods and services. The National Industrial Recovery Act 
(NIRA) of 1933 contained the general plan of the New Deal to 
accomplish this end (Taylor and Witney, p. 146) . Under the 
authority of the executive branch of the government, this 
law set up groups of self-governing business cartels which 
executed "codes” regulating production and prices. Such an 
arrangement violated the Sherman Act, so the law provided 
that "the antitrust statutes were not to apply to parties to 
the codes" (Taylor and Witney, p. 146).
Organized labor leaders both inside and outside of 
Congress lent their support to this legislation. They 
endorsed its declaration of governmental policy "favoring 
collective bargaining between employers and employees" 
(Diclcman, p. 259). They also approved the fact that the law 
stipulated that every business code contain two provisions 
pertaining to labor. First, "each code was required to 
establish a minimum wage for the workers it covered," so as 
to increase their purchasing power (Taylor and Witney, 
p. 146). Second, Section 7(a) of the NIRA had to be included 
in each code, which provided that "employees shall have the
right to organize and bargain collectively through represen­
tatives of their own choosing, and shall be free from the 
interference, restraint, or coercion of employers . . ."in
the choice of representatives "for the purpose of collective 
bargaining" (p. 288) . The economic motivation behind this 
provision was that "legal protection of collective bar­
gaining would mean stronger unions," leading to more 
"effective pressure by labor unions for higher wages" 
(Taylor and Witney, p. 146). Section 7(a) also provided that 
"no employee and no one seeking employment shall be required 
as a condition of employment to join any company union or to 
refrain from joining, organizing, or assisting a labor 
organization of his own choosing . . ." (p. 288).
Senator Robert Wagner and his fellow members of the 
National Labor Board (NLB) read Section 7 as a mandate for 
"compulsory collective bargaining between employers and 
majority unions exercising complete and unalloyed exclusive 
bargaining power." Their view was that it was crucial "that 
collective agreements take place; no interpretation of the 
'right to organize' that interfered with this overarching 
policy goal was permissible" (Dickman, p. 261). As described 
in Gross (1974), the NLB pursued this goal through a series 
of administrative decisions that formed the basis of the 
National Labor Relations Act in 1935.
Organized labor interpreted Section 7(a) of the NIRA as 
"an invitation to form independent unions under governmental 
protection." During the next year "one third of the federa­
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tion unions increased their rolls; one-fourth doubled their 
membership. The greatest increase came in the industrial 
unions." For the first time since the heyday of the Knights 
of Labor, semiskilled and unskilled laborers began to 
organize on a large scale (Rayback, pp. 328-329).
At the same time that labor unions were responding so 
favorably to the new law, the Supreme Court declared that 
the entire statute violated the Constitution. In the case of 
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States (1935), Justice 
Hughes asserted that it was unconstitutional for Congress to 
delegate to others (in this instance the executive branch) 
its legislative functions (p. 448). He went on to state that 
"the attempt through the provisions of the Code to fix the 
hours and wages of employees . . . was not a valid exercise
of federal power . . ." (p. 449).
This decision undercut the legal basis for the actions 
of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the successor 
to the NLB. Taylor and Witney observe that "Since its 
legislative authority was swept away, the orders of the 
Board had no legal validity." This ruling ended all federal 
government protection of the employees' right to collective 
bargaining (p. 152).
After this decision Senator Wagner led a drive for more 
extensive labor relations legislation. Wagner was a strong 
proponent of "the purchasing-power doctrine of forcing up 
wage rates to end the Great Depression" (Reynolds, 1984, 
p. 125). Wagner's bill was supported by the AFL, which
conducted a campaign centered around the Section 7 (a)
provisions. Taylor and Witney emphasize the seriousness with
which the AFL pressed for new legislation:
Mass meetings to urge the passage of the Wagner 
Act were held under the sponsorship of the AFL and 
other labor groups. Organized labor made letter 
clear the character of its future political 
program. It threatened to work for the defeat of 
each and every senator or congressman who opposed 
the Wagner Act. Never before did organized labor 
conduct such an all-out campaign to urge the 
passage of a particular bill (pp. 152-153).
Why was there such a determined effort to enact Wagner's 
legislation, formally entitled the National Labor Relations 
Act (NLRA)? It was the climax of a very long struggle for a 
radical restructuring of the labor market "to favor monopo­
listic collective bargaining over competition" and indivi­
dual bargaining between employer and employee (Dickman, 
p. 266). Gregory and Katz contend that
it is fairly clear that it was the political power 
of the AF of L that achieved the enactment of the 
NLRA . . .  in passing the NLRA, Congress was doing 
its best to provide the AF of L with the means to 
promote the unlimited expansion of its member 
unions, free from the interference of employers
(p. 226).
The Wagner Act was passed in 1935. As an assertion of 
"legislative approval of the collective bargaining process," 
it was "a law passed specifically and deliberately for the 
purpose of protecting and encouraging the growth of the 
union movement" (Taylor and Witney, p. 153). This was 
not to be an end in itself, but was seen to be necessary to 
achieve the economic objectives of the legislation.
What was the economic rationale of the Wagner Act? Just
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as the Railway Labor Act, the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and the 
NIRA relied on a labor market failure justification, so 
the Wagner Act affirmed that there was an "inequality of 
bargaining power between employees" and "employers organized 
in the corporate or other forms of ownership association 
. . . " This tended to "aggravate recurrent business de­
pressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power 
of wage earners in industry . . . "  (p. 289). The statute 
further stated that "protection by law of the right of 
employees to organize and bargain collectively" promotes the 
flow of commerce "by restoring equality of bargaining power 
between employers and employees" (pp. 289-290).
One of the reasons for economic instability seen by the 
authors of this law was their belief that the non-union 
employee did not "possess actual liberty of contract" 
(p. 289). Taylor and Witney explain that
Such an employment relationship meant that an 
employer could keep for the firm a dispropor­
tionate share of its revenues under conditions of 
persistent excess supply of labor. This condition 
could contribute to and prolong a business cycle 
in the downturn stage for the purchasing power to 
buy the commodities and services turned out by 
industry might not be available (p. 157).
By implementing collective bargaining, wages would tend to
rise and there would be an increase in the effective
demand for the goods and services produced by business.22
22 Another economic rationale is seen in the fact that 
Congress linked the Wagner Act to the power of the federal 
government to regulate interstate commerce as its specific 
authority in the Constitution for this legislation. Congress 
reasoned that industrial strikes obstructed "the free flow
Thus the substance of the law centered around Sections 
7 through 10, which dealt with various aspects of the 
collective bargaining process. Section 7 guaranteed to 
employees the right to self-organization and collective 
bargaining (pp. 290-291). Section 8 stated that it was an 
unfair labor practice for an employer to "refuse to bargain 
collectively with the representatives of his employees" 
(p. 291). The National Labor Relations Board was established 
to enforce the Wagner Act. As stated in Sections 9 and 10, 
the Board was required to conduct elections in appropriate 
bargaining units. It was empowered to prevent employer 
interference with the collective bargaining rights of the 
workers covered by the law (pp. 291-293).
Initially, the NLRB had difficulty enforcing the 
provisions of the law because it was hamstrung by legal 
proceedings. As Dickman notes, "Employers resisted the Board 
mightily because they were convinced that the Wagner Act 
invaded their constitutional rights" (pp. 275-276); indeed 
there was a lot of anticipation awaiting a decision by the 
Supreme Court as to the law's constitutionality.
Labor coalitions had wrestled for years with the
of commerce" by impairing "the flow of raw materials or 
manufactured or processed goods" among the states (pp. 289- 
2 90); thus, "the reduction of the frequency of such strikes 
would promote trade among the states" (Taylor and Witney, 
p. 158). The Wagner Act aimed to eliminate the cause of such 
strikes by outlawing anti-union practices. It was also 
believed that the number of such strikes would diminish if 
in collective bargaining the contesting parties possessed 
equality in bargaining power (p. 289).
problem of Supreme Court rulings overturning favorable 
legislation. For example, as discussed previously, state and 
federal attempts to control the injunction in labor disputes 
antedated the Court's recognition of the need for control of 
this instrument. Labor union leaders felt that "This 
troublesome flaw could be remedied . . .  by seeing that the 
'right' personnel was appointed to the Court" (Gregory and 
Katz, p. 177). No doubt this influenced their support for 
Roosevelt in the 1936 election. This is implicitly acknow­
ledged by academic defenders of New Deal labor law such as 
Taylor and Witney. Recognizing the nature of judicial 
appointments as being outside the direct influence of the 
voters, they argue that "it took the cataclysmic events of 
the 1930s plus the 'court packing' threat by Roosevelt to 
change the structure of the Supreme Court to effect judicial 
approval of social legislation enacted by Congress and the 
states" (p. 134).
There is little question that the threat of Roosevelt 
to "pack" the Supreme Court, while it was in the midst of 
deliberations of several significant cases, must have had 
some influence on the sitting justices. Taylor and Witney 
contend that "Roosevelt was reluctant to permit the Court 
complete freedom to evaluate New Deal policies . . .
accordingly he proposed legislation which would have 
minimized the influence of the conservative element of the 
Supreme Court" by giving the President authority to re­
organize the court system. Even though Congress was un­
willing to follow Roosevelt's proposal, "the attempt un­
doubtedly left its mark" on the high Court jurists (p. 163).
In April 1937, right in the midst of the uproar over 
Roosevelt's request, the Supreme Court decided the NLRB v. 
Jones & Lauahlin Steel Corp. case. The Court upheld the 
Wagner Act by a slim majority of a single vote. Appealing to 
previous rulings on labor legislation, Justice Hughes spoke 
for the majority in reiterating the Court's acceptance of 
the concept of the worker's right to organize because "a 
single employee was helpless in dealing with an employer"; 
organization into unions gave workers the "opportunity to 
deal on an equality with their employer" (81, p. 909).
Hughes argued that it was proper for Congress to 
prohibit unfair labor practices such as employer inter­
ference with collective bargaining because organizational 
strikes might result in "catastrophic" effects on commerce. 
Strikes involving manufacturing could burden interstate 
commerce just as strikes involving railroads. Congress 
properly endorsed the employee's right to bargain collec­
tively because it was "necessary to protect interstate 
commerce from the paralyzing consequences of industrial war" 
(81, pp. 914) .
Hughes also asserted that the statute did not violate 
the Constitution on "due process" grounds. In regards to 
substantive due process, the Wagner Act did not deprive an 
employer of his property or liberty without due process of 
law. Labor legislation which involves "restraint for the
purpose of preventing an unjust interference" with the 
right to self-organization "cannot be considered arbitrary 
or capricious" (81, p. 915). Hughes added that "The Act does 
not compel agreements between employers and employees" 
(81, p. 916). Here the Court seemed to misunderstand the 
meaning of Section 9(a), for in requiring exclusive repre­
sentation by a union chosen by majority vote the Wagner Act 
did not truly leave the employer and individual employee 
free to negotiate with each other. In regards to procedural 
due process, the procedural provisions of the Wagner Act 
afforded employers "adequate opportunity to secure judicial 
protection against arbitrary action" by the NLFB (81, 
p. 9 17) . As Taylor and Witney note, "An employer aggrieved 
with a decision of the Board has the right to appeal to the 
courts" (p. 165).
In its ruling, the Court seemed to employ a curious 
reasoning. As DicJcman suggests, Section 9(a) of the law 
gave a power to a majority union (in relation to non-union 
workers) to exercise its exclusive bargaining rights which 
was "analagous to the power of the code authorities under 
the NIRA." Hence, "it would have been logical for the Court 
either to declare exclusive representation unconstitutional 
or to overturn its precedent in Schechter . . . " But the
Court followed neither of these routes. Instead, "it upheld 
majority rule unionism" yet still allowed its precedent to 
stand "against the delegation of government power to private
groups" (Dickman, p. 277).23
This decision represented, perhaps, the most important 
pronouncement of the Supreme Court with respect to organized 
labor. After this decision, due process and freedom of 
contract took on a new look; in Reynold's view, this 
decision "marked the judiciary's general abandonment of 
constitutional protection of economic rights and economic 
due process" (1907, p. 21).
The Court opinion sustaining the constitutionality of 
the Wagner Act gave full force to the administration by the 
NLRB of the principle of exclusive bargaining by union 
representatives of employees. Dickman notes that this was in 
line with the intentions of the authors of the New Deal 
legislation to implement compulsory collective bargaining; 
"In 1934 individual bargaining between employer and employee 
as an alternative to collective bargaining after a majority 
union was chosen had been declared a violation of 'right to 
organize.' After 1937, the NLRB declared it a violation of 
the employer's 'duty to bargain'" (p. 279).
23 The justices who dissented in this case had exhibi­
ted in previous decisions support for the beneficent effects 
of competition in the labor market. As Taylor and Witney 
describe their philosophy, they believed that "if a worker 
was dissatisfied with the conditions of work determined uni­
laterally by the employer, the worker was free to quit and 
seek employment elsewhere" (p. 161). These jurists asserted 
that the Wagner Act was unconstitutional because it granted 
the NLRB excessive power (81, p. 924) . They contended that 
the lower courts were correct in holding on the L>asis of the 
Schechter case that "the Board has no authority to regulate 
relations between employers and employees engaged in local 
production" (81, p. 924).
C. AN EVALUATION OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW
How are we to understand the labor legislation and 
Court rulings of the 1930s in light of the models of regula­
tion? It is my contention that the interest group theory 
best explains the enactment of the labor law of this era. It 
can be argued that four primary groups sought and obtained 
the enactment of the 1930's labor legislation: 
"unionists, politicians and bureaucrats, academics, and an 
influential minority of businessmen." Reynolds observes that 
"the labor representation industry" greatly expanded during 
the 1930s and 1940s, especially as compared to previous 
eras. The labor legislation of the New Deal reversed an 
ongoing contraction of this industry "by creating abundant 
profit opportunities, a reliable way to attract new 
entrants, innovation, and new competition" (Reynolds, 1984, 
p. 111). These gains were won despite the "active 
opposition" which "came from the business community, 
especially the National Association of Manufacturers, and 
portions of the legal community" (1984 , p. 123).
Considering more specifically each of the statutes 
dealing with labor in this period, it should be noted that 
the NIRA provided benefits to both business and labor groups 
by the provision of joint price fixing and minimum wages. By 
contrast, the Norr is-LaGuardia and Wagner laws had a more 
limited scope. As Reynolds observes,
The ability of unionists to interfere with trade 
. . . rests largely on immunities from damage
suits and equity relief granted by Norris-
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LaGuardia and, more important, on government 
machinery set up by the Wagner Act to impose labor 
representation and collective-bargaining proce­
dures on those employees and enterprises who would 
otherwise refuse to accept and participate with 
unions in collective bargaining. These laws have 
proven effective and durable (1984, pp. 96-97).
Each of these pieces of legislation clearly provided
tangible benefits to unions, which makes it evident why they
sought them.
Union actions were consistent with the rent-seeking
component of the interest group model. This is evident as
we consider some of the specific benefits of the laws,
especially the provisions of the Wagner Act which enhanced
the market power of labor unions. Organized labor's purpose
was achieved in a distinct way, as Dickman explains:
. . . the law did not mandate closed shops, nor
did it impose any particular bargaining unit 
standard for the American economy. The function of 
the law was, in effect, to supplement union 
power. The unions would go about organizing and 
bargaining, without having to worry overmuch about 
the power of the federal courts to bring their 
violent or otherwise unlawful activities to heel, 
while the NLR8 would systematically weaken or 
destroy employers', and nonunion workers', power 
to resist. The 'right to organize', the 'duty to 
bargain', the principle of exclusive representa­
tion by majority male, and the employer's obliga­
tion to abide by collective bargains were all 
instruments to facilitate or achieve the larger 
end: a 'cartellized' labor market. Each provision 
of the law supported, and was supported by, the 
others; the law as a whole was meant to help 
unions to organize workers, and to supplement 
unions' strike threat power (pp. 266-267).
The Wagner Act was a major means by which the government
aided union efforts towards the cartelization of the labor
supply. Instead of competing in the sale of their labor
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services by means of individual bargaining, organized 
workers were able to raise the price of their services by 
means of collective bargaining.
Sections 9 and 10 which provided a specific role for 
the NLRB in the labor market were especially significant.
The Board has performed the role of cartel enforcer, solving 
two key problems which typically break up cartels even­
tually: entry of new competitors and cheating. In regards to 
the former, Reynolds notes that "union officials are safe 
from rival unionists or employee decertification efforts for 
at least one year after a decertification vote." This 
arrangement has some significant economic implications:
This legal situation is much like the historical 
meaning of the word 'monopoly, ' a grant from the 
state of the exclusive right to sell some good. 
Exclusive bargaining is a legal barrier to entry 
in the labor representation industry, protecting 
incumbent unionists by raising the costs to rival 
unionists interested in competing for greater 
membership (1984, p. 109),
The NLRA solved the cheating problem by means of granting a
union elected by a majority of its members exclusive
bargaining rights. The employer was required to deal with
the union's representative in 'good faith.'
In sum, the Wagner Act revolutionized the American law
of labor relations. As Posner observes
The common law was displaced by a system of 
federal regulation administered by a new agency, 
the National Labor Relations Board, and designed - 
as its sponsors and supporters made clear and is 
anyway obvious from the structure of the Act - to 
foster unionization (1984, p. 992).
The establishment of the NLRB as the primary agency enfor­
cing the Wagner Acts' provisions, rather than the courts, is 
best understood in the light of this purpose of facilitating 
organization of laborers, as Posner suggests:
Since the Act turned labor policy on its head, 
transforming a public policy of fostering competi­
tive determination of wages and working conditions 
into one of fostering cartelization, it was quite 
sensible for Congress to be concerned that state 
and federal judges - who after all had largely 
fashioned the former policy - might resist its 
inversion (1984, p. 1009).
Over the twelve year period between the original Wagner 
Act and its modification by the Taft-Hartley Act, the NLRB 
administered the unfair labor practice portion of the law in 
a vigorous manner, conducted representation elections, and 
thus gave substantial support to the growth of unions. 
Taylor and Witney note that "Union membership increased from 
about 4 million in 1935 to about 16 million in 1948." More­
over, under the protection of the Wagner Act, the Congress 
of Industrial Organizations "was able to organize the mass 
production industries on an industry-wide basis." The NLRA 
also facilitated a great increase in the number of effective 
collective bargaining contracts, totaling over 50 thousand 
by the year 1946 (pp. 187-188).
As noted previously, organized labor groups were not 
the only ones to benefit from this legislation. There were 
also incentives for bureaucrats (in the form of larger 
budgets, greater authority, etc.) and academic supporters of 
organized labor (in the form of new research centers, con-
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suiting income, etc.) to actively support the enactment of
the new laws (Reynolds, 1984, pp. 126-127).
Considering the supply side of regulation, there were
economic and political changes which helped to pave the way
for the enactment of the legislation the various interest
groups sought after. Reynolds notes the role that some of
these factors played in the implementation of the changes
in the labor law by Congress in the 1930s rather than in the
1920s. He posits that it was
. . . because the cost of voting yes had been
reduced drastically for congressmen. Opponents 
from the business community had been discredited 
by the Great Depression; sympathy for unions and 
the unemployed was widespread; there was a general 
urge to 'do something'; and the Democratic party 
rolled up large electoral gains in the 1930, 1932,
and 1934 elections, for all practical purposes 
eliminating opposition from the Republican party 
(1984, p. 123).
The change in the treatment of organized labor under 
the American common law also needs to be accounted for. The 
common law in the nineteenth century and early twentieth
century evaluated labor union actions under the concept of
conspiracy in restraint of trade. By the end of the 1930s, 
the judiciary had upheld the legal enforcement of carteliza­
tion of the labor supply. The change was from the early
notion of the right of an employer to obtain labor competi­
tively, violation of which was restraint of trade, to legal 
acceptance of union efforts to restrain competition in the 
labor market.
It can be argued that prior to the late 1930s the
Supreme Court most often had ruled on labor cases consistent 
with the liberty and virtue component. Legislation which had 
been aimed at outlawing yellow dog contracts was consistent­
ly held to be an unconstitutional interference with freedom 
of contract. The Supreme Court decided that some efforts of 
state legislatures under their police powers to grant labor 
unions and other labor groups certain exclusive privileges 
violated the provisions for economic due process in the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
The liberty and virtue component does not work as well 
in explaining the approach taken by the Supreme Court in the 
latter half of the 1930s. After the 1936 election a majority 
of justices "discovered a power within the Court to reverse 
the traditional attitude of that body toward legislation 
affecting labor relations . . ." The Court abandoned the
substantive due process concept. Moreover, during the years 
after the Court's membership changed, beginning around 1940, 
"the Court showed a tendency not only to foster legislation 
directed at improving the conditions of labor and streng­
thening unions, but also to invalidate legislation aimed in 
the opposite direction" (Gregory and Katz, pp. 291-292).
We have seen that the models of economic regulation 
can enhance the economist's understanding of historical 
approaches to labor law. An application of these models to 
the Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin Acts would likely 
provide an equivalent reward to future study. Such research 
would be enhanced by a normative consideration of the
American labor law of the 1930s. Let us make a few comments
in this regard.
The advocates of the interest group model oppose the
special privileges and immunities given to unions under
the laws passed in the 19 3 0s, without opposing labor unions
themselves. For example, Epstein contends that there are
insufficient reasons for the special privileges unions
obtained with this legislation:
Where unions are necessary to foster communica­
tion, they can emerge in any voluntary situation, 
in a form less formal and less adversarial than it 
is today. The frequently cited goals of labor 
organization do not justify the essential features 
of the modern law (p. 14 06).
Reynolds also argues along the same lines. He would seek "a
wholesale repeal and abolition of all the labor legislation
supporting bilateral labor monopoly in the private and
public sectors." He recommends the abolishment of the
the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the Wagner Act (as amended). He
would favor "dismantling the associated commissions, boards,
executive orders, state laws, rulings, administrative
orders, and regulations" which have been set in place by
these statutes. This would eliminate the special immunities
for organized labor in the law: "Unions and their members
would then be treated like everyone else under ordinary
contract, tort, and criminal law" (1987, p. 31).
There is no question that in fact the Wagner Act
granted unions significant legal immunities. As Pound
observes, this law "went a long way to establish a practi­
cally complete immunity of labor organizations for torts” 
(p. 71). Section 7 of the Act guaranteed to employees the 
right "to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of 
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection” 
(p. 291). Pound notes that "There is no limit imposed upon 
the measures employed or the effects of their concerted 
activities” (p. 71) . Moreover, though the law provided in 
Section lo for the prevention of "any unfair labor practice" 
engaged in by employers (pp* 291-293) , as Pound rightly 
points out, "No provision is made defining unfair practices 
by employees or unions and no means of prevention or 
securing against them are provided" (p. 71).
An analysis based on the liberty and virtue component 
would also conclude that such immunities for unions ought to 
be reevaluated. Given the lack of empirical evidence for any 
general condition of monopsony in modern labor markets, 
there is little reason to retain the concept of labor's
disadvantage as embodied in labor law. Furthermore, while 
advocates of the interest group model argue for a return to 
the common law because they argue that "the common-law 
process tends toward efficiency in the enforcement of rights 
and hence promotes efficiency in the operation of markets" 
(Reynolds, 1987, pp. 32-33), from the standpoint of the
liberty and virtue component, there are substantive reasons
besides efficiency for a prudential reconsideration of the 
labor law, such as the way of life it promotes. Such a
reexamination might conclude that while the right to
organize is necessary, because labor combinations have 
historically often facilitated the promotion of quality 
workmanship and moral virtue, special immunities in the law 
are most often unnecessary, for they tend to encourage a 
deleterious 'aristocracy of labor.' They have historically 
been associated with violence in labor disputes (Baird, 
p. 93). We could benefit significantly from a return 
to the common law approach to labor market regulation which, 
without fostering confrontations between workers and 
employers, encourages unions in the role of fostering 
character formation.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abrahams, Gerald. Trade Unions & the Law. London: Cassell, 
1968 .
Akerlof, George A. "The Market for 'Lemons': Qualitative 
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism." Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 84 (1970): 488-500.
Anderson, Gary M. , and Tollison, Robert D. "Adam Smith's 
Analysis of Joint-Stock Companies." Journal of 
Political Economy 90 (1982): 1237-1256.
_ _ _ _  and Tollison, Robert D. "A Rent-Seeking Explanation 
of the British Factory Acts." in Neoclassical 
Political Economy: The Analysis of Rent-Seeking 
and PUP Activities. David C. Colander, ed. Cam­
bridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger, 1984.
and Shughart, William F., and Tollison, Robert D. 
"Adam Smith in the Customhouse." Journal of 
Political Economy 93 (1985): 740-759.
Appleby, Joyce Oldham. Economic Thought and Ideology in 
Seventeenth-Century England. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1978,
Ashley, sir William. An Introduction to English Economic 
History and Theory. 2 vols. New York: Augustus 
M. Kelley, 1906.
Bailyn, Bernard. Education in the Forming of American
Society. New York: Norton Library, 1972.
Baird, Charles. Opportunity or Privilege: Labor Legislation 
in America. Bowling Green, Ohio: Social Philosophy 
and Policy Center, 1984.
Baldwin, John. The Medieval Theories of the Just Price, in 
Pre-Capitalist Economic Thought. New York: Arno, 1972.
Becker, Gary S. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure 
Groups For Political Influence." Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 98 (1983): 371-400.
Becker, James. "The Corporation Spirit and Its Liberal 




Benham, Lee. "The Demand for Occupational Licensure." in 
Occupational Licensure and Regulation. Simon 
Rottenberg, ed. Washington, D.C.: American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research,
1980.
Ben-Zion, Vri, and Eytan, Zeev. "On Money, Votes, and Policy 
in a Democratic Society." Public Choice 
14 (1974): 1-10.
Berman, Edward. Labor and the Sherman Act. New York: Harper 
and Brothers, 1930.
Bernstein, Marver H. Regulating Business by Independent 
Commission. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1955.
Billet, I,eonard. "Justice, Liberty, and Economy." in Adam 
Smith and the Wealth o l  Nations: 1776-1976
Bicentennial Essavs. Fred R. Glahe, ed. Boulder:
University of Colorado Press, 1978.
Bindoff, S.T. Tudor England. Baltimore: Penguin, 1955.
. "Tne Making of the Statute of Artificers." in 
Elizabethan Government and Society. S.T. Bindoff,
J. Hurtsfield, and C.H. Williams, eds. London: Athlone, 
1961.
Blackstone, William. Commentaries on the Laws of England.
4 parts. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
[1769] 1979.
Bland, A.E., Brown, P.A., and Tawney, R.H., eds. English 
Economic History: Select Documents. London:
G. Bell and Sons, 1915.
Boudin, Louis B. "The Sherman Act and Labor Disputes: II." 
Columbia Law Review 40 (1940): 14-51.
Bowen, Catherine Drinker. The Lion and the Throne: The Life 
and Times of Sir Edward Coke f1552-16341. Boston: 
Little, Brown, and Company, 1956.
Brentano, Lujo. On the Theory and Development of Guilds. and 
the Origin of Trade-Unions. London: Trubner & Co.,
1870.
Breyer, Stephen. Regulation and Its Reform. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1982.
Brown, Henry Phelps. The Origins of Trade Union Power. 
Oxford: Clarendon, 1983.
357
Brown, Ray A. "Due Process of Law, Police Power, and the 
Supreme Court." Harvard Law Review 40 (1927):
943-968.
Bryan, James Wallace. The Development of the English Law of 
Conspiracy. New York: De Capo, [1909] 1970.
Buchanan, James. "Good Economics - Bad Law." Virginia Law 
Review 60 (1974): 483-492.
_____ . "The Justice of Natural Liberty." in Adam Smith and
the Wealth of Nations: 1776-1976 Bicentennial 
Essavs. Fred R. Glahe, ed. Boulder, University of 
Colorado Press, 1978,
Cipolla, Carlo M. Before the Industrial Revolution. 2nd 
ed. New York: W.W. Norton, 1980.
Clark, G.N. The Wealth of England from 1496 to 1760.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1947.
Clarkson, L.A. The Pre-Industrial Economy in England 1500- 
1750. London: B.T. Batsford, 1971.
Clay, C.G.A. Economic Expansion and Social Change: England
1500-1700. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1984.
Clode, Charles H. The Earlv History of the Guild of Merchant 
Tavlors. 2 parts. London: Harrison and Sons, 1888.
Coats, A.W. "Adam Smith's Conception of Self-Interest in 
Economic and Political Affairs." in Adam Smith:
Critical Assessments. John Cunningham Wood, ed. 4 
vols. London: Croon Helm, 1983.
Coke, Sir Edward. Coke1s Reports. 12 vols. London: E. &
R. Nutt & R. Gosling, 1727.
. The Institutes of the Laws of England. 4 parts.
London: E.& R. Brooke, 1797.
Cole, G.D.H. h  Short History of the British Working-Class 
Movement 1789-1947. London: George Allen & Unwin,
1948 .
______  and Filson, A.W. British Working Class Movements:
Selected Documents 1789-1875. New York: St.
Martin's, 1965.
Coleman, D.C. "Labour in the English Economy of the Seven­
teenth Century." Economic History Review. 8 (2nd 
Series 1956): 280-295.
358
______. Industry In Tudor and Stuart England. New York: Mac­
millan, 1975.
______. The Economy of England. 1450-1750. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1977.
Commons Debates. 1621. Wallace Notestein, Frances Helen
Relf, and Hartley Simpson, eds. 7 vols. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1935.
Commons, John R. and Gilmore, Eugene A., eds. A Documentary 
History of American Industrial Society. 12 vols.
New York: Russell and Russell, 1958.
Cooke, C.A. Corporation Trust and Company: An Essay in 
Legal History. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1951.
Corwin, Edward S. Liberty Against Government: The Rise. 
Flowering and Decline of g. Famous Juridical 
Concept. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1948.
Crain, W. Mark, and Tollison, Robert D. "The Executive 
Branch in the Interest Group Theory of Govern­
ment." Journal of Legal Studies 8 (1979): 555-567.
Cropsey, Joseph. Polity and Economy. The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1957.
Cunningham, William. The Growth of English Industry and 
Commerce. 3 vols. 6th ed. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1938.
Davies, Margaret Gay. The Enforcement of English Appren­
ticeship 1563-1642. Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1956.
Davis, Glenn, and Helfand, Gary D. The Uncertain Balance: 
Governmental Regulators in the Political Process.
Wayne, New Jersey: Avery Publishing Group, 1985.
Davis, John P. Corporations. 2 vols. New York: Capricorn, 
[1905] 1961.
Denzau, Arthur, and Munger, Michael C. "Legislators and 
Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get 
Represented." American Political Science Review 8 0 
(1986) : 89-106.
De Roover, Raymond. "Monopoly Theory Prior to Adam Smith: a 
Revision." Quarterly Journal of Economics 65 
(1951): 273-305.
359
_____ . "Scholastic Economics: Survival and Lasting Influence
from the Sixteenth Century to Adam Smith." Quar­
terly Journal of Economics 69 (1955): 161-190.
Derry, T.K. "The Repeal of the Apprenticeship Clauses of the 
Statute of Apprentices." Economic History Review 
3 (1931): 67-87.
Dicey, A . V . "The Combination Laws as Illustrating the
Relation Between Law and Opinion in England During
the Nineteenth Century." Harvard Law Review 17 
(1904): 511-532.
_____ ;. Lectures on the Relation Between Law and Public
Opinion in England During the Nineteenth Century. 
London: Macmillan and Co., 1905.
Dickman, Howard. Industrial Democracy in America: Ideologi­
cal Origins of National Labor Relations Policy.
La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1987.
Dobson, C.R. Masters and Journeymen: & Prehistory of
Industrial Relations 1717-1800. Totowa, New
Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1980.
Ekelund, Robert B. and Tollison, Robert. Mercant11ism as 
a Rent-Seeking Society. College Station: Texas A&M 
University Press, 1981.
_____ and Hebert, Robert F. & History of Economic Theory and 
Method. 2nd. ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983.
Elzinga, Kenneth. "The Goals of Antitrust: Other Than
Competition and Efficiency, What Else Counts?" 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 125 (1977):
1191-1211.
_____ . "The Compass of Competition for Professional
Services." in Regulating the Professions. Roger
D. Blair and Stephen Rubin, eds. Lexington, 
Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Co., 1980.
Epstein, Richard A. "A Common Law for Labor Relations: A 
Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation." Yale 
Law Journal 92 (1983): 1357-1408.
Fisher, F.J., ed. Essays in the Economic and Social History 
of Tudor and StUflrt England in Honour of R .H.
Tawney. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1961.
Freeman, Richard B. , and Medoff, James L. What Do Unions
Do? New York: Basic Books, 1984.
360
Foster, Elizabeth Reed. "The Procedure of the House of 
Commons Against Patents and Monopolies , 1621-
1624." in Conflict in  Stu art England: Essays in 
Honour of Wallace Notestein. ed. by W.A. Aiken and 
B.D. Henning. New York University Press, 1960.
Fox, Harold G. Monopolies and Patents: & Study of the 
History and Future si the Patent Monopoly.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1947.
Frankfurter, Felix, and Greene, Nathan. The Labor Injunc­
tion . New York: MacMillan, 1930. —
Friedman, Milton. Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: Univer­
sity of Chicago Press, [1962] 1982.
Furniss, Edgar S. The Position of the Laborer in a System of 
Nationalism. New York: Kelly and Millman, 1957.
Gay, Margaret R. "Aspects of Elizabethan Apprenticeship." in 
Facts and Factors in Economic History. New York: 
Augustus M. Kelley, 1967.
George, M. Dorothy. "The Combination Laws Reconsidered." 
Economic Journal Economic History Supplement 1
(1927): 214-228.
Grampp, William D. "On the History of Thought and Policy." 
American Economic Review 55 (1964): 128-135.
. "The Economists and the Combination Laws." Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 93 (1979): 501-522.
Gregg, Pauline. Black Death to Industrial Revolution: A 
Social and Economic History of England. New York: 
Barnes & Noble, 1976.
Gregory, Charles 0 and Katz, Harold A. Labor and the
Law. 3rd rev. ed. New York: W.W. Norton, 1979.
Gross, Jonathan. The Making of the National Labor Relations 
Hoard: A Study in  Economics. Politics. and
Law. Albany: State University of New York Press,
1974 .
Hamilton, Walton. "The Path of Due Process of Law." in The 
Constitution Reconsidered. rev. ed. Richard 
B. Morriss, ed. New York: Harper Torchbooks,
[1938] 1968.
. "Common Right, Due Process and Antitrust." Law and
Contemporary Problems 7 (1940): 24-41.
361
Heaton, Herbert. "Heckscher on Mercantilism." Journal of 
Political Economy. 45 (1937): 370-393.
Heckscher, Eli. Mercantilism. 2 vols. London: George Allen 
and Unwin, 1935.
Hibbert, Frances Aidan. The Influence and Development of 
English Gilds. New York: Augustus M. Kelley, [1891] 
1970.
Hill, Christopher. Intellectual Origins of the English 
Revolution. Oxford: Clarendon, 1965.
_____ . Change and Continuity in 17th-Century England.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 197 5.
Hirsch, Barry T. and Addison, John T. The Economic Analysis 
of Unions: New Approaches and Evidence. Boston:
Allen and Unwin, 1986.
Hirshleifer, Jack. "Comment." Journal of Law and Economics 
19 (1976): 241-244.
Hogan, Daniel B. "The Effectiveness of Licensing: History, 
Evidence, and Recommendations." Law and Human 
Behavior 7 (1983): 117-138.
Holderness, B .A . Pre-Industrial England: Economy and Society 
1500-1750. London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1976.
Holdsworth, Sir William. A History of English Law. 12 
vols. London: Methuen & Co., [1924] 1966.
_____ - "Industrial Combinations and the Law in the
Eighteenth Century." Minnesota Law Review 18 
(1934): 369-390.
Hollander, Samuel. The Economics of Adam Smith. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1973.
Hooper, John. Early Writings of John Hooper. Rev. Samuel 
Carr, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1843 .
Hutchison, Terrence. "Adam Smith and The Wealth of
Nations." Journal of Law and Economics 19 (1976):
507-528.
Hutt, William H. Economists and the Public: A Study of 
Competition and Opinion. London: Jonathan Cape,
1936.
362
_____ . "Misgivings and Casuistry on Strikes." in Individual
Freedom: Selected WcrKe sf william H . Hutt.
Svetozar Pejovich and David Klingaman, eds. 
Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood, 1975a.
 . Theory o£ Collective Bargaining 1930-1975.
London: institute of Economic Affairs, 1975b.
Jack, Sybil M. Trade and Industry in Tudor and Stuart 
England. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977.
Jacobs, Clyde E. Law Writers and the Courts. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1954.
Jones, Franklin. "Historical Development of the Law of 
Business Competition." Yale Law Journal 3 5 
(1926): 905-938 and Yale Law Journal 36 (1927):
351-383.
Jones, Whitney R.D. The Tudor Commonwealth 1529-1559.
London: Athlone, 197 0.
Joskow, Paul L-, and Noll, Roger G. "Regulation in Theory 
and Practice: An Overview." in Studies in Public 
Regulation. Gary Fromm, ed. Cambridge, Massachu­
setts: The MIT Press, 1981.
Journals of the House of Commons. 1547-1714. 17 vols.
London: 18 03.
Kahl, William F. The Development of London Liverv Com­
panies . Boston: Harvard Graduate School of 
Business Administration, 1960.
Kahn, Alfred E. The Economics of Regulation: Principles and 
Institutions. 2 vols. 2nd ed, Cambridge, Massachu­
setts: The MIT Press, [1970] 1988.
Kau, James B. , and Rubin, Paul H. "Self-Interest, Ideology, 
and Logrolling in Congressional Voting." Journal 
of Law and Economics 22 (1979): 365-394.
_____  and Rubin, Paul H. "The Impact of Labor Unions on the
Passage of Economic Legislation." Journal of Labor 
Research 2 (1981): 133-145.
_____  and Keenan, Donald, and Rubin, Paul H. "A General
Equilibrium Model of Congressional Voting."
Quarterly Journal of Economics 97 (1982): 271-294.
Keeler, Theodore E. "Theories of Regulation and the Deregu­
lation Movement." Public Choice 44 (1984): 103-145.
363
Keeton, George W. English Law: The Judicial Contribution■ 
Newton Abbott, England: David & Charles, 1974,
Kellett, J.R. "The Breakdown of Gild and Corporation Control 
Over the Handicraft and Retail Trade in London." 
Economic History Review 10 (2nd Series 1958):
381-394.
Kelman, Steven. "Regulation and Paternalism." Public 
Policy 29 (1981): 219-254.
. "Public Choice and Public 'Spirit.'" The Public 
Interest 87 (1987): 80-94.
Kirzner, Israel M. The Perils of Regulation: A Market- 
Process Approach. Coral Gables: Law and Economics 
Center, University of Miami School of Law, 1978.
Knafla, Louis A. Law and Politics in Jacobean England. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
Labor Relations and the Law. Jerre S. Williams, ed. 3rd 
ed. Reference Supplement. Boston: Little, Brown, 
and Co., 1965.
Landes, William M. , and Posner, Richard A. "The Independent 
Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective."
Journal of Law and Economics 18 (1975): 875-901.
Langer, Gary F. The Coming o l  Age of Political Economy, 
1815-1825. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood, 1987.
Leland, Hayne E. "Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of 
Minimum Quality Standards." Journal of Political 
Economy 87 (1979): 1328-1346.
Lescohier, Don D. "Working Conditions." in History of Labor 
in the United States . 1896-1932 . vol. 3. New
York: Macmillan, 1935.
Letwin, William. The Origins gf Scientific Economics. 
London: Methuen and Company, 1963.
. Law and Economic Policy in America. New York: 
Random House, 1965.
. "Economic Due Process in the American Constitution 
and the Rule of Law." in Liberty and the Rule of 
Law. Robert L. Cunningham, ed. College Station:
Texas A&M University Press, 1979.
364
Lewis, Thomas J. "Adam Smith: The Labor Market as the Basis 
of Natural Right." Journal of Economic Issues 11 
(1967): 21-50.
Lincoln, John A. Journey to Coercion: From Tolpuddle to 
Rookes v . Barnard. London: Institute of Economic 
Affairs, 1964.
Lipson, Ephraim. The Economic History of England. 3 vols. 
6th ed. London: Adam and Charles Black, 1961.
Little, David. Religion, Order. and Law: A Study in Pre-
Revolutionarv England. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, [1969] 1984.
Machlup, Fritz. The Political Economy fif Monopoly: Business, 
Labor and Government Policies. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press: 1952.
McChesney, Fred. "Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the 
Economic Theory of Regulation." Journal of Legal 
Studies 16 (1987): 101-118.
McCloskey, Robert G. "Economic Due Process and the Supreme 
Court: An Exhumation and Reburial." The Supreme 
Court Review (1962): 34-62.
McCulloch, J.R. The Principles of Political Economy. 4th 
ed. Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black, 1849.
McCurdy, Charles W. "Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of 
Government-Business Relations: Some Parameters of 
Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 1863-1897."
Journal of American History (61): 970-1005.
McKenzie, Richard B. and Tullock, Gordon. Modern Political 
Economy: An Introduction to Economics. New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1978.
McNulty, Paul J. The Origins and Development of Labor 
Economics. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT 
Press, 1980.
Maine, Sir Henry Sumner. Ancient Law. New York: J. Murray, 
1901.
Maitland, Frederick W., and Montague, Francis C. A Sketch of 
English Legal History. New York: The Knickerbocker
Press, 1915.
Malament, Barbara. "The 'Economic Liberalism' of Sir Edward 
Coke." Yale Law Journal 76 (1967): 1321-1358.
365
Mantoux, Paul. The Industrial Revolution In the Eighteenth 
Century: An Outline of the Beginnings of the 
Modern Factory System in England. New York: Harper 
& Row, 1961.
Marshall, Alfred. Elements of Economics of Industry.
London: Macmillan, 1892.
Marvel, Howard P. "Factory Regulation: A Reinterpretation of 
Early English Experience." Journal of Law and 
Economics 20 (1977): 379-402.
Mason, Alpheus T. Organized Labor and the Law. Reprint. New 
York: Arno, [1925] 1969.
Mathias, Peter. The First Industrial Nation: An Economic 
History of Britain 1700-1914. 2nd ed. New York:
Methuen, 1983.
Minchinton, W.E., ed. Wage Regulation in Pre-Industrial 
England. New York: Barnes and Noble, 197 2.
Misselden, Edward. Free Trade or the Means to Make Trade 
Flourish. New York: Augustus M. Kelley, [1622] 1971.
Mitchell, Wesley Clair. Types of Economic Theory: From 
Mercantilism to Institutionalism. 2 vols. Joseph 
Dorfman, ed. New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1967.
Moore, Thomas G. "The Purpose of Licensing." Journal of Law 
and Economics 4 (1961): 93-117.
Morris, Richard. Government and Labor in Early America.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1946.
Mund, Vernon. Open Markets. New York: Harper & Brothers, 
1948 .
Nef, John U. Industry and Government in France and England 
1540-1640. Philadelphia: The American Philosophi­
cal Society, 1940.
Nelson, William E. "The Impact of the Antislavery Movement 
Upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century 
America." Harvard Law Review 87 (1974): 513-566.
Noll, Roger, ed. Regulatory Policy and the Social Sciences. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.
O'Brien, D.P. J .R. Mcculloch: A Study in Classical Econo­
mics . New York: Barnes & Noble, 1970.
366
Olson, Mancur. "Comments on Sympathy and Self-Interest." in 
The Market and the State: Essays In Honour of Adam 
Smith. Thomas Wilson and Andrew S. Skinner, 
eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976.
_____ . The Rise and Decline of Nations. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1982.
Owen, Bruce and Braeutigam, Ronald. The Regulation Game: 
Strategic TJse of the Administrative Process.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger, 1978.
Palliser, D.M. The Age of Elizabeth: England under the Later 
Tudors 1547-1603. Longman: New York, 1983.
Pelling, Henry. A History of British Trade Unionism.
New York: St. Martin's, 1966.
Peltzman, Sam. "Toward a More General Theory of Regula­
tion.” Journal of Law and Economics 19 (1976):
211-240.
. "Current Developments in the Economics of Regula­
tion." in Studies in Public Regulation. Gary 
Fromm, ed. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT 
Press, 1981.
. "Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting." 
Journal of Law and Economics 27 (1984): 181-210.
Petro, Sylvestor. "Unions and the Southern Courts: Part III 
- The Conspiracy and Tort Foundations of the Labor 
Injunction." North Carolina Law Review 60 (1982):
544-629.
Phillips, Almarin, ed. Promoting Competition in Regulated 
Markets. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institu­
tion, 1975.
Pike, E . Royston. Human Documents of Adam Smith♦s Time. 
London: George Allen and Unwin, 1974.
Pocock, J.G.A. The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957.
Porter, Mary Cornelia. "That Commerce Shall Be Free: A New 
Look at the Old Laissez-Faire Court." The Supreme 
Court Review (1976): 135-159.
Posner, Richard A. "Theories of Economic Regulation." Bell 
Journal of Economics and Management Science 5 
(1974): 335-358.
367
. "Some Economics of Labor Law." University of Chicago 
Law Review 51 (1984): 988-1011.
Postan, M.M. The Medieval Economy and Society. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1972.
Pound, Roscoe. "Legal Immunities of Labor Unions." Reprint. 
Journal of Labor Research 1 (1979): 46-97.
Rae, John. Life of Adam Smith. New York: Augustus M. Kelley,
[1895] 1965.
Ramsey, Peter. Tudor Economic Problems. London: Victor 
Gollancz, 1965.
Raushenbush, Carl and Stein, Emanuel, eds. Labor Cases and 
Materials: Readings on the Relation of Government 
to Labor. New York: F.S. Crofts & Co., 1947.
Rayback, Joseph G. A History of American Labor. New York:
The Free Press, 1966.
Reynolds, Morgan O. Power and Privilege: Labor Unions in 
America. New York: Universe Books, 1984.
_____ . Making America Poorer: The Cost of Labor Law.
Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 1987.
Ricardo, David. The Works and Correspondence of David 
Ricardo. Piero Sraffa, ed., with the collaboration 
of M.H. Dobb. 11 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1951-55, 1973.
Rimlinger, Gaston. "Labor and the Government: A Comparative 
Historical Perspective." Journal of Economic 
History 37 (1977): 210-225.
Roche, John P. "Entrepreneurial Liberty and the Fourteenth 
Amendment." in American Economic History: Essays 
in Interpretation. Stanley Cohen and Forest 
G. Hill, eds. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1966.
Romer, Thomas, and Rosenthal, Howard. "Modern Political 
Economy and the Study of Regulation." in PtibT i c 
Regulation: New Perspectives on Institutions and 
Policies. Elizabeth E. Bailey, ed. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1987.
Rose, Jonathan. "Occupational Licensing: A Framework for 
Analysis." Arizona State Law Journal 1 (1979):
189-202.
368
Rottenberg, Simon, ed. Occupational Licensure and Regula­
tion. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980.
Rubin, Stephen. "The Legal Web of Professional Regula­
tion." in Regulating the Professions. Roger
D. Blair and Stephen Rubin, eds. Lexington, 
Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1980.
Rubinstein, David. "Trade Unions, Politicians and Public 
Opinion 1906-1914." in Trade Unions in British 
Politics. Ben Pimlott and Chris Cook, eds. New 
York: Longman, 1982.
Say, Jean-Baptiste. & Treatise on Political Economy. 
Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, [1827] 1863.
Sayre, Francis Bowes, ed. A Selection of Cases and Other 
Authorities on Labor Law. Cambridge, Massachu­
setts: Harvard University Press, 1923.
Scheiber, Harry N. "The Road to Munn: Eminent Domain and the 
Concept of Public Purpose in the State Courts." in 
Law in American History. Donald Fleming and 
Bernard Bailyn, eds. Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Charles Warren Center for Studies in American 
History, 1971.
Shimberg, Benjamin and Roederer, Doug. Occupational Licen­
sing: Questions a Legislator Should Ask. Lexing­
ton, Kentucky: The Council of State Governments,
1978.
Siegan, Bernard. Economic Liberties and the Constitution. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.
Smith, Adam. Lectures on Jurisprudence. R.L. Meek, D.D. 
Raphael, and P.G. Stein, eds. Indianapolis:
Liberty Classics, [1766] 1981.
_____ . An Inguirv Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth
of Nations. R.H. Campbell and A.S. Skinner, 
eds. Indianapolis: Liberty classics. [1776] 1981.
Spengler, Joseph. "Right to Work: A Backward Glance." 
Journal of Economic History 28 (1968): 171-196.
Stigler, George. "The Theory of Economic Regulation." Bell 
Journal of Economics and Management Science 2 
(1971): 3-21.
_____ . "Wealth, and Possibly Liberty." The Journal of Legal
Studies 7 (1978): 213-217.
359
_. "Comment." in Studies in Public Regulation. Gary
Fromm, ed. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT 
Press, 1981.
_. "Smith's Travels on the Ship of State." in The
Economist as Preacher and Other Essays. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1982.
Stone, Alan. Regulation and Its Alternatives. Washington, 
D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1982.
Stone, Lawrence. "State Control in Sixteenth-Century 
England." Economic History Review 17 (1947):
103-120.
Strong, Frank R. Substantive Due Process of Law: A Dichotomy 
of Sense and Nonsense. Durham: Carolina Academic 
Press, 198 6.
Tawney, R.H. "Introduction" to Thomas Wilson, A Discourse 
Upon Usury. New York: Augustus M. Kelley, [1925]
1965 .
■ Religion and the Rise of Capitalism. Gloucester, 
Mass.: Peter Smith, 1962.
_____  and Power, E., eds. Tudor Economic Documents. 3
vols. New York: Barnes & Noble, [1924] 1951.
Teichgraeber, Richard F. 1 Free Trade1 and Moral Philosophy: 
Rethinking the Sources of Adam Smith1s Wealth of 
Nations. Durham: Duke University Press, 1986.
Thompson, E.P. The Making of the English Working Class. New 
York: Vintage, 1963.
Thompson, Fred, and Jones, L.R. Regulatory Policv and 
Regulatory Practice: Regulating Better and
Regulating Less. New York: Praeger, 1982.
Thorelli, Hans B. The Federal Antitrust Policv. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1955.
Thorne, Samuel. Essays in English Legal History. London: 
Hambledon, [1957] 1985.
Thrupp, Sylvia. "Medieval Gilds Reconsidered." Journal of 
Economic History 2 (1942): 164-173.
Tollison, Robert D. "Rent Seeking: A Survey." Kyklos 35 
(1982): 575-601.
370
Travers, T.H.E. "Sir Edward Coke on Corporations." 
Unpublished paper, Yale University, 1966.
Tullock, Gordon. "The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, 
and Theft." Western Economic Journal 5 {1967):
224-232.
. "The Backward Society: Static Inefficiency, Rent 
Seeking, and the Rule of Law." in The Theory of 
Public Choice-II. J.M. Buchanan and R.D. Tollison, 
eds. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
1984 .
Twiss, Benjamin R. Lawyers and the Constitution: How 
Laissez-Faire Came to the Supreme Court.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1942.
United States Statutes at Large. 10 3 vols. Washington, D.C.
United States Supreme Court Reports. 103 vols. Lawyer's 
ed. Rochester, New York.
viner, Jacob, "Adam Smith and Laissez Faire." in Adam Smith. 
1776-1926. New York: Augustus M. Kelley, [1928]
1966.
. "The Intellectual History of Laissez Faire." Journal 
of Law and Economics 3 (1960): 45-69.
Wagner, Donald. "Coke and the Rise of Economic Liberalism." 
Economic History Review 6 (1935): 30-44.
_____ . "The Common Law and Free Enterprise: An Early Case of
Monopoly." Economic History Review 7 (1937):
217-220.
Walton, Gary D. and Ross M. Robertson. History of the 
American Economy. 5th ed. New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1983.
Webb, Sidney & Beatrice. Industrial Democracy. New York: 
Augustus M. Kelley, [1897] 1965.
West, E.G. "The Burdens of Monopoly: Classical Versus 
Neoclassical." Southern Economic Journal 44 
(1978): 829-845.
. "Adam Smith's Economics of Politics." in Adam Smith 
and Modern Political Economy. Gerald P. O'Dris- 
coll, ed. Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1979.
371
White, Stephen. Sir Edward Coke and "The Grievances of the 
Commonwealth." 1621-1628. Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 1979.
Winch, Donald. Adam Smith's Politics: An Essav in Historio­
graphic Revision. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1978.
Witte, Edwin E. "Early American Labor Cases." Yale Law
Journal 35 (1926): 825-837.
. The Government in Labor Disputes. Reprint. New 
York: Arno, [1932] 1969.
wolfson, Alan D., Trebilcock, Michael J,, and Tuohy, Carolyn 
J. "Regulating the Professions: A Theoretical 
Framework." in Occupational Licensure and Regula­
tion. Simon Rottenberg, ed. Washington, D.C.:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, 1980.
Wyman, Bruce. "The Law of the Public Callings as a Solution
of the Trust Problem." Harvard Law Review 17
(1904): 156-173.
VITA
Date of Birth: June 3, 1955
Marital Status: Married, two children
Education: Ph.D. (Economics), Louisiana State University, 
1989.
Doctoral Dissertation - "Theories of Economic Regulation and 
the Development of the Doctrine of 'Conspiracies in 
Restraint of Trade' in the Labor Market" (Dr. William F. 
Campbell, Chairman).
M.B.A. (Finance), University of Texas at Austin, 1980. 
Professional Report - "A Theory of Stock Price Determination 
in the Monetarist Framework" (Dr. Charles T. Franckle, 
Chairman).
B.A. (Economics, with honors), Texas Tech University, 1976.
Teaching Experience: Assistant Fiofessor of Economics and 
Business, Westmont College, August 1986 to Present.
Graduate Teaching Assistant, Department of Economics, 
Louisiana State University, August 1982 to July 1986.
Instructor, Department of Business, College of the Mainland, 
January 1981 to July 1982.
Graduate Teaching Assistant, Department of Finance, 
University of Texas at Austin, September 1980 to December 
1980.
Teaching Fields: History of Economic Thought, Monetary 
Economics, Financial Institutions, Antitrust Law and 
Regulation, Comparative Economic Systems.
Research Fields: Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century English 
Economic Thought, History of Christian Economic Thought, 
American Economic History, Regulation and Market Failure.
Publications: "Coke and English Puritans on Voluntary Labor 
in Early Seventeenth-Century English Economic Thought." 
Southwestern Journal of Economic Abstracts. 7 (1986).
372
373
"Sir Edward Coke and Adam Smith on Occupational Regulation: 
Economic Efficiency, Justice, and the Public Good." in 
Perspectives on the History of Economic Thought: Selected 
Papers from the History &£ Economics Society Conference. 
1987. 2 vols, Hampshire, England: Edward Elgar, 1989.
Professional Associations: American Economics Association, 
History of Economics Society, Western Economics Association, 
Southern Economics Association, Southwestern Economics 
Association, Association of Christian Economists.
Honors/Awards: Earhart Foundation Fellowship, 1983-1984.
Permanent Address: 1476 Manzanita
Carpinteria, California 93013




Fd d  S I d n e v  N o e ]1
I ' l ' o n o m l  i-ft
T h e o r i e s  o f  Ki nnomi i . '  R e g u l a t i o n  a n d  t h e  D e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t h e  
D t i e t r i n e  " C n n s p  i r a c  i e s  i n  R e s t r a i n t  o f  T r a d e "  t i t  t h e  
I a h e r  M a r k e t
Approved
f
M a jo r  F rn fe v so r  anti C h a i r m a n
D ean  of the Gradual
EXAMINING C O M M IT T E E
Date of Examination:
M.iv IS, I h K h
